Social Economics

A Humanist Capitalism?: Dissecting Andrew Yang's 2020 Presidential Platform

By Charles Wofford

One of the most delightful experiences I've had as a leftist is when I hear someone who has no apparent class consciousness express, seemingly from nowhere, a remarkably perceptive comment on class society. I recall a coworker once mentioning aloud how strange it was that we were all so frightened of the boss and what they might do to us. Entrepreneur and 2020 democratic presidential candidate Andrew Yang of Venture for America has given us another example with his essay, " Humanity is more important than money - it's time for capitalism to get an upgrade ." Throughout the article, Yang advocates for a new capitalism, based on three principles: that humanity is more important than money, that the individual person ought to be the unit of the economy rather than the dollar, and that markets exist to serve "common goals and values." In the end, Yang explicitly calls for federal government intervention to "reorganize the economy."

There is little to disagree with in Yang's moral analysis and his point that capitalism does not serve the interests of the great mass of people. To be clear, I also think the government ought to reorganize the society along more egalitarian lines. But Yang also appeals to certain widely accepted economic beliefs about the "invisible hand," and self-interest and competition being the main drivers of economic prosperity. As a result, Yang's case is subject to the same critique that Marx made of the classical political economists in his 1844 economic manuscripts :

"Political economy starts with the fact of private property; it does not explain it to us. It expresses in general, abstract formulas the material process through which private property actually passes, and these formulas it then takes for laws. It does not comprehend these laws - i.e., it does not demonstrate how they arise from the very nature of private property...Precisely because political economy does not grasp the way the movement is connected, it was possible to oppose, for instance, the doctrine of competition to the doctrine of monopoly, the doctrine of craft freedom to the doctrine of the guild..."

Translation: Like the classical political economists, Yang looks at the capitalist world in which we live and simply takes it as a natural order, whose economic tendencies are unchanging laws. Because he does not understand the historical origins of the divisions of labor that make up capitalism, Yang can posit such oxymorons as "human-centered capitalism." Because he sees capitalism in the misleading and pedantic terms of supply-and-demand ("capitalism prioritizes what the world does more of") he thinks we need to merely demand a more just world and capitalism will provide it. Yang is clearly not involved in activist spaces, otherwise he would know that people have been making radically humanist and egalitarian political demands for longer than capitalism has been around, and at no time has capitalism worked toward those goals. If Yang read up on the founding of the United States (particularly Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10), he would know that the founding fathers intended this anti-egalitarianism. If Yang read up on Hamilton, he would know that many founding fathers thought the wealthy were the natural representatives of all people - a complete fabrication and a lie.

Yang argues for a conception of markets that meet human needs rather than compelling humans to meet the needs of markets. But then he talks about how we can change our behavior as economic subjects in order for the market to provide what we want. The contradiction seems lost on him: if markets are to be geared toward human need, then the question is not an economic one, but a political one. The question is not "how do we read the market?" The real question is "how do we get the power to create a human-centric society?" And this is the conceptual problem behind Universal Basic Income (UBI). Yang justifies it in terms of the productivity it may increase. But that's not a humanist concern; it is a capitalist-economic concern.

A brief history of how capitalist relations came to be is in order. Yang never defines exactly what he means by capitalism, but he suggests that it goes back over 5,000 years, conflating it with the invention of money. In reality, the notion of capitalism - private, for-profit ownership of industry with wage labor and commodity production - has its origins in 17th-century England. Over the centuries the city dwellers of the country - who were mostly merchants and exchangers by profession - had acquired so much money, and thereby power, that they were able to appropriate common-owned land in England. Up until the late 18th century, most of the land in England was commons: the people who lived there had rights to the land irrespective of whatever the "owner" may wish to do with it. Modern concepts of ownership did not exist at the time. As the merchants in the cities grew more wealthy, they bought out or often outright stole commons land in order to expand their holdings, and thereby their businesses. By the late 18th century, the merchant class (who Marx called the bourgeoisie, which literally just means "city-dweller") had bought parliament itself, and started passing parliamentary laws of enclosure to finish up the long consolidation process the bourgeoisie had begun over 100 years prior. At the end of this process, a tiny number of people concentrated in the cities owned some 98% of the land and industry in the UK. 99% of the population, formerly peasants, had to go work for them in a condition called "employment" in order to live. They were now wage laborers: the proletariat. This is the origins of what we now call capitalism. It did not come about through some peaceful transition, but through a violent process of robbery by a small class of an entire country. One of the relevant points to take from this history is that the peasants of England did not voluntarily employ themselves to the nascent bourgeoisie. They were compelled to go to work in the factories because they had been robbed of their own access to the means of existence. None of this has anything to do with freedom; it is all coercion.

The standard economic view of money is that it is a neutral means of exchange. However, if any one individual or clique acquires enough money then they may purchase and bribe politicians, control entire fields of media coverage giving them huge influence on political opinion, and they may commit horrible crimes with impunity because no one will take them to court, etc. In short, having enough money allows one to shape society to one's whims at the expense of others. The conclusion is that money is not merely a neutral means of exchange; it is a form of social power. A society focused around human need, and not markets and money, would therefore have, at the very least, strict limits on the amount of money any individual may possess. Ideally, it would abolish money altogether. But this is against the capitalist premise, which is about free exchange.

With this in mind, where does Yang propose that the government get the power to do these things that he suggests? Short of forcibly expropriating the wealth of the 1%, I do not see a way. Money is a form of social power, and the government is a prime target for that power. Yang has perhaps watched one too many episodes of the television show The West Wing, which shows some fairy-tale vision of politics as an honest journey of visionaries. Yang does not seem to understand that it's all about accumulation of wealth, exploitation of resources, the maintenance of power systems, and that capitalist society is unavoidably inhuman.

David Harvey gives a beautiful example that may help to illustrate the point. In almost every major city in the world today one can find thousands of high-rise condominiums existing in the same city as thousands of homeless people. The condos are empty except for a few weeks of the year. They were not purchased to be lived in; they were purchased to be speculated on in a housing market. This housing market grew to such proportions and has been given such reign that it caused a housing crisis which foreclosed some 4 million people of their homes. Those who lost their homes are not the same people who speculated on the housing market; those people are doing just fine. What does this show? Precisely that the market itself, if allowed to grow unchecked, may wreak havoc upon a society; a truism that seems obvious to everyone except business people and economists.

Ok, so we control the market via government regulation. But those market owners do not like that, and they lobby against regulation laws, they bribe politicians, they control the media discourse etc. Those without the money do not have any real recourse within the system to stop them, for the system has been hijacked via its own methods. So it's not as simple as "well, the government can just do this." The government has long ago been bought out by the capitalists, and politics is treated like another market now. Since the 1980s laws have been made such that it is all but impossible to reregulate the markets. The solution is that we need a completely new system, because "capitalist democracy" (so-called) has fallen past the event horizon into unworkability. This means the end of capitalism, and it means a newer, more direct, less representational form of government. It means public banking rather than private banking. It means the redistribution of wealth from those at the top who have robbed from all of humanity through a coercive system. Interestingly, this would also entail smaller government in many ways, as institutions like the FBI, the CIA, the military industrial complex, and others which exist to protect the status quo would be abolished. Just to drive the nail home, it would also mean the abolition of the Constitution and its replacing with something more progressive and centered around human values rather than defending the "minority of the opulent." (Madison)

Harvey rightly blasts the UBI idea as simply a front for Silicon Valley to get more effective demand for their products. The UBI is really a subsidy to Silicon Valley, not a method of providing for the people. That Yang is an entrepreneur from Silicon Valley is no coincidence.

In other ways, Yang's entrepreneurial training implicates him in the very values he attempts to refute. His "human-centered capitalism" is not a society that is in fact based on human need, but simply around the old fallacy of "meritocracy." A moment's reflection would tell us that a truly humane society would not be meritocratic, as the notion of "merit" is inherently politically implicated. Who defines what counts as merit? A truly humanist society would allow all people the means to develop to their fullest potential on their own terms.

Yang proposes a "parallel economy around social good." The capitalist economy would simply allow this parallel economy to get plump before taking it over. That is exactly what the capitalists are currently doing with the internet. If Yang's "parallel economy" were possible, it wouldn't be needed.

Yang writes, "Most entrepreneurs, technologists and young people I know are chomping at the bit to work on our problems." Our problems are known and have been known for at least 100 years. The problem is capitalism: private control over the means of production. The solution is socialism: worker control over the means of production. The means are popular revolution, which is above and beyond electoral politics. Unless and until you are speaking that language, your "human-centric" ideology is just a sham. Technology will not save us on its own; otherwise it would already have done so.

Lastly is Yang's line about how a humanist capitalism could "spur unprecedented levels of social activity without spending that much." This sounds like the opposite of a humanistic anything, and very capitalist. Why? Because Yang is thinking of more ways to get people to work more, produce more, engage in more activity. But we are already working ourselves to death; American worker productivity is higher than it's ever been. We don't need new ways to do more; we need new ways to do less. We need a new concept of what it means to "contribute" to society. A humanist society would not be obsessed with getting people to work, producing, exchanging, etc. but would rather leave them in relative peace while providing at least for their basic needs. But this is what the entrepreneur is trained to do: produce more, take more risks, and be more daring in the market. In this mindset, people are inherently viewed as commodities, tools to be used by the entrepreneur. We need to move beyond capitalist thinking if we are to move beyond the problems of capitalism.

In conclusion, Mr. Yang's proposed solutions are impressive to those armchair theorists and liberals who lack a deeper understanding of capitalism. They will not solve our problems. They may, in fact, empower capitalism to appropriate even more of our lives. I cannot help but suspect that Mr. Yang is just the liberal version of Donald Trump: the "successful" businessman who is "outside the system." Yang is noticing that there is a political market for progressive values and he is attempting to cash in on it.

He is, after all, an entrepreneur. But treating politics like a business is part of our problem. We've seen how capitalism can posture around the idea of "freedom." Do we not think it could do the same with ideas like "humanism?"


Charles Wofford is an activist and PhD student in historical musicology.

Protectionism and Globalization Have the Same Mother: The Crisis of Capital

By Celso Beltrami

Has "globalization", the freedom for capital and goods to move from one end of the planet to the other, with no barriers to limit trade and its miraculous effects, come to an end? Looking at what has happened recently, it seems that an ideology, and, even more so, one of capital's ways of being has reached the end. It seems like the bourgeoisie, or at least a part of it, has taken a suit from its wardrobe which it has not worn for a long time, one which was needed for a tougher climate and the storms that come with it.

Beyond the metaphors, Trump's protectionist turn, which is carried out in a threatening manner and not just aimed at China, constitutes another turbulent factor, both from an economic point of view and that of imperialist relations on a world scale. These two aspects reflect two sides of the same coin, as Trump's economic measures serve an imperialist strategy aimed at both declared rivals and allies who are applying the brakes and who would like the embrace of the stars and stripes, which they have suffered for more than seventy years with varying degrees of enthusiasm, to be less suffocating. In fact, it is very doubtful that the custom duties will really be able to protect the entire US economy from foreign competition. Perhaps they will give a bit of respite to certain sectors of US manufacturing, like steel or aluminum, but many more will be hit and the retaliation will fall upon the workforce (but not just on them), who will probably be the victims of redundancies and worsening working conditions.

As is well-known, after decades of "globalization", it is difficult to disentangle the chain of value, since the productive process involves so many states: you just have to look at the "made in" label stuck on goods to see to what extent their constituent parts are "international". Moreover, it is no mystery that, for example, the large distribution chain Wal-Mart has many articles on its shelves which are entirely made in China. Therefore, "America First" served up in a protectionist sauce threatens to seriously reduce the enormous advantages that the tax reform launched a few months ago is generating for American firms. In this regard the mountain of money given by Trump to his capitalist accomplices is yielding the expected fruit - far from stimulating investment and therefore jobs in the so-called real economy, this mountain of money is mostly employed for speculative purposes, to strengthen financial activities aimed at realizing extra value, at collecting surplus value extorted from the productive process, without taking part in that process.

But, to return to protectionism, perhaps the duties, like those threatened on May 11th for cars produced abroad, are intended, in the creative mind of the New York property speculator, to compel the car manufacturers of Europe and Asia to increase their production in the US, but this would require large investment, more publicly-funded incentives at the expense of the taxpayers (as always) and, not last, conditions of work that approach those imposed on the working class in "offshore" destinations, like, for example, those in Mexico. Which, moreover, has already happened; however, "approaching" does not mean equal to. So as to not pose as prophets, we say that it is very probable that so-called reshoring, the repatriation of productive activity located abroad, will not go that far. But the thinking heads of the US bourgeoisie, and perhaps even those that think like Trump (who a few years ago was considered a buffoon of popular entertainment, good only for rubbish TV, but, who has been propelled to the top of the leading world power by the difficulties in political management generated by the crisis), know this. It is this, the story of the "populists", who have won power or made gains everywhere, that has made (political) life more complicated for the traditional bourgeois political class. The history of the bourgeoisie is not lacking in figures like Trump (remember Italy's national glory, the ex-cavalier Berlusconi?), starting with that Emperor of the spectacle, Louis Bonaparte, to whom Marx dedicated some of his most brilliant and magisterial works.

But, beyond the "unpredictability" of his course, the US President, even if in the badly joined-up and partly disconcerting terms which are characteristic of him, expresses a need, as was said at the beginning, to combat the economic and political growth of the US' competitors (to not say adversaries) on the world imperialist chessboard, or at least to put the brakes on their unhealthy idea (for the US) of, if not striking out on their own, at least carving out more room for autonomy vis-à-vis their burdensome ally. In short, the USA must continue to set the good and the bad tempo over the centuries and the rest should adapt themselves to it. This, however, is more and more complicated, because of the crisis that began 40 years ago, whose development has put China closer and closer to the heels of the USA and pushed the quarrelsome European bourgeoisie to undertake the difficult, and not to be taken for granted, road to a unitary pole of imperialism.

If China has become what it is, this is due in significant part to "Western" capital, including US capital, but now Chinese "market socialism" (that's not a bad joke…) is menacing the first place held by the USA in many economic sectors, starting with hi-tech manufacturing. Behind the duties on steel and aluminum, there is the real objective of harming the "Made in China 2025" [1] project, which aims at developing or accelerating the development of high technology, to make the leap from the "factory of the world" based on products with a medium or low added value (to use bourgeois terminology: in reality, value extorted from the working class), to one that uses the most advanced technologies. Although, according to certain bourgeois observers, the distance between China and the US is still large, and in certain sectors, very large, the gap is being made up very rapidly, even, it seems, more rapidly than forecast, which cannot fail to make the Yankee bourgeoisie think, no matter who their supreme representative is. Washington justifies the duties and the blocking of the acquisition of certain companies by Chinese capital as retaliation against China's supposed addiction to the theft of intellectual property. True or not - something which is anyway judged by the norms of the bourgeois world - it remains a fact that the USA cannot simply dominate the world through its brutal military superiority, which, furthermore, presupposes a military-industrial apparatus second to none, especially in the hi-tech sectors.

In some ways the same considerations can be made with respect to the protectionist "insults" announced against Europe, which, in passing, are supposed to release more money for the maintenance of NATO. Trump, obviously, didn't like Merkel's musing about the fact that Europe (guided by Germany) is starting to walk by itself, without always having to have Uncle Sam holding its hand. Clearly, in the present state of affairs, such a hypothesis is just a hypothesis, and isn't even close, but, if the US trade deficit with the EU, and, in particular, Germany, is added in, then there starts to be more than just something unpleasant.

We are in the first stages of this new phase of imperialist relations, a phase in which diplomatic formalities rooted in good manners still play a role, even if substantially as a façade (see the China-US summit of May 3rd, where practically nothing was decided), but, alongside the fake smiles, weapons are being waved, up to now only economic ones. China, in fact as a first response, has announced that it will stop importing soya from the USA (the world's biggest producer). China is the biggest importer of soya from the US. If this happens, it will hit the agricultural state of the Mid-West, which, among other things, gave majorities to Trump. Some think that the import block on soya "could cost more than 300,000 jobs in the Mid-West and Donald Trump's re-election, not withstanding his tweets on 'America First'."

It is not possible to yet know if, how and how far this protectionist battle will go forward, but it is a type of battle that has historically laid down the preconditions for the birth of acute tensions between states or for the accelerated worsening of these, to the point where they vent themselves in open conflict, no longer on the economic terrain, but on the military one. Already proxy wars have flared up in various parts of the planet and there is no guarantee that sooner or later these will not be fought in more direct fashion. The horizon is heavy with storms and it will be the course of a crisis which isn't going away to write the screenplay for the near future.


Originally published by The Internationalist .


Notes

[1] Without mentioning the new Silk Road, or rather China's geostrategic expansion to the four corners of the World, with the development of ways of communication which favour trade. And one can also add in the US's substantial trade deficit with Peking and the fact that the latter holds a portion of the US public debt that cannot be sniffed at. For more on this in English see leftcom.org

When Fellow Workers Can No Longer Find Work: A Talk with the Long-Term Unemployed

By Devon Bowers

The following is an email interview with three individuals - Cayla, Carlos, and DR - who have been long-term unemployed. They talk about how their unemployment has affected them mentally and emotionally, and also question the idea of work being so deeply linked to a person's identity.


If you are okay with saying, what led to your long-term unemployment?

Cayla: Well, my unemployment wasn't intentional. I am a student. I have been since I left the Army in 2011. I was in the middle of working on a bachelor's degree when I got sick. I am schizoaffective. So, I had to take some time off school. I'm going back in the fall. Because I am a veteran, I get free education and a monthly stipend while I attend school, so I have no need to work.

Carlos: I work in an industry that has a very short span guarantee of employee, I work in the non-profit industry (for a lack of a better term). In the region that I live, South Texas, there are a good number of nonprofits which provide invaluable services to the community. Especially for an area with high poverty rates as those on the Appalachian region and Native American reservations. Funding for non-profits is usually tied to the funding source, which can be from local to national government grants, foundations, or university grants. The life span of grants usually range from one to five years and it is never guaranteed to be refunded. So as much as I love working in community organizing or community-building work, it is very tenuous employment. The times I was unemployed was because my service to a nonprofit ended due to no more funding or end of funding of program. The longest I have been unemployed was about 10 or 11 months.

DR: In 2014, I was working as a salesperson for a regional chain furniture store. They prided themselves on being "family friendly" and their ability to work with staff in arranging or adjusting schedules as needed or in case(s) of a family emergency. This was one of the main reasons I had been so happy to be hired there, as I was the main provider of my two young daughters at the time and in the midst of a somewhat messy custody dispute.

According to their records I was laid off because my sales were below target, but at the time my sales seemed to be on par with just about everyone else's, and the only real difference I could see was that I was the most recent hire. Also, it should be pointed out that at the time I was laid off, I was just shy of the end of my 6-month trial period, after which I could begin receiving benefits. You can draw your own conclusions from this.

Not long after I was hired my ex-wife moved approximately 2,000 miles away to Tennessee, leaving both children in my care, which meant I immediately went from being the main provider to the sole provider of my daughters - something I obviously had no say in. As a newly single father I desperately needed that job, especially as I couldn't even afford childcare as things were. Once let go, I was forced to be even pickier for which jobs I applied. I could no longer accept any other job like say, fast food work, or another minimum-wage or part-time job… that is, unless they knew my story beforehand and were willing to work with me and possibly whomever else also took a chance and hired me, which was already not likely.

Plus, given the large amount of teenagers and retirees in my town who obviously made much better part-time or minimum-wage workers than me, this was basically impossible. Let me tell you, though, I tried and I tried with gusto - my children's livelihood was/is on the line. I could not and can not afford to feed my kids on California's minimum wage. California, as I'm sure you're aware, is one of the highest cost-of-living states.

So, after everything I just detailed, I enrolled in CalWorks - California's form of general assistance. I was already receiving SNAP (food stamps) while working at the furniture store, because again, even with minimum-wage plus commission, I could still not afford food for my family


I was recently listening to a podcast where it was mentioned that the idea of personhood has been linked to work, that in working, we in a way prove that we are people. What are your thoughts on that? Do you think that on a societal level that's true? Do you still accept that notion or have you moved on and if so what made you start to reject the idea that work equals personhood?

Cayla: I think our society stresses the notion of work = personhood because we are capitalist. We worship the dollar bill, therefore we associate exploitation with identity. None of us are what we do, we just spend a large part of our day being exploited. I don't need to be exploited to feel like a whole person.

Carlos: This is an idea that you can trace to most ancient societies once they settled into economic classes. The idea of what you do (work, skills) is who you are. In the United States, this is drilled into our psyche. Not only does work reflect us, but the idea that you must be working in or be employed in order to have worth as a person. Fortunately, for me, I am a red diaper baby. So my parents inculcated in me with a different view of the world than the one schools, peers, institutions promote.

DR: Let me say this, the idea that personhood equals value, with value equating work, is absurd. You are a human being, and therefore have intrinsic value because you exist. Not the kind of value that says whatever you can contribute to others equates to what kind of person you are; how you should be treated or where you fall on the scale of who matters and how much.

As Human Beings, we are entitled to life, liberty, and property. Property falls under the label of labor; labor is property. Life includes healthcare -- ALL healthcare: mental and emotional care is the upkeep of our minds and brain; teeth and eyes are parts of our physical body that need upkeep, therefore mental, emotional, dental, and eye care are included in healthcare as well. Life also includes education, childcare, food, clothes, and shelter - these all contribute to the upkeep of our lives.

Last but certainly not least, liberty is (but should be so much more than just) the choice between working to receive what is little more than a slave wage or starving. Which, in all actuality, is not liberty because the idea that it's a choice is a joke in the worst form. It is not a choice, and it is not liberty. The idea that value equals work which equates to personhood is ridiculously able-ist in construct. There are many, many people who cannot physically work… does that take away their personhood? What an archaic, classist, able-ist construct of thinking. This isn't 10,000 years ago, I believe we can and SHOULD evolve from that ancient, unreasonable, dusty form of "Social Darwinism" or "Natural Selection." We are modern humans living in the modern age. I wholeheartedly believe that "from each according to their ability to each according to their need" is fundamentally the best idea and construct for our society and ourselves.

The entire time I have been unemployed, I have not remained idle. I have labored. Intensely. I have: raised my children, grown gardens in my backyard in a step towards self-sufficiency, I have worked my family member's land and houses. I have done handiwork in my own home. I have constructed things. I have educated people, adults and children on a multitude of different issues. While on CalWorks, I have gone to college, increasing my own knowledge, and working towards my goal of becoming an educator; a history teacher to be specific. I have volunteered with countless organizations, including Western Service Workers Association (WSWA), which is a mutual aid organization and a "para-union", or a union for non-unionized workers, like IHSS workers or farmworkers. I am currently a coordinator for their food procurement program, which entails me going to different grocery markets and taking donations for our food bank, so that it may be fully stocked and ready to help other families and individuals in need. I have become an organizer for the Socialist Party USA (SPUSA).

I have organized protests against the DAPL and other such pipelines. I have organized demonstrations in support of universal healthcare. I have organized demonstrations of solidarity with the LGBT community when our local mega-church Bethel openly declared themselves a hate group in support of conversion therapy and told their congregation to vote against a CA Assembly bill which would grant members of the LGBT community greater access to healthcare and would ban the practice of billing people for conversion therapy.

I have organized food drives and supply drops for the homeless, and poor working class families like ours. Most importantly, I have been the in-home caretaker of my partner, and mother to our new son, who suffers from PTSD, agoraphobia, and panic disorder, due to rape-trauma, multiple sexual assaults, including while she was a child. I have witnessed the ableism she has encountered- from her own family no less. We are currently in the process of having me added as an official IHSS worker on payroll, which would end my long spell of unemployment. I have been working this entire time. I am proud of the work I have done.


What are some of the psychological and emotional effects that have been caused by your long-term unemployment? Have any of these problems spilled over and started affecting you physically?

Cayla: My psychological problems are likely caused by my disorder, but I experience a lot of boredom. I have a severe lack of motivation, so even the simplest chores are hard work for me. This has led to a feeling of emptiness that may be associated with a lack of direction or an existential crisis. Anyhow, not working can become boring, if you don't engage in some kind of hobby. I gained weight, though, again, this could be the schizoaffective disorder and the meds I have been put on. My health has suffered, my Dr. gave me some bad news: pre-diabetes and high cholesterol.

Carlos: It is a very stressful time when you are unemployed. Even more so when you have a family. Not only do you depend on your livelihood, but also your spouse and child. When I was unemployed, it created a lot of stress. Each & every day. Not knowing how you are going to pay for rent, utilities, etc. Knowing that you need to keep your core of living expenses to make sure you can make it through. For example, making sure you have enough to pay the phone bill so you can still be connected for interviews, etc. From when you wake up to when you go to bed and hoping you were able to survive that day. And physically it's even worse since you lose your health insurance and you're a diabetic like me. Meds become a luxury, but knowing you need them in order to get to old age.

DR: The psychological and emotional effects of my long-term unemployment have mostly been encountering the ableist and classist constructs of people in society who do believe that as long as I am not officially "working" that my life and myself are meaningless. There is anger. There is resolve and determination to keep working towards the abolition of such a cruel, self-serving, greedy, hateful society.


What are your thoughts on universal basic income? Do you think it could provide something of a cushion for you?

Cayla: I think it's a wonderful idea, though I'm unsure how effective it would be in practice. I've read that it may be ineffective because if it were ever put into place, the resulting price increases would basically render it useless. I have a pension from the VA, so I know how wonderful it can be to have a bit of security. I wish this for everyone, though I'm not sure that a universal income is the way to get there. While I have my doubts, if I were forced to choose now, I would give everyone a universal income. I want everyone to have the opportunity to pursue their passions and chase their dreams.

Carlos: Honestly, I do not know much about the movement or proposal. I have read different variations of it. As a quick reform, it sounds promising. I do think in the immediate, what we would need is to make sure we a) fund unemployment insurance better, b) make sure that the level of unemployment insurance is of a level good enough to live on while also making sure that it is there as long as the person is looking for a job, and c) making sure the unemployed have access to health insurance. I would add that as a democratic socialist, a UBI still doesn't do away with the exploitation of the capitalist on the working class. The end goal is not to reform capitalism, but to birth a new society not based on class exploitation.

DR: Universal Basic Income can only be a good idea if it does not come in place of free healthcare, or education, or food stamp benefits. As it is now, proponents of UBI are suggesting $1000. If you live in CA, you'd be lucky if that even covered rent, let alone food and other necessities. The fact that big CEO's like Mark Zuckerburg, Elon Musk, and more are starting to come around to UBI should be alarming to the working class. They say it will be necessary because automation will replace countless jobs. Now if those jobs are gone forever, you can't call UBI supplemental, it will be the only source of income for working class families to live off of. I've even seen some republicans come around to it, but saying they'd want it to replace food stamps and medical coverage. So UBI by itself, or replacing other benefits would ultimately be destructive to the working class. I would, however, support a UBI that a working class family could actually live on. Along with Universal Healthcare for all, free education from Preschool through College for all, a Job Guarantee for those who are able to work, cost of living controls, and a minimum wage that could sustain a family, and a maximum wage of no more than 10x the minimum. Then, and only then, would UBI be a good idea. Technology has the opportunity to free us from work for necessity, and could free us to working for passion and fulfillment, only if it is hands of the People, and not the elites.


What do you think of a federal job guarantee?

Cayla: Again, I'm not very well versed on the subject, but with my limited knowledge, I would choose to have one. I don't know how effective they have been in the past, but the idea sounds great. I am disabled from the Army. That's how I receive my pension. I am limited as to how many hours or how physically demanding a job can be. It would be nice if the government could guarantee me a good part-time job with benefits. As I understand it, some countries are moving to shorter work days, due to overproduction. We don't need to be constantly working and producing so much. We are destroying the planet doing it. Perhaps if the gov't guaranteed everyone work, we could limit our own work days. If everyone worked together, rather than competing, we could all work less.

Carlos: I think a federal job guarantee should be tied in closely with the aforementioned response. I do think this reform is more viable and easier for mainstream folks to understand and back. This is one proposal from Sen. Sanders, but has been around since the '70s.

DR: As I stated above a Federal Job Guarantee would be useful, if coupled with the following services; UBI, Universal healthcare for all, free education from Preschool through College for all, cost of living controls, a minimum wage that families could live on, and a maximum wage of no more than 10x the minimum. These reforms must exist together if they are to truly benefit the working class.

The Significance of Karl Marx

By Chris Wright

I often have occasion to think that, as an "intellectual," I'm very lucky to be alive at this time in history, at the end of the long evolution from Herodotus and the pre-Socratic philosophers to Chomsky and modern science. One reason for my gratitude is simply that, as I wrote long ago in a moment of youthful idealism, "the past is a kaleidoscope of cultural achievements, or rather a cornucopian buffet whose fruits I can sample-a kiwi here, a mango there-a few papayas-and then choose which are my favorite delicacies-which are healthiest, which savory and sweet-and invent my own diet tailored to my needs. History can be appropriated by each person as he chooses," I gushed, "selectively employed in the service of his self-creation. The individual can be more complete than ever in the past!" But while this Goethean ideal of enlightened self-cultivation is important, perhaps an even greater advantage of living so late in history is that, if one has an open and critical mind, it is possible to have a far more sophisticated and correct understanding of the world than before. Intellectual history is littered with egregious errors, myths and lies that have beguiled billions of minds. Two centuries after the Enlightenment, however, the spirit of rationalism and science has achieved so many victories that countless millions have been freed from the ignorance and superstition of the past.

Few thinkers deserve more credit for the liberation of the human mind than Karl Marx. Aside from the heroes of the Scientific Revolution-Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Boyle, a few others-and their philosophical 'translators'-Francis Bacon, Spinoza , Voltaire, Diderot, David Hume-hardly any come close. But not only did Marx contribute to our intellectual liberation; he also, of course, made immense contributions to the struggle for liberation from oppressive power-structures (a struggle that, indeed, is a key component of the effort to free our minds). These two major achievements amply justify the outpouring of articles on the bicentennial of his birth, and in fact, I think, call for yet another one, to consider in more depth both his significance and his shortcomings.

My focus in this article is going to be on his ideas, not on his life or his activism. He was certainly an inspiration in the latter respect, but it is his writings that are timeless. The fanatical and violent hatred they've always elicited from the enemies of human progress, the spokesmen of a power-loving, money-worshipping misanthropy , is the most eloquent proof of their value.

*

The central reason for Marx's importance and fame is, of course, that he gave us the most sophisticated elaboration of the most fundamental concept in social analysis: class.

He was far from the only thinker to emphasize class. One might even say that the primary of class verges on common sense (despite what postmodernists think-on whom, see below). In his Politics, Aristotle already interpreted society according to the divergent interests of the poor and the rich. The semi-conservative James Madison, like other Enlightenment figures, agreed, as is clear from his famous Federalist No. 10:

[T]he most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and views.

Could anything be more obvious than this proto-historical materialism?

But Marx was unique in systematically expounding this materialism and grounding it in rigorous analysis of production relations-the concept of which he practically invented, or at least self-consciously elevated to a determining status and analyzed with exhaustive thoroughness. As everyone passingly familiar with Marxism knows, such notions as exploitation, surplus, surplus-value, and class struggle acquired a quasi-scientific-which is to say exact and precisely explanatory-character in the context of Marx's investigation of production relations, in particular those of capitalism.

Given that historical materialism is often ridiculed and rejected, it isn't out of place here to give a simplified account of its basic premises, an account that shows how uncontroversial these premises ought to be. This is especially desirable in a time when even self-styled Marxists feel compelled, due to the cultural sway held by feminism and identity politics, to deny that class has priority over other variables such as gender, sexuality, and race.

The explanatory (and therefore strategic, for revolutionaries) primacy of class can be established on simple a priori grounds, quite apart from empirical sociological or historical analysis. One has only to reflect that access to resources-money, capital, technology-is of unique importance to life, being key to survival, to a high quality of life, to political power, to social and cultural influence; and access to (or control over) resources is determined ultimately by class position, one's position in the social relations of production. The owner of the means of production, i.e., the capitalist, has control over more resources than the person who owns only his labor-power, which means he is better able to influence the political process (for example by bribing politicians) and to propagate ideas and values that legitimate his dominant position and justify the subordination of others. These two broad categories of owners and workers have opposing interests, most obviously in the inverse relation between wages and profits. This antagonism of interests is the "class struggle," a struggle that need not always be explicit or conscious but is constantly present on an implicit level, indeed is constitutive of the relationship between capitalist and worker. The class struggle-that is, the structure and functioning of economic institutions-can be called the foundation of society, the dynamic around which society tends to revolve, because, again, it is through class that institutions and actors acquire the means to influence social life.

These simple, commonsense reflections suffice to establish the meaning and validity of Marx's infamous, "simplistic," "reductionist" contrast between the economic "base" and the political, cultural, and ideological "superstructure." Maybe his language here was misleading and metaphorical. He was only sketching his historical materialism in a short preface, the Preface to his Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and could hardly have foreseen that generations of academic sophists would later pore over his words, pick at them, cavil at them, fling casuistries at each other until a vast scholarly literature had been produced debating Marxian "economic determinism." As if the relative primacy of economic institutions-which is to say relations of production, class structures-that are, by definition, directly involved in the accumulation and distribution of material resources and thus power, isn't anything but a truism, and can be seen as such on the basis of such elementary reasoning as in the preceding paragraph.

The Communist Manifesto's epoch-making claim, therefore, that the history of all complex societies has been the history of class struggle is not ridiculous or oversimplifying, contrary to what has been claimed a thousand times in scholarship and the popular press; it is, broadly speaking, accurate, if "class struggle" is understood to mean not only explicit conflict between classes (and class-subgroups; see the above quotation from Madison) but also the implicit antagonism of interests between classes, which constitutes the structure of economic institutions. Particular class structures/dynamics, together with the level of development of productive forces they determine and are expressed through, provide the basic institutional context around which a given politics and culture are fleshed out.[1]

Thus, to argue, as feminists, queer theorists, and confused Marxists like Peter Frase are wont to, that class is of no special significance compared to group identities like gender and race is quite mistaken. Neither feminism nor anti-racist activism targets such institutional structures as the relation between capitalist and worker; or, to the extent that these movements do, they become class-oriented and lose their character as strictly feminist or anti-racist. If you want a society of economic democracy, in which economic exploitation, "income inequality," mass poverty, imperialism, militarism, ecological destruction, and privatization of resources are done away with, the goal of your activism has to be to abolish capitalist institutions-the omnipotence of the profit motive, the dictatorial control of capitalist over worker-and not simply misogyny or vicious treatment of minorities. These issues are important, but only anti-capitalism is properly revolutionary, involving a total transformation of society (because a transformation of the very structures of institutions, not merely who is allowed into the privileged positions).

Moreover, as plenty of feminists and Black Lives Matter activists well know, you can't possibly achieve the maximal goals that identity politics pursues while remaining in a capitalist society. Most or all of the oppression that minorities experience is precisely a result of capitalism's perverse incentives, and of the concentration of power in a tiny greedy elite. This ties into the fact that, since the time of Marx and Engels, a colossal amount of empirical scholarship has shown the power of the Marxian analytical framework. (I summarize some of the scholarship here.) Even ideologies of race, nation, and gender are largely a product of class-of slavery and its aftermath in the U.S., of European imperialism , of attempts by the Victorian upper class to control working-class women's lives and sexuality.

In the case of religious fundamentalism in the U.S., for example, historians have shown that since early in the twentieth century, and especially since the 1970s, conservative sectors of the business community have subsidized right-wing evangelical Christianity in order to beat back unionism and liberalism, which have been tarred and feathered as communist, socialist, godless, etc. More generally, for centuries the ruling class has propagated divisive ideas of race, religion, nationality, and gender in order, partly, to fragment the working class and so control it more easily and effectively. By now, leftists see such arguments, rightly, as truisms.

On the other hand, most intellectuals, including academically trained leftists, also see Marxian "economistic" arguments as overly simplifying and reductivist. Mainstream intellectuals in particular consider it a sign of unsophistication that Marxism tends to abstract from complicating factors and isolate the class variable. "Reality is complicated!" they shout in unison. "You also have to take into account the play of cultural discourses, the diversity of subjective identities, etc. Class isn't everything!" Somehow it is considered an intellectual vice, and not a virtue, to simplify for the sake of understanding. It's true, after all, that the world is complex; and so in order to understand it one has to simplify it a bit, explain it in terms of general principles. As in the natural sciences, a single principle can never explain everything; but, if it is the right one, it can explain a great deal.

Noam Chomsky, with characteristic eloquence, defended this point in an interview in 1990 . I might as well quote him at length. Since he is in essence just an idiosyncratic and anarchistic Marxist - in fact one of the most consistent Marxists of all , despite his rejection of the label-his arguments are exactly those to which every thoughtful materialist is committed.

Question: But you're often accused of being too black-and-white in your analysis, of dividing the world into evil élites and subjugated or mystified masses. Does your approach ever get in the way of basic accuracy?

Answer: I do approach these questions a bit differently than historical scholarship generally does. But that's because humanistic scholarship tends to be irrational. I approach these questions pretty much as I would approach my scientific work. In that work-in any kind of rational inquiry-what you try to do is identify major factors, understand them, and see what you can explain in terms of them. Then you always find a periphery of unexplained phenomena, and you introduce minor factors and try to account for those phenomena. What you're always searching for is the guiding principles: the major effects, the dominant structures. In order to do that, you set aside a lot of tenth-order effects. Now, that's not the method of humanistic scholarship, which tends in a different direction. Humanistic scholarship-I'm caricaturing a bit for simplicity-says every fact is precious; you put it alongside every other fact. That's a sure way to guarantee you'll never understand anything. If you tried to do that in the sciences, you wouldn't even reach the level of Babylonian astronomy.

I don't think the [social] field of inquiry is fundamentally different in this respect. Take what we were talking about before: institutional facts. Those are major factors. There are also minor factors, like individual differences, microbureaucratic interactions, or what the President's wife told him at breakfast. These are all tenth-order effects. I don't pay much attention to them, because I think they all operate within a fairly narrow range which is predictable by the major factors. I think you can isolate those major factors. You can document them quite well; you can illustrate them in historical practice; you can verify them. If you read the documentary record critically, you can find them very prominently displayed, and you can find that other things follow from them. There's also a range of nuances and minor effects, and I think these two categories should be very sharply separated.

When you proceed in this fashion, it might give someone who's not used to such an approach the sense of black-and-white, of drawing lines too clearly. It purposely does that. That's what is involved when you try to identify major, dominant effects and put them in their proper place.

But instead of trying to systematically explain society by starting from a general principle and evaluating its utility, then proceeding to secondary factors like race or sex and using them to elucidate phenomena not explained by the dominant principle, the approach that tends to prevail in the humanities and social sciences is a sort of methodological relativism. In historical scholarship , for example, especially social history, you're generally expected just to describe things from different perspectives. You should discuss gender, and race, and class, and various relevant "discourses," and how people identified themselves, how they reacted to given developments, and perhaps issues of sexuality and the body, etc. Some knowledge may be gained, but often this work amounts merely to unanchored description for its own sake - description from an idealist perspective , not a materialist one. The anti-Marxian idealism is an essential quality of this mainstream writing, and is quite dominant in the humanities and social sciences.

*

On the bicentennial of Marx's birth, it's intellectually shameful (though predictable) that idealism is still the primary tendency in scholarship and journalism. I've criticized bourgeois idealism elsewhere, for examplehere,here, and here, but it is worth discussing again because of how dominant it is, and how damaging.

What idealism means, of course, is an emphasis on ideas or consciousness over material factors, whether "social being"-economic conditions, institutional imperatives (the need to follow the rules of given social structures), interests as opposed to ideals or ideologies, and the necessities of biological survival-or, in the context of philosophical idealism such as that of Berkeley, Schopenhauer, and the logical positivists , the existence of mind-independent matter. Philosophical idealism, while no longer as respectable as it once was, persists in forms less honest and direct than that of Berkeley, especially in postmodernist circles and schools of thought influenced by the Continental tradition (e.g., phenomenology) and even American pragmatism. More important, though, is the type of idealism that disparages class and social being.

This idealism comes in different varieties. Its most common manifestation is the uncritical tendency to take seriously the rhetoric and self-interpretations of the powerful. As Marx understood and Chomsky likes to point out, humans are expert at deceiving themselves, at attributing noble motives to themselves when baser desires of power, money, recognition, institutional pressures, etc. are what really motivate them. The powerful in particular love to clothe themselves in the garb of moral grandeur. They insist that they're invading a country in order to protect human rights or spread democracy and freedom; that they're expanding prisons to keep communities safer, and deporting immigrants to keep the country safe; that by cutting social welfare programs they're trying honestly to reduce the budget deficit, and by cutting taxes on the rich they only want to stimulate the economy. When journalists and intellectuals take seriously such threadbare, predictable rhetoric, they're disregarding the lesson of Marxism that individuals aren't even the main actors here in the first place; institutions are. The individuals can tell themselves whatever stories they want about their own behavior, but the primary causes of the design and implementation of political policies are institutional dynamics, power dynamics. Political and economic actors represent certain interests, and they act in accordance with those interests. That's all.

The example I like to give of academics' naïve idealism is Odd Arne Westad's celebrated book The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times , which won the Bancroft Prize in 2006. Its thesis is that "the United States and the Soviet Union were driven to intervene in the Third World by the ideologies inherent in their politics. Locked in conflict over the very concept of European modernity…Washington and Moscow needed to change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies…" It's a remarkably unsophisticated argument, which is backed up by remarkably unsophisticated invocations of policymakers' rhetoric. It rises to the level of farce. At one point, after quoting a State Department spokesman on George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq-"I believe in freedom as a right, a responsibility, a destiny… The United States stands for freedom, defends freedom, advances freedom, and enlarges the community of freedom because we think it is the right thing to do"-Westad states ingenuously that the Iraq invasion was a perfect example of how "freedom and security have been, and remain today, the driving forces of U.S. foreign policy." As if gigantic government bureaucracies are moved to act out of pure altruism!

Related to this idealism is the self-justifying faith of liberal intellectuals that ideals truly matter in the rough-and-tumble of political and economic life. John Maynard Keynes gave a classic exposition of this faith in the last paragraph of his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, which has stroked the egos of academics for generations:

…[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. [?!] Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas… [S]oon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.

These are backward fantasies, which grow out of a poor sociological imagination. The point is that the ideas that come to be accepted as gospel are those useful to vested interests, which are the entities that have the resources to propagate them. (In the typically bourgeois language of impersonal 'automaticity,' Keynes refers to "the gradual encroachment of ideas." But ideas don't spread of themselves; they are propagated and subsidized by people and institutions whose interests they express. This is why "the ruling ideas of a society are the ideas of its ruling class," which has the resources to spread them.)

Keynes' famous book itself contributed not at all to the so-called Keynesian policies of FDR and Hitler and others; in fact, such policies were already being pursued by Baron Haussmann in France in the 1850s, because they were useful in giving employment to thousands of workers and raising aggregate demand and thereby economic growth. Is it likely that had Keynes not published his book in 1936, the U.S. government during and after World War II would have pursued radically different, un-Keynesian economic policies? Hardly. Because they were useful to vested interests, those policies were bound to be adopted-and economists, tools of the ruling class, were bound to systematize their theoretical rationalizations sooner or later.

But liberals continue to believe that if only they can convince politicians of their intellectual or moral errors, they can persuade them to change their policies. Paul Krugman's columns in the New York Times provide amusing examples of this sort of pleading. It's telling that he always ends his analysis right before getting to a realistic proposal: he scrupulously avoids saying that for his ideas to be enacted it's necessary to revive unions on a systemic scale, or to organize radical and disruptive social movements to alter the skewed class structure. Such an analytic move would require that he step into the realm of Marxism, abandoning his liberal idealism, and would thus bar him from being published in the New York Times.

If I may be permitted to give another example of liberal idealism: I recall reading a few years ago Richard Goodwin's popular book Remembering America: A Voice from the Sixties (1988), a memoir of his time as speechwriter and adviser to John F. Kennedy. It's a flabby centrist whitewashing of history, a nostalgic apotheosis of Kennedy and America and democracy, etc., not worth reading on its merits. However- to quote myself-

The book is enlightening as a window into the mind of the Harvard liberal, revelatory of the sort of thoughts this person has, his worldview. Liberalism from the inside. A prettified ideology, bland but appealing, with the reference to spiritual truths, reason, ideals of harmony and peace, a rising tide lifting all boats, the fundamental compatibility of all interests in society (except for those we don't like, of course), the nonexistence of class struggle, government's ability to solve all social ills, history as a progressive battle between knowledge and ignorance, light and darkness, reason and unreason, open-mindedness and bigotry, and any other set of binary abstractions you can think of. The whole ideology hovers above reality in the heavenly mists of Hope and Progress. It's all very pretty, hence its momentary resurgence-which quickly succumbed to disillusionment-with Barack Obama. And hence its ability to get through the filters of the class structure, to become an element in the hegemonic American discourse, floating above institutional realities like some imaginary golden idol one worships in lieu of common sense. It serves a very useful purpose for business, averting people's eyes from the essential incompatibility of class interests toward the idea of Gradual Progress by means of tinkering at the margins, making nice policies.

Such is the function of liberal idealism for the ruling class.

One other type of idealism that must be mentioned is the postmodernist variety (or rather varieties). It's ironic that postmodernist intellectuals, with their rejection of "meta-narratives" and the idea of objective truth, consider themselves hyper-sophisticated, because in fact they're less sophisticated than even unreflective doctrinaire Marxists. They're not so much post-Marxist as pre-Marxist, in that they haven't assimilated the important intellectual lessons of the Marxist tradition.

In both its subjectivism and its focus on "discourses," "texts," "meanings," "vocabularies," "cultures," and the like, postmodernism is idealistic-and relativistic. Foucault's Discipline and Punish, for example, tends to ignore class and particular economic and political contexts, instead concentrating on the opinions of reformers, philosophers, politicians, and scientists. (Far better-more illuminating-is Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer's Marxist classic Punishment and Social Structure , published in 1939.) Later on things got even worse, as with Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler's much-heralded collection Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (1997). I can't go into depth here, so suffice it to say that this book, like so much of postmodernism, consists essentially of playing around with ideas of cultural "contestations" and the tensions involved in people's "negotiations" of disparate identities. The analyses are so particularistic and so purely descriptive, focusing, say, on (the cultural dimensions of) some little village in Senegal or some protest movement in Ecuador, that no interesting conclusions can be drawn. Instead there is a fluctuation between hyper-particularity and hyper-abstractness, as in the typical-and utterly truistic-"arguments" that the colonized had agency, that colonized cultures weren't totally passive, that "colonial regimes were neither monolithic nor omnipotent" (who has ever said they were?), that "meanings" of institutions "were continually being reshaped," and so on. After all the "analysis," one is left asking, "Okay, so what?" It's all just masturbatory play undertaken for the sake of itself. No wonder this sort of writing has been allowed to become culturally dominant.

The postmodern focus on the body, too, is, ironically, idealistic. Subjectivistic. Which is to say it's more politically safe than Marxism, since it doesn't challenge objective structures of class (except insofar as such subjectivism, or identity politics, allies itself with a class focus). Any intellectual who finds himself being accepted by mainstream institutions, as hordes of Foucault-loving postmodernists and feminists have-contrary to the treatment of materialists like Gabriel Kolko, Thomas Ferguson, Jesse Lemisch, David Noble, Staughton Lynd, Rajani Kanth , Norman Finkelstein, Noam Chomsky, Glenn Greenwald, and many others-should immediately start to question whether his ideas get to the heart of the matter or do not, instead, distract from the workings of power.

Said differently, the problem with identity politics is that it doesn't completely reject Margaret Thatcher's infamous saying, "There is no such thing as society." It takes a semi-individualistic approach to analysis and activism. A revolutionary answers Thatcher with the statement, "There is no such thing as the individual"-in the sense that the focus must be on institutional structures, which mold us and dominate us. To the degree that the focus turns toward the individual, or his identity, his body, his subjectivity, the radicalism becomes more anodyne (while not necessarily ceasing to be oppositional or important).

There is a great deal more to be said about postmodernism. For instance, I could make the obvious point that its particularism and relativism, its elevation of fragmentary "narratives" and its Kuhnian emphasis on the supposed incommensurability of different "paradigms," is just as useful to the ruling class as its idealism, since it denies general truths about class struggle and capitalist dynamics. (See Georg Lukács' masterpiece The Destruction of Reason for a history of how such relativism and idealism contributed to the cultural climate that made Hitler possible.) Or I could argue that the rationalism and universalism of the Radical Enlightenment , which found its fulfillment in Marxism, is, far from being dangerous or containing the seeds of its own destruction-as postmodernists and confused eclectic Marxists like Theodor Adorno have argued-the only hope for humanity.

Instead I'll only observe, in summary, that idealism is not new: it is as old as the hills, and Marx made an immortal contribution in repudiating it. Idealism has always afflicted mainstream intellectual culture, all the way back to antiquity, when Plato viewed the world as consisting of shadows of ideal Forms, Hindus and Buddhists interpreted it in spiritual terms and as being somehow illusory, and Stoics were telling "the slave in the mines that if he would only think aright he would be happy" (to quote the classicist W. W. Tarn ). Idealism persisted through the Christian Middle Ages, Confucian China, and Hindu India. It dominated the Enlightenment, when philosophes were arguing that ignorance and superstition were responsible for mass suffering and a primordial conspiracy of priests had plunged society into darkness. Hegel, of course, was an arch-idealist. Finally a thinker came along who renounced this whole tradition and systematized the common sense of the hitherto despised "rabble," the workers, the peasants, the women struggling to provide for their children-namely that ideas are of little significance compared to class and material conditions. The real heroes, the real actors in history are not the parasitic intellectuals or the marauding rulers but the people working day in and day out to maintain society, to preserve and improve the conditions of civilization for their descendants.

Had there been no Marx or Engels, revolutionaries and activists would still have targeted class structures, as they were doing before Marxism had achieved widespread influence. Unions would have organized workers, radicals would have established far-left organizations, insurrections would have occurred in countries around the world. Marx's role has been to provide clarity and guidance, to serve as a symbol of certain tendencies of thought and action. His uniquely forceful and acute analyses of history and capitalism have been a font of inspiration for both thinkers and activists, a spur, a stimulus to keep their eyes on the prize, so to speak. His prediction of the collapse of capitalism from its internal contradictions has given hope and confidence to millions-perhaps too much confidence, in light of the traditional over-optimism of Marxists. But having such a brilliant authority on their side, such a teacher, has surely been of inestimable benefit to the oppressed.

As for the narrow task of "interpreting the world," the enormous body of work by Marxists from the founder to the present totally eclipses the contributions of every other school of thought. From economics to literary criticism, nothing else comes remotely close.

*

Marx did, however, make mistakes. No one is infallible. It's worth considering some of those mistakes, in case we can learn from them.

The ones I'll discuss here, which are by far the most significant, have to do with his conception of socialist revolution. Both the timeline he predicted and his sketchy remarks on how the revolution would come to pass were wrong. I've addressed these matters here , and at greater length in my book Worker Cooperatives and Revolution: History and Possibilities in the United States , but they deserve a more condensed treatment too.

Regarding the timeline: it has long been a commonplace that Marx failed to foresee Keynesianism and the welfare state. His biggest blind-spot was nationalism, or in general the power of the capitalist nation-state as an organizing principle of social life. Ironically, only a Marxian approach can explain why national structures have achieved the power they have, i.e., why the modern centralized nation-state rose to dominance in the first place. (It has to do with the interconnected rise of capitalism and the state over the last 700 years, in which each "principle"-the economic and the political, the market and the state-was indispensable to the other. See, e.g., Giovanni Arrighi's The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times . )

In essence, while Marx was right to locate a capitalist tendency toward relative or even absolute immiseration of the working class, he was wrong that this tendency could not be effectively counteracted, at least for a long time, by opposing pressures. That is, he underestimated the power of tendencies toward integration of the working class into the dominant order, toward "pure and simple trade-unionism," toward the state's stabilizing management of the economy, and toward workers' identification not only with the abstract notion of a social class that spans continents but also with the more concrete facts of ethnicity, race, trade, immediate community, and nation. These forces have historically militated against the revolutionary tendencies of class polarization and international working-class solidarity. They have both fragmented the working class and made possible the successes of reformism-the welfare state, social democracy, and the legitimization of mass collective bargaining in the wake of the Great Depression and World War II. Like other Enlightenment thinkers, Marx was too optimistic.

On the other hand, he was right that capitalism isn't sustainable-because of its "contradictions," its dysfunctional social consequences, and also its effects on the natural environment. No compromises between capital and wage-labor, such as the postwar Keynesian compromise, can last. The market is just too anarchic, and capital too voracious. Stability is not possible. Sooner or later, with the continued development of the productive forces, capital mobility will increase, markets-including the labor market-will become more integrated worldwide, elite institutional networks will thicken worldwide, and organized labor will lose whatever power it had in the days of limited capital mobility. In retrospect, and with a bit of analysis , one can see that these tendencies were irresistible. Genuine socialism (workers' democratic control) on an international or global scale never could have happened in the twentieth century, which was still the age of oligopolistic, imperialistic capitalism, even state capitalism. In fact, it wasn't until the twenty-first century that the capitalist mode of production was consolidated across the entire globe, a development Marx assumed was necessary as a prerequisite for socialism (or communism).

The irony, therefore - and history is chock-full of dialectical irony - is that authentic revolutionary possibilities of post-capitalism couldn't open up until the victories of the left in the twentieth century had been eroded and defeated by hyper-mobile capital. The corporatist formations of social democracy and industrial unionism, fully integrated into the capitalist nation-state, had to decline in order for class polarization in the core capitalist states to peak again, deep economic crisis to return, and radical anti-capitalist movements to reappear on a massive level (as we may expect they'll do in the coming decades). Many Marxists don't like this type of thinking, according to which things have to get worse before they get better, but Marx himself looked forward to economic crisis because he understood it was only such conditions that could impel workers to join together en masse and fight for something as radical as a new social order.

The best evidence for the "things have to get worse before they get better" thesis is that the relatively non-barbarous society of the postwar years in the West was made possible only by the upheavals of the Great Depression and World War II, which mobilized the left on such an epic scale and so discredited fascism that the ruling class finally consented to a dramatic improvement of conditions for workers. Similarly, it's quite possible that decades from now people will think of neoliberalism, with its civilization-endangering horrors, as having been a tool of (in Hegel's words) the "cunning" of historical reason by precipitating the demise of the very society whose consummation it was and making possible the rise of something new.

But how will such a revolution occur? This is another point on which Marx tripped up. Despite his eulogy of the non-statist Paris Commune, Marx was no anarchist: he expected that the proletariat would have to seize control of the national state and then carry out the social revolution from the commanding heights of government. This is clear from the ten-point program laid out in the Communist Manifesto-the specifics of which he repudiated in later years, but apparently not the general conception of statist reconstruction of the economy. It's doubtful, for example, that he would have rejected his earlier statement that "The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class." Moreover, he seems to have endorsed Engels' statement in Anti-Dühring that "The proletariat seizes state power, and then transforms the means of production into state property." It appears, then, that both he and Engels were extreme statists, even though, like anarchists, they hoped and expected that the state would (somehow, inexplicably) disappear eventually.

In these beliefs they were mistaken. The social revolution can't occur after a total seizure of state power by "the proletariat" (which isn't a unitary entity but contains divisions)-for several reasons. First, this conception of revolution contradicts the Marxian understanding of social dynamics, a point that few or no Marxists appear ever to have appreciated. It exalts a centralized conscious will as being able to plan social evolution in advance, a notion that is utterly undialectical. According to "dialectics," history happens behind the backs of historical actors, whose intentions never work out exactly as they're supposed to. Marx was wise in his admonition that we should never trust the self-interpretations of political actors. And yet he suspends this injunction when it comes to the dictatorship of the proletariat: these people's designs are supposed to work out perfectly and straightforwardly, despite the massive complexity and dialectical contradictions of society.

The statist idea of revolution is also wrong to privilege the political over the economic. In supposing that through sheer political will one can transform an authoritarian, exploitative economy into a liberatory, democratic one, Marx is, in effect, reversing the order of "dominant causality" such that politics determines the economy (whereas in fact the economy "determines"-loosely and broadly speaking-politics). [2] Marxism itself suggests that the state can't be socially creative in this radical way. And when it tries to be, what results, ironically, is overwhelming bureaucracy and even greater authoritarianism than before. (While the twentieth century's experiences with so-called "Communism" or "state socialism" happened in relatively non-industrialized societies, not advanced capitalist ones as Marx anticipated, the dismal record is at least suggestive.)

Fundamental to these facts is that if the conquest of political power occurs in a still-capitalist economy, revolutionaries have to contend with the institutional legacies of capitalism: relations of coercion and domination condition everything the government does, and there is no way to break free of them. They can't be magically transcended through political will; to think they can, or that the state can "wither away" even as it becomes more expansive and dominating, is to adopt a naïve idealism.

Corresponding to all these errors are the flaws in Marx's abstract conceptualization of revolution, according to which revolution happens when the production relations turn into fetters on the use and development of productive forces. One problem with this formulation is that it's meaningless: at what point exactly do production relations begin to fetter productive forces? How long does this fettering have to go on before the revolution begins in earnest? How does one determine the degree of fettering? It would seem that capitalism has fettered productive forces for a very long time, for example in its proneness to recessions and stagnation, in artificial obstacles to the diffusion of knowledge such as intellectual copyright laws, in underinvestment in public goods such as education and transportation, and so forth. On the other hand, science and technology continue to develop, as shown by recent momentous advances in information technology. So what is the utility of this idea of "fettering"?

In fact, it can be made useful if we slightly reconceptualize the theory of revolution. Rather than a conflict simply between production relations and the development of productive forces, there is a conflict between two types of production relations-two modes of production - one of which uses productive forces in a more socially rational and "un-fettering" way than the other . The more progressive mode slowly develops in the womb of the old society as it decays, i.e., as the old dominant mode of production succumbs to crisis and stagnation. In being relatively dynamic and 'socially effective,' the emergent mode of production attracts adherents and resources, until it becomes ever more visible and powerful. The old regime can't eradicate it; it spreads internationally and gradually transforms the economy, to such a point that the forms and content of politics change with it. Political entities become its partisans, and finally decisive seizures of power by representatives of the emergent mode of production become possible, because reactionary defenders of the old regime have lost their dominant command over resources. And so, over generations, a social revolution transpires.

This conceptual revision saves Marx's intuition by giving it more meaning: the "fettering" is not absolute but is in relation to a more effective mode of production that is, so to speak, competing with the old stagnant one. The most obvious concrete instance of this conception of revolution is the long transition from feudalism to capitalism, during which the feudal mode became so hopelessly outgunned by the capitalist that, in retrospect, the long-term outcome of the "bourgeois revolutions" from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries was never in doubt. Capitalism was bound to triumph after it had reached a certain level of development.

But the important point is that capitalist interests could never have decisively "seized the state" until the capitalist economy had already made tremendous inroads against feudalism. Likewise, socialist or post-capitalist interests can surely not take over national states until they have vast material resources on their side, such as can only be acquired through large-scale participation in productive activities. As the capitalist economy descends into global crisis/stagnation over the next twenty, fifty, and a hundred years, one can predict that an "alternative economy," a "solidarity economy" of cooperative and socialized relations of production will emerge both in society's interstices and, sooner or later, in the mainstream. In many cases it will be sponsored and promoted by the state (on local, regional, and national levels), in an attempt to assuage social discontent; but its growth will only have the effect of hollowing out the hegemony of capitalism and ultimately facilitating its downfall. And thereby the downfall, or radical transformation, of the capitalist state.

I can't go into the detail necessary to flesh out this gradualist notion of revolution, but in my abovementioned book I've argued that it not only radically revises the Marxian conception (on the basis of a single conceptual alteration), in effect updating it for the twenty-first century, but that it is thoroughly grounded in Marxian concepts-in fact, is truer to the fundamentals of historical materialism than Marx's own vision of proletarian revolution was. The new society has to be erected on the foundation of emerging production relations, which cannot but take a very long time to broadly colonize society. And class struggle, that key Marxian concept, will of course be essential to the transformation: decades of continuous conflict between the masters and the oppressed, including every variety of disruptive political activity, will attend the construction-from the grassroots up to the national government-of anti-capitalist modes of production.

Glimmers of non-capitalist economic relations are already appearing even in the reactionary United States. In the last decade more and more scholars, journalists, and activists have investigated and promoted these new relations; one has but to read Gar AlperovitzEllen Brown , and all the contributors toYes! MagazineShareable.netCommunity-Wealth.org, etc. A transnational movement is growing beneath the radar of the mass media. It is still in an embryonic state, but as activists publicize its successes, ever more people will be drawn to it in their search for a solution to the dysfunctional economy of the ancien régime. Local and national governments, unaware of its long-term anti-capitalist implications, are already supporting the alternative economy, as I describe in my book.

I'll also refer the reader to the book for responses to the conventional Marxian objections that cooperatives, for instance, are forced to compromise their principles by operating in the market economy, and that interstitial developments are not revolutionary. At this point in history, it should be obvious to everyone that a socialist revolution cannot occur in one fell swoop, one great moment of historical rupture, as "the working class" or its Leninist leaders storm the State, shoot all their opponents, and impose sweeping diktats to totally restructure society. (What an incredibly idealistic and utopian conception that is!) The conquest of political power will occur piecemeal, gradually; it will suffer setbacks and then proceed to new victories, then suffer more defeats, etc., in a century-long (or longer) process that happens at different rates in different countries. It will be a time of world-agony, especially as climate change will be devastating civilization; but the sheer numbers of people whose interests will lie in a transcendence of corporate capitalism will constitute a formidable weapon on the side of progress.

One reasonable, though rather optimistic, blueprint for the early stages of this process is the British Labour Party's Manifesto, which lays out principles that can be adapted to other countries. Such a plan will necessarily encounter so much resistance that, early on, even if the Labour Party comes to power, only certain parts of it will be able to be implemented. But plans such as this will provide ideals that can be approximated ever more closely as the international left grows in strength; and eventually more radical goals may become feasible.

But we must follow Marx, again, in shunning speculation on the specifics of this long evolution. He is sometimes criticized for saying too little about what socialism or communism would look like, but this was in fact very democratic and sensible of him. It is for the people engaged in struggles to hammer out their own institutions, "to learn in the dialectic of history," as Rosa Luxemburg said. Nor is it possible, in any case, to foresee the future in detail. All we can do is try to advance the struggle and leave the rest to our descendants.

*

Marx is practically inexhaustible, and one cannot begin to do him justice in a single article. His work has something for both anarchists and Leninists, for existentialists and their critics, cultural theorists and economists, philosophers and even scientists . Few thinkers have ever been subjected to such critical scrutiny and yet held up so well over centuries. To attack him, as usefully idiotic lackeys of the capitalist class do , for being responsible for twentieth-century totalitarianism is naïve idealism of the crudest sort. Ideas do not make history, though they can be useful tools in the hands of reactionaries or revolutionaries. They can be misunderstood, too, and used inappropriately or in ways directly contrary to their spirit - as the Christianity of Jesus has, for example.

But in our time of despair and desperation, with the future of the species itself in doubt, there is one more valid criticism to be made of Marx: he was too sectarian. Too eager to attack people on the left with whom he disagreed. In this case, Chomsky's attitude is more sensible: the left must unite and not exhaust its energy in internecine battles. Let's be done with all the recriminations between Marxists and anarchists and left-liberals, all the squabbling that has gone on since the mid-nineteenth century. It's time to unite against the threat of fascism and-not to speak over-grandiosely-save life on Earth.

Let's honor the memory of all the heroes and martyrs who have come before us by rising to the occasion, at this climactic moment of history.


Notes

[1] In my summary of G. E. M. de Ste. Croix's 1981 masterpiece The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests , I added the following thoughts to the foregoing account: "Class struggle is central to history in still more ways; for instance, virtually by analytical necessity it has been, directly or indirectly, the main cause of popular resistance and rebellions. Likewise, the ideologies and cultures of the lower classes have been in large measure sublimations of class interest and conflict. Most wars, too, have been undertaken so that rulers (effectively the ruling class) could gain control over resources, which is sort of the class struggle by other means. Wars grow out of class dynamics, and are intended to benefit the rich and powerful. In any case, the very tasks of survival in complex societies are structured by class antagonisms, which determine who gets what resources when and in what ways."

[2] In reality, of course, political and economic relations are fused together. But analytically one can distinguish economic activities from narrowly political, governmental activities.

The Multiple Meanings of Marx's Value Theory

By Riccardo Bellofiore

Karl Marx's "critique of political economy" is grounded in his value theory. "Critique" has to be distinguished from criticism: Marx aimed not only to point out the errors of political economy, but also to learn from its scientific results. Here the key names are François Quesnay, Adam Smith, and David Ricardo. Marx was also interested in assessing the conditions and the limits of the knowledge provided by classical political economy. At the same time, he saw the critique of the "science" of political economy as the means to develop a critique of capitalist social relations.

Among Marx's unique contributions was that his value theory is the only one consistently put forward within a monetary analysis: that is, it introduces money in the very initial deduction of value. In fact, Marx's object of inquiry is capital understood as a "social relation of production," defined by two main traits: the exploitation of labor within a monetary commodity-producing economy and an internal tendency to crisis. The connection between money and class exploitation on one side and the endogeneity of crisis on the other is related to the view that, in a capitalist economy, the "value added" (a monetary magnitude) newly produced in a given period has its exclusive source in "abstract labor" as an activity - more precisely, in the living labor of wage workers.

In a nutshell, Marx's reasoning may be considered a macro-monetary theory of capitalist production. In the capitalist labor process, the totality of wage workers reproduce the means of production employed and produce a net product. The net product is expressed on the market as a new money value that is added to the money value attached to the means of production, historically inherited from the past. This value added is the monetary expression of the living labor time that has been objectified by the wage workers in the period. The value of the labor power (for the entire working class), which is exhibited in money wages, is regulated by the labor-time required to reproduce the capacity for labor, and hence by the labor-time required to reproduce the means of subsistence bought on the market. Accordingly, the surplus value(value added less value of labor power) originates from surplus labor, defined as the positive difference between, on the one hand, the whole of living labor spent in producing the total (net) product of capital and, on the other, the share of that living labor which has been necessary to devote to reproducing the wages, which Marx labels "necessary labor."

The Marxian critique of political economy is inseparable from the meaning Marx gave to the "labor theory of value," which in his case was rather a value theory of labor. The issue is how relations of production and circulation are affected by the fact that labor takes the capitalist social form of producing value and surplus value embedded in "things," in commodities. In what follows, I will look at Marx's value theory from five perspectives: (1) as a monetary value theory; (2) as a theory of exploitation; (3) as a macro-monetary theory of capitalist production; (4) as a theory of individual prices; and (5) as a theory of crises.


A Monetary Value Theory

Marx's starting point is that capitalism is an economy wherecommodity circulation occurs throughuniversal monetary exchange. The analysis of exchangeas such is given priority relative to the analysis of capitalist exchange, and money is introduced before capital. In exchange "as such," individual commodity producers are separate and in competition with each other. The labor of these asocial individuals is immediately private and "becomes" mediately social on the market. Socialization of labor goes on indirectly, through the selling of commodities. Each commodity is shown to be equal to the others in certain quantitative ratios. The commodity has a use value, but it also possesses an exchange value: though invisible in the commodity, it is externally exhibited in money as the "universal equivalent."

At this stage of Marx's original argument, money must be a (special) commodity with universal purchasing power, gold, as a result of a historical process of selection and exclusion sanctioned by the state. The equal "validity" of products sold on the market is in fact an a posteriori equalization of the labors producing them. Thus, labor is not social in advance, but only insofar as its true output will be money, a form of "generic" or "abstract" wealth. Individual labor, which is concrete labor producing an object with some utility for some other agent (a social use-value), counts for the producer as its opposite, as abstract labor. Abstract labor is a portion of the total labor exhibited in the money value of output: it is then also a portion of the gold-producing concrete labor, the latter being the unique, immediately social labor. The "value of money" is fixed when gold first enters monetary circulation, in the original exchanges with the other commodities.

Although private labor becomes social labor only through money as a universal equivalent, it is not money that renders the commodities commensurable. On the contrary, commodities possess an exchange value because, even before the final exchange on the commodity market, they have already acquired the ideal property of being universally exchangeable, giving them the form of value. This property, so to speak, grows out of objectified labor as the substance of value: the form of value in the individual commodity is a ghostly entity, but it materializes by taking possession of the body of money as a commodity; the internal duality is now "redoubled" in the external duality of commodity-money. Money is nothing but value made autonomous in exchange, divorced from commodities and existing alongside them, and as the form of value it is the outward necessary exhibition of abstract, indirectly social labor.

This qualitative analysis of exchange-as-such has a quantitative counterpart. The magnitude of value of a commodity is determined by the socially necessary labor-time needed for its production. "Socially necessary labor-time" has two meanings: production must run according to average techniques and intensity (determined by intra-industry competition), but it is also driven by the paying social need (what Marx calls "ordinary demand"). In a particular branch of production, each commodity of a given type and quality is sold at the same money price. Hence, the magnitude of value is ruled not by the "individual" labor-time actually spent by a single producer (i.e., by its individual value) but by the labor-time that has to be expended under "normal" conditions (i.e., by its social, or market, value). The magnitude of value is inversely related to the productive power of labor (the labor time required to produce the commodity, given the prevailing level of intensity). Commodity values are necessarily manifested as money prices. The quantity of money that is produced by one hour of labor in a given country and period may be defined as the monetary expression of labor: the magnitude of value of a commodity multiplied by the monetary expression of labor gives the so-called simple or direct price.

From this perspective, it is always possible to translate the external monetary measure of each commodity's value (ideally anticipated by producers before exchange) into the immanent measure in units oflabor-time. Note, however, that value is not identical with price, with the latter defined as any arbitrary relative ratio between commodity and money fixed on the market. Value instead expresses a necessary relation with the (abstract) labor-time spent in the production of commodities. To be effective in regulating market prices, value implies a coincidence between individual supply and demand. In that case, the spontaneous allocation of the private labors of autonomous producers affirms itself a posteriori on the market as a social division of labor. Price is the money-name taken by commodities, and since individual supplies and demands may well diverge, price may in turn exhibit a labor amount that differs from the socially necessary labor contained in the commodity. The whole mass of newly produced commodities is a homogeneous quantity of value whose monetary expression is necessarily equal to their total money price. The discrepancy between values and prices simply redistributes among producers the total direct labor, i.e., the content hidden behind the money form taken by the net product.

This approach to value theory, where value eventually "comes into being" in money, may be characterized as Marx's monetary value theory. In it, value and money cannot be divorced. It is formulated most clearly in the opening pages of Capital, where Marx moves from exchange value to value, from value to money, and from money to labor. It may be attacked on several grounds. In his famous critique of Capital, the nineteenth-century Austrian economist Eugen Böhm von Bawerk failed to notice the essential monetary side of Marxian value theory, instead looking only at what he saw as a linear deduction in the sequence exchange value-value-abstract labor. Quite reasonably (from this limited reading), he observed that abstracting from specific use-values does not mean abstracting from use value in general. Moreover, an exchange value is also attached to non-produced commodities. It follows, then, that hidden behind the notion of value are the common properties that allow for exchange on the market, namely utility and scarcity.

A more recent criticism stresses that while the backward connection from money to value is convincing, less so is Marx's idea of an absolute or intrinsic value justifying that inverse movement from the inner dimension of value to the outer dimension of money. Marx himself shows that the social equalization among labors is achieved only when commodities are actually sold in circulation: before that, in production, we meet only concrete labors, which are heterogeneous and non-additive.


A Theory of Exploitation

All these positions ignore the fact that for Marx, commodity exchange is universal only when the capitalist mode of production is dominant-that is, only when workers are compelled to sell their labor power to money as capital, as self-valorizing value. Consequently, labor is for him the content of the value-form because of a more fundamental sequence going from money-capital to (living) labor to (surplus) value. The private "individuals" who are distinct and opposed on the commodity market, where they eventually become "social" (in capitalist terms) through the metamorphosis of their products into money, are now to be interpreted as the collective workers organized by particular capitals in mutual competition.

To explain the origin of the value added, and thereby of the surplus value contained in it, Marx begins from two assumptions: supply meets a demand of the same amount, and commodities are sold at prices proportional to the labor required to produce them ("simple" or "direct" prices). The argument is based on a two-step comparison. First, he sketches a hypothetical situation (but one that expresses something very real and significant in capitalism) where the living labor extracted from wage workers is equal to the necessary labor required to produce the historically given subsistence. It is a situation of simple reproduction without surplus value, akin to Joseph Schumpeter's "circular flow," where the rate of profit is absent. In the second step, Marx imagines a (or rather, reveals the actual) prolongation of the working day beyond necessary labor imposed by capitalists. The extension of the working day beyond the necessary labor time creates a surplus labor and its monetary expression, surplus value.

In this argument, some points must be noted. First, Marx does not abstract at all from circulation. Account must be taken, before the capitalist labor process, of the buying and selling of labor power on the labor market, and of the way subsistence is determined. He must also assume that the potential (latent) value within the commodities produced will be confirmed as a "social use value" in circulation: the metamorphosis of the commodities into real money must happen according to sales expectations. Moreover, to make clear that abstract living labor is the only source of value, Marx must abstract from the tendency toward the equalization of the rate of profit between the branches of production. Throughout the first and second volumes of Capital, Marx ignores "static" (Ricardian) competition as the tendency towards the equality of the rate of profit among industries. Already in the first volume, however, he cannot avoid considering "dynamic" (Schumpeterian) competition, the intra-industry struggle to obtain extra surplus value. The diversification and stratification of the conditions of production is determined by innovation and spreads the rate of profit within the sector.

The "generativity" of the surplus is an endogenous variable, influenced by the social form taken by production as production for a surplus value to be realized on the market. With given industrial techniques, and assuming that competition on the labor market establishes a uniform real wage, necessary labor is constant. Surplus value is extracted by lengthening the working day. Marx calls this method of increasing surplus value the production of absolute surplus value. When the length of the working day is limited-whether by law or through workers' resistance-capital may enlarge surplus value by the production of relative surplus value, that is, through technical innovations or by speeding up the pace of production (a greater intensity of labor). Technical change, which increases the productive power of labor, lowers the unit-values of commodities. To the extent that the changing organization of production directly or indirectly affects the firms that produce wage-goods, necessary labor falls, and with it the value of labor power. This makes room for a higher surplus labor, and thus a higher surplus value.

Changes in production techniques yielding relative surplus value are a much more powerful way of controlling worker performance than is the simple personal control needed to obtain absolute surplus value. Moving from "cooperation" to the "manufacturing division of labor" to the "machine and big industry" stage, a specifically capitalist mode of production is developed. Here labor is no longer under a formal subsumption to capital (with surplus value extraction occurring within the technological framework historically inherited by capital) but it is under a real subsumption to capital (enforced by "technology," i.e., a capitalistically designed system of production). Workers (the human bearers of labor power) become mere "appendages" of the means of production, a means of "absorption" of labor power in motion (living labor). The concrete "qualities" possessed by laborers spring from a structure of production incessantly revolutionized from within and designed to command living labor. At this point in the argument, labor does not only "count" but really "is" purely abstract, indifferent to its particular form (which is dictated by capital), in the very moment of activity, where it has lost the nature of the active element and become the passive object of capitalist manipulation in the search for profit. This stripping away from labor of all its qualitative determinateness and its reduction to mere quantity encompasses both the historically dominant tendency to de-skilling and the periodically recurring phases of partial re-skilling.

A moment of reflection is needed to appreciate the special features of this unique social reality where labor is made abstract already in production. Profit-making springs from an "exploitation" of workers in a double sense. There is, first, exploitation through the division of the social working day, with laborers giving more (living) labor in exchange for less (necessary) labor. The perspective here is that of the traditional notion of exploitation, which considers the sharing-out of the quantity of social labor contained in the new value, added within the period. Its measure is surplus labor over and above necessary labor. This, however, is the outcome of a second, more basic exploitation of workers, in the form of the use of workers' labor power. Capitalist wealth is created only on the condition of this "consumption" of workers' bodies and minds, which perverts the nature of labor. The quantitative measure of this "productive" notion of exploitation, which refers to the formation rather than the distribution of the fresh "value added," is the social working day in its entirety. From this second perspective, exploitation becomes identified with the whole working day, and with the abstract (living) labor of wage workers. This is the ultimate reason for tracing back value to labor, because of the value form taken by labor.

Marx shows that abstract labor reflects an inversion of subject and object (what philosophers would call a "real hypostatization"), which is deepened in the theoretical movement back from the commodity-output market to the labor market and the production process. Within commodity exchange, objectified labor is made abstract because the products of human working activity, as long as they are commodities, manifest themselves as an independent and estranged reality, divorced from their origin in living labor. The consequent "alienation" of individuals is coupled by "reification" and "fetishism": reification because in a commodity-capitalist economy production-work relations among people necessarily take the form of an exchange among "things," and fetishism because, as a consequence, the products of labor seem endowed with social properties, as if these were bestowed upon them by nature. These characteristics reappear in the other two moments of the capitalist circuit. On the labor market, human beings become the personification of the commodity they sell, labor power (or "potential" labor). Within production, living labor (or labor "in becoming") is shaped by capital as abstract labor, and embedded in a definite technique and organization specifically designed to enforce the extraction of surplus value. Abstract labor in motion (as the activity producing value and money as its result) is the true subject of which the real individual workers performing it are the predicates. In this way, Marx's capital as self-valorizing value is akin to Hegel's Absolute Idea, seeking to actualize itself and reproducing its own conditions of existence; but it is potentially limited by workers' resistance to their "incorporation" as internal moments of capital.

At this point, it is possible to understand that behind the anarchic "social division of labor"-carried out by private producers independently of one another and effected a posteriori via the market-a different "technical division of labor" within production is taking place. In the latter, inasmuch as it is subjected to the drive of valorization, an a priori despotic planning by capitalist firms leads to a technological equalization and social pre-commensuration of the expenditure of human labor power, tentatively anticipating final validation on the commodity market. This process imposes on labor-already within direct production and before exchange-the quantitative and qualitative properties of being abstract labor spent in the socially necessary measure. Even though capitalist production is completely actualized only in exchange-and therefore single capitals in competition are not guaranteed to find an outlet for their production-individual workers are immediately socialized in production.

Capitalist production is the paradox of dissociated firms whose production is "in common," but which have yet to appear as part of total social labor in the eventual validation on the commodity market. This pre-commensuration of labor and socialization within production, in its turn, is conditional on a monetary ante-validation expressed by the finance for production that money-capitalists grant to industrial capitalists. For Marx, once capitalism has reached its full maturity in large-scale industry, the subjection of wage workers to capital, with the consequent (ex ante) abstraction of living labor already in production, and hence the theory of exploitation, must be seen as the foundation of the monetary value theory.


A Macro-Monetary Theory of Capitalist Production

I have heretofore surveyed two interpretations of Marx's value theory: as a monetary theory of value and as a theory of capitalist exploitation. Here I will summarize a contemporary analysis that may link these two: an approach to the value theory as a macro-monetary theory of capitalist production. This interpretation was put forward by the Italian economist Augusto Graziani, as part of his version of the theory of the "monetary circuit," and it has the advantage of revealing a hidden Marxian current in the work of the "bourgeois" monetary heretics of neoclassical theory (Knut Wicksell, Schumpeter, D. H. Robertson, the Keynes of the Treatise on Money).

According to both the Marxian view and these monetary heretics, the capitalist "cycle," or circuit, is logically split into a sequence of successive phases: first, the initial buying and selling of labor power on the labor market (where money wages are bargained); then, immediate production, where labor power is used; and eventually, the final selling of commodities in the moment of circulation (where real wages are eventually fixed), leading to the reconstitution of the money capital which has been advanced. If we distinguish money-capitalists from capitalist-entrepreneurs, this series follows the tripartite separation of Graziani's macro-agents in the most basic abstract picture of the monetary circuit: financial capital, industrial capital, and the working class. Means of production circulate only within the firm-sector, out of reach of wage-workers, whose purchasing power can only materialize in buying the means of consumption that the capitalist class makes available to them.

The defining features of Marx's value theory can be characterized as follows. It is, first of all, a class macroscopic analysis, which leads directly to a description of the capitalist economic process as a monetary circuit. In the cycle of money capital, money is initial finance from the banking system, allowing the firm-sector as a whole to purchase labor power from the working class. Money, before being the universal equivalent in circulation (the "social relation" in circulation), is what puts capitalists in a specific "social relation" with workers in production. The possibility of crisis arises when money is hoarded, because of the pessimistic prospects of capitalist-entrepreneurs or money-capitalists, and brings with it unsold commodities and involuntary unemployment. Crisis is a "break" in the circuit-a point which encompasses both Keynes's view of crisis as the result of a rise in liquidity preference (failure to "close" the circuit), and circuitists' view of crisis as an outcome of capitalist-entrepreneurs' reluctance to invest (failure to "open" the circuit).

"Valorization" means an enlargement of abstract wealth. In a truly macro-monetary perspective, no exchange internal to the firm-sector can contribute to valorization. If we assume Marx's macrosocial, monetary, and class point of view, it is clear that surplus value (gross profits) cannot originate in internal exchanges within the capitalist class: inter-firm transactions could only give way to "profit upon alienation" (or "profit upon expropriation"), cancelled out at the level of the firm-sector as a whole. The genesis of surplus value can be found instead in the only external "exchange" for capital as a whole, the one between capitalist firms (financed by banks) and the living bearers of labor power. Following Michał Kalecki's revision of Rosa Luxemburg's argument, the level, composition, and distribution of output can be easily determined. The "autonomous" capitalists' expenses for investment and their own consumption fix the amount of their profits, their market power (expressed in the "degree of monopoly") defines the profit share on income, and from here it is straightforward to derive the level of output, income and employment. In this view, in a capitalist economy, the totality of the means of production must go to capitalist-entrepreneurs. Thus, the entrepreneurs must be able to buy all the new means of production which have been produced. The profit margin must be set at a level such that the mass of profits is equal to realized investments.

It is noteworthy that in this reconstruction of Marxian theory what the working class actually receives are the consumption goods that firms put on the market for them, even if there are household savings. Financial wealth allows individuals to modify their consumption stream over time, but it is irrelevant for the aggregate. A reduction in saving is followed by higher real consumption by workers only if the firm sector autonomously decides to increase the supply of wage goods. Even shares represent a fictitious ownership, as long as decisions over real production are out of workers' control. This does not mean that distribution is immutable. However, workers exert influence on firms' or government's decisions about the real composition of output through non-market actions: conflict in production, or struggles in society, or political interventions.

On the Marxian theory of money, Graziani also offers some original insights. We must distinguish "money" (Geld in Marx's original German) from "currency" (Münze). The former represents abstract "wealth in general," while the latter is the universally accepted intermediary of exchange, and is one among many representatives of wealth in general. If we accept this distinction, the valorization process is defined as money-commodity-more money, or M-C-M´, while the monetary circuit enabling its reproduction is defined as currency-commodity-currency. It follows that the specific goal of the capitalist is to acquire money in the sense of abstract wealth, not to accumulate money as currency. When Marx discusses the nature of gross profit, he makes clear that it is acquired by capitalists solely in the form of commodities.

While Marx stresses that currency as "means of circulation" in commodity markets is itself a commodity, currency representing money as a form of capital must be a form of credit, and more specifically bank credit ex nihilo. The role of currency as bank credit ex nihilo is not made explicit in Capital because, when Marx writes of money and currency, especially in volume 3, he does not present a "pure" theory of the monetary circuit, but only an inquiry into what we today call the practice of money markets. Moreover, he assumes an open economy and the presence of the state. It has been suggested that the assumption that money is a sign (like that made by the monetary heretics) threatens to undermine Marx's theory of exploitation, since money as capital may seem to be valueless. This is not so. The problem of the value of money as capital is reduced to the problem of determining wages, because in a class macro-monetary approach the only purchasing power of the advanced currency is the number of workers hired: following the general principle of the theory of value, the value of the real wages of workers is equal to the given (subsistence) real wage .


A Theory of Individual Prices

The macro-monetary reconstruction, like the other perspectives on Marx's value theory I have presented, deflates the theoretical drama which has been going on for a century or more about the so-called transformation problem. This debate centers on Marx's value theory as a theory of the determination of (relative) prices: the conclusion many drew from the discussion was that Marx failed to transform the "simple" or "direct" prices (proportional to the labor contained in the commodities exchanged, sometimes labelled "labor-values") into the "prices of production" (containing an equal rate of profit, and systematically diverging from simple prices).

The reason is easy to understand. In volume 1 of Capital, Marx focuses on the rate of surplus value (identical to the rate of exploitation)-that is, the surplus value divided by the money capital spent in buying labor power (what Marx calls variable capital). This ratio is identical to that between surplus labor and necessary labor. The rate of surplus value is positively related to the length and intensity of the working day. It also rises with increases in the productive power of labor, which is positively affected by the capital composition: the ratio between the money capital advanced to buy means of production (labelled by Marx constant capital) and variable capital. Surplus value springs only from the use of labor power bought with variable capital, and not from the means of production bought with constant capital-hence, their respective names.

The rate of surplus value explains the origin of gross profits for total capital, confronted with the working class as a whole. Total capital extracts the new value, as exhibited in money, of the living labor of the working class, and pays back the value of labor power, as exhibited in the necessary labor. However, for the individual capital, the success of an investment is rather measured by the rate of profit: the ratio between total surplus value and total capital (the sum of variable capital and constant capital). Because of inter-industry, "static" competition, the rate of profit tends to be equal among branches of production.

Here the problem is said to emerge. The rate of profit is positively related to the rate of surplus value, and negatively related to capital composition. The rate of surplus value tends to be equal in every industry, but there is no reason for capital composition to equalize across industries. Commodities, including the elements of constant and variable capital, cannot be evaluated at labor-values when inter-industry competition is introduced-hence the need to transform the labor-values in prices of production, with the rate of profit helping to determine the elements of variable and constant capital.

I will not go into the intricacies of this debate. The point is that, whatever the opinions on the technical details of the transformation, the problem simply cannot exist as such: it is a pseudo-problem. If the core of Marx's value theory is taken to be the a posteriori socialization of labor on the market against the universal equivalent, the argument may be put forward that there are no actual "labor-values" before the eventual validation on the final market . There is only a single system of prices, and the assumption of simple or direct prices is just a "law of exchange," to be removed at a lower level of abstraction. The vision of Marx's value theory as a theory of capitalist exploitation, tracing back surplus value to the extraction of living labor from human beings as bearers of labor power, is even more radical: the point there is that valorization arises from the social relation of capital and workers in the capitalist labor process as a contested terrain, through class struggle in production. Accordingly, the extraction of living labor meets specific social difficulties for the buyers, because the labor power sold by workers (and hence the living labor to be extracted from them) are attached to the sellers, who in capitalism are supposed to be "free" and "equal" individuals. Thus the new value produced in the period cannot but be the monetary expression of living labor alone: whatever the "rule of prices," the ratios by which commodities exchange cannot but redistribute the new value. By definition, gross profits appropriate a share of workers' living labor.

The macro-monetary theory of capitalist production complements this argument, assigning a more fundamental role to the labor-values hidden behind simple or direct prices as a price rule. In fact, it is maintained that in the macro-social argument, in the first volume of Capital, the relevant price between class macro-agents is the rate of surplus value, adequately expressed through simple or direct prices. The reason is easy to see. The new value added by current production is identical to the monetary expression of living labor, and the value of labor power is the monetary expression of the labor contained in the real wage of the working class. All this occurs independently of saving behavior, and, we may add, it remains true whatever the ruling price system. As Graziani argues, in a quite extreme but effective fashion, Marx's theory of value has nothing to say directly about the phenomenon of the prices in final commodity-circulation, since valorization has been accounted for in the macroscopic class analysis, which includes the buying and selling of labor power and immediate production.

The macroeconomic inquiry into valorization is prior to the microeconomic determination of individual prices. At stake in the latter are not the relations between total capital and working class, but the exchange-relations of single firms. The determination of prices of production may well give way to a disparity between the labor commanded (in exchange) by gross profits and the labor contained (in production) within surplus value, and between the labor commanded (in exchange) by the money wage bill and the labor contained (in production) within the real wage for the working class. However, this "unequal exchange" can only obscure the process of valorization, not erase it. The new value (and then the living labor extracted by total capital from workers) and the value of labor power (and then the necessary labor required to produce the given real wage of the working class) remain the same.

Both the Marxists, and their neo-Ricardian or neoclassical critics-who dealt with the determination of prices of production within a simultaneous exchanges perspective-were unfaithful to Marx, because they overlooked the process that constitutes the equilibrium position. In fact, Marx's value theory as it has been depicted here is a non-equilibrium theory. This is something intrinsic to all the foregoing accounts of Marx's value theory: that value eventually comes into being with money as its phenomenal form (the monetary value theory); that class struggle and intra-capitalist competition affect the extraction of living labor (the theory of exploitation); as well as in the view of the essential monetary ante-validation of labor power as potential labor through the financing of production (the macro-monetary theory of capitalist production). "Non-equilibrium" refers to the constitution of the economic magnitudes, allowing us to distinguish, afterward, between equilibrium and disequilibrium. This is not a "temporal" but a "logical" re-reading of Marx's value theory. In my understanding, this duality of value theory (an out-of-equilibrium perspective, embodying both an equilibrium and a non-equilibrium) is at the core of David Harvey's notion of "anti-value," which has eluded many commentators.


A Theory of Crises

Another controversial area in Marxian political economy is the theory of crises. According to Marx, accumulation-i.e., the conversion of some portion of surplus value into additional (constant and variable) capital, to produce more surplus value-is a contradictory process. Crises are at once necessary explosions of the contradictions, and temporary solutions to them.

Capitalism's tendency toward instability is already evident in its structure as a monetary economy, where commodity-exchange is universalized. For some of the separate and autonomous firms, the anarchy in capitalist social division of labor may easily lead to an incomplete "realization" in circulation of the value potentially produced in immediate production. The presence of money dissociates sales from subsequent expenditures, so that hoarding may disrupt the smooth sequence of supply finding its own outlet on the market as incomes are spent. Most of Marx's inquiry in the three volumes of Capital, however, rests on the assumption that commodities are sold on the market at their "social values" (in volumes 1 and 2) or at "prices of production" (in volume 3)-something akin to Keynes's basic model in the General Theory of fulfilment of short-term expectations.

In volume 2 of Capital, drawing on an original insight by Quesnay, Marx constructs his schemes of reproduction, which show that a balanced growth path, independent of the level of consumption demand, is a theoretical possibility. Marx divided social output into two departments, the first producing capital goods and the second consumption goods (which may be subdivided into wage-goods and luxury-goods). The value output of both sectors is seen as the sum of its three constituent parts, i.e., constant capital, variable capital, and surplus value. In simple reproduction, capitalists unproductively consume the entire surplus value, resulting in zero growth. In enlarged reproduction, they more or less completely invest surplus value in new constant and variable capital, allowing for accumulation. What the scheme clarifies is that each value component of the output is also a component of demand for its own or the other sector. Equilibrium, which is always possible, depends on some balance among intersectoral trades. Against Malthus and Sismondi, Marx affirms that capital may expand over time without meeting a barrier in effective demand, because it is the mainspring of its own demand. Nevertheless, against Ricardo and Say, Marx also states that, since equilibrium needs exchange in definite, "correct" proportions-and not only in value, but also in use value and money terms-a balanced long-run accumulation is not a guaranteed outcome, but rather materializes by "accident" (a point taken up again in the Harrod-Domar growth models).

The likelihood of departures from equilibrium because of this absence of planning simply reflects the possibility of crises occurring in a market environment. Marx instead seeks to explain the necessity of crises arising from the capitalist class relation itself. In his view, failures of effective demand issue from a fall in investments, which itself proceeds from a profitability crisis. Thus, the question becomes one of understanding the systemic, recurring causes of profit shortfalls. A first argument is described in the "general law of capital accumulation" at the end of volume 1 of Capital: assuming a constant composition of capital, a sufficiently rapid growth in the value invested exhausts the supply of labor power and tightens the labor market. Wage increases outpace the rise in the productive power of living labor, the rate of profit starts falling, and consequently, accumulation and the demand for labor slow down. A more lasting solution to this difficulty, located in distributive struggles over the partition of the new value added, is the introduction of labor-saving, capital-intensive methods of production. For a given capital, mechanization reduces the share of variable capital, and thereby the demand for labor, to produce the same output: it displaces workers, replacing them with machines.

Theoretically, a rise in the rate of accumulation may enhance or reduce employment, according to the relative weight of the two forces, the increase in the size of capital and the change in its composition. Through the cycle, the pace and structure of the accumulation of capital (the independent variable) constantly vary to reproduce an industrial reserve army of potential workers ready to be included in the valorization process, exerting a downward pressure on wages-the dependent variable. A permanent downward pressure on the real wage, i.e., an "absolute" impoverishment of the workers, is among the possible outcomes. All the same, the normal situation is very different. Capitalist accumulation is propelled by the production of relative surplus value, which presupposes a positive dynamics of the productive power of labor. The real wage, then, has room for improvement (without impeding the tendency for a greater share of the surplus value in the new value added to go to the capitalist class), as long as the increased level of workers' consumption is expressed in a lower value of labor power. This is what Luxemburg called the tendency toward a fall in the relative wage, i.e., a contraction in wages as a proportion of national income-a relative, not an absolute, impoverishment. On the other hand, with the rise of trade unions and a more militant working class, wage struggles can become partially independent from the labor market, break the tendential fall in the "relative" wage, and develop into an independent cause of capitalist crises.

Mechanization of production is also an autonomous drive for capital to control living labor and to remove workers from the point of production. If mechanization is a powerful lever to regulate both the exchange value and the use value of labor power, it nevertheless creates a further difficulty. The rise in what Marx calls the technical composition of capital - the "physical" ratio of the number of means of production to the number of workers employed-contributes to the expulsion of workers from the productive process; but workers' living labor, we know, is the exclusive source of value and surplus value. According to Marx, the consequent rise in the composition of capital expressed in value terms yields a tendency of the rate of profit to fall. It must be noted, however, that Marx expresses the "law" with reference to the rise in what he calls the "organic" composition of capital (in which the elements of constant and variable capital are evaluated at the prices before the diffusion of innovation), and not in the value composition of capital (in which these elements are evaluated at the prices after such diffusion). The latter definition fully reflects the revolution in the evaluation of constant and variable capital produced by mechanization, whereas the former measures inputs at their original prices. The "organic" composition follows the increase in the "technical" composition, but the trend in the profit rate depends on the "value" composition. The clarification of the distinction between physical, value, and organic composition of capital was a fundamental contribution made by Ben Fine and Laurence Harris in the late 1970s, and developed more recently by Alfredo Saad-Filho.

Some authors have interpreted the tendency of the rate of profit to fall not only as a cause of cyclical crises, but also of capitalism's long waves, and others have considered it the reason for a secular downward trend in profitability. There is some justification for this view. The application of greater quantities of constant (and especially, fixed) capital per unit of output is the most effective means to propel surplus value extraction from workers. Marx thought that the increase in the rate of surplus value could not compensate in the long run for the negative influence on the rate of profit of the higher (value) composition of capital, and so he downgraded it as a mere counter-tendency. Marx's strongest argument in favor of the "law" is an appeal to an absolute limit to the surplus labor that may be pumped out of a given working population.

To understand what is involved here, it is best to view the composition of capital as an index of the ratio between, on the one hand, the dead labor contained in the means of production and, on the other, the living labor expended in the period-that is, to represent it as the ratio between constant capital and the sum of variable capital and surplus value. Assuming that variable capital is tending toward zero, and thus that the whole social working day is objectifying itself as surplus value, the (value) composition of capital becomes the reciprocal of themaximum rate of profit. This latter can be seen as the ceiling for the upper movements of the actual rate of profit. Marx suggests that the numerator of the maximum rate of profit meets a "natural" constraint in the amount of living labor that can be extracted from workers, while, on the contrary, its denominator is free to grow without limits. At the ruling social values, individual capitalists are willing or forced to introduce more capital-intensive methods of production. In this way, they lower unit costs to gain excess temporary profits, but the longer-run effects of their behavior force a reduction of the social values of commodities and depress the average rate of profit.

Nevertheless, to deduce a necessary fall in the rate of profit would be unjustified, because progress in the productive power of labor, accelerated by mechanization, ends up reducing the values (i.e., prices) of all commodities, and thereby also those of the means of production. It cannot be excluded a priori that the devaluation of constant capital might even be strong enough to raise the maximum rate of profit, removing the barrier to the actual rate of profit. The latter is both a positive function of the rate of surplus value and a negative function of the composition of capital. Another criticism is thus that there is no reason to exclude the possibility that the rise in the rate of surplus value can offset the (possible, not necessary) rise in the value composition of capital.

It is interesting to observe that the higher the rate of surplus value soars, and thereby the more the tendency for the rate of profit to fall is repressed, the more likely the system is to run into a third type of crisis, that of realization. Some Marxists have indeed suggested that the rate of profit falls because actual (or expected) effective demand is insufficient for the system as a whole to buy commodities at their full value (including the average rate of profit). Two conflicting positions have been dominant in this group of theories. One approach (that of Hilferding, for example) stressed that disproportionalities-i.e., sectoral imbalances between supply and demand-were intrinsic to a spontaneous, chaotic market economy. If excess supply persistently affects important branches of production, this can spread to other sectors and easily degenerate into a general glut of commodities. This kind of difficulty, however, depends on the speed of price-and-quantity adjustment to disequilibrium, and may disappear in a more "organized" form of capitalism. Some of its proponents (such as Mikhail Tugan-Baranovski) even ended up endorsing the view that, being "production for production's sake," capitalism encounters no true barrier in effective demand, and in principle sustain a balanced growth path with declining consumption. The other approach (associated with Luxemburg and others) is sometime wrongly labelled "underconsumptionist," though in fact it stresses under-investment. It maintains that net investment could not compensate for insufficient consumption forever, since the long-term profitability of new machine-goods depends on future outlets, and these latter are less and less predictable with a decreasing share of consumption in total demand. The same reproduction schemas prove that the inter-sectoral trade proportions required for expanded reproduction are precarious and unsteady. An increasing extraction of relative surplus value-which is needed to overcome the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, and which strengthens the tendency for the relative wage to fall-shifts them continuously, making them unlikely to be met for long.

For some of these theorists, such forms of realization crisis are of increasing severity and lead to a final breakdown, when the "external" factors mitigating them (such as the net exports to non-capitalist areas) are exhausted. Other writers in the same tradition, as Kalecki, objected that the insufficiency of effective demand may be solved by what he dubbed "domestic exports," i.e., governments' budget deficits financed by the injection of new money; indeed, Luxemburg already hinted at something of this kind in her original argument, under the heading of military expenditures on armaments. A similar role may be played by unproductive consumption by "third persons," drawing their incomes from deductions from total surplus value. To be compatible with a stable accumulation of capital, these "solutions" call for continued pressure on living labor. This confirms the role of the rate of surplus value as the pillar of capitalist development, and of the outcome of the class struggle within the capitalist labor process as the crucial determinant of its dynamics.

A re-reading of Marx's theory of crisis looks at the tendential fall in the rate of profit as a meta-theory of crises, incorporating the different kinds of crises which can be derived from Marx, and extending them to a historical narrative of the evolution of capitalism. From this point of view, the tendential fall in the rate of profits due to a rising value composition of capital was confirmed during the Long Depression of the late nineteenth century. The increasing rate of exploitation needed to overcome the tendency was implemented by Fordism and Taylorism, which jointly strengthened the tendency for the relative wage to fall. The rise in the rate of surplus value, however, created the conditions of a realization crisis, the Great Crash of the 1930s. The so-called golden age of capitalism after the Second World War was predicated on a higher pressure on productive workers, to obtain enough living labor and gain ever higher surplus labor. This in turn opened the way to a social crisis of accumulation, because of the struggles within the immediate valorization process-a key factor in the stagflation of the 1970s.

From this point of view, the so-called Great Moderation, leading to the recent Great Recession (if not Lesser Depression), must be interpreted as capital's reaction to a crisis originating from a rupture in the same capital-labor "social relation" within production. "Great Moderation," of course, was a misnomer, coined by Ben Bernanke in 2004 and founded on the delusion that finance and business cycles were at last under control. Neoliberalism is best captured as a real subsumption of labor to finance and debt within a Minskyian "money manager capitalism": the subordinated integration of households into the stock exchange market, and their descent into bank indebtedness. As I have argued several times with Joseph Halevi, even before Minsky the tendency to household private indebtedness was captured by Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff as a powerful countertendency, and Sweezy developed a reading of the new phase of capitalism in terms of "financial dominance." The other side of the coin was the "deconstruction" of labor in the new phase of capitalist accumulation, characterized by new styles of corporate governance leading to a centralization without concentration, and then to a weakening of workers in the labor market and in the labor process. This form of capitalism was based on a capital market inflation, which, though it stabilized the system for a time, has proven unsustainable.


This piece originally appeared at MROnline . It is a revised version of a paper presented at the Union for Radical Political Economics session of the Allied Social Sciences Association Conference in Philadelphia in January 2018, and previously presented at the Historical Materialism Conference in London in November 2017.

Riccardo Bellofiore is a professor of economics at the University of Bergamo.

Contrived Connections of Capital

By Steven L. Foster

Unpastoral Limps

I made a couple of connections while taking an early morning bike ride along tree-lined, deeply rutted and pot-marked, dirt access lanes leading me through expanses of flooded checkered rice fields, sprouting green and dotted with white heron. One connection was a barbed-wire fence newly stung and anchored by poured concrete posts rising higher than the older bamboo barriers tied to trees along the pathway designating ownership over parcels of land.

The other was an old man in a not-too-distant wooded area emerging from his tiny platformed shack constructed from corrugated sheet metal, rough-hewn wood planks, and bamboo. Remnants of a wood fire in an arched ground level mud oven smoldered. Chickens were scampering about with dogs barking-once I became sighted, and a couple of penned-up pigs grunting near a small vegetable garden. The abode was likely his year-round home, and not a makeshift shelter built in shaded areas for temporary field laborers escaping the tropical sun.

Clad in grimy clothing, he listed to his left, severely limping (I too have limps), and slowly trudging toward a beat-up grimy motorcycle with side-car. He nodded towards me in acknowledgement while calming his dogs as he hoisted a bundle of wood kindling taken from the side-car. The old man's likely working as a tenant farmer hired by the land owner who constructed the new barbed wire fencing. Less than 14 percent of the farmers in the largely agrarian country where I reside own the land they work, even though less than three decades ago 44 percent were small land-owning farmers.

Triggered by the fence and seeing the farmer-representing to me an arduous life of poverty and toil for someone so old, I briefly thought: All three of us are commodities.

A contrived connection? Yes. But, not by me. We were intentionally made commodities and had little choice in the matter. After all, who wants to be merely a commodity unless you're branded as a wealthy superstar, luring others "to be like Mike," Madonna, or Rihanna? Especially, since I believe far more intrinsic connections exist between the three of us-whether we know it or not.

In what follows, I'll briefly explore the broad historical processes in how the land, the old man, and I received our assigned roles in the socially constructed capitalist global market. Retired (also with little choice in the matter) after nearly five decades of working, I've had time reflecting on my life in a society designed to turn as much as it can into commodities where my value resided largely in making someone else profits.

Let me first clarify what is meant by commodity and the processes of commodification.

Marx's analysis of a commodity basically stresses a thing's exchange value, quite different than the use an item possesses. For instance: A new case-hardened steel axe may have higher value to the tenant farmer when gathering fire wood than his old axe. That steel axe doesn't have much use value for someone living in a Chicago high-rise building. However, a hardware store owner in selling it (she lives in a high-rise) changes the nature of value the axe possesses. It becomes valuable for the profit it makes by buying the axe at a low price, then selling it at a high price beyond initial costs of purchase and overhead. The axe is now a commodity to the store owner.

Selling everything it can as commodities is essential to capitalism. That's how profits are made. The higher the degree of profit, the more valued a commodity becomes, often outstripping its worth as a useable item.

Take as an example a sturdy handbag and an elegant Gucci satchel. Both perform similar tasks by carrying things and may even require similar material. But, the Gucci sells at a significantly higher price, very likely making much more profit, and therefore, retaining higher commodity value when sold. Not surprisingly, you don't want to harm a costly satchel by carrying potentially leaky groceries in it. Just as you'd not want to take a grocery carrying handbag-maybe stained from previously seeping fresh fruit that got squashed, to a stylishly sophisticated restaurant. You pull out the Gucci for such an occasion and not carry much in it so there'd be no conspicuous bulges breaking its lines complimenting the sleekness of your evening wear.

Economic historian Karl Polanyi noted from his study of capitalist history (modern western history): the commodification of land, labor, and money was necessary for capitalism to work as a social system (see The Great TransformationThe Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Beacon Press edition, 2001). Without a capitalist market built around these three forms of commodities, we have something other than capitalism. He also suggested that commodifying these things stretches the seams of our social makeup where vital connections to our environments and the people in them breaks down.

We'll look at a broad history of how land and then labor changed into commodities that fueled my initial lament connecting me, the fenced land, and the (other) old man.

(I'm connecting large historical dots with thick lines in keeping with the essay's scope.)


Something Called Nature: Dominated and Sold

Modern humans have hypothetically labelled things in the world not made by us as part of nature. A tree is natural. The wood from it making a press board book shelf isn't. It's made by a human culture. The cultural worlds of people somehow became separated from a "natural" world comprised of nonhuman things: wild forests and jungles, oceans and reefs, and all the animals and strange stuff in them we study and use for our purposes. We moderns think of ourselves as minds living in bodies that we steer and engineer like a space craft from another world fashioned from material that's alien to the aliens.

Thinking and living like that's true provides us an illusion of our transcendence from a non-living world of atoms and what they combine to make, just waiting for us to give them meaning. People with minds give minds to mindless matter found in nature. Nice of us.

It's an unfounded modern concept. Our current sciences are showing the separation between nature and culture is patently artificial, a mere abstraction created by people in the past considering themselves scientific; yet, unaware of their specifically historical conditioning and the perspectival limits of knowledge saddling our finitude as humans. Examples of current scientific inquiry blurring distinctions are: quantum physics-with theories of massless (or nearly so) "fields" forming the primary essence of an organically connected universe (very likely one of many universes); molecular biology informed by this (meta)physics suggesting particles can be in two places at once that's important for respiration and nutrient absorption; sciences pursuing theories around consciousness finding it in more than just smart animals-like the self-awareness of tree communities; neurosciences questioning the existence of a unique self that's separated from "outside" experiences forming an individual; anthropology studying human cultures and still asking: what are humans and their societies-really?, etc.

But, this "Great Divide" between nature and culture persists. That's because the "Divide" has been, and continues to be, useful. (For analysis of the Divide see Bruno Latour: We've Never Been Modern, Harvard University Press, 1993, and, Beyond Nature and Culture, by Philippe Descola, University of Chicago Press, 2013. I've taken current science references from a plethora of sources).

The nature part of the Divide is seen by modernity as a thing to be subdued. The Christians of the 16th century and 17th centuries took the biblical mandate from Genesis-subduing God's creation of a natural order, in a way very different than a Hebraic understanding of the passage. The myth of humans subduing and having dominion over nature was likely viewed by the authors of Genesis as caring for and nurturing a creation as one of its creatures placed on earth as a divine vassal, totems of God's cherishing presence (humanity in the image of God). The European religious understanding shifted the meaning to what the father of the scientific method- Francis Bacon (1561-1626), proposed. Nobly concerned as he was with the plight of humans struggling against uncertainties in a natural world, his search for scientific knowledge was for bringing nature under utter control of people. Now, subduing the earth means exercising dominating power over it in a constantly raging battle to conquer it as something other than us.

It's important to recognize this understanding between us and nature when considering how land became a commodity in the capitalist world. Using land productively for profit as an individual owner sees fit, with the land passed along to other individuals through sale or inheritance as a commodity, became like a religion in the west vehemently protected by law.

To be civilized, however rich and ancient your historical traditions, you must adopt the modern capitalist understanding regarding land. The primary meaning of "the rule of law and order" is the protection of private property and the absolute rights of an individual owner over that property, especially land. This is a very modern understanding, legally codified as recently as the later part of the 19th century, though theoretically formulated by John Locke two centuries before then. If you're one of those societies resisting 'the rule of law," you're automatically thrust into being from the natural world and not of culture, or at minimum, in a nebulous area in between the two (Latour); and therefore, less human and in need of civilizing.

Land use for myriads of cultures throughout human history was not for individual exploitation, but, for communities to take what was necessary for their cultural existence, replenishing the resources when able, or moving on when unable-allowing the land to recover and revitalize itself over time. The heads of communities-both women and men, provided land allotments based on specific family needs. Larger families got more land for their sustenance. Most often, there was redistribution of pooled resources ensuring needs be met for those unable, or under-able, to care for themselves. Reciprocity was the basis of economic practices and not individual gain central to commodity exchange-now nearly a universal feature in our global capitalist cultures. In some societies, leadership was chosen based on their capacities to give away the material excesses they accumulated through war or other means and ways.

Yes, there were resource wars over land and its contents. Tribal boundaries existed designating areas used by specific communities and infringement on these territories could amount to conflict, especially in times of scarcity. However, treaties were made allowing other groups certain access rights as needed, and inter-tribal marriages brought communities together effecting allocations of combined resources.

In sum, the singularly individual ownership of land for most our globe's cultures was a totally outlandish concept.

Of course, land was controlled. Under empires, it many have fallen under the jurisdiction of individual rulers and the religions supporting them. Though, what control primarily meant was exacting tribute over populations on the dominated land, payments often in the form of produce from it. There wasn't ownership of a thing called "private property." The subsistence needs of the populous garnered from land were granted by those in authority; that's if a dominating leader wanted to remain in power. When populations were denied land access, they violently rebelled jeopardizing a ruler's position.

In ancient Greece, private ownership for the sake of individual commercial exploitation occurred as prominent men transacted with other city-states and cultures through trade networks. But, land was still provided to non-slaves by law. Of course, tribute/taxation and other services were required for a ruler's protection.

Absolute ownership by an individual becomes legally granted under Roman law, statutes passed in the Republic by the elite landed classes. It was a break with tradition. Again, land was provided as a cultural practice to plebeians-classes of commoners. Access to land was vital to Roman self-understanding since citizen farmers served in the army when called upon with payment for military service often coming through land grants. House-holding networks were central to the Roman economy with redistribution of booty from the conquered supplementing the basic house-hold units.

After the break-up of the Roman empire, access to land for all classes of people during the middle ages followed centuries of socially engrained custom. This was the right of the commons (common land use).

The lowest of peasant groupings in the constructed social hierarchy-villeins, were able to maintain subsistence from the land: growing food, using materials for housing, raising livestock, and making things needed for essential living which was also traded for other needed items based on local markets controlled by social custom. The villeins maintained about 13 acres in their modest farms, holding between 40-50 percent of all the arable land according to geographer Gary Fields ( EnclosurePalestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror, University of California Press, 2017, kindle location 821). In 1300 CE, nearly 50 percent of farming in England was on the commons (Fields). Landed nobility exacted tribute consuming most surpluses and would also demand services from villeins that could change like the weather.

Life was not easy. However, the deeply felt pride of self-sufficiency was part of the social fabric. Fields reveals that villeins, even though legally land insecure, still had recourse through manor courts protecting rights to the land based on custom. They were able to procure more holdings of land left fallow after the Black Plague depleted the population. Copyhold practices became a legal process in the 15th century where land occupied by villeins could be passed on to family if fines were paid to nobility.

They, like freeholding farmers, were vested in the land they worked, upgrading and maintaining both their individual lots and common fields worked by the community. It was a unique balance between individual farms and collective agrarian practices on the commons (Fields). Peasant farmers along with the manor courts ensured individuals would not dominate the commons and regulated grazing, crop rotation, and land regeneration ensuring individual farmers would preserve their lots for the benefit of the community and its future. Agricultural innovations boosting productivity were implemented well before the modern technological revolutions occurred.

All was to change by the dawning of the 16th century as England nobility, driven by a number of factors, most notably-commercial greed as mercantile capitalism was on the rise, began a long march of physically enclosing the land under their control. It was, as Fields states, "a long-term project of improving land by 'making private property' on the English landscape. This transformation represents a decisive moment in the long-standing lineage of reallocations in property rights, in which groups with territorial ambitions gained control of land owned or used by others." The result was "…eradicating common field farming and remaking a landscape that once boasted a large inventory of land used as a collective resource (loc 759)."

Very importantly, Fields points out that enclosing the land-using fences, barriers, and roads to designate individualized private property, not only meant inclusive control over it and all that it contains; but, exclusion of others. Even access passages leading to other areas of land that still held common use were denied. Boggs and forested areas were closed off from common use making hunting, food foraging, even fire wood-gathering, illegal to all except the owner. A whole way of life existing for centuries was slowly, yet systematically, dismantled as agrarian societies throughout England, Europe, and then the world lost vital access to land.

The rationale was improvement of land for commercial ends that would bolster integration of a national economy trading increasingly on a global scale. Whether turning grain producing fields into pasture or using it for monocrop growth in order to maximize exports outside of region or country, the goals were profits for elite landholders. Larger estates dominated the English landscape. The villeins, the most precarious members of society, were the first to be affected as peasant residents were expelled. Smaller holdings (yeoman farmers and copyhold villeins) were bought out or outright ousted with the rationale being "efficiency" (read-maximizing profits) in using land. What happened was an all-out assault on common field agriculture. And after the enclosing processes, whether noticeable efficiency in greater productive capacity over the long haul was really achieved or not-other than increased profits, is still a matter of debate among agricultural historians. Over grazing and soil exhaustion through large scale monocrop production had detrimental effects decades after initial increases in produce occurred over the short term because of so called improvements.

Land is now fully a commodity; a thing to be personally possessed and valued for its profitability as an investment. All others are excluded from using this commodity.

Importantly, land enclosures caused unrelenting social upheaval. It was the primary impetus for the institution of wage labor on a mass scale.


Behold! A Labor Market Is Birthed

It's always remarkable just how actions become supported by theoretical 'reason' after events have already occurred. John Locke, a founding thinker regarding land use and any "natural law" surrounding it, systematized what constituted proper land management while the English were slaughtering Indigenous peoples and taking their lands for decades prior to his ruminations. He served as a colonial bureaucrat overseeing the process in the Americas. Adam Smith, father of the "science" of modern economics, theorizer of free markets and worshipped by adorning capitalists in following generations, saw all people in history acting like his local butcher; that is, humans as essentially bartering, trucking, and trading beings driven by individual self-interest looking for personal gain. However, as Polanyi suggests, "…the alleged propensity of man to barter, truck, and exchange is almost entirely apocryphal (pg. 46)." Like the dichotomy between nature and culture, Smith's reductive speculations concerning human motivation is more useful than fundamentally truthful.

This was a necessary understanding of what constitutes the human for transforming society into capitalist culture. Polanyi notes, "The transformation implies a change in the motive of action on the part of the members of society; for the motive of subsistence that of gain must be substituted. All transactions are turned into money transactions (pg. 43)." Subsistence labor on the land must be displaced in capitalist society, workers now becoming wage earners.

The cultural change of the 19th century where, according to Polanyi, full-fledged capitalist culture occurred, was set-up in the 16 th and 17th centuries. As stated above, enclosures increasingly eliminated peasant copyholds, making remaining villeins at-will tenants, meaning they could be removed from the land at the whim of the owners without legal recourse and protections. Rents levied on leases of land and housing increased significantly over this period of time.

It wasn't that peasants didn't rebel against nobility's reneging on responsibilities as reactions were found in the high medieval period and continuing. Enclosing barriers were destroyed. Major rebellions, in Norfolk with Kett's Rebellion (1549), to the revolt at Midlands (1607) "would mark numerous protests against specific enclosures well into the eighteenth century (Fields, loc 770)." Violent crackdowns by local magistrates and state authorities met the insurgences. It was also a time of heightened religious persecutions in support of elites, including the church "inquisitions" of heretics and other evil-doers from among the lower-class rabble who were upsetting burgeoning commercial successes and calling into question questionable practices.

Incidents of poaching were on the rise throughout the long period. Capital punishments also increased, especially following armed poaching by masked raiders in the 18th century, not infrequently sending an offending party to the gallows for stealing a goose. Law enforcement groups were organized by gentry and the idyllic rural countryside was laced with precarity and the thievery and violence that accompanies it. Poaching only increased during the 19th century in spite of harsh laws inflicting weighty penalties.

After the Glorious Revolution in 1688, the merchant classes and large land owners winning the day in controlling English monarchal power, the enclosure processes began to hit full stride, not stopping until the beginning of the 20th century. With the triumph of the capitalist classes came an onslaught of parliamentary actions that assaulted the traditions of law protecting rights of common land use, passage and access rights, collective farming, and tenant occupancy rights.

How did the once landed peasantry survive other than by illegal means?

The newly un-landed hired themselves out to large land owners for wages. Wage labor became a necessity if peasantry was to survive.

A degree of wage labor did exist prior to the enclosures. Landless folks unable to fully support themselves from farming would hire out to a manor lord, as well as to yeomen farmers who held larger plots, and even to a cohort of villeins who gained more copyhold land access. There were also local and increasingly regional cottage industries making needed items for use by local communities. However, wage labor was not a typical form of sustaining life. Society largely frowned it. Even if self-sufficient peasants were themselves poor, they were independently self-supporting. The social mores around idleness were severe to say the least. A chronically offending vagabond (unemployed, unauthorized traveler between parishes), or an able-bodied beggar, could be put to death.

Unemployment, or underemployment-pauperism, as never before seen was now a regular feature of the countryside. Enclosures were a key feature propelling this, although it must be granted that other processes were also at work. There were instabilities in commodity prices making for fluctuations in available work, especially after an increasingly nationalized and globalized mercantile capitalist markets spread.

During this time of upheaval, merchant groups were procuring charters for expanding once local cottage industries into manufacturing settlements, towns making commodities for sale to a larger region and on the growing international markets that would include supplying finished goods to colonial populations abroad. Un-landed peasants supplied them with workers. The towns grew into manufacturing cities with a workforce no longer restricted to manors and feudal life under a lord as of 1795. With the Industrial Revolution in full swing, the industrial cities were fostering the inhumane conditions that Charles Dickens spoke about in the early 19 th century and Upton Sinclair in the early 20th century. Historical social research has confirmed their insights into urban squalor as the countryside was emptied of its hungry inhabitants needing wage labor for survival and travelling wherever work could be found.

And very usefully, the power of the parish craft guilds was broken. Previous to the privatizing of land as a commodity, guilds through the manor courts had authority controlling production: how many producers of given items in a geographic location averting undue competition, prices of goods and services with minimal standards of living specific to professions, as well as product quality-including worker training in all aspects of production, social support for the infirmed, etc. When agrarian society was dismantled, so was the cultural power of the guilds helping control individualistic merchant greed and manorial excesses. Meager wages now bought necessities with money and no longer through locally defined economics based on reciprocity and social convention. Now, "…all incomes must derive from the sale of something or other, and whatever the actual source of a person's income, it must be regarded as resulting from sale. No less is implied in the simple term 'market system' (Polanyi, pg. 43)." A national labor market being birthed in England was coming to full force.

Under the growing labor market income systematically fell short in meeting basic sustenance. Pauperism was becoming rampant. Previously, wages under the guilds were designed to be adequate for a worker to sustain his family appropriate to life's social stations (not everyone was to have the same standard of living). Not now. The roles of women changed along with the men, as their labor responsibilities in the mass-producing industries of factory towns were formed replacing those of the cottage. Hiring out as domestic servants took women away from the fields. Men, women and children, in making ends meet, were forced to work long, arduously monotonous hours of hard and dangerous factory labor. They were re-socialized into labor's divisions imposed from the outside-theorized in Smith's production of pins for maximizing profits, and not as workers who once made end products through all stages of manufacture.

The new labor force was disciplined and punished (M. Foucault) into new cultural configurations radically different than the centuries long traditions that formed them, traditions that were based on the cycles of nature and the harvest. Now lives were reflected in the factory and the inhuman drudgery it imposed. It was socially fracturing contributing to alcoholism, domestic abuse, petty thievery, and the ills and disease that infested their new environs.

Was there social relief for an enlarged population in distress? There was.

Beginning in 1494 and continuing through 1547 and beyond, laws were formed distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving poor. Those deemed deserving had recourse to support in special living arrangements-poor houses, with orphans and children of single mothers living with the elderly and those unable work-the infirmed. Those undeserving served under harsh workhouses that only grew harsher as time went on. But, as the feudal social system continued breaking down, more vagabondage, begging, and unemployment occurred growing the populations of the work-houses and debtors prisons.

The later part of Queen Elizabeth I's reign witnessed Poor Laws enacted, the 1601 laws codifying the previously established legislations and harsh penalties surrounding begging and undocumented travel between locales, and more systematically defined what was meant by being poor. It also provided relief for the pauperism plaguing the crown's subjects. These laws were administered at the local parish levels with lots of disparity between the parishes- who gets and how much assistance was given. The funding was also local through compulsory taxation rates on land, pressuring mostly smaller landholders and business people, not the elite whose personal wealth was exempted from the tax. Keeping costs down was a big motivation. Population movement to parishes better off and with better benefits was restricted with stark limits placed on travelling without appropriate permits in the mid-17th century.

The Speenhamland System, enacted around the same time of nationally "freeing" peasants for travel between parishes (1795) so they could find work, suggested an allowance system based on the price of bread and family size since grain prices were increasing primarily due to England's part in fighting the French revolutionaries, then the Napoleonic Wars, and subpar harvests. It was intended to supplement the cries of low wage earners for a "right to live," something wage rates did not afford. The system was a failure on many accounts.

Speenhamland, though national, was administered unevenly on the local level, and mostly in rural areas where peasant unrest was an ever-present reality. Little assistance went to the newly urbanized populations who also needed it. It became too easy for a worker not to work, or to not produce on a level of one's reasonable capacity, since there was a guaranteed income, even though survival on it was dismal. This was demoralizing and degenerating to long social traditions of self-sufficiency and the benefits work provided for families and their cohesion. Being "on the dole" was too similar to the social stigma attached to the work and poorhouses even though the system paid benefits 'outdoor' with recipients not having to live in one of the houses of disrepute if receiving assistance. The local taxation pressure placed on the smaller landholding and manufacturing employers made for deep animosity between those receiving benefits and those supporting the system.

The taxation levels only grew because of an important central flaw to a well-meaning system. There was never any pressure for raising wage rates. Quite the contrary. Employers lowered the wage rates as much as they could, knowing the system would make up the difference. Further, commodity prices remained high since public money was provided based on the price of buying bread. It also made what jobs were available more unstable when profits levels fluctuated and an employer could ready eliminate positions knowing workers would retain a basic income regardless. When it became clearer that the program hurt capitalist production in the long run, important public opinion decried the Speenhamland system, again-a program well intentioned, but, poorly conceived. Though costly to those paying the funding rates, it mostly hurt and dispirited the intended recipients-the working poor.

Prominent public policy figures and theorizers, such as Edmund Burke, Jeremy Bentham, David Ricardo, and Thomas Malthus railed against the relief. Foremost, the lack of a "free" self-regulating market for labor was being jettisoned by Speenhamland. Ricardo suggested that wages would "naturally" stabilize at a basic survival level. Malthus felt 'right to live' wages would only encourage the poor to reproduce beyond the capacity of the land to sustain human life and starvation was a natural phenomenon for necessary population control. For him, the poor only waste any wage surplus in the ale house. (The Reverend Malthus appears an avatar for some of our current forms of (un)Christianity.) In the end, the old Poor Laws under Speenhamland were repealed and new Poor Laws enacted in 1834, cruelly sharpening the conditions of relief and removing outdoor assistance, making all who received support live in the workhouse, separating family members and deleting any dignity to life in a place worse than the poorest of working people's conditions.

At bottom, under the new Poor Laws, being poor was declared a moral character deficiency.

Polanyi indicates when the new Poor Laws of 1834 were implemented, a completely commodified labor market was born, the last of his three processes of commodification necessary for shaping capitalist society. Removed from subsistence sources and the land supporting agrarian communities, people were now left for a labor market to decide wage payments, hunger motivating a workforce to take whatever wages were offered them.

Yet, ironically, capitalism created its own critics and chief nemeses in a phenomenon labelled the proletariat.


Retorts and Exports

Though we've engaged an English commodification history, the process didn't stop within those borders. Other like-minded countries of Europe quickly followed the economic path the English elite trod, they too transforming their agrarian societies, such as: the 16th century independent Netherlands, France, Germany, late-comer Russia, along with a number of others joining the capitalist profits parade. However, it wasn't as if it was smooth sailing in socially transforming cultures into capitalist societies.

Retorts of seething revolutionary rumblings burst into action in the revolts of 1830, widespread throughout Europe, where demands were made for greater public participation through parliaments forming their country's direction and placing limits on monarchies. Even more unsettling to the system run by ruling elites were the revolts of 1848 (the People's Spring) involving a large part of western Europe that demanded greater democratic voice in national affairs. It didn't stop there as the Paris Commune shook all of Europe's profit-oriented leaders when coalitions of workers, craftsmen and artisans declared Paris independent from the French monarchy and showed the world that the rabble was very capable of self-governance outside the existing capitalist culture foisted upon them. They had to be utterly crushed to prevent others from undergoing the same machinations. And, brutally, in 1871 the French army-with the aid of the Prussians who had just signed a peace treaty with a defeated France, along with the political support of the rest of capitalist Europe, did just that. An alternative to capitalism was decapitated.

It's important to recognize that capitalism demands removing any ability for people sustaining themselves through other alternatives. This is an obvious lesson modern English history taught us when the population was removed from self-sustenance via land privatization while having a wage system thrust upon them. Capitalists also implemented minimal programs when necessary to thwart revolt against the system. The remedies of the Poor Laws were most active in areas bordering on revolution.

Capitalist leadership learned that making the labor market more humane through safer workplaces and providing some benefits to workers-like Bismarck's reforms in the later part of the 19th century, would ensure the system could continue operating. However, any reforms were still in the context of a system that had already commodified land and working people destroying any existing forms of collective self-sufficiency. When reforms impede the profit-making roles commodified land and labor possess, the impediments are removed, just like the Poor Laws were banished and harsher rules implemented.

This historical fact is very apparent today. The systemic pressures to remove the welfare side of state responsibilities to its citizens-obligations demanded and won through generations of workers fighting (and dying) for greater security, respect, and dignity, demanding the "right to live," have never been greater. Witness roll-backs of wage gains throughout the world, cut-backs of public safety nets under austerity as capitalists assume less responsibilities funding public programs, privatizations of public services through selloffs and private/public "partnerships," including national parks to roadways, from bridges to postal services (postal-England); even retirement programs (Chile), and fully public funded health-care services are being transformed into profit making endeavors.

I emphasize, it's not about neoliberal capitalist ideology versus a good capitalism where a paternal state will protect its people from the system's excesses. The socially destructive aspects of commodifying life have been apparent from capitalism's mercantile origins regardless of the liberal-electoral forms undertaken in the 19th and 20 th centuries that attempted to mitigate capital.

Stronger state interventions attempting to train an untrainable and individually greedy capitalism may have helped over the very recent historically anomaly-capital's golden age after the Second World War, but, not over modern history's long duration. Just as remedies were applied to social ills created by the enclosures and labor market, the modern state-intrinsically wed to capitalism, will suspend its paternalistic role whenever so demanded by capital. And under severe systemic threats, capital and its nation/state merge into a totalitarian state-run economy and society, taking fascist forms as seen following the World War I, and during the Great Depression after the 1929 market crash, and is now seen again, if under 21st century circumstances.

The same commodification processes of land and labor, and everything else it can, continue in various stages throughout the globalized world. It's the metastatic legacy of imperialism. This is where my fenced land and limping old man come in.

Consolidation of land into the hands of a few - now fueled by major corporations and investment firms (witness the voracious corporate land grabs in the food insecure areas of Africa and other parts of the world) dominate the remaining vestiges of a natural world ripe in generating profits while feeding populations of consumers. The mass migrations over the last few decades have forcibly expelled innumerable populations in a developing world from their ancient sustaining lands into cities where wage labor now provides their sustenance. Giant agribusinesses force feed existing agrarian societies with land exhausting technologies when they've been very capable of feeding themselves apart from global commodity markets while sustaining their land (unless disasters caused by global warming or profit-driven wars befall them.) Just like the brief history outlined in this essay, the globe is undergoing the necessary processes of social transformation needed to make capitalism supreme, regardless of any preexisting cultural structures.

Cultures founded on capitalism are irreformable. Mitigating reforms attempting to save societies, that's taken many generations to achieve, are being dismantled within far less time than a single generation. And answers don't mean trying to reassemble pre-capitalist pasts. These are long gone with social aspects that should be gone. Potential futures are bleak should capital remain dominant.

It will take visions of a flourishing future without capitalism from a new generation of the systemically dispossessed and disgruntled, dreams looking past the present, while recognizing how this moment came to pass by critically engaging history, and then saying no longer. Local ways will be found for working around the current system, and then networking of local successes into regional and more global alliances building new futures (local change cannot stand alone). Whatever alternatives will take place, they must not include making all things into commodities if life on the planet, as we know it, prevails.

The old man likely limps from his hard labors. A limp of mine from my past labors is now exposed.

The White Noise of Forgetfulness: How Imperialism and Racism Remain Central to Capitalism

By Steven L. Foster

Michael Corleone in the The Godfather II (1974) is son of the Godfather seeking legitimacy for the family's amassed Mafia fortune. It was attained by violent extortion from those considered more vulnerable and lesser people, through mass murder, general mayhem supporting groveling servitude, sexual slavery, and other gruesome activities. The money needed protection and cleansing, so Michael invested it into enterprises respected by the business community. The fortune was placed into legal gambling in Las Vegas because there's nothing more respected in capitalism than gambling against money tendered by other people. He achieved a veneer of acceptability.

He accomplished this by working with high level politicians while gaining respect from prominent members of the community. Even the church hierarchy paid him homage. Yet, while his son (and heir) was being baptized, the real ways the family gained wealth was busily doing what they do; murder and mayhem by systematically eliminating any, and all, potential rivals. Terrified fear as respect was always legitimacy to Mafioso. When questioned before the Congressional committee investigating him, he tells a story wholly unrelated to the truth, and may have even been convinced of his own confabulatory history.

Confabulation is a psychological term where historical recollections leave out important details, while making things up and twisting meanings placating personality dysfunctions-like narcissistic disorders. Argentinian born scholar, Enrique Dussel, has applied the term to western ways of narrating history.

The west has forgotten important details of an inordinately violent imperialist past supporting capitalism and central for making formerly marginal world cultures fabulously rich and globally dominating to this day. When the topic of imperialism is discussed, it's often treated as an artifact from an unfortunate past. Or, it recasts itself as the beneficent patron without which all of humanity would be in a far worse place had it not arrived. It's been deemed as socially evolutionary.

My purpose in taking us on a very short not so magical history tour is for clearing away the white noise of the west's forgetful self-deception about capitalist imperialism and the necessary racism accompanying it. My claim: capitalism has been devolutionary to human flourishing and not evolutionary as claimed by many supporters. I want to show that my Godfather illustration is more than mere metaphor.

In doing so, my intention is not berating people of western origins since the Scots represent half of mine. However, to understand the present and change the future, an honest and courageous appraisal of our pasts is indispensable.

A simple syllogism outlining my argument is: Western imperialism is (essentially) racist. Capitalism is imperialist. Therefore, capitalism is racist.

In western modernity imperialism, racism, and capitalism is a single historical package. You may define them as separate, but, historically they are inseparable as I hope to show.

Without segueing into what constitutes capitalism as a cultural construct, I'd like to use the term generally to include its various historical forms: mercantile, 19th century "free market", Keynesian, mixed-market, neoliberalism and whatever other flavors may be so bandied. The types and when they appear, disappear, and reappear, or even if present all at once in history, doesn't affect my use of the term since all types have directly, or indirectly, benefitted from imperialism throughout modern history.

Importantly, my charge regarding racism is: if capitalism can't use people of color as labor commodities driving down costs as much as possible for maximizing profits, the tendency is for killing them in vastly large numbers to gain what was wanted from them. Using racial difference has helped provide a certain relaxed ease in making the whole earth into one large mass grave for racially designated 'others.'

I refer to the attribute "white" in this essay as an artificial construction deeply situated in the legacy of the racist lexicon used for denoting an ingrained idea of "higher" and "lower" human natures.

First, let me briefly define in theory what are imperialist activities. Then I'll touch on only a few historical points from imperialist practices.

(To track sources and citations, I use a purposefully short bibliography of recent scholarship at the end of the essay [a number of them award-winning] so my argument won't be considered "dated", referring to last names in the narrative and locations in their works when necessary. It makes, hopefully, for an easier read.)

Mann defines imperialist actions as: "a centralized, hierarchical system of rule acquired and maintained by coercion through which a core territory dominates peripheral territories" (pg. 17). By "core" territories he follows Immanuel Wallerstein who assigns core to the original capitalist nation/states, like: Spain and Portugal (infant forms of capitalism), the Netherlands, Britain, France, Japan, and once colonies that gained independence like: the U.S.A., Canada, South Africa, Australia, etc. Those on the periphery would be the geographic areas and peoples pillaged by the core countries controlling their resources, institutions, labor, and cultural self-understandings, among other needful things between the core and periphery; as well as, dictating how the peripheries are to conduct relations with each other.

There are decidedly racial differences between core and periphery that can't be historically blurred. There was no such thing as a make-believe "melting pot."

Many post-colonial thinkers suggest capitalism as a globalizing social system began with Columbus. So, we'll start with him.


Columbus: Trail-Blazing Slaver

There are increasing histories written about the horrors of the African slave trade and who profited and how, but, few dealing with the enslavement of Amerindians. With apologies, my cursory focus will be more on the American Indigenous enslavement while still referencing the African occurrence because both were indispensably central to Europe's wealth accumulation.

Columbus was a seasoned sea-merchant operating in the Mediterranean early capitalist mercantile system before setting sail in a profit-making venture for his investors and himself. He correctly believed by travelling west he'd find a trading passage to the rich East, thereby circumventing hostile Muslims who dominated trade by controlling the Silk Road networks connecting Europe to the East. At Columbus' time, dissimilarities in human essences were deeply ingrained in the European mind (defined as 'the races' early in the 16th century and becoming solidified in the vocabulary during the 17th century). Papal pronouncements declared "blood" differences between Christians, Muslims, and Jews providing divine sanction for the permanent enslavement of non-Christians who were taken captive through "religious" crusades. Those definitions were extended to include the Indigenous of the Americas and African peoples, even though they were not at war with the Europeans as were Muslims.

Columbus visited the Portuguese fortress-Sao Jorge da Mina (later known as Elmina located in modern Guinea), 10 years prior to his famous voyage. At the time of Columbus' visit, it was already fast becoming a notorious port that ended up disembarking millions upon millions of enslaved Africans over the next centuries for the very lucrative Atlantic slave trade with human "product" destinations in the Caribbean, Americas and elsewhere in the world.

Todorov documents that the Europeans had not run into any people like those they met in the Caribbean on Columbus' first voyage. As Resendez remarks, the climate was like Africa, but the people were not as dark as African slaves, having straight hair, their physical features more like the Europeans, hence were considered cleverer than Africans. Columbus noted their mental capacities, but, recorded seeing them as "weaker and less spirited" than the Europeans, and therefore, ripe for domination. He wrote of their ingenuity and docility, how they shared things in common and freely gave gifts, were scantily dressed without immodesty, all characteristics Europeans thought people from hotter climates possessed, "making them suitable as slaves," like those sold from Africa (Resendez, pg. 22).

Columbus' voyage was a commercial venture above all else as he was to receive hefty percentages from all future wealth generated by his trip when Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain underwrote the endeavor. Mainstream histories have made much of Columbus' wish to "Christianize" the pagans of the "new" world when he "discovered" it. However, as his letters and diary entries attest, he was far more interested in finding gold than bringing new converts to God, using gold as motivation to keep potentially mutinous crews in line. Finding gold was a European preoccupation. An Amerindian lead the Spanish to where it may be found thinking no consequence in it. How wrong he was.

The curiosity displayed by Columbus toward the Caribbean peoples changed dramatically after initial quantities of gold were pointed out. The docile potential future subjects of the crown suddenly became labelled as savage, pagan idolaters and cannibals, not making for good vassals under civilized rule and suitable only for slavery.

Part of the return voyage's cargo included a couple dozen "Indians" (believing he had actually reached the Orient). They served as tokens of his success because quantities of gold were disappointing and they could possibly serve as interpreters for planned future voyages. Columbus' pressed business plans urging the crown to consider wholesale slavery from the Americas.

It was the reason the destination of Columbus' second commissioned voyage, consisting of seventeen ships carrying provisions and fifteen hundred colonists looking for golden opportunities, carried him further southwest in exploring any business potentials the hotter climates were thought to possess.

Resendez notes that 1600 Indigenous slaves were brought to port for the second voyage's return to Spain, 550 of which were crammed into four small boats since most of the colonists returned disappointed in not finding enough gold. Provisions and booty needing room were also loaded. Over 200 slaves perished on the voyage with half arriving in Europe very weakened and ill. Columbus again pressed his slaving proposal to Isabella and Ferdinand and indicated that he could easily ship 4,000 slaves, commanding large profits according to his most conservative calculations, but it would require a sizable number of ships in order to accomplish the task with less damage to the cargo. Resendez suggests Columbus wished to transform the new European outposts in the Caribbean into a similarly lucrative slave port like the one he witnessed on the West African coast.

Slavery was not readily accepted by the Spanish monarchy when there wasn't a war involved, the practice becoming technically illegal by Spain in the mid-16th century. Yet, it continued by the Spanish for centuries as it was firmly entrenched in the encomienda systems where land and everything contained on it, including human inhabitants, was given to loyal recipients. The English (along with other Europeans) quickly filled the role of legal slaving of those from Africa and vastly expanded it.

Since the African slave trade was legal, its extent could be readily quantified by comparing shipping bills of laden, formal property assessments, etc. This is not easily accomplished with the Indian slave trade in the Americas. Yet it was a thriving practice as Resendez uncovers, paralleling the profoundly inhuman trade in human flesh of the African slaves even though Indigenous numbers were ravaged by genocidal land grabs. He and Horne consider the slave trade of the Amerindians and Africans (along with a host of other scholars) playing the dominate role in what Todorov considered the greatest genocidal catastrophe in human history.

Indian numbers were thought by the Spanish as rather plenteous and could be used up and discarded as easily replaceable commodities. This assessment turned out to be wrong as whole language groups were eliminated from human history in the Caribbean and on the American continents. As slaves, the Indigenous endured unspeakable cruelty-similar to the Africans that followed, being used as beasts of burden in place of domesticated animals with the women from largely matriarchal societies forced into sex slavery in utter cultural humiliation.

Silver extracted from the Americas washed the European continent making it rich beyond compare. It became the preferred precious metal backing credit and trade. It was Indigenous slave labor digging the silver producing ore, often taken from mountains at perilous heights. As Resendez documents, Potosi in Bolivia has a peak of over 15,000 feet, many mine entrances at 12,000 feet. Tunnels were hand-dug hundreds of feet into the mountainsides and the ore was brought to the surface on the backs of Indigenous slaves who would then crush the rock into powder extracting the silver using mercury and lead, both known today as highly toxic materials causing severe disabilities and death. This mine alone was productive for centuries, to the extent that Spain built a minting factory near it. Hundreds upon hundreds of silver mines dotted the Latin American landscape, with over 400 in Mexico alone-that territory's top producing mine at its height yielded 14 times the amount of gold produced during California's gold rush bringing over 300,000 migrating prospectors for work in the western United States. This provides an indication of the amount of slave labor used to mine just silver alone.

As Horne documents, "From the advent of Columbus to the end of the nineteenth century it is possible that five million Indigenous Americans were enslaved (pr. 7)." Moreover, for reasons not just due to mining, the obliteration of an Indian labor force made the vast importation of African slaves a necessity for monocrop production that was then exported to European markets. As Horne indicates, this influx of African slaves represented two-thirds of those coming to the "new" world in the 17 th century alone. Against their will of course, and as hugely profitable commodities.

Horne, Ortiz, and Resendez follow a number of modern scholars who have convincingly refuted the allegations that up to 90-95 percent of the Indigenous died from diseases carried by immune Europeans for which Indigenous were biologically unprepared to thwart. The initial waves of disease were devastating. But, so were the plagues in Europe which decimated 40 percent of the populations in some areas, with plagues still occurring even at the time of Columbus. In Europe, not over 90 percent died from 'initial contact' from plagues. Horne suggests "Population may have fallen by up to 90 percent through devilish means including warfare, famine, and slavery, all with resultant epidemics (pg. 8)." Ortiz similarly comments that Jews were used as slave labor in the Nazi war production system, work from which an overwhelming majority went to their deaths because of diseases. Not all six million deaths came through the gas chambers and other means of directly systematic executions.

But, confabulated disease theories continue shrouding history helping frightened consciousnesses not question capitalist benevolence claimed by the imperial victors writing their own histories.


Sequels of the Same Saga

Those from the Iberian Peninsula sought treasure using slaves for its extraction. The English saw "empty" land in America as something to improve-meaning, English-style tilling making it materially profitable for capitalist agricultural production. It was a divine mandate: "subdue the earth" as God's useful creation to be mastered by humans; and natural law: idle land demands profitable use (Fields). Permanent colonies were needed for carrying out these mandates.

What constituted 'productive use' was being systematically defined (culminating with John Locke) as making land a commodity to be owned and used as the owner saw fit-as long as it was made profitable and tilled properly. Therefore, when the first permanent English colony survived at Jamestown, they had a narrow understanding of how land's productivity should look. Amerindians were considered wasting a divine gift! (Of note: a few short years after Jamestown survived as a colony, they purchased African slaves to work the land they ethnically cleansed of its inhabitants.)

Fields writes of two schools of thought about how wasted, empty land could be obtained from the Indians: "…the English could acquire Indian land lawfully by purchasing it." (Buying and selling land was a totally foreign concept for First Peoples). Or, they "could lawfully take Indian land (his emphasis)." Either way, 'lawful' is a key condition for ownership, and laws changed over time. Therefore, it's not surprising that taking the land from savages was the better cost option and this view gained widespread appeal after being introduced earlier in colonization by clergymen such as Robert Gray. He and a raft of other men-of-the-cloth underwent the utter demonization of the Amerindians, describing them as little more than violent animals with a propensity toward cannibalism. After the American Revolution, the foreboding portrayal of the ruthlessly savage won over land-hungry imaginations. First Peoples became cleansed from the land and any remaining were 'at-will' tenants with no rights to land claims against settlers enclosing their environments.

As the land was cleansed, plantations and smaller land holdings established, African slaves were imported by the 100 of thousands, with totals amounting to over 13 million during legal slavery in America. In some areas, slaves significantly outnumbered the "whites" who controlled them.

Also, the 'new' lands were colonized as a release valve from the social tensions occurring in England and other European territories due to a plethora of wars, with many displaced and unemployed because of the land enclosure processes occurring first on the British Iles and then throughout the continent that didn't end until the early 20th century. Ortiz records that approximately half of those coming to America financed their way by indentured service-some contracts of bond slavery lasting up to seven years-a very profitable capitalist ploy in leveraging the distress of others and gaining low-cost labor in return. Yet, as difficult as the work would be for bond-service, they knew they'd be better off than those considered beneath them as humans: First Peoples and African slaves. And, they'd be free after service ended to pursue their dreams of owning and farming their own land.

But, there was a difference in the promise of land and the fact of its actual possession. Therefore, waves of colonists functioned both as settler-farmers, and well-armed militia, cleansing the land of its original inhabitants. As new immigrants arrived to an independent America from different parts of Europe, it became a culturally normal duty slaughtering Indigenous as African slave importation filled the need for workers in areas newly claimed through conquest. Killing heathen became a socially unifying venture, a perverse right-of-passage into the higher "white" race while building a sense of pride in a national mission given by God- a "manifest destiny"- as land grabbing and massacre was later described in the 19th century.

The whole mission helped gloss over real class divisions between capitalists and those Europeans immigrants exploited by them (see Ortiz).

What the settlers turned into Ortiz describes as a "culture of conquest, violence, expropriation, destruction, and dehumanization (pg. 32)." Ortiz references historian John Grenier describing America's "first way of war" as it was fought against Amerindians: "razing and destroying enemy villages and fields; killing enemy women and children; raiding settlements for captives; intimidating and brutalizing enemy noncombatants; and assassinating enemy leaders…." (pg. 56). These were methods of war that Europeans found largely abhorrent when fighting amongst themselves in Europe prior to emigration (though it did occur), or even during the American Civil War, but, thoroughly applicable when dealing with those not considered fully human.

Imperialism needs justification for its missions. Theology and natural law joined science with the political/economic intentions of the times in the later portion of the 19th century. Evolution became the ultimate rationalization for exterminating those standing in the way of "white" control of resources and wealth marking an idea of progress. As summarized by an iconic American literary hero in the second half the century, Walt Whitman: "The nigger, like the Injun, will be eliminated; it is the law of the races, history…. A superior grade of rats come and then all the minor rats are cleared out" (quoted in Ortiz, pg. 117).

The enslavement and genocide of humans inhabiting the Americas and Africa for the sake of profit, as well as the monumental exploitation of resources, positioned collections of backwater cultures in Europe for violent world dominance. This is especially true of England whose rise as an empire had extensive control throughout the world. Populations not useful, or in the way, were massacred without mercy.


Liberal Democracies and Very Illiberal Behaviors

The nineteenth century has been labeled by Immanuel Wallerstein as "centrist liberalism triumphant." Political leadership and capitalist elites felt it was either provide a degree of salient state support for their populations, or, the rabble would pummel the system into submission. Initiated by Bismarck in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, some of the rudiments of the modern welfare state were instituted deterring revolt against capitalism. Other countries began to recognize its value (England and France), with America's New Deal (though never completely implemented) becoming supposedly standard fair after WWII. Capitalism could now remain intact and any democratic processes would be controlled enough by monied concerns ensuring capital would hold sway over governments.

However, liberalism's rise is also called the "age of imperialism," and "the new age of empires" when a 'scramble for Africa' occurred, the push for America to reach "sea to shining sea" was being completed, and British gun-boat diplomacy was subduing China and other parts of the world. Western nations of all stripes joined the ravenous quest for resource extractions in order to better position themselves in the context of unequal international "free trade." Yet, as if oblivious to imperial history, Western historians nostalgically referred to the time-frame from Napoleon's demise-1815, to the Great War's outbreak in 1914, as the "100 Years Peace." And except for the intense ruckus internal to nation/states because of restive populations under thumbs of capitalist elites, there were very few international conflicts by warrior Europe's prior historical standards.

Contrastingly, the 100 years of European international peace should be juxtaposed to the rest of the world's conflagration at the hands of, in-truth, not-so-peaceful Europeans.

The inordinate violence and forced labor by capitalists only accelerated all over the world during this time of liberal democratic visions, especially after Africa was carved into spheres of influence following the Conference of Berlin in 1885-a meeting setting the rules for colonization and resource extraction from the periphery ensuring core states would stay away from conflict with each other. Mann reports grisly casualty figures for non-Europeansover 50-60 million Africans and Asians were massacred at the hands of the imperialists scratching for raw materials. Ninety percent of these casualties were civilian.

And the rationale for the carnage? The now universal mission statement used by "white" cultures: "survival of the fittest"- the phrase coined by the influential English intellectual, Herbert Spenser. His views on natural selection saw the elimination and supersession of 'others' by European cultures as a necessary component for evolutionary progress (see the Whitman quote above).

After all, savages do not have the capacity for understanding what resources they possess and are profligate-mismanaging their treasures a civilized world could make better use of-a tried and true argument used for centuries. It was a "white man's" burden on an evolutionary mission dragging all of humanity toward progress.

Even tiny Belgium was economically transformed during liberalism's growing prevalence. It became the sixth largest economy in the world within less than a generation, making its King-Leopold II one of the earth's richest men. According to Prashad, the piece of Africa Belgium received after 1885, the Congo-immensely rich in raw materials, was eighty times the size of their home country. And, populating the Congo was a ready-made work force for Belgium's profitable exploitationHeads were cut off as an encouragement for others to work harder. In a single day 1,308 severed hands were sent to an official showing that those under his charge were being optimally motivated for doing their jobs. Mutilation, rape and torture, were prevalent. The imperial brutality reduced the size of the Congo's population from 20 million to 10 million during the short period 1885-1908 (Prashad).

Of course, when the gruesome actions came to light, there were outcries of bloodthirstiness levelled against Belgium; ironically, especially from the British. Yet during this period, as Prashad continues: "…much [the same] had been standard for the English elsewhere…the Putumayo region between Colombia and Peru followed the same kinds of barbarism, the U.S.-based United Fruit Company in Central America…, and in Portuguese Angola as well as French and German Cameroon…. (pg. 18)."

Horne, Ortiz, Prashad, and Resendez, from our short bibliography, document the war-driven nature of imperial Europe's technology (and capitalist Japan during liberalism's rise). Through their technological applications they've been able to inflict mass punishment from the 16th century until the rise of industrial levels of killing during liberalism's triumph. The new technologies were field tested on those of color.

Then, Europeans turned the weaponry on themselves in 1914.

It occurred at a time when Europe controlled 85 percent of the earth's surface for capitalist goals of insatiably competitive profiteering. Competition between capitalist countries was key in driving them into the Great War. As newer technologies for mass slaughter were invented, the ability in detaching a combatant from the carnage wrought through distance helped desensitize them from the results they inflicted. Destruction from long-range through the incessant artillery shelling caused 60 percent of the war's casualties. However, killing by dirigible and then plane was to revolutionize devastation from a distance. Yet, before the annihilating capacity of flying machines was used in the Great War, it had already been tested on non-whites.

Prashad quotes R.P. Hearne from Airships in Peace and War (1910), "In savage lands the moral effect of such an instrument of war [the air bomber] is impossible to conceive. The appearance of the airship would strike terror into the colored tribes," for these machines can deliver "sharp, severe and terrible punishment," and save "the awful waste of life occasioned to white troops by expeditionary work (pg. 42)." It became "standard policy" (Prashad) by Italians in North Africa, the British in India and Iraq, the Americans in Nicaragua, and other European nations visiting the Basques and Moroccans with air-born weapons.

When the Great War didn't end all wars between the imperium, the Second War brought its own new technological horrors that also included "The Bomb."

Much overlooked are the preparations a culture requires for dehumanizing others to the point of genocide. For the West, their preparation is marked by centuries of imperial debauchery against 'others' considered less human. Once practiced, it becomes easier for transferring supreme malice to anyone deemed 'other.'

The racist violence of the Nazis did not suddenly appear from a void. Germany already possessed a racist legacy destroying populations in Namibia, Uganda, Cameroon, and Tanzania prior to the Great War in 1914. German ideas of racial superiority provided license for invading eastern Europe in the late 1930s and executing 'master race' designs against "lesser" Slavs, and first and foremost-Jews. After using "commies" as warmups in populating the concentration camps, the sites would become thoroughly modern administrations of genocide.

Following the horrific revelations of the Nazi holocaust during the war crime trials, Martinique intellectual, Aime Cesaire, suggested what was being shockingly evaluated and brought to justice at Nuremburg had been occurring against non-whites for centuries. However, when genocide is committed by Westerners on people indistinguishable from themselves, breasts are pounded in anguished soul-searching despair.

The U.S. economy after WWII was unscathed by the war-and running at full tilt in need of trading partners. With its military prowess (it had demonstrated it would use the atomic bomb), the U.S. provided a needed role as the leading Western imperial power-an exhausted and bankrupt Britain relinquishing the hegemonic "burden." It's mission: making the world- it thought it "owned" (Noam Chomsky), safe for democracy American style. In reality, the mission is administrating the global capitalistic system.

The processes of rebuilding selected capitalist countries, including war nemeses Germany and Japan, were heavily controlled and financed by three U.S. dominated international institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) - both established in 1944 (Bretton Woods institutions) dictating international monetary policy and providing loans for reconstruction. Additionally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) -effective in 1947- had goals of lowering tariffs and quotas on imported goods and services while opening doors to outside investments for promoting international trade.

The United Nations was founded in 1945 in hopes of achieving international cooperation and peace, what an earlier League of Nations failed to do. With high ideals, the UN General Assembly issued The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. In it, the humanity of all people on the earth was outlined mandating respect for basic human needs no matter the geographic and racial origins.

However, in matters of security and UN troop deployment, the U.S. dominated through the five-permanent member UN Security Council with allies in tow (Britain France), (the other two-Russia and China). The Council's determinations are legally binding with overriding power on questions of where and when to engage in violence, negating the General Assembly decisions of all UN nations.

UN human rights aspirations were placed on hold when tensions between the U.S. and Russia reached a very dangerous point in a Cold War. With the 1949 Maoist victory in China, battlegrounds of the Cold War took place in a "Third World" hungry for their own self-determination, but, consigned as pawns in an international struggle not of their making. Violence broke out in Korea, a country divided by Russia and the U.S. after WWII, with likely unifying elections in that country subverted by the U.S. War was waged in Korea and mass extermination of 'others' from a distance was brought to new heights.

The amount of munitions dropped from the air in the Pacific campaign during WWII amounted to 503,000 tons of ordinance in total. The U.S. dropped 635,000 tons of aerial munitions, mostly on civilian centers north of the Korean division which included 35,000 tons of napalm - the jellied gasoline bombs used in 1945 decimating Tokyo's civilian populations principally living in wooden structures.

Following an unresolved cease-fire on that peninsula, Third World revolutions for independence struggling to wrest control away from imperialism raged all over the globe. Irrepressible desires were recorded through the UN General Assembly's declaration of December 1960: On the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It expressed conditions towards reversing direct and indirect types of western imperialism entrenched for centuries.

America intervened in a number of countries before the 1960 statement and then militarily entered a fray in Vietnam, a former French colony winning independence after a long bloody struggle with the colonizer, American involvement occurring in more deliberate fashion after the statement by the UN.

The U.S. dropped on Vietnam the equivalent of a 500-pound bomb for every child, woman, and man, a country comprised largely of poor farmers with a total population numbering 12 million. Napalm was liberally used on civilian populations as was the defoliating chemical Agent Orange. The conflict also included an American "secret war" in Laos and Cambodia with Henry Kissinger's desire to "bomb them into the stone age" - a fact hidden from an American public's view.

Laos, a nation with a population of about 2.5 million, attained the dubious distinction of the world's most bombed country in history, receiving 3.4 million tons of ordinance including over 250 million cluster bombs. Today, many of these initially unexploded bomblets are being accidentally detonated by farmers working in fields and kids playing unwittingly in infected areas causing 34,000 Laotian deaths, with many more maimed, since the Vietnam war ended.

Post WWII, liberal democracy's leader- the U.S., has very illiberally been directly or indirectly involved in overturning approximately 50 governments across the world, many democratically elected (Noam Chomsky), in spite of the UN declarations. In the process, the U.S. and its allies have supported some very undemocratic regimes for imperial interests, funding killing machines in Iran, Guatemala, Uganda, Indonesia, Chile, Argentina, Cambodia, Iraq, and many, many more. According to research provided by James A. Lucas in a November 2015 report for Global Research, since WWII, America has been involved with their clients in killing more than 20 million people in 37 countries, overwhelming territories of "color," with the U.S. directly accounting for approximately half of those deaths through military conflicts and economic wars of sanctions-like the 1990's Iraqi sanctions causing 500,000 child deaths according to UN studies.

Former U.S. Defense Secretary under George W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld, when asked about Iraqi casualties, stated, "We don't do body counts." Nevertheless, others do. The levels of civilian deaths in the Middle East are frighteningly atrocious.

Underscoring the deep cynicism in which liberal democracy is embroiled in its foreign affairs, technology is now exploring small-scale versions of nuclear weaponry for tactical use with one trillion dollars in developmental appropriations authorized by the first African-American president of the U.S., and a 2008 Nobel Peace Prize recipient.

Keep in mind though, as I stated earlier in the essay, if cost-saving labor might be attained from those of "color," at the cheapest rates possible, ways to control that will be found.


Tummy Tucks Over Rotten Guts: Imperialism by Other Means

A new imperial mission statement has superseded the older ones. This occurred following the unavoidable independence of a Third World. The mission: development. More innocuously attractive than a phrase like "civilizing mission," or, "survival of the fittest," it's nevertheless mere cosmetics masking real intentions that have always accompanied capitalist imperialism: maximally making more money at the expense of non-western populations.

The meaning of development in the peripheries during the decades following WWII has changed. Development has shifted from "New Deal capitalism" or "social capitalism"-governmental redistribution of some wealth for financing state administered programs for people, to something else. As Robinson explains, now development means fostering "…laissez-faire, comparative advantage, free trade, and efficiency…." (pg. 54), an "ideology, a culture, a philosophical worldview that takes classical liberalism and individualism to an extreme. It glorifies the detached, isolated individual-a fictitious state of human existence-and his or her potential that is allegedly unleashed when unencumbered by state regulation and other collective constraints on 'freedom' (pg.55)." Neoliberalism drives our current international developmental regime.

Both forms of development, New Deal and neoliberal, are capitalist impositions of social ordering too often with little regard for real internal needs expressed by the populations being developed. Plus, to receive money, both demand strict criteria be met through aligning with the economic and political goals of the core countries doing the developing. Both have profitably exploited the periphery while claiming unmitigated beneficence.

Complicating things, no longer is it core imperial states dominating periphery territories and nations. Now, domination comes in the form of multinational corporations and transnational finance. This makes imperial control opaque, hidden behind life's every-day routines. Describing the current form of imperialism, Screpanti explains in his introduction, "[global capitalism is] a system of international relations in which state policies are forced to remove the obstacles that national agglomeration place in the way of the process of accumulation [profits] on a global scale." Global markets dictate to nation/states forcing them to dismantle barriers to international trade and the profits reaped. Not surprisingly, most of the bases of operations of transnational corporations and finance are in the core countries made rich to begin with though imperialism exercised over centuries.

Central are the post WWII governing bodies already mentioned, Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)-born after several rounds of negotiations expanding GATT. The WTO administers and arbitrates the world's regional and global trade agreements. There's nothing democratic about these institutions even though they shape global economic policies in a time of liberal democratic triumphalism. (Authors in the bibliographic material below elaborate how they work because brevity beckons in this essay).

What has this meant for labor in developing the global periphery?

After all, hasn't poverty been reduced, jobs been added, hope primed into the previously dry pumps of hopeless futures? The short answer is: No. Appeals to GDP averages for a country's workers tell a very truncated story as they don't specifically provide how income is disseminated unless intentionally parsed for detailed information. Plus, cost of living change is excluded. Currently, inequality of wealth distribution is only increasing all over the world (See Oxfam reports and numerous university studies).

Economist John Smith introduced his work, stating: "The wildfire of [job] outsourcing spread during the past three decades is the continuation, on a vastly expanded scale, of capital's eternal quest for new sources of cheaper, readily exploitable labor-power." When a "crisis" of diminishing profits occurred in the core during the 1970s, elites began searching for cheaper labor pools as national worker costs were thought too high. As international investments took off in the 1980s and 90s-especially after 1995 with the expansion of the WTO, the whole world became a large labor resource from which capital could draw low-wage workers. Now, worker competition for jobs pits each against all in a global labor market. This is especially true in labor intensive manufacturing productions delivering most of the commodities exported from the periphery to the core. With advancements in technology, production formerly accomplished within a territory or nation, could now be done across the globe. The orchestrated poverty in the periphery under older forms of imperialism is being leveraged for low cost labor approaching near slavery status.

For example: The U.S. is the largest consumer of clothing in the world, but, makes only two percent of the clothing it purchases. Smith reports that in Bangladesh, a garment worker earns "1.36 euros in a day working 10-12 hours and producing 250 T-shirts per hour, or 18 T-shirts for each euro cent paid in wages.…" (loc 218). Nearly 85 percent of the garment workers are women because they are paid significantly less than their male counterparts. "The basic wage is barely one-fifth of what is necessary to nourish, house and clothe a garment worker, one adult, and two child dependents" (loc 244). This means lots of additional hours and multiple members of a family working just to get by. A cheap T-shirt may be marked up by 150 percent with low labor costs contributing to large profits on the item. More expensive clothing (and more heavily advertised) has mark-ups of over 700 percent, with some reported by Smith as much as 1800 percent.

Examining commodity supply chains, Smith shows how various components comprising a more complex product (like computers) needn't be made and assembled in a single location (the old corporate model of efficiency). Different tasks may be done in various countries completing segments in stages of a manufactured item assembled elsewhere. No longer is a multinational company compelled to invest in building overseas infrastructures for their operations and take cost responsibilities for maintaining an overseas work-force. Now, they can just issue contracts to different regions for various component production, keeping investment costs low and letting the lowest bidder perform the tasks demanded by the agreement. It's what Smith calls "arms-length" production. This lets the transnational corporation off the hook for any environmental degradation and worker exploitation. The foreign companies picking up the contract work and their governments are said to be responsible, making compliance to protections (if they exist) issues of the nationally based parties involved.

Additionally, because bids for pieces of product manufacture are very competitive, profit margins for those taking on the assigned operations are slim. A supplier's profit on the T-shirt example is claimed being in the single digits. It provides greater incentive in squeezing their workers and making the thin slice of profit for the company working on the consigned task thicker. Therefore, it's not only a race to the bottom for workers, it's also a similar situation for many contractors picking up arms-length agreements issued by large transnational companies, contractors often overtaken and put out-of-business by those from other geographic areas of exploited cheap labor doing a task for less.

Smith discusses Foxconn, International in China, the successful mammoth assembling arms-length contracted products for giants like Apple and Samsung. Foxconn puts together components made by low-paid employees from other global regions. And the Chinese workers' portion in the sale price of the iPhone? About 3.6 percent according to Smith's researchFoxconn is an example of Export-Processing Zones, "now found in over 130 countries…," all competing against each other for contracts with only a small fraction getting consistent business-like Foxconn has achieved. It's the logic of so called efficiency, meaning, the largest returns on investment over the shortest time for the benefit of transnational investors, regardless of social consequences. Social considerations, like the environment and basic worker needs being met, are externals deemed separate from business calculations.

Further, as Robinson documents, "capital-labor relations [are] based on deregulated, informalized, flexibilized, part-time immigrant contract, and precarious labor arrangements (pg. 52)." Robinson continues, "The International Labor Organization reported that 1.53 billion workers around the world were in such 'vulnerable' employment arrangements in 2009, representing more than 50 percent of the global workforce (pg. 53)." This means, in most countries (including those in the core), large segments of populations are working in so called "flexible labor" positions with little to no benefits and no guarantees of consistent future employment. Investment money may come and go freely across borders. People cannot do so when already insecure jobs leave with the investors. Expulsed workers in precarity are trapped in a system, if allowed to do so, that's driving wages toward the very profitable levels of quasi- slavery.

It seems approaching conditions of slavery is an ever-present goal for the capitalist. My, how things remain the same under the façade of change.

What happens when food prices jump because of market "forces"? - nearly 80 percent during the 2008 commodity crisis in some impoverished areas of the world causing food riots. A large portion of income for the majority of workers in the South goes toward food they can no longer grow themselves-unlike the slaves under former agrarian economies. Leech suggests violence should include human suffering "caused by social structures that disproportionately benefit some people while diminishing the ability of others to meet their fundamental needs…needs like food, health care and other resources… (loc 205)." Systemic violence by capitalism entails more than just imperial wars.


Conclusion

Are there specific counter-examples to my claims supporting something other than the contentions in the syllogism at the beginning of this essay? Of course. However, because all birds don't fly doesn't mean we stop saying that birds have the gift of flight. Look at the whole, not anomalies. Should someone reveal from actual history, while looking at the whole, that modern imperialism/capitalism isn't racist, or that actually existing capitalism didn't arise from imperial endeavors, unlike the paper-premises and theories from the Austrian School of Economics-Joseph Schumpeter's response to Lenin in particular, then let's talk about it. Have there been totalizing systems other than capitalism and its triumph through liberal democracy that have done better, like central state communism-Russian Soviet style, or state administered fascism? Not really, because both were imperialist, with fascism essentially wedding capitalist interests with the state and the U.S.S.R.'s massive bureaucracy controlling the "efficiencies" of quasi-capitalist style production; those forms invading others in superimposing their will. But, does that mean all options for the future are exhausted? Aren't we creatures who can dream of alternatives and work toward creating them?

But, what about capitalism with an Asian face in state dominated China? A new leader may fix it all.

Under new imperialist tenets called development, China is already looking for cheaper labor outside its borders to fuel its own budding consumerism while keeping costs down and profits up. No longer does it just wish to be the manufacturing work-shop of the world. Its massive financial tentacle is far-reaching with infrastructure projects all over the world benefitting its own economic necessity at the expense of local populations. This is expressed through ventures such as large dam, mining and deforestation projects displacing Indigenous peoples and destroying food producing land, high speed rail construction leading to important Chinese cities-remaking the urban spaces and environmental landscapes through which bullet-trains travel, continued fossil fuel activities, purchase of arable land in food insecure areas (East Africa and elsewhere) for feeding themselves by exporting agricultural production necessitating local populations' importation of food as they're displaced off ancestral lands, etc. Plus, defaults on loans provided to poor countries are occurring and looming in greater numbers. What pounds of flesh will be exacted from them? It's flexing its military muscle in the South China sea and squashing dissent at home with a leader who wants that position without term limits. Though leading in renewable energy, historically with capitalism-profit always trumps environmental prudence. Yes, they are in competition with the U.S., but, increasing threats of violence is part of a competitive capitalist past that's sealed in its very concrete history. China is new to capitalism, but already the logic is becoming deeply ingrained.

Michael Corleone would likely not bet on China for providing a legitimate cultural framework cleansing capitalism. He's well aware how murder and mayhem work.

For the future of human flourishing, capitalism in all its forms is essentially violently imperialist, and therefore, racist. It's devolutionary because it's ultimately parasitical, devouring the host, and therefore killing itself (Michael Hudson) along with our environments -both natural and cultural (if you can even divide the two). It's also devolutionary for the fewer and fewer people gaining from it because capitalism makes them competitively callous human beings, stifling the very human abilities of mutuality and empathetic concern. And, it's all for the sake of what capitalism has been designed to do by elite beneficiaries from the beginning: make more money above all else-including human life and all life on the planet.


References

Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne, An Indigenous People's History of the United States, Beacon Press, 2015.

Fields, Gary, EnclosurePalestinian Landscapes in a Historical Mirror, University of California Press, 2017.

Horne, Gerald, The Apocalypse of Settler ColonialismThe Roots of Slavery, White Supremacy, and Capitalism in the Seventeenth-Century North America and the Caribbean , Monthly Review Press, 2017.

Leech, Gary, CapitalismA Structural Genocide, Zed Books, 2012 (Kindle book locations).

Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power: vol. 3, Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Prashad, Vijay, The Darker NationsA People's History of the Third World, The New Press, 2007.

Resendez, Andres, The Other SlaveryThe Uncovered Story of Indian Enslavement in America, Houghton, Mifflin, Harcourt, 2017.

Robinson, William I., Global Capitalism and the Crisis of Humanity, Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Screpanti, Ernesto, Global Imperialism and the Great CrisisThe Uncertain Future of Capitalism, Monthly Review Press, 2014.

Smith, John, Imperialism in the Twenty-First CenturyThe Globalization of Production, Super-Exploitation, and the Crisis of Capitalism , Monthly Review Press, 2016. (Kindle book locations)

Todorov, Tzvetan, Conquest of America:The Question of the Other, Harper and Row, 1984.

An Economic Theory of Law Enforcement

By Edward Lawson

Law enforcement is a necessary endeavor in society. Government makes laws, but someone must enforce those laws, through violent coercion if necessary. The American ideal is that the people elect the government and the government serves the people, so naturally the police serve the people as well. However, the actual activities of the police call this normative account into question. I argue that government--the state--serves the will of anonymous, extraordinarily wealthy oligarchs, and it passes laws that benefit them at the expense of the rest of society. In addition, I argue that the police are the primary tool of enforcing compliance with the wishes of oligarchs among society, and that they alter their behavior based on the socioeconomic conditions of the area in which they operate.

The recent deaths of individuals such as Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO and Walter Scott in North Charleston, SC, are only the most recent, high-profile incidents of police acting according to this purpose. Police violence, as well as mass incarceration, maintain a state of fear among the working class, as well as the ongoing division between races within the working class, in order to prevent organization for common cause. Oligarchs--the anonymous, incredibly wealthy individuals who exert disproportionate pressure on the state to do their bidding--use institutions such as the police to hold and expand their power.

Operating behind the state provides oligarchs with a veneer of legitimacy, particularly in a democracy. That legitimacy extends to the police, who have state-sanctioned authority to enforce compliance with the law and punish noncompliance with violence. However, rather than using that authority to benefit society, they use it to oppress the poor and placate the affluent--those who are comparatively wealthy but not oligarchs themselves.


On the Origin of States

Law enforcement organizations are agents of the state, and therefore the goals of the state are also the goals of law enforcement. This connection means that, in order to determine why members of law enforcement behave in certain ways, it is necessary to discuss the purpose of the state first. Fortunately, political theory devotes a great deal of attention to the origin and purpose of states. In all of the various theories on the origin of the state, the state exists as a product of individuals ceding at least some of their rights to a governing body. This body makes laws according to, generally (and idealistically), the will of the population it governs. However, what happens when some members of that population possess influence over the government in excess of others? What happens when a small minority dominate that government, and use it to benefit themselves rather than society?

In essence, this is how Winters (2011) views society, particularly in the United States. He argues that most societies are ruled by oligarchs, and he defines oligarchs as those who control large concentrations of material resources--wealth--and use those resources to defend and increase their wealth and position. Essentially, oligarchs use wealth to protect and improve their dominant position within society.

One purpose of the state is to protect property rights. In a Hobbesian state of nature, those who possess property are under constant threat of its loss to rivals who desire it. Therefore, individuals form states, in part, to legitimize claims of property rights and protect them from others who would try to take property away. The legitimized defense of property rights by the state is what Winters (2011) refers to as property defense, which is the first mechanism of oligarchs' wealth defense. The second, income defense, comes after property is secured. Income defense is the use of wealth to manipulate government into passing laws that protect the income of oligarchs as well as their property, at the expense of other citizens.

Using the mechanisms of wealth defense essentially subordinates the state to the oligarchs. The state, therefore, becomes an agent of oligarchs. The state's purpose is to preserve and promote the oligarch's power at the expense of the rest of the population and using the state as its defender provides a veneer of legitimacy. The oligarchs need the state to support their interests, otherwise they face the threat of losing their property, wealth, and power to an overwhelmingly large number of people who would certainly try to take that property and wealth if it were not protected by the state.


Special Bodies of Armed Men (With a Nod to V.I. Lenin)

How, then, does the state enforce the will of the oligarchs controlling it? If oligarchs are a small minority, how can they force the majority of the population to follow laws they create for the purpose of legitimizing their own wealth and power? What stops the rest of the population from simply destroying them? The answer lies in what Lenin (1918/1972) refers to as special bodies of armed men. In The State and Revolution, Lenin proposes his own theory on the origin of the state which seems closely aligned with that of Winters (2011). Lenin argues that the state is the product of irreconcilable class differences, specifically the conflict between those who own the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and those who produce (the working class).

The state is, therefore, a means for the oppression of one socioeconomic class by another. Oligarchs hoard wealth and use it to increase their power (and wealth) at the expense of the larger society. The rest of society prefers a societal organization that benefits the majority and leads to a more egalitarian distribution of material resources. The solution to this irreconcilable conflict is for the oligarchs to use their wealth and the associated power to construct a state that legitimizes their control of society.

The special bodies of armed men are the tool oligarchs use to enforce compliance with the state (Lenin 1918/1972). Specifically, these bodies are the military and the police. Both of these institutions have state-sanctioned authority to use violence in order to protect the state and force compliance with its laws. However, their domains are separate. The military address foreign threats to the state (and to the wealth and power of the oligarchs controlling it). The police address domestic threats and enforce compliance among citizens (Kraska 2007).

As Lenin (1918/1972) writes, ``A standing army and police are the chief instruments of state power." They are, then, the chief instruments of oligarchical power. The state exists to grant legitimacy to oligarchy and promote the interests of oligarchs. Special bodies of armed men (and women, of course) --the military and the police--exist to promote the interests of oligarchs as well. As agents of the state, they have legitimacy that an armed band of hired mercenaries would not. They have uniforms, rules of engagement, codified laws and policies, etc., to convey legitimacy to the public. But they are still only tools.

Indeed, an armed band of mercenaries, while more directly controllable by oligarchs, would also be counter-productive. As Winters (2011) argues, part of the power of oligarchs is that no one knows who they are. Hiring an armed mercenary group to enforce their will is a highly visible act and also lacks the legitimacy of a state-sponsored police force. The visibility shows the general public who the oligarch is that hired the group. The lack of legitimacy means that the public have much less incentive to comply with the group's instructions. Therefore, though hiring an armed band would give an oligarch more direct control, operating indirectly through control of the state is preferable.


Protect and Serve or Patrol and Control

As this paper discusses law enforcement, I leave the topic of the military to others. I have explained the origin of the state as a means for oligarchy to protect and expand its power, as well as the existence of police as a tool for enforcing the will of oligarchs. The next logical step, then, is to address why some people receive harsher treatment from police than others. If law enforcement organizations exist to enforce the will of the state, which exists to legitimize the will of oligarchs, why is every state not a tyrannical dictatorship? There are several reasons.

One may assume that, for this theoretical framework to hold, then police should be violently oppressing everyone within a society. This is a flawed conclusion. First, citizens who are not wealthy enough to be oligarchs but are what Winters (2011) calls the "merely affluent" have a considerable stake in maintaining the society's respect for property rights and protection of incomes even if they do not exercise control over the state or have as much wealth as the oligarchs who do. These merely affluent citizens are not wealthy enough to exert control over the state, but they are wealthy enough to have lives of relative comfort which they do not want to jeopardize. A regime that oppresses all citizens risks encouraging the affluence of society to pool their resources in order to fight against the oligarchs even with the protection of the state. Those pooled resources, combined with sheer numbers as the lower class joins the effort, have a real chance of overwhelming the oligarchs despite their wealth advantage. In particular, the police and the military may join the side of the oppressed rather than stay with the oppressors, which eliminates the state's means for enforcing the oligarch's will.

The affluent are also much more visible. They are typically community leaders or, at least, respected residents. They know each other. The media recognizes them. A regime that turns oppressive against the affluent also risks exposing the oligarchs to media scrutiny, which could have the effect of rallying the affluent from all of society to a common cause of self-defense.

In addition, the limited wealth of the affluent provide an incentive to not ``rock the boat." Just as the oligarchs want to protect their wealth, so do the affluent even if their wealth is considerably less. Without the pressure of a tyrannical regime, they have little incentive to resist the state and risk losing their relatively comfortable position.

Instead, oligarchs direct the power of the state--and, by extension, the police--against the poor. The poor are more numerous, which by itself presents an increased threat. If the lower class could unite itself against the oligarchs, no amount of material resources could stop them. However, they are less able to organize than the affluent for a few reasons. First, they are much less visible despite their numerical advantage. The poor do not receive much media coverage (except, perhaps, to demonize them) and are not typically well known in a community. Second, those who join the military and police typically come from the poorer sections of society. This means that, essentially, the state can effectively divide much of the lower class against itself. Third, they spend most of their time focusing on meeting basic survival needs and do not have the time or energy to organize themselves as the affluent might. Fourth, in addition to lacking time and energy for organization, they also lack the material resources necessary for mounting a large scale and sustained organizing effort.

This last point is important for another reason: although the poor lack the means to organize, they also have the least to lose from trying. If they manage to overcome the impediments to mounting an organized opposition to the oligarchs, it is likely to be much more radical precisely because they risk so little. As opposed to the affluent, the poor have much less incentive to avoid ``rocking the boat" in order to protect what they have. They have, essentially, nothing, and have nothing to lose if they oppose the oligarchs and fail.

For these reasons, oligarchs are more likely to use state power to oppress the poor and placate the affluent. Police enforce the laws of the state, and the state passes laws to benefit the oligarchs, so the laws of the state and the behavior of the police in enforcing those laws will mirror this purpose. This leads to the dichotomy of protect and serve versus patrol and control.

Protect and serve is the normative idea of policing as experienced by the affluent. The police are public servants. They are trustworthy, kind, friendly, honest, brave, etc. The affluent tell their children that they can always go to a police officer for help. The affluent trust the police to enforce the laws of the state because the laws of the state are designed to maintain their comfortable position. The police protect law and order in society. If a member of the affluent violates the law and pays a fine or goes to prison, it is that person's fault for violating the law, but they can make bail, continue with their lives, and receive a capable defense in a fair trial. The police only enforce law. They do not have much discretion, nor do they allow their own prejudice to alter their behavior. They are Sheriff Andy Taylor in Mayberry.

On the other hand, the poor experience patrol and control. The police are militarized oppressors. They take on the mindset of an occupying army holding down an enemy population. Rather than serving the public, they serve the state and its oppressive controllers. The poor tell their children not to run to the police for help but to avoid them as much as possible. And, if they cannot avoid them, to peacefully and quietly comply with any and all directions in order to avoid jail, assault, or death. The poor fear the police rather than trust them, and they see the laws as a means to facilitate their oppression rather than maintain law and order. Indeed, ``law and order" is just a code phrase for the violent and discriminatory oppression of the poor and minorities. If a poor person violates the law, which they may be forced to do for survival, that person is put in jail where they sit for months, maybe years, because they cannot afford bail. They get an overworked, underpaid public defender in a trial they have no hope of winning before going to prison. After prison, they cannot find a job and will probably have to return to illegal means for survival, which repeats the same process over again. The police have significant discretion to decide how to deal with the public, and they choose to deal with the poor harshly and violently. To the poor, they are Judge Dredd.


Conclusion

In this paper, I have sketched out a theory of law enforcement that explains how police alter their behavior based on the socioeconomic conditions of the people with whom they interact. I began by describing several theories on the origin of states, highlighting the commonalities between them and linking them with a more modern theory of states which formed the foundation of my later discussion. I next explained how special bands of armed men--the military and the police--are tools used by the state to enforce the will of the oligarchs who control it, granting both legitimacy and anonymity to the oligarchs. Finally, I describe why and how police officers provide different treatment to different socioeconomic groups.

This paper is a theoretical work, but it has a great deal of potential empirical purchase. Indeed, research already suggests its accuracy. Some work demonstrates the discretion of police and how they teach the public about their place in society (Oberfield 2011). Other work suggests that police violence is a means of controlling the poor in society (Chevigny 1990) or of maintaining inequality (Hirschfield 2015).


References

Chevigny, Paul G. "Police Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica, Argentina, and Brazil." Criminal Law Forum, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990, pp. 389-425., doi:10.1007/bf01098174.

Hirschfield, Paul J. "Lethal Policing: Making Sense of American Exceptionalism." Sociological Forum, vol. 30, no. 4, 2015, pp. 1109-1117., doi:10.1111/socf.12200.

Kraska, P. B. "Militarization and Policing--Its Relevance to 21st Century Police." Policing, vol. 1, no. 4, 2007, pp. 501-513., doi:10.1093/police/pam065.

Lenin, Vladimir Illyich. "The State and Revolution." Marxists Internet Archive, 1999, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1917/staterev/.

Oberfield, Zachary W. "Socialization and Self-Selection: How Police oCers Develop Their Views about Using Force." Administration & Society, vol. 44, no. 6, 2011, pp. 702-730., doi:10.1177/0095399711420545.

Winters, Jeffrey A. Oligarchy. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Retail Work and Customer Relations: An Interview

By Devon Bowers

This is the transcript of an email interview I did with former UK retail worker Helen Howard in which we discuss retail work, relations between customers and workers, and where the US retail industry is headed.




How did you wind up working in retail?

I started at the age of 16 in 1997, and by the next year I needed a weekend position to help me out financially. I was given four hours on a Sunday afternoon working in the music/video section of the store my brother worked at, with the opportunity to work extra hours during the week to fit in around my studies. Once I left college in 2001 I decided to stay on as I didn't know what I wanted to do for a career. I worked for the one company in various branches for 16 years, then left to enter education in 2013.


You stated in our discussion that you went all the way from a regular worker to an asst manager. In what ways did you see the personality differences and attitudes towards workers change as you moved up the ladder? Did you internalize some of these attitudes?

As members of my family had worked in the same store, I was pretty well known anyway and it was always assumed I would have most of the answers to questions. The store I was working at was unlike most other high street stores, giving all members of the store team the authority to solve most issues without having to call a supervisor. As I grew in confidence I dealt with most things myself and soon noticed that my weekend colleagues would turn to me to help them out. I discovered I was good at solving problems and when I was given a new member of staff to train up, I was able to help her settle in and eventually empower her to make her own decisions over refunds etc. I was given the promotion to supervisor in another store when I left college.

I soon gained a reputation as a 'fix-it' person, and was sent by the area managers to other stores that needed support in getting back on track with tasks. I only met with negativity in one particular store, but the whole attitude of the store team was not as it should be, and although I got a few people onside it was not a big success, and I left soon after. I didn't take these attitudes on board, as I knew the problems in that store ran deeper than I could fix.


When the internet first came into existence, how did that affect workers and what was the industry concerned about, if they were concerned at all?

We first noticed that people were starting to question why something was cheaper online than in stores, not something we were prepared for. When people then said, "Oh well I may as well get it online then," we knew we had a problem.

This grew when the cuts to overtime came in. Then we noticed that we were increasingly left with fewer and fewer colleagues around, and that people who had left were not getting replaced. When the large, two-floor store I used to work at was reduced to one floor in the early 2000s: that was when the alarm bells started ringing.

The company saw takings fall and knew it had to increase footfall into their stores and away from the internet so there was a huge increase in promotional activity in the store. Confectionery and stationery companies now do deals with the company to push their merchandise. This was by far and away the biggest change. Bigger signage, more cardboard display stands, more hanging signage, more pre-orders on books and videos were introduced. The pressure increased on workers to offer exemplary customer service, give out vouchers, keep displays filled and push certain confectionery lines at the tills. Stores in the 1990s were clear, tidy and quite open plan. By the 2000s, they were filled with colour, huge signs and displays everywhere to the point where they now look cluttered and visually 'noisy.'


You did a study in which you examined interactions between retail workers and customers. What were your findings and how do they relate to the alienation people experience in the workplace and larger society?

I had long been fascinated by the reactions some customers would have when told they couldn't have a refund, even though I remained calm and explained the store policy very clearly. This led to me deciding to explore this when I went back to university to study a degree in Psychology. I interviewed both customers and my colleagues at the store I was working inat the time. I compared their responses, and discovered something rather interesting. I saw that both the customers and sales assistants had a 'them and us' mentality. The customers saw the assistants not as individuals, but as faceless representatives of the company, and the assistants saw each customer as just one of many people they would serve that day. Significantly, both sides saw themselves as unique individuals. When this view was challenged by the other side, that's when the high negative emotions began to emerge.

Additionally, it should also be understood that human beings have a strong need to belong and to feel safe in a collective. Customers would band together and support each other against the assistant in a refund dispute, and so would the assistants. This effect would heighten the more serious the dispute. (I would theorise that if something extraordinary happened such as armed gunmen coming in to the store, the customers and assistants would then band together against the gunmen as it would make them feel safer.) This all relates to social identity theory, which aims to explain how people behave and feel in society. Tajfel (1979) proposed that the groups (e.g. social class, family, football team etc.) which people belonged to were an important source of pride and self-esteem.

Groups give us a sense of social identity: a sense of belonging to the social world. So customers would see fellow customers as their 'in-group,' and the assistants as the 'out-group.'I understood from my study that the best customer service was when a customer was made to feel their uniqueness and individuality, particularly when an assistant would make an extra effort to solve an issue or query. An assistant would always remember and appreciate a customer who would smile and be pleasant to them, perhaps offering a compliment or something. On each occasion, the customer or the assistant would have their sense of individuality recognised and appreciated, rather than just be treated as 'one of the out-group.'

As a supervisor in a large store (as I was in around 2004), I was effectively Assistant Manager although the official title was almost obsolete by then. I knew that team morale was lead by the store manager and myself. I could sense that when there was conflict between us, the store team was unsettled and uneasy. When we were having a laugh and the store was doing well, the team was happy and worked very well together. If any member of my team felt unhappy or alienated, I would do my very best to talk to them and identify what the problem was. It was essential to make every person feel they were valued, respected and that I was grateful for every contribution they made.


Retail work many times is manual labor. Why do you think society looks down on retail as not a so called real job, but simultaneously admires manual laborers?

Twenty to thirty years ago, a career in retail was admirable and respectable. Nowadays this is not the case.

I would say that the main reason that retail is looked down on by most in other professions, is because there are no real qualifications needed to start, and many store managers have risen up the ranks by experience alone. (We do have some qualifications in the UK to assist in a career in retail, such as a BTEC or NVQ in Business Management, but these are not necessary.) The skills needed in retail (common sense, practical thinking, solution-focused problem-solving, numeracy and literacy, stress and time management amongst many) are not taught in a course but developed over time and mostly learned on the job.

Even though not everyone can develop these skills, they are still not valued as much and are therefore not as well paid. Most people in other professions would have taken a Saturday job in order to bring in a bit of pocket money, so it would be seen as a stop-gap job and not taken seriously.

People admire manual labourers such as builders, plumbers, electricians etc, because there are necessary courses to take to learn how to perform these jobs and a lot of money can be made. To most people, fixing a car or their central heating system is completely beyond them and therefore those that can, are respected and admired.


In the US currently, many retail stores are shutting down due to folks shopping online. Is there a same affect in the UK?

Yes, absolutely. We have lost many beloved high street stores over the past twenty years, particularly record and electronic shops and have also seen many companies buy each other out. However the various pound shop chains are alive and thriving.

For those that remain, store staff has been reduced to a skeleton and pressure exists to cut even more. Branches have been closed down with staff either made redundant or forced to relocate. Self-service checkouts have been introduced to attempt to cut queues. As a side-note, this further exacerbates the feeling of 'de-individualisation' of customers by the company, as they are not even served by a real person!

I think in the future, the convenience of shopping online will slowly bring back the desire to be treated as a human being and people will return to shopping in actual stores. People have never liked using automated systems such as telephone banking or choosing options on a phone keypad and really appreciate more than ever a personal service.

The Class Politics Behind Last Week's Market “Correction”

By Ben Luongo

Markets plunged into correction territory last week after losing 10% from record highs. Economists continue to reassure the public that market corrections are a normal part of a cycle that peaks and troughs over time. The term itself implies that the precipitous drops are temporary adjustments that put the markets back on track. This is certainly how investors look at it. Ron Kruszewski, Stifel Financial Corporation CEO, told reporters that "people just need to relax. Just relax […] It's a healthy correction to a market that has gone almost straight up since the election over a year ago."

However, framing the recent market drops as transient and remedial fails to recognize the larger structural problems boiling under the surface. Indeed, this week's market sell-offs reflect issues of class and inequality - in particular it is a direct response to reports of modest increases in American wages.

This may sound counterintuitive. One would think that an increase in wages would be a welcome development in an economy whose GDP growth has remained consistently under 4% for the last fifteen years . After all, higher pay means increased consumption where the demand for more goods and services translates into even more jobs. However, investors interpret the good news of wage increases as a sign of inflation looming around the corner. CNN Money reported that "Concerns about inflation was most glaring on Friday, when stocks tanked after the January jobs report revealed the strongest wage gains since 2009."

The argument that inflation follows a rise in wages is called wage-push-inflation (WPI). It argues that executives, in an attempt to maintain corporate profits, finance wage increase through prices hikes. If you buy into this argument, then you worry that Federal Reserve will respond by raising interest rates in order to sow the economy. This of course makes it harder to borrow money and grow one's business. The WPI argument may sound good in theory, but it's not how the real world works. In reality, the recent increase in worker pay is a modest 2.9% increase , and it is the first in eight years. This hardly suggests a dramatic rise in the bargaining power of workers to demand higher wages. In fact, the real governing power in corporate policy rests with shareholders (I get to this in a minute).

It's hard to believe, then, that driving the market volatility are fears of rising inflation. Such inflation would have to follow a dramatic rise in worker pay, which simply isn't the case. In fact, the portion of the profits that workers take home continues to shrink as evidence of the labor share following overall downward trend . Additionally, inflation has been historically low for years. The Federal Research measure inflation through the Consumer Price Index which has held at a low and steady rate since the 1990s. Regardless, the fact that investors treat wage increases as a destabilizing force exposes the role that wealthy elites play in suppressing labor gains. To understand this, it's important to add context the market's bullish growth these past eight years.

As much as the media likes to conflate Wall Street with Main Street, market trends reflect elite interests more than anything else (new research by NYU economist Edward N. Wolff evidences how the top 10% of Americans own 84% of all stocks). An important point to make here is how markets are tethered to corporate profits. Where profits go, so go the markets.

The reason for this is because corporate profits are reinvested back into stocks in order to inflate their prices. Rising stock value send signals to speculators to purchase even more shares which, in turn, is good news for executive pay (executive compensation packages usually include stock appreciation rights (SARs) which are essentially bonuses for good market performance).

This feedback loop explains the bullish market for the past eight years. Executives invest in their companies stock, which is good for investors looking to grow their finances. Investors then buy those shares which increases business performance. And the cycle goes on treating executives and financiers very well. As is often the case in economics though, what's good news for elites is not always good news for labor. The rise of corporate profits have come at the direct expense of worker's wages.

The reason for this is because the incorporation of SARs into executive pay packages incentivizes management to more on those financial instruments and less on payroll. Think of it this way - executives can either a) reinvest their profits into their workers and factories, which is costly and yields a slower return on investment, or b) purchase stock buybacks and dividends, which generates a much faster return for impatient investors. Executives have chosen the latter. This is evidenced by an overall declining trend in domestic investment as share of the GDP.

While they spend less on building their business and hiring workers, they are investing more in those lucrative financial instruments (buybacks, dividends, etc.)

Overall, company expenditures have been siphoned over the years from payroll to financial instruments in order to cater to shareholder interests. This reveals who really exercises power in corporate policy. The new corporate governance functions to maximize shareholder value - speculators determine how companies invest, executives and management make a killing, and workers takes home a small portion of the pie. None of this suggests, in any way, that labor has the bargaining power to demand higher wages. On the contrary, this exposes how the markets are designed for executives to capture larger portions of the company's profits in a way that ensure the subordination of labor.

This came to a head with last week after investors responded to wage increases with market volatility. Nervous speculators threw the markets into correction territory after news that workers may be cutting into record-setting corporate profits. After all, wage increases imply more investment in payroll and less in those lucrative buybacks. The decision for executives to ease up on stock purchase and other financial instruments confused speculators who have been used to confident managers investing in their own company's stocks. As a result, investors become unsure of their shares and their decisions to divest created a seller's market (and all of that money that top-income earners got from the new tax deal simply sits in the bank).

Overall, last week's market drops were strategic movements to counterbalance the modest rise of worker's wages. So, the next time investors describe market drops using the term "correction," remember what they really see as the problem.


Ben Luongo is a doctoral candidate at University of South Florida's School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies where he teaches courses in global political economy and international human rights. He previously worked as a campaign organizer and directed several campaigns for groups like the Human Rights Campaign and Save the Children. His articles have appeared in the Foreign Policy Journal, Foreign Policy in Focus, International Policy Digest, and New Politics .