[Pictured: The Black Panther Party’s Free Breakfast for Children Program in action, New York, 1969. Photo by Bev Grant/Getty Images]
By Samatha Pleasants
The first chapter of The Black Panther Party came out of Oakland, CA, in October 1966. From then on, the party spread like wildfire across the nation, from Oakland to New Haven, CT. The Oakland Chapter compiled the Black Panther Party Ten-Point Program, detailing the Black Panthers’ purpose and intentions. The program cites freedom, equal employment, equal opportunities, an end to capitalism, equal housing, exemption from military service, an end to police brutality, freedom for the incarcerated, etc. The party implemented social services, including The Free Ambulance Program, health clinics, The Black Panther Newspaper, youth institutes, and legal aid offices. Some of these, like The Children’s Free Breakfast Program, exist today. The Black Panther Party was not a fly-by-night organization. According to the Party’s own history: “The Black Panther Party at one point of time or another, between 1966 to 1971, had official chapters with the same name or affiliated organizations under other names in at least 61 cities in 26 states and the District of Columbia”.[1] The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) followed behind Black organizers quickly with a Counterintelligence Program initiative (COINTELPRO) to eradicate the potential threat of Black Nationalism. Though the BPP lasted into the 1980s, the FBI completed its objective by rendering them ineffective. The COINTELPRO was a multi-dimensional effort that was ultimately very successful in marginalizing the Black Panther Party from the populace of the United States without completely taking the party out.
The 1960s were a politically charged decade and a pivotal time for Civil Rights. Nearly a century after the ratification of the 13th Amendment, Black Americans still faced life-threatening prejudice. As the decade went on, the Civil Rights movement flourished. Uprisings across the country, from Detroit to Newark, spoke to the angry Black populous fighting for equality. Unrest in the community continued to grow, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's concern about organized revolution grew along with it. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the revisions made to the Civil Rights Act in 1968 were not enough of a gesture from the United States Government to rectify the injustices faced by the Black Population. This, in turn, created a more radical approach to gaining equality- the Civil Rights Movement shifted into Black Power. The FBI's greatest fear was Black leaders engendering a sense of freedom within their community. The Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) was a campaign conducted by the FBI and created by its director, J. Edgar Hoover, from 1956 to 1971. Through COINTELPRO, the FBI targeted groups that it deemed subversive. The FBI's goal was to dismantle these groups and to destroy their public perception as much as possible. The first group targeted by COINTELPRO was the U.S. Communist Party during the Red Scare of the 1950s. The program eventually expanded to target more groups during the 1960's. In August 1967, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover expanded the bureau's Counterintelligence Program to tackle Black Nationalism.
Did the FBI target the Black Panther Party because they were a "black extremist organization… advocating the use of violence and guerrilla tactics to overthrow the U.S. government"[2]? Or was it actually because of their "free breakfast program," which FBI director J. Edgar Hoover feared brought about a sense of unity and strength in the Black Community? In the film A Huey P Newton Story, Roger Guenveur Smith states:
If you read the FBI files, you will see that even Mr. J. Edgar Hoover himself had to say that it was not the guns that were the greatest threat to the International security of the United States of America; it was not the guns, it was the Free Children's Breakfast Program that was the greatest threat to the international security of the United States of America. [3]
In 1971, a robbery conducted by the Citizens Committee to Investigate the FBI led to a leak of the COINTELPRO files to the media. The backlash from politicians and the public caused the FBI to discontinue the Counterintelligence Program. Later, more information would be discovered through Freedom of Information Act requests and lawsuits filed by BPP members. Next came information obtained from federal agents who came forward and confessed their wrongdoings and involvement in the COINTELPRO. In 1976, the Senate formed a special Senate committee- The Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence (later nicknamed the "Church Committee"). Unfortunately, many documents from the COINTELPRO went unreleased, and parts of the documents released were blacked out. The investigation concluded that the FBI wrongfully targeted, surveilled, and violated the rights of average citizens.
The Black Panther Party experienced significant splits in 1971; from that point on, the party started to decline. According to political scientist Ollie A. Johnson: “From 1970-1974, the party changed from a large, decentralized, revolutionary organization to a small, highly centralized reformist group.”[4] All the chapters, besides Oakland, were shut down. Though the Black Panther Party went on into the early 1980s, the party as it was no longer existed. The FBI may not have diminished them entirely, but they crippled the Panthers so severely that the party could never recover- thereby achieving their goal. This was accomplished through consistent harassment, surveillance, covert operations that used illegal tactics and infiltration, multiple coalitions with local law enforcement, and reinforcement from the Panther's negative perception in the media.
Historiography
The Federal Bureau of Investigations’ Counterintelligence Program spanned from 1956 to 1971 and has remained controversial. The program involved the illegal surveillance of numerous U.S. citizens, covert and illegal operations, and the production of false narratives. The program, in turn, significantly impacted various political movements in the United States- especially the Civil Rights Movement. The FBI stated that “the purpose of this new counterintelligence program is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, and otherwise neutralize the activities of Black Nationalist organizations and groupings and their leadership, spokesmen, made, and supporters.”[5] The COINTELRO focused significantly on Black Liberation groups. This period of history has garnered substantial attention from historians due to its profound impact on groups like the Black Panther Party. Though the consensus of the program is that it had a negative effect, some historians argue that the program was not the cause of the demise of the BPP. Historians Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin, for instance, argued that “To what extent federal counterintelligence measures may have contributed to the unraveling of… the Oakland Party in the 1970’s is difficult to determine.” [6] Also, most historians have concluded that, even after the exposure of COINTELPRO to the public, the general population still saw the FBI positively.
One of the first notable books on the topic is Racial Matters: the FBI's Secret War on Black America, 1960-1972, published in 1989. Author Kenneth O'Reilly received his Ph.D. in American history from Marquette University. He has published several books on the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is a professor specializing in 20th-century U.S. history. Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 of O'Reilly's book focus on the relationship between the FBI and the Black Panther Party. Here, O'Reilly tears into the FBI and its intentions with COINTELPRO, debunking the portrayal of the Bureau as one that made great strides toward racial justice. O’Reilly highlights the racist ideals that FBI director J Edgar Hoover shared with white supremacist groups like the Ku Klux Klan. O'Reilly’s take on President Johnson and his administration’s role in enabling the Bureau’s illegal actions, however, is confusing. This point was brought up in Robert Justin Goldstein’s review of O’Reilly’s book as “another example of overreaching”[7]. He asserts that Johnson enabled the FBI’s attacks on the Black Panther Party. O’Reilly states that Hoover and his aides "interpreted the president's obsession with militants and nationalists, and as well with those civil rights leaders who opposed the Vietnam war, as an Oval Office grant of authority to do whatever was necessary to neutralize them"[8]. Right after that, O'Reilly admits that it is uncertain how much Lyndon B Johnson knew about the FBI's counterintelligence. Goldstein does agree with O’Reilly “that not only Johnson but John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon… were directly responsible for encouraging massive FBI intelligence gathering”. Goldstein and O’Reilly agree that the lack of control and supervision of the FBI puts much of the responsibility on these presidential administrations. Though Goldstein’s review of O’Reilly’s work was not all praise, he gives credit where it is due, deeming this book as “the most comprehensive account yet published concerning the FBI and the civil rights movement” [9]. O’Reilly concludes that the nation's congressional leaders overwhelmingly favored the dismantling of Black Power groups and the jailing of their prominent members.
At the beginning of a review of O'Reilly's book, Steven F. Lawson agrees with O’Reilly’s assertion that, even after the exposure of the illegal and unethical Counterintelligence Program, the public still admired the FBI. Lawson seems to disdain J. Edgar Hoover, which is something to consider when reading the book review. Nevertheless, facts support his disdain concerning Hoover's character. He goes on to emphasize Hoover's fear of racial equality and his sympathizing with white supremacy groups.
O’Reilly notes the impact that Attorney General Clark had on the FBI's operations — adding another actor to the list of those who enabled the FBI’s mentions. Though Clark was not the most loved official by Hoover, he was a part of introducing surveillance to the United States government. According to the text, J. Edgar Hoover called Attorney General Clark "a coddler of crooks and Black terrorists and an enemy of law-and-order values."[10] Many people in Washington viewed Clark negatively. AG Clark supported recruiting informants, but Hoover clarified that he would do it on his terms. Once the "communist menace" was replaced with a new Black one, the FBI began targeting Black Power organizations.
In 2001, Bettye Collier-Thomas and V.P. Franklin put together Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Civil Rights-Black Power Movement- a compilation of separate essays. This book addresses the many instances where the FBI targeted an African American woman—going as far back as 1940 when the FBI targeted Ella Baker. In the essay "No One Ever Asks a Mans Roll in The Revolution," the author Tracey A Matthews mentions the BPP, highlighting the "competing gender ideologies"[11] within the Black Power Movement and the BPP. Not only did the party have external forces depleting them, but there were internal forces as well. The struggle with gender roles took its toll, and the FBI took advantage of any division it discovered within the party. Both Matthews and O'Reilly would agree that the Panther's various social programs, including the Free Children's Breakfast Program, horrified the FBI. The programs they implemented went neck and neck with the destruction campaigns implemented by the Bureau. Matthews, like O'Reilly, discusses the importance of FBI destruction campaigns, like using informants to achieve their goal. These informants gathered information for the FBI and incited activity that would put the party at risk. Matthews states that "many of the FBI's activities against the Party were designed to undermine the free breakfast for children operations." The motive behind the FBI's covert operations were to destroy the party; it could not achieve its goal if the party were doing credible things for the community.
In 2011, Ryan J. Kirby wrote an article titled, “Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Community Activism and the Black Panther Party”. This article examines the activism of the Black Panther Party from 1966 to 1971, focusing on the relationship between the FBI and the BPP. 1968 was a big year for the party; the "Free Huey" campaign took the party from Oakland all across the country. The growth of the party and the surprising amount of support it engendered was a significant concern to the FBI. The larger the party got, the more the Counterintelligence Program expanded. The Bureau matched every move the party made. According to Kirby, in these four years, the COINTELPRO attacks on the BPP led to "violent confrontations, arrests, and fines that depleted the party's funds and strength."[12] This quote made me consider the primary sources I examined at Yale Sterling Memorial Library and the National Archives in D.C. The John R. Williams Papers contains subpoenas of the party's finances, and so do the congressional records in D.C. Kirby's article also mentions a point made in the Matthews's article from Sisters in the Struggle[13]- the party had internal issues that impacted them- they were hindered more by the FBI's interference.
Jakobi Williams published the book From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago in 2013. William’s is currently a professor in African American Studies and African diaspora at Indiana University. Williams dives into the tumultuous but significant relationship between the Chicago BPP (ILBPP- Illinois Black Panther Party) and the FBI. Williams and O’Reilly (among other historians) have come to the same conclusions about J. Edgar Hoover’s motives and his character. On page 172, Williams states that J. Edgar Hoover “disliked political leftists, believed in white supremacy, and aligned his position with U.S. elites to maintain blacks in subordinate economic positions.”[14] Where there is smoke, there is fire- most historians who have written about J. Edgar Hoover have articulated the same things.
William’s highlighting of the ILBPP allows for a new perspective of the party. Scholarship about the BPP was often centered around its Oakland chapter, putting the focus on Chicago adds more pieces to the puzzle. Williams credits the FBI's particular interest in the Chicago chapter to its leader, Fred Hampton. Due to the political climate in Chicago and across the nation, Chicago BPP concluded that partnering with the Black Stone Rangers (another Black Liberation group) would help increase their rank and file. One of the first things on the FBI's to-do list was to destroy the relationship between the Black Panthers and Black Stone Rangers in Chicago. Historians writing about COINTELPRO consistently bring up the FBI's strategy of causing strife within Black liberation movements to weaken them. Williams finds, like many others, that the interferences made by the FBI heightened the rift between the groups.
The book is perfectly separated into well-thought-out chapters breaking down the strategy the FBI, in partnership with law enforcement, used to dismantle the ILBPP. Chapter Five is titled Law Enforcement Repressions and the Assassination of Chairman Fred Hampton. The mention of using local media to help heighten the public’s fear of the party is a common theme in all of the sources cited so far- going back to O’Reilly’s book. At the chapter's start, Williams states, “Both the Chicago Police Department, intelligence arm, the Red Squad, and FBI agents enlisted the local media in efforts to discredit the Panthers.” [15] Williams emphasizes an essential fact about the relationship between the FBI and the local Chicago Police. Judson Jefferies raves in a book review about how Williams unpacked the BPP’s campaign against the Mayor of Chicago.[16] The relationship between the Mayor and the Chicago Police speaks to how deep the fight was to destroy the BPP. The fact is that the FBI could not complete the task alone, and it was not the only group that wanted something to be done about the Panthers. The protests at Chicago’s Democratic National Convention increased the Party’s attention. Williams refers to the mayor’s “stranglehold on political protest, the brutality of the city’s police force, and (though this did not come to light for many years) the city government’s infiltration of protest groups.”[17]
Though the FBI cooperated with various departments nationwide, their relationship with Chicago was profound. The Chicago police were thoroughly intertwined with the Bureau, as stated in the text, “to an extent not duplicated in any other city.”[18] The two forces worked closely together to deplete the BPP of their resources and instill fear and paranoia. Raids and arrests happened often, and the BPP did not have the money to back up the costs of bail or lawyers. Also, spending money on bail and lawyers meant less funding for their community programs.
As mentioned earlier, in 2013, Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin Jr. wrote an informative study of the Oakland Party, discussing the impact of surveillance and COINTELPRO in particular. Bloom and Martin argue that the state's repression did not significantly impact the BPP in Oakland, or at least not to the degree that other historians thought. This take is not common, but the points made throughout the book are valid. For example, the party’s involvement with so-called enemies of the state and third-world nations greatly hindered them. However, this book fails to mention many key factors, as noted in a book review by Navid Farnia. Farnia states that they overlook the “ruthlessness of what Judson L. Jeffries calls the repressive government apparatus.”[19]
In 2020, Brian Mullgardt wrote an article in the Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society (1998-), further delving into the story of the ILBPP. Here, he quotes Bloom and Martin’s piece, citing their indecisiveness on the impact of COINTELPRO on the BPP. What stands out to in Mullgardt’s piece is his mention of COINTELPRO’s ineffectiveness in completing specific tasks. He explains ‘that the Panthers, along with the Puerto Rican organization the Young Lords and the white groups the Young Patriots and Rising Up Angry, formed the Rainbow Coalition in 1969, further indicating COINTELPRO’s ineffectiveness at sowing discord in Illinois.”[20]. That does not mean the Rainbow Coalition was a huge success- the coalition did not last, but its impact did. That is noted in Ana Durkin Keating’s review of Williams’s work. She mentions the importance of the book’s conclusion, looking at the lasting impact of the ILBPP-noting the Rainbow Coalition's effect on electing Chicago’s first Black mayor in 1983. [21]
Each monograph and essay examined reaffirms my choice of primary sources. These primary sources include the Freedom of Information Act, congressional records, first-hand accounts from Black Panthers and Bureau members, and newspaper articles. The only concern with the primary sources is the FOIA documents- some are hard to interpret due to the redacted pieces. However, that does not mean they aren't valuable. Even looking as far back as O'Reilly's book Racial Matters: the FBI's Secret War on Black America, 1960-1972 from 1989, most historians researching the topic used what they could from the Freedom-of-Information Act FBI documents. These files, combined with Congressional records, first-hand accounts, and newspaper articles, give a well-informed view of the strategies used by the FBI to dismantle the BPP.
Main Body
The FBI’s nationwide coalition with local law enforcement was its most potent COINTELPRO weapon. Black Panther Déqui Kioni-Sadiki asserts that the length and extent of the FBI's surveillance wasn't common knowledge, that "almost from its inception, J. Edgar Hoover engaged in an undeclared and clandestine Counter Intelligence Program war- on the BPP in particular and on the whole Black Power Movement in general.”[22] By the end of 1967, the COINTELPRO Black Power initiative had commenced and was implemented with the help of police precincts across the country, from Oakland, CA, to New Haven, CT. Those in local law enforcement working alongside the FBI would be referred to in correspondence as SAC (special agents in charge). From the beginning of the creation of the Black Panther Party's first chapter in Oakland, CA, in 1966, the FBI was on its tail.
The released Counterintelligence Program records include memorandums, letters, "Airtels," and other forms of correspondence. An Airtel communication was to be sent the same day it was composed. Correspondence's being marked Airtel hinted at a sense of urgency. These communications were sometimes made between the Director of the FBI and SACs in various police offices across the country. By 1967, the COINTELPRO operation was in 43 cities across the United States. On February 29, 1968, an Airtel correspondence from G. C. Moore (FBI Associate Director) to William C. Sullivan (Assistant FBI Director, leader of domestic intelligence operations) affirmed that the program was in full force. The subject of the Airtel: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM /BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS. Moore starts the Airtel by laying out the purpose of the initiative, "to extend the Counterintelligence Program designed to neutralize militant black nationalist groups from 23 to 41 field divisions to cover the great majority of black nationalist activity in this country". This Airtel was in reference to another Airtel sent on August 25, 1967, that held instructions regarding the COINTELPRO Black nationalist operation. At the time, the Airtel went to twenty-three different cities nationwide. Moore referred to the "tremendous increase in black nationalist activity," asserting that a sense of urgency needed to be behind the implementation of the FBI's COINTELPRO initiative. This Airtel established guidelines that the SACs should follow. One is that all SACs submit progress reports periodically and have any COINTELPRO initiatives approved before implementation. Though it is apparent looking through the records that these guidelines aren’t as stringent.
The post haste feel of the Airtel proved that the FBI was concerned. They no longer saw Black resistance as unorganized and lacking in leadership; they started to see it as an actual threat. How could it not be? The Black Panther Party had stretched across the country, coast to coast. They had legitimate parties in major cities like Chicago, IL, and Charleston, NC; the FBI was on top of the growing "problem." An Airtel dated March 4, 1968, from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to SAC Albany lists all the FBI field offices that were participating in the initiative to take down Black “extremist” groups. A few locations listed include Atlanta, GA; Baltimore, MA; Detroit, MI; Memphis, TN; Los Angeles, CA; New Orleans, LA; New York, NY. The Airtel stated that "the Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each office added to this program should designate an agent familiar with black nationalist activity… this agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested." [23] The Airtel also laid out a list of goals set by the Bureau, which each field office was required to follow. Though the Black Panther Party wasn't the only Black Nationalist group on the FBI's radar, it was at the top of the list.
Another Airtel correspondence dated May 27, 1969, from J. Edgar Hoover to SAC, San Francisco, displays the blatant push to distort the image of the Black Panther Party. This Airtel was in response to another Airtel made to the Director by SAC, San Francisco, on May 14, 1969. One in which SAC San Francisco expressed their hesitance to pursue the Black Panther Party. The DOJ sees the BPP as a Black Nationalist group intending to overthrow the government; San Francisco disagreed, writing that though the Black Panther Party is seen as a subversive, violent organization, “there seems to be little likelihood of this.” The director's response starts with a defensive tone, arguing that the Airtel sent by the San Francisco office expresses a negative outlook on COINTELPRO and is unacceptable to the Bureau, stating that “your (SAC, San Francisco) reasoning is not in line with Bureau objectives…”[24]. The Airtel starts with counterarguments to statements made by SAC, San Francisco. According to the Airtel, SAC, San Francisco was not urgently ensuring the FBI COINTELPRO objectives were met in their jurisdiction. Hoover then lists the various concerns the BPP poses to San Francisco and its surrounding area. Throughout the Airtel, the director continuously emphasized keeping the BPP away from "moderate" Black and white community members who might support them. Hoovers' next topic of concern was The Breakfast for Children Program. The FBI feared that The Breakfast For Children Program, a program that gave free food to children before they went to school, would likely appeal to moderate Black and white community members. This food wasn't only intended for Black and brown children, but it was also for poor white children. Hoover insists that The Breakfast for Children Program was developed with malicious intent. This implies that the Panthers conducted programs like this simply to build their public image and recruit youth for their cause. Hoover informed SAC, San Francisco, that their COINTELPRO operations needed re-evaluation. Suggesting that San Francisco pick other agents better suited for COINTELPRO operations. This correspondence made it clear that Hoover and the FBI had little tolerance for those in the COINTELPRO network questioning their orders and the motives behind them. From the beginning of the COINTELPRO Black Nationalist initiative, the goal was to establish a strong allegiance between the FBI and the SAC offices. Local police needed to prove their loyalty to the FBI and the COINTELPRO. These connections would play a key role in the FBI’s initiative and the ultimate downfall of the Black Panther Party.
The SAC at work: various cases from city to city
Different objectives made in cities nationwide by law enforcement were key to getting at the weak points of the Black Panther Party’s infrastructure. At the end of Huey Newton's Revolutionary Suicide, he states, "A revolutionary party is under continual stress from both internal and external forces. By its very nature, a political organization dedicated to social change invites attack from the established order, constantly vigilant to destroy it." The FBI had the time, the resources, and the grit to continually attack and infiltrate the Black Panther Party at any chance it could get.
Fighting within political groups, especially ones garnered around the motivation of revolution, was inevitable. The FBI wanted to heighten their chances of things going awry within the confines of the Black Panther Party, so they strategized. Inserting informants and agent provocateurs was a standard method used by the FBI to infiltrate BPP chapters. Direct and indirect action from the FBI's COINTELPRO initiative weighed heavy on the party.
SAC, San Diego cites their accomplishments in an AIRTEL from August 20, 1969, "Shootings, beatings, and high degree of unrest continues to prevail in the ghetto area of Southeast San Diego although no specific counterintelligence action can be credited with contributing to this over-all situation, it is felt that a substantial amount of the unrest is directly attributed to this program…”[25] Straight from the horse's mouth, law enforcement took responsibility for destroying local communities through the COINTELPRO initiative. The Black revolutionaries of San Diego were victims of the FBI’s manipulation, which would lead to infighting and eventually the death of two of the BPP San Diego Chapter’s leaders.
The FBI intended to destroy the morale of the BPP and its members; attacking leadership could have a domino effect. The FBI and local law enforcement knew it was necessary to get into the minds of the youth. This was made evident in an Airtel from SAC, San Francisco, stating that "The Negro youth and moderate must be made to understand that if they succumb to revolutionary teaching, they will be dead revolutionaries." The Black Panther Party was being made an example of by local and federal law enforcement. Many BPP members were incarcerated, some of whom remained behind bars for a long time. Being tangled up in the carceral system was mentally and physically exhausting and a great way to deplete morale. It was also a way to rob the party of their funding stashed away for community purposes.
From its formation, the BPP saw the FBI as an immediate threat which had no mercy. Former Panther Sundiata Acoli (former Panther) recalls the beginning of the COINTELPRO initiative against the BPP in "An Updated History of the New Afrikan Prison Struggle" from the book Look For Me in The Whirlwind. Acoli writes:
It began with the mass arrest of Lumumba Shakur and the New York Panther 21. It followed with a series of military raids on the Black Panther Party offices in Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Haven, Jersey City, Detroit, Chicago, Denver, Omaha, Sacramento, and San Diego, and was capped off with an early-morning four-hour siege that poured thousands of rounds into the Los Angeles BPP office.[26]
Chicago, Illinois
The case of the Black Panther Party in Chicago exemplifies the devastating tactics used in COINTELPRO. An Airtel, from the FBI Director to SAC, Chicago, gives the SAC office authority to carry out an operation they detailed to the FBI. The letter states, "Authority is granted" for the mailing of anonymous letters, a tactic often used by the SAC offices. The bureau directed the SAC office to "utilize a commercially purchased envelope for this letter and ensure that the mailing is not traced to the source.”[27] Informants were to take every step to ensure that no one suspected law enforcement of composing the letters. That letter was for Black Stone Rangers leader Jeff Fort, another Black community organization founded in Chicago . The bureau hoped this letter would create strife between the Black Stone Rangers and the BPP. Fred Hampton’s willingness and intention to work with other organizations scared the FBI and bogus letters like this prevented those coalitions that Fred Hampton hoped to form and ruined those the BPP already had. After the letters were sent, the conflict between both parties arose, and there was no hope of working with the Black Stone Rangers. Using this tactic, along with others, dissolved Fred Hampton’s dream of a “rainbow coalition,” giving the Bureau what it wanted.
Like fake letters, informants were frequent during the height of the COINTELPRO objective. The most notable use being with William O’Neal in Chicago, IL. O’Neal was the informant who infiltrated the Chicago Black Panther Party in 1969, leading to the death of revered leader Fred Hampton. FBI informants did not follow any code of conduct- the mission was for them to get as much information as possible and hopefully cause some trouble in the process. Fred Hampton's case was gruesome and unjustifiable, but a great example of the extent to which the FBI went to achieve its goals. You can see the threat he posed to the FBI just by looking at the files dedicated to Fred Hampton. In the FOIA COINTELPRO records, Fred Hampton Part 1 file is compiled of 100 pages. [28] The file includes newspaper articles around the death of Fred Hampton, transcripts from a news conference held by the Maywood Human Relations Commission, Airtel’s, and other records.
The FBI informant William O’Neal tells his story in The Eyes on the Prize series documentary. [29] William O’Neal became an FBI informant after a run-in with the law. O’Neal and a friend stole a car, drove around Chicago, and left to visit a relative out of state. They stopped at a pool hall, where visitors were required to leave their names and addresses. After playing a few games, the gentlemen left the pool hall, got into an accident outside, and fled. They managed to get back to Chicago, and "about three, four months later," O’Neal was contacted by FBI agent Roy Mitchell. Mitchell let O’Neal know that the FBI knew of the accident in the stolen car, playing a game of cat and mouse back and forth with O’Neal for several minutes. Mitchell assured O’Neal that though his lies weren't believable, he had nothing to worry about- if he helped him out. Something is troubling about the circumstances O’Neal faced- a man encounters legal issues, and the police approach him with a quid pro quo situation to buy his freedom. In the interview, O’Neal details the authority that Chicago’s SAC gave him. He explained that FBI agent Roy Mitchell "gave me a lot of room, a lot of leash, in order to be a Panther. He wanted me to become a Panther before I became an FBI agent."[30] The tone in O’Neal’s voice throughout the interview and the constant self-assurance that he was not responsible for the assassination of Fred Hampton spoke to his guilt.
O’Neal got close to the party, gained its members' trust, and obtained secrets vital to the Chicago PD's operations. O’Neal became Hampton’s bodyguard and eventually the head of BPP security in Chicago. He was so close to Fred Hampton that he was able to create a map of Hampton's home. This map considered every detail, from the purpose of each room down to the location of furniture. Chicago PD used this to plan the assassination, disguised as a so-called arms raid of Fred Hampton’s residence on December 3, 1969. That evening, O’Neal drugged Hampton, assuring that he would be subdued during the planned raid. Finally, at 4 am the Chicago PD busted into the Hampton residence, achieving their goal of killing Fred Hampton.
California to Connecticut
The case of Ericka Huggins exemplifies how depleting it was to be a part of the Black Panther Party and constantly under the microscope of the FBI. Huggins is known for participating in the New Haven, CT chapter. But, Huggins roots are in Los Angeles, where she lived with her husband, Jon Huggins. Huggins was murdered, not directly by the FBI or any informants, but he did die due to the FBI’s actions through their COINTELPRO initiative. The bureau had clandestine, indirect ways of getting what it wanted. In an Airtel communication from SAC, Los Angeles, to the FBI Director, SAC agents lay out operations "under consideration."[31] The operations bore a resemblance to those implemented in Chicago. The Airtel discusses a series of anonymous letters that the SAC office will send out—one to the BPP from a member of the US organization (a rival Black nationalist organization). The letter would go on to state that members of the group US are aware of "plans" that the BPP had to kill their leader, Ron Karenga. SAC, Los Angeles, hoped this would "result in a US and BPP vendetta." [32] Next, a letter was sent to the party's donor, The Peace and Freedom Party (PFP). The intention of the letter was for the PFP to cut ties with the BPP. The letter warned that "when the armed rebellion comes, the whites in the PFP will be lined up against the wall with the rest of the whites."[33] The anonymous letter would indefinitely cause a stir and cripple the relationship that both organizations had. This was proven on January 17, 1969, when Alprentice “Bunchy” Carter and Jon Huggins were killed by members of the US. A tragedy that would forever tarnish the relationship between both groups and reassured the FBI that their initiative was working.
As stated before, BPP leader Ericka Huggins moved to New Haven after her husband's death to be close to his family. June 4, 1971, an Airtel was sent to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover from SAC, New Haven[34]. A monthly summary from New Haven, reporting to headquarters and keeping everyone updated. Part 1 of the summary lists the informants involved in SAC New Haven operations, but the actual list is deleted from the file. Here, the informants laid out every piece of information they received from their deceptive fieldwork. The document included the branch's name, national leaders, local leaders, headquarters location, and support groups. They knew everything the party and its members did, down to the last detail. In that same Airtel, SAC New Haven lists the party's "public appearances," mainly referring to their various demonstrations, how unorganized they were, how many people were in attendance, etc. The case of the New Haven Black Panthers involved Ericka Huggins and Bobby Seale. Both Panthers were charged with conspiracy involving the murder of Alex Rackley in 1969 after a tape of Huggins interrogating the victim was released. The trial was less than a year long, from October 1970 to May 1971, but Huggins was imprisoned for two years. Due to the controversy surrounding the case, the jury selection process was the most prolonged in the history of Connecticut. Ericka was in prison, away from a tiny baby, as well as dealing with the death of her husband- living in a mentally exhausted state. This was all intentional- everything worked out as planned.
In an Airtel, the New Haven SAC mentioned the release of Ericka Huggins on May 25, 1971, "the case against the Panthers was dismissed, and ERICKA HUGGINS was immediately freed.” [35] Though Huggins was freed, it did not take away the trauma that she endured throughout the process. The work became grueling and the continual interaction with law enforcement was life-altering. Another Airtel from SAC New Haven from June 11, 1971, contains a transcript from a telephone conversation. This conversation shows the very real impact all this legal trouble had on the Black Panther Party. Panther Millie Farmer calls George Edwards in the transcript, stating that she "exhausted all of her sources in New Haven" [36] and needed to borrow $380 before the 15th when she goes to a court hearing. The FBI's plan was working; they were exhausting the members of the BPP in every way possible. All those involved in the COINTELPRO initiative knew it was necessary to get into the minds of the youth. In a correspondence to the FBI, SAC San Francisco stated that, "The Negro youth and moderate must be made to understand that if they succumb to revolutionary teaching, they will be dead revolutionaries." Many BPP members were incarcerated, some of whom remained behind bars for quite some time. Dealing with the carceral system is exhausting and a great way to deplete morale. It is mentally and physically exhausting and could rob a party of a good portion of their funding stashed away for community purposes.
North Carolina
The case of The Black Panther Party in North Carolina also speaks directly to the FBI's devastating impact. So, it seems that wherever a chapter popped up, the FBI followed. SAC Charlotte reported back to the FBI that on April 21, 1969, a man (whose name was deleted) from Greensboro contacted the BPP in Oakland to get the okay to form their own chapter. The Oakland chapter gave them “no authority at this time to organize”. [37] On May 8, 1969, SAC, Charlotte contacted the FBI Director via Airtel. The Airtel states that after reviewing information through investigation, they had determined “that a charter has not been issued to a Black Panther unit in North Carolina... informants report that the Charlotte, N.C., and Greensboro, N. C. Both have hopes of receiving charters…” [38] There is another COINTELPRO correspondence in this FBI file where the sender and receiver have been blacked out. However, the correspondence starts by informing us that on May 21, 1969, posters were being passed around Charlotte. The next page of the file contains a copy of the flyer for a rally that will last from 12 to 4 pm at a restaurant called Chicken and Ribs. The flyer cited the organizers as “Citizens of the Black Community who are interested in organizing. A Black Panther Party”[39]. The FBI knew every single move of Black organizers, whether they were officially affiliated with the Black Panther Party or not.
In a memorandum on August 25, 1969, the FBI in Charlotte stated that "this group (Afro-American Unity Organization) has since the fall of 1968 been unsuccessfully attempting to affiliate nationally with the Black Panther Party… advised that this group even though they are not affiliated nationally with the BPP do wear the garb of the BPP and study from books supplied by the BPP.”[40] The purpose of the memorandum is to investigate the possibility of a BPP chapter being formed, due to a meeting of "the potential BPP" in Charlotte. That is six months of investigation, and there is still no assurance of any affiliation. Nevertheless, the SAC office was established in Charlotte; the agents began documenting every single step made by those active in Charlotte. Even if they weren't affiliated, this proactiveness on the part of the FBI put them one step ahead.
The FBI North Carolina Files are extensive; the focus isn’t just on one city in North Carolina. Greensboro, Charlotte, and Winston-Salem are the three cities most frequently mentioned. On the FOIA archive, there is a section listed as “Black Panther Party, Winston Salem, NC.” some of these are duplicate files as the ones in the FBI vault and on the Internet Archive website.[41] In Part 01 file, a document details the BPP’s activity in North Carolina. In the heading of this document, it says UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. Bellow that title says, “copy to:” and then lists several army bases. The report of date lists SA, something blacked out, May 23, 1969. The next page lists a table of Contents and Part 1 is Charlotte. Subsection A starts on page 4, titled Organizational Activities and Connections with the Black Panther Party Headquarters, Berkley, California. First notation, December 13, 1968, an individual (name blacked out) had recently contacted the BPP headquarters in Oakland, referring to themself as a member of the Charlotte-based group Afro-American Unity Organization. The person was inquiring about affiliating with the Black Panther Party, stating that he was told “it would be necessary for him to forward the amount of $300.00 to the national headquarters so that a representative of the national office… could travel to Charlotte, North Carolina, to indoctrinate the new members”.[42] Further on in the document it states that on December 30, a blacked-out name advised that Jerome Clifton Johnson, known as “The Fox” held a meeting at Johnson C. Smith University in Charlotte, claiming to be a member of the Black Panther Party.[43] This subsection of the document concludes that Jerome Johnson wasn’t able to “establish affiliation with the BPP of California”. Apparently, the reasoning behind the delay in receiving national accreditation is due to “a purge being conducted within the national party to get rid of informants and undesirable characters.”[44] It was confirmed on May 13, 1969, that Charlotte did not have a “charter group of the BPP”. The paranoia and fear that came over BPP members indicated that the FBI’s strategies were hard at work. This made it clear that the constant interference from law enforcement hindered the party’s expansion and ultimately trust with one another. Without a strong rank and file, the BPP had nothing.
Local police thoroughly documented the activities of anyone associated with the BPP. Looking to correspondence from SAC, Charlotte, to the FBI director labeled 5:31 PM URGENT, stamped for March 17, 1969, though the incident detailed occurred on February 8. The agent composing the letter goes on to describe a “plot to bomb” a local market by the Black Panthers in Greensboro. Even if there is no evidence to back up claims, the SAC office delivers the claims to the bureau. The very first sentence of the correspondence is blacked out. Still, the following sentence says “members of the Black Panther Party (BPP), Greensboro, NC are discussing the possibility of bombing the Thrifty Curb Market in Greensboro NC”. No matter who did it, if it talked like a Panther and walked like a Panther, the FBI was on top of them. The surveillance that came along with the COINTELPRO initiative was constant and excessive.
New York, NY
The Collective Autobiography of the New York 21 (1971) gives great insight into the extent of the harassment the Black Panther Party faced at the hands of local law enforcement and the FBI. The Case is one of great significance; not only did it deplete the resources of the New York Panthers, but it also tarnished the relationship between the New York Panthers and the National Chapter (Oakland, CA). The New York 21 trial was one of the costliest New York had seen at the time and quickly became a prominent topic in the media. According to Déqui Kioni-Sadiki the expensive and prolonged trial was "never about justice or protecting people or places from Panthers allegedly conspiring to harm or destroy them”[45] The group known as the New York Panther 21 had been charged with an array of crimes, 186 counts including attempted arson and conspiracy to blow up police precincts, schools, and other locations, including the New York Botanical Garden[46] It seemed that "almost the entire" Harlem-Bronx chapter of the party was tied up in the web. On May 13, 1971, the jury found those Black Panthers not guilty. This might seem like a win for the BPP, but the impact of the trial left a more significant mark.
The legal issues that the New York chapter faced led to a need for more support for incarcerated members. They called on the national leadership to step up and aid their chapter- unfortunately, Oakland did not answer their calls for help. The New York chapter did not appreciate the lack of support they received from Oakland and parted ways from them in 1971. Slowly, the cracks in the party became bigger and bigger, breaking up coalitions and giving the FBI what it wanted.
The Committee on Internal Security of the United States House of Representatives Hearings on the Black Panther Party
Another outcome of the FBI’s COINTELPRO campaign was formal House of Representative investigations into the Black Panther Party- these did not help the Party maintain its durability and optimism. In 1970, The Committee on Internal Security of the House of Representatives held a series of hearings concerning various chapters of the BPP. On Tuesday, March 3, 1970, the committee started its investigation discussing the Kansas City Chapters and its activities. Day two was led by Chairman, Representative Richard H. Ichard. He begins by discussing claims of the party’s activity (referring to the press) and the contradictory claims from The Black Panther Party and its supporters. Ichard states that “It's effects and supposed successes in the communities throughout the Nation, the amount of police work that has been consumed because of it, and the attention it has been afforded by the press seems to me to be inordinately disproportionate to the size of the Black Panthers.[47] Representative Ichard points out that the party did not present a significant threat. Then why the hearings? Though the party appeared unorganized and small in scale, the hearings alone prove that the BPP posed a threat. Unfortunately, false narratives about the party ignited the fear held by many Americans at the time. This lead to local representatives taking action under the pressure of their constituents.
The revolutionary vocabulary and statements used by Black Panther leaders rubbed many people the wrong way. Richard explains his reasoning for voting yes for the investigation, citing the Panther’s 10-point program as a concern. He continues to assert that though the words of Panther leaders could be rhetoric, there is enough evidence around those words that they pose a threat; “… In view of these statements and in view of the depth of specific and comprehensive data and in order to ascertain if there are deficiencies in the law which are in need of remedy. Order to permit society to contend to such organizations, this committee has authorized an investigation and hearings.”[48] What Representative Ichard said next really strikes a chord. If the Federal Government was responsible for keeping law and order in Kansas City, "then we (the United States) must have a national police force. Very few people in the Congress, very few people in this Nation, want a national police force."[49] The mention of this concern reassures the fact that Congress, to a certain extent, was aware of the FBI's plans. Nevertheless, the local government was taking its own measures to examine the party and its intentions. Probing the Black Panther Party, subpoenaing witnesses, and collecting evidence "until we are satisfied that enough is known to make an intelligent evaluation.”
In part two of the hearings, the committee examined the Seattle, WA, chapter of the BPP. This was referred to as a “continuation of the series of hearings concerning the Black Panther Party.” [50] The committee subpoenaed witnesses who would testify, along with committee investigators. Representative Richardson Preyer of North Carolina proclaimed that these testimonies pertained to the BPP Seattle chapter and “the general reaction of the Seattle community to the Black Panther Party”[51] The community’s perception was key for the Black Panther’s survival, if the community did not show support success would be hard to achieve. The first witness is a special investigator from the Seattle Police Department. Officer Porter concluded that the Black Panther Party in Seattle was dying off, and turnout was dropping. He estimated that the chapter’s membership decreased from around “12 to 15” to “8 to 11” members. The officer blames this decline in membership on the party’s radicalism, stating, “They felt that the party had nothing to offer them. To quote several of those youngsters, they didn’t feel like going to a meeting and listening to lectures and studying out of Chairman Mao’s “red book”. This is a bold statement, without actual evidence but his account and estimations. Knowing how corrupt the police were when dealing with the BPP, these words don’t hold as much weight. Representative Ichord asked the same question, “How do you know that?”. He wants to know how accurate the testimony of this officer is. The officer also credits the various arrests, charges, and convictions that party members have received as another reason why membership declined.
Part three of the hearings lasted from July 21, to the 24. In this hearing, the committee examined three cities: Detroit, MI, Philadelphia, PA, and Indianapolis, IN. Representative Pryor states that “the subjects that we will inquire into today relate to the history, the origin, the organization, character, the objectives, and activities of the Black Panther Party.”[52] Three of the four witnesses were formally BPP members, one from either of the three cities. The fourth is the Philadelphia Police Sergeant. The first witness was from Detroit. Representative Pryror asked a variety of questions regarding the promotion and education of self-defense. The party’s use of weapons and self-defense courses worried U.S. officials. Berry recalled the death of the BPP's defense captain being the reason that the chapter briefly closed. Though he was not present, he recalls what was conveyed to him- stating that he was killed in a Black Panther home with twelve other members present. Calls from the Chicago chapter, which held seniority over Detroit, pressured the party to disperse. Berry asserts that though the death of the captain was the straw that broke the camel’s back, the Black Panther Party is no longer in Detroit for various reasons. Barry painted a clear picture of the BPP as a corrupt, unorganized, and violent organization. According to Barry, Chief of Staff (BPP Chicago chapter), David Hilliard contacted him after hearing that the BPP was still active in Detroit. Berry claimed that Hilliard threatened him, “he told me that we could get in trouble for posing as Panthers because there were no Black Panthers in Detroit.” Those left of the BPP in Detroit who still wanted to organize created, what Berry refers to as, an organizing branch titled The National Committee to Combat Fascism. Berry never joined that branch, and by his testimony, it was clear the biases he had toward radical dissent. Barry bragged about his harmony with law enforcement; then he claimed that the national party called him “chicken.” These claims help paint the narrative that the BPP is corrupt and violence prone. The three witnesses being former Panthers make those testimony’s biased- they separated from the party for a reason, there was going to be negative feedback. Therefor, these testimonies would not represent the party fairly.
Part four, the final part of the Congressional hearings, involved an examination of the National Office and of the Des Moines, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska branches of the BPP. These hearings took place on October 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15 and November 17 of 1970. Representative Richardson Preyer, again, started by stating that the hearigs were a “continuation of hearings concerning the Black Panther Party”. [53] But, more specifically, he states that the purpose of this fourth part of the hearings is” to develop information on the activities and objectives of the national office of the Black Panther Party” emphasizing statements made by the party about “revolutionary violence” that emanated from “national leaders or printed in the Black Panther Party newspaper”. They would like to conclude, are these statements simply rhetoric? Or is the BPP the real deal, ready to take “revolutionary action”? Again, one of the witnesses is a former Black Panther. Another is Quinn Tamm, executive director of the International Association of Chiefs of Police; Sheriff Frank Madigan, Alameda County sheriff’s office, representing the National Sheriffs Association; and John J. Harrington, national president of Fraternal Order of Police.[54] Representative Preyer believed that these witnesses, “representing three levels of local law enforcement, are in an excellent position to relate to the committee the problems facing the local law enforcement officers in this area and discuss the need for Federal legislation”. It seems that speaking only to law enforcement is biased, showing one side of the argument and not that of the BPP. The first witness called is Investigator Robert M. Horner, chief investigator for the Committee on Internal Security. Investigator Horner answers most of the representatives’ questions in great detail- laying out the activities of the BPP, related groups, affiliated groups, the number of members, the percentage of female members, the age group of the average leader, etc. Then he goes on to state that, “thirty-six out of forty-two groups reported upon were said to have been in possession of firearms” and that “seventeen groups having active chapters and five having inactive chapters were reported to have been in possession of explosives.” Each of those statements was made with no examples nor evidence presented.
Investigator Horner then mentions that “most cities reported that the relationship between the police and the Negro communities is good; that community support of the Panthers is small; and that few, if any, benefits have accrued to the Negro communities through the efforts of the Black Panthers.” The information that the investigator presented was acquired through surveys. These surveys were based upon inquiries directed to seventy-seven law enforcement agencies with active BPP chapters in their jurisdiction. There are going to be biased responses.
The witness, Mr. De Patten, was a former Black Panther as a member of both the Des Moines and Kansas City Chapter. He refers to his actions after joining the BPP, how he came up “with some off the wall theory of marching downtown, destroying it..[55]” Though this is a former member, he wasn’t as dismissive of the BPP belief system as the BPP member cited in the Seattle hearing. Patten began to describe how he was taught to deal with “right-wingers” when out in public, representing the BPP. He detailed an incident when a white woman came up to him, behaving erratically, stating that she is a “poor white working woman and that they are doing everything for those black people; they even passed a law in Kansas where if they rioted and robbed the stores, nothing would happen to them. I didn’t know anything about any such law and I still don’t.. I told her if she was a white working woman, then we should ally ourselves; that she should be my normal ally… because we were talking about not a race struggle, we were talking about a class struggle…” Patten articulated that, by speaking to her and relating their struggles, he got her to listen. The questioning continued, as if Representative Romines did not want to hear that response; that wasn’t enough to make the party look bad.
The representative continued to question the former Panther. He hounded him about the existence of a BPP in Des Moines, whether it was actually disbanded, and if the National Chapter was the one that ordered the disbanding. He then asked a couple of questions, to which the witness outright said that he “isn’t sure” in response. For example, when representative Romines says, “You made the statement that the des moines Black Panther chapter wanted to relate more on a hard-core community level, is that right?” But, he told Representative Rominespreviously that he “believe(d), they wanted to relate more on a cultural level; that is from my understanding. I have not been to Kansas City, I don’t know for sure about Kansas City”[56]. However, the representative is taking these statements as truth, and in no way does he fact-check these responses. These investigations and those statements made so matter-of-factly applied more pressure on the Black Panther Party.
The media as a catalyst of negative public perception
The mainstream media played an essential role in assisting the FBI in its plan to destroy the Black Panther Party. Though the newspaper articles were not being put out directly by the FBI, it was clear what side the mainstream media resided on. Yes, there were underground revolutionary periodicals like the Black Panther Newspaper, which spoke on the oppression that the party faced at the hands of the police. Despite that, the public was mostly fed negativity concering the BPP. During the congressional hearing on the Investigation of the Black Panther Party's Kansas City Chapter Representative Ichard addressed those in attendance, stating that "a great number of my colleagues in the House have expressed concerns about the intentions and the capabilities of the Black Panther Party. Citizens throughout the country, and my own constituency included, have been alarmed by press accounts of open incitement to kill, destroy, and revolt.”[57] The constant outpouring of horror stories surrounding the actions and motives of the Black Panther Party plagued public perception.
The New York Times
The New York Times played a role in perpetuating a negative narrative of the Black Panther Party. April 8, 1969, The New York Times published an article titled "Former Members Liken Black Panthers to the Klan". In 1969, The New York Times had 800,000 subscribers. It has been a major news outlet since its founding in 1851.[58] The black Panther Party was covered by other major newspapers like the Chicago-Sun Times, The Seattle Times, etc. People were reading what was being put out about the party- good or bad, those articles shaped public opinion. The New York Times in particular, whether they knew it or not, played a major role in the public's ongoing fear of the Black Panthers.
Even mainstream media that incorporated the Black Panthers voice in news story’s still inserted police propaganda into the mix. Before the assassination of Fred Hampton, The New York Times published an article titled "Panther Toll Is Now 28" regarding the Chicago Panther's chapter. The start of the article relays a cry out from the Chicago Black Panthers, delivering to the public their claims of a "national conspiracy to wipe out their leadership and destroy their organization." [59] The article then goes on to make some obvious and somewhat pointless statements- reinforcing that the audience knows the Black Panthers are “Black” and what type of attire they sport. Once that is over, the journalist lists the Chicago Black Panther's Death Toll, the latest being on January 1, 1968. Twenty-eight people dead, that's quite the toll on a small organization that is up against local police and the federal government of a world superpower. But then, the article shifts to the point of view of the police officers involved in the murders, describing the last shootout as a "furious gun battle which ensued after a woman opened up on the officers with a shotgun." [60] Generally, police across the country were revered as respectable and honest citizens who kept communities safe. In 1968, Gallup took a survey and found that seventy-seven percent of Americans had respect for the police[61]They would be more likely to take the word of one officer over that of a group of radical Black Nationalists.
In New York City, May 1968, the Fillmore East Theater set the stage for a Black Panther Benefit Performance. This Benefit was detailed in a New York Times article on May 22, 1968, titled Black Panthers Stage a Benefit: 3 Theater Troupes Perform to Aid 7 Jailed Members. The journalist Dan Sullivan starts off by describing the event as "a rhetoric composed of racial paranoia, political jargon, Utopian idealism, unprintable threats, gutty 'soul' talk and shrewd humor"[62] He was very careful about how he spoke regarding the police, the FBI, and local government. Though the author holds nothing back when delivering his opinions about the Black Panther Party from a self-proclaimed "mild-mannered white liberal". Sullivan referred to the event as a "depressing indication of just how deep the chasm between the white community and the militant black community really is." [63] Now, what does that even mean? What about the gap between the white community and the Black community in general? There continued to be a push to separate the Black Panther Party from the Civil Rights movement- labeling them as a rogue and radical Black Nationalist group with a separate agenda. That narrative is what made it easier for "mild-mannered white liberals" to condemn the actions of the Black Panther Party but support the actions of peaceful civil rights activists like Martin Luther King Jr. The article went on to use language that was guaranteed to scare the white populous, quoting speeches calling "white men … 'devils'… Policeman was 'Gestapo pigs'… the Black Panther Party 'hates you, white people".[64] Wording like this fed the propaganda machine which influenced the majority of the American. As stated in the article, for "civil libertarians”, the arrest of the 'Panther 21' appeared to be a case of the government engaging in preventive, political detention and ignoring due process.[65] After word of the Bernstein’s support got to law enforcement, they became a target of the FBI's smear campaign, using the media as their catalyst. They were painted as villains, making a mockery of those who were "actually" fighting for civil rights and equality. As stated in The New York Times,
“Emergence of the Black Panthers as the romanticized darlings of the politico-cultural jet set is an affront to the majority of black Americans. ...The group therapy plus fund-raising soirée at the home of Leonard Bernstein... represents the sort of elegant slumming that degrades patrons and patronized alike. It might be dismissed as guilt-relieving fun spiked with social consciousness, except for its impact on those blacks and whites seriously working for complete equality and social justice. It mocked the memory of Martin Luther King Jr…."[66]
Media on behalf of the Black Panther Party
The Worker, considered a communist newspaper, appealed to a very niche group ofpeople and often published articles about the Black Panther Party. On June 28, 1968, The Worker released an article titled “Demand Fair Jury For Huey Newton.” The article mentioned a group of white liberals who were raising money for Huey, the Huey P. Newton Defense Committee, once known as “Honkies for Huey.” That group of white people were quote, “also involved in fundraising and educational programs in the white community.” This was the fear of the Bureau coming true- the Black Panther Party was infiltrating the surrounding white communities through their white liberal supporters. Fear of underground media use was apparent in an Airtel from FBI Director to SAC San Francisco on May 27, 1969. Director Hoover stated that “activities of the BPP have reached the black and white communities as evidenced by their weekly newspaper, which has reached a circulation of 45,000.”[67]
The Black Panther Party’s coalition with the white left was one of the reasons Stokely Carmichael left the party, but he did not oppose the coalition for the same reason that the FBI did. Carmichael not only saw organizing with whites as an off-kilter approach, but he thought it was not wise to seek out their support in any way. Carmichael noted that being friendly with white folks, radical or liberal, had its faults. Especially in terms of dealing with the white press. In his book Ready for a Revolution, Carmichael writes that “Ramparts began to run features on the Panther leadership and proclaimed the party the ‘revolutionary vanguard.’ The establishment media followed suit, presenting the Panthers as the militant black wing of the American youth rebellion, the black shock troops of the white New Left and the ‘counterculture’… whether it’s the left’s revolutionary fantasy or the right’s racist nightmare: angry young Negroes with guns”.[68] Various articles from the height of the Black Panther Party’s tenure support Carmichaels argument. Look as far back as December 6, 1968. The New York Times put out an article from San Francisco titled “Black Panthers Growing, but Their Troubles Rise”. Earl Caldwell is the journalist who wrote the article, starting off by observing a storefront that the “Black Panther movement occupies.”[69] He goes on to describe the ongoings outside of the store- the “noisy teen-aged youths” that were “hustling newspapers”. It is important to look at the language Caldwell used. Instead of referring to them as “noisy” teens, he could have said “energetic young people”; instead of “hustling,” he simply could have used the term “selling.” Unfortunately, that specific wording would help paint a negative narrative for the public. During the field investigation done for the article, Caldwell stopped and asked a random man about the Panther’s activity on that block; the man replied, “You’re damn right they sell a lot of those papers…a lot of people are afraid not to buy it…”. Again, this is another example of Caldwell painting a narrative. Though these words did not come out of Caldwell’s mouth, he chose to publish them.
Conclusion
By the end of 1971, the damage had already been done- irreversible events that had a long-lasting impact transpired. The harassment from police, along with internal party struggles, backlash in the media, and loss of resources, began to take its toll on the Party. As Dhoruba Bin Wahad writes in Excluding the Nightmare after the Dream, “resources were depleted, and programs cut back due to the relentless overt and covert police attacks and prosecutions.”[70] In just two years, from December 1967 to December 1969, the Black Panther Party put out over two hundred thousand dollars in bail for members[71]. The ruthlessness of the FBI and local law enforcement tactics created hostile environments, with party members constantly on edge. The funding collected by the party was being used for legal aid and survival instead of implementing community programs. Every time the BPP made a step forward, the actions of the FBI and local law enforcement set them two steps backward. The actions and motives of the police appeared to be endorsed by the mass media, which aided the COINTELPRO efforts. The Black Panther Party was not immune to the tricks of the media, even after adapting to the art of propaganda. According to former Panther Acoli Sundiat, “too many Panthers fell into the habit of making boisterous claims in the public media…”[72] Members were losing patience and became emboldened when being interviewed- often writing checks they couldn’t cash and making promises to the public that were unrealistic, thereby bringing down morale and community support. It is safe to say that 1971 was the year that the Black Panther Party ceased to exist as it was. They started to see a very swift drop in numbers, and people were becoming less and less enamored with the revolution; as Sundiat stated in a brief History of the BPP, “COINTELPRO eventually intimidated and corrupted all three of the BPP’s top leaders: Huey P. Newton, Bobby Seale, and Eldridge Cleaver. Each, in his way, caved into the pressures and began acting in a manner that was designed deliberately to destroy the BPP.” [73]
The COINTELPRO initiative was finally exposed, thanks to a group known as the Citizens Committee to Investigate the FBI. [74] They managed to steal an assortment of the COINTELPRO files from an FBI office in Media, PA. They then gave these files to the media. The backlash the FBI faced led to an official “dismissal” of the program. However, the FBI continued operations not under the official COINTELPRO name from 1972 to around 1974. This is apparent from the countless COINTELPRO documents from after 1971. For example, in the FBI Vault Black Panther Party Part 30 of 34, an Airtel is sent from SAC, Charlotte, to the FBI director concerning “Black Panther Party Finances and Extremist Matters,” dated August 21, 1972. [75]People started coming forward and talking, especially former agents and informants with stories from inside the COINTELPRO. Irreversible damage had been done to citizens who now intended to hold the bureau accountable in court. Finally, in 1976, the Church Committee concluded that the Federal Bureau of Investigation wrongfully targeted, surveilled, and violated the rights of average citizens. Also, after the hearings, the Senate created The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to provide “vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States.”[76] After, in 1977, The House of Representatives created the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Even after the end of the COINTELPRO, the pieces left of the BPP crumbled. As stated by former BPP member Sekou Odinga, “The illegal Counterintelligence Program of the U.S. government seemed so effective that work above ground was no longer strategic. We couldn’t work under the banner of the Black Panther Party, which was at war with itself.”[77] The Black Panther Party as it was had disappeared, and though COINTELPRO was put to an abrupt stop, they accomplished what they set out to. Eventually, the Church Committee hearings concluded wrongdoing and condemned the actions of the FBI through the illegal COINTELPRO operation. However, no formal investigation has been implemented to hold the federal government accountable.
There have been no investigations into the criminal convictions, and there have been no attempts to free “political prisoners” who are victims of COINTELPRO. On September 14, 2000, Representative Cynthia McKinney ‘convened a ‘brain trust” on this subject (COINTELPRO) as part of the Congressional Black Caucus’ Legislative Conference, a yearly series of forums and panel discussions on issues of importance to the communities represented by the Caucus.” [78] . The first speaker on the panel was Professor Nkechi Taifa, whose record is more than impressive, ranging from director of the Howard University Law School Equal Justice Program to staff attorney for the National Prison Project, having worked with “issues involving COINTELPRO and political prisoners since 1975.” [79] Professor Taifa highlights the hypocrisy of the FBI’s campaign, stating that “we have to remember that it was actually the FBI who was fomenting the violence (not the BPP).” The next speaker was Kathleen Cleaver, communications secretary of the Black Panther Party from 1967 to 1971. Cleaver starts by detailing her history with the Black Liberation Movement, particularly the Black Panther Party. Cleaver highlights the egregious number of cases involving the Black Panther Party, which turned members into political prisoners. She mentioned Romain Fitzgerald, “who after 30 years is still serving time in California for killing a policeman and it is known that he did not do the shooting. He is very ill”. There are many former Panthers, victims of the FBI’s illegal COINTELPRO, who are still facing consequences for things they did not do. Cleaver was in the trenches, at the forefront of the battle between the FBI and the BPP. She states that, “The issue is always human rights. The government tried to redefine our struggle for us, to minimize the international broad concept of human rights that motivated us and turn it into something smaller and less threatening.” Cleaver and other leaders knew that the FBI planned to cripple the party, shrink them, and render them incapable of achieving any of their goals. The FBI’s COINTELPRO initiative was ultimately a success, leaving a mark on the Black revolutionaries it victimized.
Notes
[1] NYPL, Black Panther Party Harlem Branch Files 1969-1970. https://archives.nypl.org/scm/20948
[2] Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The Vault, The Black Panther Party”, https://vault.fbi.gov/Black%20Panther%20Party%20
[3] Smith, Roger Guenveur, Spike Lee, and U.S Public Broadcasting Service. A Huey P. Newton story. [Alexandria, Va.: PBS, 2002).
[4] Johnson, Ollie A. (1998) Explaining the Demise of The Black Panther Party The Role of Internal Factors. theanarchistlibrary.org pp. 8
[5] Day, Susie and Whitehorn, Laura. (2001). “Human Rights in the United States: The Unfinished Story of Political Prisoners and COINTELPRO”, New Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2001) 8.
[6]Bloom, Joshua, Waldo E. Martin, Jr. (2013) Black Against Empire: The History and Politics of the Black Panther Party. Berkley: University of California Press. P. 382.
[7] Goldstein, Robert Justin. 1990. Reviewed Work(s): “Racial Matters”: The FBI’s Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972. The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, No. 1. Oxford University Press on behalf of Organization of American History.
[8] O’Reilly, K. (1989). Racial Matters: the FBI’s Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972. Free Press.
[9] Goldstein, Reviewed Work(s): “Racial Matters”.
[10] O’Reilly, Racial Matters, P. 265
[11] Collier-Thomas, Bettye and V.P. Franklin. (2001). “No One Ever Asks a Mans Roll in The Revolution”. Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Cilvil Rights-Black Power Movement. New York University Press. P. 230.
[12] Kirby, Ryan J. (2011). “The Revolution Will Not Be Televised” Community Activism and the Black Panther Party, 1966-1971.
[13] Collier-Thomas, Bettye and V.P. Franklin. (2001). “No One Ever Asks a Mans Roll in The Revolution”. Sisters in the Struggle: African American Women in the Cilvil Rights-Black Power Movement. New York University Press, 230.
[14]Williams, Jakobi. (2013). From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 172
[15]Williams, Jakobi.From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago. The University of North Carolina Press, 161
[16] Jeffries, Judson L. Reviewed Work(s): From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago.
[17] Williams, Jakobi.From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago. The University of North Carolina Press, 107
[18] Williams, From the Bullet to the Ballot, 174
[19] Farnia, Navid. State Repression and the Black Panther Party: Analyzing Joshua Bloom and Waldo E. Martin’s Black against Empire.
[20] Mullgardt, Brian. (2020). “Further Harassment and Neutralization”: The FBI’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) in Illinois, 107
[21] Keating, Ann Drukin. From the Bullet to the Ballot: The Illinois Chapter of the Black Panther Party and Racial Coalition Politics in Chicago by Jakobi Williams (review). 127.
[22] Kioni-Sadiki, Dequi, “The Past Catches Up to The Present,” Look For Me in The Whirlwind: From the Panther 21 to 21st Century Revolutions, edited by Dequi Kioni-Sadiki and Matt Meyer, 21-35. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2017.
[23] Churchill, Ward. The Cointelpro Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Domestic Dissent. Boston, MA: South End Press, 109.
[24] Churchill, The Cointelpro Papers, 144
[25] Churchill, Ward. The Cointelpro Papers: Documents from the FBI’s Secret Wars Against Domestic Dissent. Boston, MA: South End Press, 133
[26] Sundiata Acoli, “An Updated History of the New African Prison Struggle,” Look For Me in The Whirl wind, edited by Dequi Kioni-Sadiki and Matt Meyer, 41-79. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2017.
[27] Churchill, W., & Vander Wall, J. (1990). The COINTELPRO papers: Documents from the FBI's secret wars against domestic dissent. Boston, MA: South End Press, 138.
[28] Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. FBI. Fred Hampton. 44-HQ-44202. Part 1.
[29]A production of Blackside, Inc. ; [ creator and executive producer, Henry Hampton]. Eyes on the Prize [ Alexandria, Va.] : PBS Video, 2006. William O’Neil interview Part 1
[30] FBI: The Vault. Black Panther Party. Fred Hampton. 44-HQ-44202. Part 2.
[31] Churchill, W., & Vander Wall, J. (1990). The Cointelpro Papers: Documents From the FBI's Secret Wars Against Domestic Dissent. Boston: South End Press, 132
[32]Churchill, The COINTELPRO Papers, 132
[33] Churchill, The Cointelpro Papers, 132
[34] SAC, New Haven Airtel to FBI Director, 4 June 1971, Box 10, John R. Williams Papers.
[35]“SAC, New Haven Airtel to FBI Director, 4 June 1971,” Box 10, Folder 71, John R. Williams Papers.
[36] “Airtel SAC San Francisco to FBI Director, 17 June 1971,” Box 10, Folder 66, John R. Williams Papers.
[37]FBI Files, 1968-1976 Black Panther Party, North Carolina, Vol. 2-15. Federal (various) Bureau of Investigations Electronic Reading Room, P 28 (https://archive.org/details/FBI-BPP-North-Carolina/105-HQ-165706-8-01/page/n49/mode/2up).
[38] FBI Files, Vol. 2-15, 74
[39] FBI Files, 1968-1976 Black Panther Party, North Carolina, Vol. 2-15. Federal (various) Bureau of Investigations Electronic Reading Room, pp. 75 (https://archive.org/details/FBI-BPP-North-Carolina/105-HQ-165706-8-01/page/n49/mode/2up).
[40] FBI Files, 1968-1976 Black Panther Party, North Carolina, Vol. 1-15. Federal Bureau of Investigations Electronic Reading Room. Pp. 48
[41] FBI Files, Black Panther Party, Winston Salem, Vol. 1. Freedom of Information Act. Pp. 30 https://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041019154956/http://foia.fbi.gov/bpanther/bpanther1.pdf .
[42] FBI Files, Black Panther Party, Winston Salem, Vol. 1. Freedom of Information Act. Pp. 30
[43] FBI Files, Black Panther Party, Winston Salem, Vol. 1. Freedom of Information Act. https://webharvest.gov/peth04/20041019154956/http://foia.fbi.gov/bpanther/bpanther1.pdf Page 30 of PDF.
[44]FBI Files, Black Panther Party, Winston Salem Vol. 1. Page 30
[45] Kioni-Sadiki, Dequi, “The Past Catches Up to The Present,” Look For Me in The Whirlwind: From the Panther 21 to 21st-Century Revolutions, edited by Dequi Kioni-Sadiki and Matt Meyer, 21-35. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 201. (23).
[46]Kioni-Sadiki, Dequi, pp. 21-35.
[47] United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 1: Investigation of Activities in Kansas City, Missouri.; and Indianapolis, Ind. Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress. 2nd Session July 21-24, 1970.
(http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/blackpanther19.pdf)
[48] United States House of Representatives, Kansas City, pp. 2616
[49] United States House of Representatives, Kansas City, pp. 2616
[50] United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 2: Investigation of Activities in Seattle, Washington.; and Indianapolis, Ind. Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress. 2nd Session July 21-24, 1970.
(http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/blackpanther20.pdf)
[51] United States House of Representatives, Seattle, pp. 4298.
[52] United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 3: Investigation of Activities in Detroit, Mich; Philadelphia, Pa.; and Indianapolis, Hearings Before Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress. 2nd Session July 21-24, 1970. (http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/blackpanther21.pdf)
[53] United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 4 Investigation of Des Moines, Iowa and Omaha, Nebraska: Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress, second session. Washington D.C. (1970)
[54] United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 4: National Office and Investigation of Activities in Des Moines, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebr. . Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress. 2nd Session July 21-24, 1970, P 4718 (http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/blackpanther22.pdf)
[55]United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 4: National Office and Investigation of Activities in Des Moines, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebr. . Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress. 2nd Session July 21-24, 1970, P 4792 (http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/blackpanther22.pdf)
[56] United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 4: National Office and Investigation of Activities in Des Moines, Iowa, and Omaha, Nebr. . Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress. 2nd Session July 21-24, 1970, P 4795 (http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/blackpanther22.pdf)
[57] United States House of Representatives. Black Panther Party Part 1: Investigation of Activities in Kansas City, Missouri.; and Indianapolis, Ind. Hearings Before the Committee on Internal Security House of Representatives. Ninety-first Congress. 2nd Session July 21-24, 1970. (http://blackfreedom.proquest.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/blackpanther19.pdf)
[58] New York Times. https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-New-York-Times. Britannica (2024)
[59]Kifner, John. “The Black Panther Toll is Now 28”. The New York Times. December 7, 1969.
[60] Kifner, “The Black Panther Toll is Now 28”
[61] Gallop. “Americans Respect For Police Surges”. https://news.gallup.com/poll/196610/americans-respect-police-surges.aspx
[62]”Black Panthers Stage a Benefit”233.20. NARA- Washington, D.C.
[63] ”Black Panthers Stage a Benefit” 233.20. NARA- Washington, D.C.
[64] ”Black Panthers Stage a Benefit” 233.20. NARA- Washington, D.C.
[65] Chisholm, The Panther 21 Fundraiser and “Radical Chic”.Leonard Bernstein Office.
[66] Chisholm, The Panther 21 Fundraiser and “Radical Chic”.Leonard Bernstein Office.
[67]Churchill, W., & Vander Wall, J. (1990). The COINTELPRO papers: Documents from the FBI's secret wars against domestic dissent. Boston: South End Press. 148
[68]Carmichael, Stokely. Ready For Revolution: the Life and Struggles of Stokely Carmichael (Kwame Ture). New York, NY. Scribner, 2003. 663
[69] Caldwell, Earl. (1968). “Black Panthers Growing, but Their Troubles Rise”. New York Times
[70] Bin Wahad, Dhoruba“Assata Shakur, Excluding the Nightmare after the Dream: The Terrorist Label and the Criminalization of Revolutionary Black Movements in the USA,”Look For Me in The Whirl wind, edited by Dequi Kioni-Sadiki and Matt Meyer, 103-125.Oakland,CA: PM Press, 2017.
[71] Charles R. Garry, “A Survey of the Persecution of the Black Panther Party,”
The Black Panthers Speak, edited by Philip S. Foner (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 257–258.
[72] Sundiata Acoli, “A Brief History of the Black Panther Party and its Place in the Black Liberation Movement,” Look For Me in The Whirl wind, edited by Dequi Kioni-Sadiki and Matt Meyer, 79-85. Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2017
[73] Sundiat,“A Brief History of the Black Panther Party and its Place in the Black Liberation Movement,” , P 79-85.
[74] Stealing J. Edgar Hoover’s Secret. January 7, 2014. Retro Report for the New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000002635482/stealing-j-edgar-hoovers-secrets.html?searchResultPosition=22
[75] Federal Bureau of Investigation, Part 30 of 34, “The Vault, The Black Panther Party”, 30. (https://vault.fbi.gov/Black%20Panther%20Party%20)
[76] Senate Resolution 400. Church Committee. 1976.
[77] Bin Wahad, Dhoruba“Assata Shakur, Excluding the Nightmare after the Dream: The Terrorist Label and the Criminalization of Revolutionary Black Movements in the USA,”Look ForMe in The Whirl wind, edited by Dequi Kioni-Sadiki and Matt Meyer, pp. 91.Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2017.
[78] Day, S., & Whitehorn, L. (2001). Human Rights in the United States: The Unfinished Story of Political Prisoners and Cointelpro. New Political Science, pp. 23(2), 286. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393140120056009
[79] Day, Human Rights in the United States, 287
