supply

Housing is Determined By Class Power and Profit, Not "Supply and Demand"

By Shi Sanyazi

There is a widely accepted belief among the journalists, think tanks, and politicians who animate the housing discourse that a lack of housing supply is the source of tenants’ present conditions (ever-rising rents, primarily). It follows that these thinkers advocate for a variety of policies which will, in their eyes, allow the market to “self-correct.” Once the supply of housing has met the demand, they argue that rents should go down (just like in the graphs we drew in high-school economics class!).

We shouldn’t deny that the idea has a comforting appeal. It offers a neat, ostensibly “common-sense” solution that all sides — developers, landlords, tenants — can theoretically get behind. It’s very easy to say: “match supply and demand and rents will go down — that’s just how markets work.” It’s more difficult to admit the inconvenient truth. 

The truth is that — especially in the era of algorithmic price-setting and increasingly financialized, corporate ownership of rental housing — our conditions as tenants are determined by the balance of class power, not the balance of supply and demand. 

Landlords, developers and their financiers are classes with class interests — namely, making the fattest profits possible. They are highly organized and have historically been willing to wage war on anyone who challenges their bottom line. Real estate capital’s return-on-investment depends on their capacity to out-organize and overpower tenants. 

Tenants' class interests — community control over our housing and the basic need for shelter — are, by definition, the opposite of real estate capital’s class interests.

The “supply crisis” narrative is deficient because it makes no attempt to reckon with the class relationships which define the housing market. The assumptions this narrative makes about the behavior of the housing market hinge on ignoring the structural imbalance of power between tenants and landlords, developers and their financiers. 

Landlord’s profit margins are determined by their level of organization (aided nowadays by political corruption, algorithmic financialization and consolidation of the rental housing stock) and the state’s ability to enable their exploitation with neglect, violence, and the threat of violence. Developers similarly ensure their profits by working in tandem with local governments and the police to forcibly remake neighborhoods to their liking, displacing working-class Black and brown communities. Lurking in the shadows, backing the landlords and developers, is the ruthlessly efficient and sophisticated arm of finance capital.

If we understand real estate capital as an organized class pursuing its class interests, and if we take the “pro-housing” argument at face value (i.e; increased supply will decrease rents), then we would expect real-estate interests (whose profits would be cut into if rents decreased) to oppose their policy prescriptions.

It’s quite curious then that the real-estate lobby and their political bedfellows openly support “pro-housing” non-profits and propagate their political lines. Powerful lobbying groups like the Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) and the National Multifamily Housing Council revel in parroting “pro-housing” talking points. From REBNY’s 2022 testimony on Mayor Adams’ housing plan: 

New York is facing a housing crisis. A key driver of this crisis is the lack of housing production and inadequate supply to meet the needs of our growing and diverse city.

They go on to — shocker! — recommend the city and state remove regulatory barriers to development and continue to subsidize their lucrative construction projects. It shouldn’t come as a surprise that NYC Mayor, Eric Adams, agrees: he’s pledged to administrate a “city of yes,” arguing bluntly in The Economist that “although many factors contribute to the problem, at its core we have a housing crisis because we are not building enough housing.” NY Governor Kathy Hochul’s housing proposals echo the same logic. For what it's worth, Adams and Hochul have both been consistently showered with real-estate donations.

So, despite the promise that building more housing will bring down rents, the real-estate lobby embraces the prospect of building more housing! Why? Because the “supply crisis” narrative is an idea working in defense of their class interests.

Do we really believe that landlords and developers will actively support a reduction in their profits? Do we think they’re going to resign themselves with a deep sigh and a “well, that’s just the way the cookie crumbles?” How naïve can we possibly be? As James Baldwin once wrote of capitalism, to imagine these leeches ceding power and profits willingly demands “yet more faith and infinitely more in schizophrenia than the concept of the Virgin Birth.” 

Landlords and developers have no interest in solving the housing crisis because the permanence of that crisis is the condition of their wealth and power. This understanding has serious practical implications. 

In other words, if we understand our conditions to be a result of class struggle (rather than a market imbalance), it becomes quite clear that our conditions will be determined by our level of organization as tenants and our ability to wage struggle against the force that commodifies our need for shelter: real-estate capital.

The magic lies in our hands and our hands alone

This conclusion is the same as that at the core of all consciousness-raising movements, indeed at the core of all anti-capitalist, anti-colonial, anti-racist, anti-patriarchal movements (see, for example, the Black Consciousness movement in South Africa; the Combahee River Collective; or the Landless Workers Movement in Brazil). It's the same conclusion which the legendary anti-colonial thinker Frantz Fanon came to:

[Political education] means driving home to the masses that everything depends on them, that if we stagnate the fault is theirs, and that if we progress, they too are responsible, that there is no demiurge, no illustrious man taking responsibility for everything, but that the demiurge is the people and the magic lies in their hands and their hands alone.

The magic lies in our hands and our hands alone.

When we get organized, we have the capacity to transform our conditions. Will we win collective control over our cities? Will the threadbare protections we have left be rolled back? Will we stagnate? It’s up to us! 

Through militant organization, tenants wield — and historically have wielded! — a tremendous amount of power. Every concession from the landowning class; thus, every victory for tenants, has been won through this organization. 

The first rent control laws in New York City were passed due to pressure created by waves and waves of militant rent strikes (not to mention the fears of a Bolshevik-style revolution that these strikes helped inspire). Great Depression-era tenant activism — which included the successful efforts by the Communist Party to reverse evictions of working class tenants — was the impetus for New York City’s first public housing projects (FDR himself said that the concessions of the New Deal were driven by a desire to “save our system, the capitalist system…”). Mass agitation by Black organizers led to the passage of Fair Housing laws (while the real estate lobby was organizing against them). The COVID-19 eviction moratorium in New York was fought for and repeatedly extended due to pressure from organized tenant unions.

These are all tenuous and often contradictory reforms (public housing in the US, for instance, often deepened racial segregation), class truces which politicians negotiated in exchange for relative peace and quiet. The goal is not to aspire to reform, but to highlight that these reforms were not enacted because of our participation at the ballot box, nor passed by a benevolent state, nor advocated for by benevolent landlords and developers — they were fought for, collectively, in the streets and hallways and lobbies of our neighborhoods. 

Tenants are and always have been the protagonists of the struggle for control over our buildings, neighborhoods, and cities. 

OK. With that in mind, we can move on to addressing the core claim — that the “housing crisis” is caused by a supply deficit — in detail. Through this, we can highlight that the “housing crisis” is not “fixable” with “policy.” Our conditions as tenants are determined by our level of organization and effectiveness at waging class struggle.

The “supply crisis”

An imbalance between supply and demand is not the source of tenants’ present conditions. The real source — as has been the case since capitalism violently imposed its will on the world four centuries ago — are the private property relations which enable the exploitation of working people by the landowning class. Present-day gentrification is just one chapter in the centuries-long story of displacement, enclosure and imperialism which has marked the penetration of capital into indigenous and working class communities. So long as these relations remain intact, our struggle will persist. 

This is not to say that we should never build housing. There’s no doubt that under the collective governance of the working class (god-willing), the supply of housing would be responsive to migration and other fluctuations in demand. The disagreement stems from a core question: who is building housing and for whom are they building housing?

The alternative to the current arrangement, wherein tenants have next to zero democratic control over their communities, is to organize towards a world where tenants themselves collectively control and direct the development of safe, beautiful, ecological housing. 

That’s the polemic response — let’s dive a little deeper. As we work through the details, let’s keep the argument in mind:

Tenants’ conditions are determined by the balance of class power, not “supply and demand.”

This section is divided into a few parts to make it a bit more digestible. 

Mind the rent gap!

We can start by exploring the process of gentrification, where we can very clearly observe how real estate capital wields its class power to mold cities to its liking. Notably, its class organization has become increasingly sophisticated in recent years, as the rental housing stock has been consolidated in fewer and fewer hands. It can be quite challenging nowadays to figure out who your landlord actually is, as they usually hide behind a maze of shell companies, LLCs and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). An army of supers and management companies further distance landlords from tenants, acting as convenient buffers for the corporate owners and private equity firms pulling the strings.

As a result of this consolidation, private equity firms, mega-developers and corporate landlords execute rent hikes, serve evictions, illegally (and legally) deregulate apartments and in sum, cause displacement, in an increasingly coordinated manner. 

In our organizing, more often than not, we work with tenants in buildings owned by a landlord with hundreds to thousands of units in their portfolio. (The average apartment in New York City is part of an 893 unit portfolio.) When we visit other buildings in that portfolio, we’ll usually find the same issues, whether disrepair, harassment, skyrocketing rents, and (illegal and legal) deregulation. 

(If you are interested in researching the owner of your building in NYC and kick-starting a tenants association in your building, JustFix is an incredible asset.)

To streamline gentrification, mega-developers, corporate landlords, and private equity firms utilize sophisticated algorithms to identify “rent gaps.” A rent gap is the difference between the rent currently being paid by tenants and the rent that could be potentially charged in the same location if the current tenants were evicted through legal or illegal means. PropTech companies like Skyline AI and RealPage are accomplices in this plunder. Their business is that of identifying apartments which are “‘inefficient’ in the rental market in relation to their total cost, before teaming up with the largest property investment companies to make an offer.” 

These advanced techniques (enabled by troves of data collected by big tech firms) allow investors to target optimal neighborhoods for gentrification with pinpoint accuracy. It shouldn’t surprise us that at a neighborhood level, there is a direct correlation between concentrated corporate ownership and gentrification. 

Naturally, real estate capital’s drive to extract as much profit out of our cities as possible does not care much for pesky renter protections like rent-stabilization and public housing. In fact, the relatively low rents in rent-stabilized apartments and public housing (as compared to market-rate) make them even more appealing, in the sense that they present even larger rent gaps to “close.” 

From a private equity firm’s perspective: Imagine a rent-stabilized building which rents for an average of $800/mo per unit, in a neighborhood where rents are averaging $1500/mo per unit (and climbing!), or are where rents are primed to increase to that price (in accordance to the precise calculations of algorithms from RealPage and Skyline AI). To a private equity firm, the building represents an opportunity for superprofits. To the building’s working class, usually Black and brown tenants, the building is not an investment opportunity — it’s home, a small pocket of resistance to the waves of real estate capital engulfing their communities. But if the private equity firm can evict the current residents, destabilize the building, and slap on a gentrification mask — then they can charge many times as much in rent and make a fat profit. All in a day's work for the vampires sucking our cities dry. 

Real estate capital also pushes this class agenda through legal action. For instance, New York City landlords are currently suing to wipe out rent regulations which protect around 1 million tenants from naked exposure to the “free market.” This case will go to the revanchist Supreme Court, who will likely rule in favor of the landlords. Once again, we can plainly observe that our class enemies are organized and aggressive!

It’s not an accident that in our organizing we encounter and experience consistent patterns of harassment, disrepair, and neglect in rent-regulated buildings. In New York City, deregulation is most commonly allowed upon vacancy, so it follows that landlords and speculators doggedly pursue vacancy via eviction. Some of their choice strategies include: buyouts, fake eviction notices, illegal refusal to renew leases, intimidation, neglect, intentional disrepair, cutting off heat, electricity and water, calling the police on tenants, and direct harassment. There are technically legal protections against strong-arming tenants out of regulated apartments, but they’re rarely enforced. Like other tenant’s rights (or, for that matter, any right “granted” by the state), protection from harassment is generally only realized when enforced by organized tenants. 

It’s also not an accident that the real-estate lobby and their politician friends have intentionally neglected to fund the upkeep of New York City’s remaining public housing stock. After all, NYCHA’s repair backlog (many tens of billions dollars) makes for a very convenient political device. When it came time to justify the “Preservation Trust” — nothing more than a scheme to privatize and commodify that remaining bastion of working class affordability — NYCHA’s repair backlog was cynically presented as evidence that public funding is no longer feasible. When challenged by outraged NYCHA tenants, conservative and “socialist” politicians alike argued that we have no option but to turn to the private sector to save NYCHA. As Holden Taylor writes

The line of reasoning put forth by the policy wonks and “socialists” advocating for the trust is, as usual, one of pragmatism and practicality. The Trust is the only way to get money for repairs, they say. This boils down, to butcher Rosa Luxemburg’s aphorism, a framework of “Privatization or Barbarism,” as these experts claim that the only alternative to the Trust is the status quo and the ever more crumbling infrastructure and dire quality of life that define it. Again, this is a failure of imagination. It is the socialist’s responsibility to push past the status quo, to fight for socialism, not merely a different form of marketization.

These observations about de-regulation and the privatization of public housing also help us to understand why the minority of left YIMBYs — who argue we should pair market solutions with an increase in social housing and tenant protections — are so woefully misguided. There is no way to guarantee that any housing we build will stay affordable when landlords, developers and finance capital have demonstrated they will wield their class power to commodify every inch of the city they can get their grubby hands on. Even our supposedly “socialist” elected officials are liable to bend to the will of real-estate capital without an organized mass movement to back them. The sober reality is: the remaining sources of off-market housing are being eroded because we are not sufficiently organized to protect them. The only way to protect those apartments and reverse the trend is through organized struggle. 

For instance, in 2020, organized community groups resisted the illegal eviction of tenants at 1214 Dean St. in Crown Heights. By occupying the stoop and physically resisting the eviction, the tenants eventually forced the city to buy the apartments and convert them into publicly-funded, affordable housing.

Build, baby, build! What could go wrong?

It doesn’t matter how “market optimistic” you are (as one reporter recently described the “pro-housing” non-profit Open New York) — when we let developers build freely, they will always be incentivized to build market-rate housing because those are the developments with the juiciest profit margins (and often the juiciest subsidies). This is not a neutral outcome. Building housing which people in surrounding neighborhoods cannot afford is the one of the first steps in the process of gentrification. 

In response to residents’ concerns about displacement, politicians will often promise that developments will meet the needs of communities because they contain 10% or 20% affordable units. This logic is premised on the idea that flooding a working class neighborhood which desperately needs cheap housing with, for instance, 900 market-rate units and 100 “affordable” units (which, due to the way affordability is measured, are often not actually affordable to those who most desperately need them), will produce anything but an influx of wealthier people who will displace the current residents. Just the announcement of permits for new market-rate developments can set off a frenzy of speculation, as investors look to sink their grimy fingernails into the imminently gentrifying neighborhood. 

The rise in the median income of an area (which inevitably accompanies market-rate development in working class neighborhoods) is often the impetus for steep hikes in the median rent. Which is to say: when people have more money, landlords generally raise rents (and rents usually rise faster than income — a few studies to reference: here, here and here.) Income inequality ensures that rising median rents disproportionately displaces working class tenants, as Francesca Manning explains:

While some people’s income is increasing at a rate to keep pace with rising rents, a large group of people’s wages are stagnating, falling, or rising far too slow to keep them housed … households that live in high-income [areas], whether or not they are themselves high income, end up paying a higher and higher percentage of their wages in rents.

In locales where market-rate development is not profitable, developers will not develop unless subsidized. This is a prominent form of “organized abandonment,” the movement of capital and social services away from populations and geographies deemed surplus and/or no longer profitable. Working class Black and brown communities are the first victims of this abandonment. These communities are faced with either: investment and gentrification; or disinvestment and abandonment. It’s russian roulette, except all of the chambers are loaded. Flint’s working-class Black population is one such example of a community which has been systematically abandoned by capital and the state.

Even with an understanding that developers will always build for profit, some will maintain that new housing supply at the top-end creates downward pressure on the market and “filters” units down to working class tenants. This is not an effective strategy, especially with the urgency that present conditions demand. Even when a filtering effect can be observed over decades, it is usually outweighed by the more immediate effects — sharply increased rent burdens and displacement  — that market-rate development set in motion. It’s important to understand that the “housing market” is not a single, unified market, but rather a series of income-level based sub-markets. Increased supply at the top end of the market can simultaneously stabilize rents for high-income tenants and increase rents for low-income tenants.

The “filtering” theory makes more than a few dubious presumptions. Three more are:

  1. that new apartments will be occupied by warm-blooded humans;

  2. that tenants are able to move constantly to and from apartments in the name of market equilibrium; 

  3. that landlords who were recently collecting rent from a wealthier tenant will suddenly have a change of heart and lower their rent to accommodate the new, lower-income tenant who is moving into the “filtered” apartments.

1) ignores the reality, which is that many of these apartments are destined to be bought for investment purposes. At least a hundred thousand units in New York City are investment properties and second homes for the ultra-rich. As Raquel Rolnik writes, luxury real estate in places like New York City has increasingly become a “safe-deposit box for the transnational wealthy elite,” rendering many new apartments un-filterable.

2) and 3) are even further divorced from reality. I’m not quite sure where the filtering theory nerds are finding landlords willing to grant day-to-day leases to allow for this kind of flexibility — nor where they find landlords willing to sacrifice their bottom line for the sake of market equilibrium. 

To this point (that supply and rents are not necessarily, or even likely to be correlated), we can briefly look at two of the metropolitan areas which produced the most housing in the last decade (2010-2019): Raleigh, NC and Austin, TX. Both of these cities maintained a ratio of 1-2 jobs per new housing unit, which mainstream economists consider to be “healthy.”

In Raleigh, housing construction kept pace with population growth from 2010-2019. Did rents stabilize or go down in accordance with the magic supply and demand graph? No! They rose 53%, miraculously spurning the ironclad economic law of supply and demand.

In Austin, between 2010 and 2020, new housing production actually outpaced population growth (25.5% to 21.7%). According to the “supply crisis” narrative, rents should have gone down or at least stabilized, right? You’ll be shocked to learn that between 2010 and 2020, rents in Austin increased by 93%. Historically Black enclaves like East Austin have rapidly gentrified in spite of the growth in housing construction. The supposedly common sense relationship between housing supply and median rents is, uh, not so apparent to the average tenant in Austin.

The shock troops of real-estate capital

Class power requires enforcers, and real-estate capital’s war on working-class tenants is no different. The police are intimately involved in the process of displacement. 

The police are, after all, the most visible manifestation of the violence which undergirds private property relations. When you don’t (or can’t) pay your rent, you come face to face with the enforcers of the private-property relation: the court sending a Marshall to serve you with an eviction notice, and the police forcefully and violently executing that eviction if you resist. Landlords rely on the police to backstop evictions, which is the most fundamental mechanism for the reproduction of privately-owned housing. Without the threat of eviction, the landlord's power would evaporate, as we experienced during the COVID-19 eviction moratoriums. The state’s power is also felt implicitly: even if a tenant association is interested in taking a radical action like resisting a fellow tenant’s eviction, they understand that the state will almost certainly intervene on the side of the landlord, and can therefore be discouraged from acting. 

The process of eviction is nothing less than the state using their monopoly on legal violence to privilege the landlord’s right to exploit us over our human need to have a roof over your head. 

Gentrification relies on the same violence to function. In its infancy, gentrification is marked by the violent projections of private property relations onto working class communities, which solidify in physical form as the police. Cops consistently step up broken windows policing in neighborhoods which are gentrifying, further exposing working class Black and brown communities to the carceral state. Broken windows policing is the proverbial stick to the carrot of tax abatements, rezoning and developer incentives which open the floodgates for real estate capital. 

In the process of gentrification, homeless tenants (homeless people are tenants in that they do not control their housing; the struggles of housed tenants and homeless tenants exist along the same spectrum of precarity) are brutalized and disappeared. Eric Adams’ assault on homeless tenants which we have resisted over the past year is inseparably part of this same project. He is not uniquely evil either; his predecessors De Blasio and Bloomberg similarly utilized the NYPD to terrorize homeless tenants and remake the city to the real estate lobby’s liking. Connecting the struggles of homeless tenants to housed tenants — not just in solidarity, but as a movement united in opposition to the same forces of real estate capital — is a crucial task.

As many have compellingly argued, including her own family, Breonna Taylor was, at least in part, a victim of state-sanctioned gentrification. Breonna was murdered in the Russell neighborhood, which was being explicitly targeted for gentrification by the city of Louisville. Before and after her murder at the hands of the state, there was an observable “sharp increase in public nuisance cases, with 84% of those cases occurring in Louisville’s predominantly Black western half, which includes the Russell neighborhood.” As the Root Causes Research Center explains:

… the forces of property and police converged in Russell to acquire the remaining property for the redevelopment of Elliott Ave through the collaboration of the Louisville Metro Develop Louisville Office and the Louisville Metro Police Department’s Placed Based Investigations Squad (PBI). Increased pressure from the Louisville Mayor's Office to acquire these properties led directly to the rapid employment of PBI. The PBI Squad, then, employed a concept they were barely familiar with, to create the false evidence needed for the "No-Knock Warrant" that led to the murder of Breonna Taylor.

Gentrification is a process which travels along the existing contours of racial capitalism. Working-class Black communities (including homeless tenants) are the first to encounter — and the first to resist — the rusty knife edge of displacement. 

In sum: Gentrification is initiated by speculative, algorithmically-backed, financialized development and landlord harassment; enabled by racist police violence, tax abatements, developer incentives and capitalist urban planning; and resulting in displacement and harm (sometimes death) for the working class Black and brown communities who stand in its way. Gentrification is, in other words, not a natural phenomenon, not an unavoidable but necessary process, but rather one front in real estate capital’s organized class war on working class tenants.

Does this evidence point to a solution which gives more freedom to developers and landlords? No. Gentrification can only be stopped by collective control of our buildings, neighborhoods and cities. After all, it's highly unlikely that communities would displace themselves if and when they win control over their space.

One glimmer of hope we can look to for inspiration: In Los Angeles, after being confronted with rent increases of up to 200%, the tenants of Hillside Villa organized, militantly — in Spanish, Cantonese and English, no less. In 2022, their organizing paid off: they successfully pressured the city to buy their building on their behalf, thwarting their landlord's attempt to fatten his profit margins and placing their housing under some level of community control.

Ransom, manipulation, collusion

Organized real-estate capital demonstrates every day that it will protect its profits by any means necessary — regardless of “market equilibrium.” Outside of the strategies we’ve already covered, some of their choice tactics include market manipulation, legal action and collusion.

For instance: CHIP — a New York landlord advocacy group — is currently keeping 20,000 rent-stabilized units vacant (an act that is particularly malicious considering that over a hundred thousand New Yorkers are homeless, including thirty thousand children). In total, over 60,000 rent stabilized units are currently vacant across the city. Why? As a threat! A show of force! An act of organized class war! CHIP has openly stated that they won’t put these apartments back on the market until the state legislature repeals the 2019 Housing Stability and Tenant Protections Act, which limits their ability to jack up rents after making necessary renovations. It’s a “ransom!”

As Karl Marx himself pointed out (and others have more recently argued), the tendency of the landowning class to withhold their land from the market, and to threaten to withhold land from the market, is intrinsic to capitalism. Holding land off the market is not an irrational action for landlords — it is a rational, profit-maximizing strategy that is employed everyday by landowners across the world. This tendency is why, seemingly paradoxically, increases in vacancy rates do not always correspond with reduced rents.

This tendency explains why property owners will always fight vigorously against any regulation which would restrict their ability to keep units vacant. For example, in response to a newly passed vacancy tax which would fine landlords for failing to rent empty apartments, organized San Francisco landlords (through lobbying groups representing thousands of property owners) are suing the city, arguing they have “constitutional and statutory rights to keep their units vacant if they so choose.” Constitutionally speaking, they’re correct — the Supreme Court will always protect property owners “right to exclude” — but that’s only because the Supreme Court is designed to codify and protect private property relations.

According to the most recent statistics (from 2021), there are around 250,000 (officially) vacant units in New York City. Importantly, the vacancy rate does not include the hotel rooms which sit empty while homeless tenants beg for change just outside their doors, nor unreported warehoused market-rate apartments, nor the hundred thousand or so units which are kept as investment properties and second homes for the ultra-rich.

While in any context, there will be some vacancies, to really understand this number we have to understand which apartments are vacant. Low-cost apartments are at near-zero vacancy levels while the vacancy rates  in high-cost apartments remain extraordinarily high. Tracy Rosenthal of the LA Tenants Union sums up this disparity bluntly: “There is no shortage of housing except for poor and working people, which the market has never and will never provide.” 

In their 2022 report, the Community Service Society of New York echoes Rosenthal, writing that many of New York’s vacancies can be attributed to “long-term overproduction of luxury condos/co-ops as investment vehicles.” They sum up their findings neatly:

There is very little available housing at low rents, but a lot available at rents most New Yorkers couldn’t possibly pay. At the same time, more and more apartments are going unused, not because nobody wants them – clearly there’s plenty of demand for housing – but because their owners are keeping them as pieds-a-terre, Airbnbs, investment properties, or warehoused rentals.

One example of this phenomenon, from Madden and Marcuse:

On January 16, 2015, a limited liability corporation named P89-90 bought a single penthouse apartment in Midtown Manhattan for $100,471,452.77 … the luxury tower that it tops, branded as One57, is not likely to be a particularly sociable environment. Chances are that none of the building’s ninety-two condominium units will be their owner’s sole residence. In fact, many of the apartments in One57 will remain empty. They will be held as investments or as vanity homes for people who do not lack for places to live. One57 is not high-rise housing so much as global wealth congealed into tower form.”

In recent years, the rental housing stock has become increasingly concentrated in larger and larger portfolios controlled by private equity firms and corporate landlords. In New York City, around 9 in 10 apartments are owned by corporate landlords. 

One important implication of this trend: the more organized and concentrated ownership is, the easier it is for landlords to collude and fix prices — a task made significantly easier due to the rise of algorithmically-informed price-setting. Services like the now infamous RealPage — which uses advanced data to help landlords charge the highest possible rents for their units — openly boast about their role in driving the staggering rent hikes of recent years. A ProPublica investigation revealed RealPage has “recommended that landlords in some cases accept a lower occupancy rate in order to raise rents and make more money.” RealPage and other similar services are a potent tool for cartel style market collusion, a fact which has not escaped the ire of the Department of Justice's antitrust lawyers. 

A common “pro-housing” argument is that increased supply gives renters more options, thus allowing us to play landlords off of eachother and secure lower rents. Again, this line of thinking ignores the sordid reality, which is that landlords will flex their class muscle to keep rents high — and that without organization, tenants have no power to contest their ever-worsening conditions. What good is a market equilibrium if the landlords are almost certain to collude, warehouse apartments and keep rents high regardless?

Landlord’s profit-maximizing behavior plainly highlights the irrationality endemic to capitalism. Well, let's amend that: it's quite rational for those who own the property. For the rest of us (the vast majority) — not so much. A system which distributes (and chooses not to distribute!) housing based on the profits that will accrue to its owners is a system which is incapable of ending the precarity which defines our lives as tenants. 

The “housing crisis” is not so much a crisis as a permanent feature of urban capitalism, an unavoidable consequence of developing and distributing housing as a commodity to line the pockets of the few, rather than organizing housing around the social need for shelter. Framing our experience as a “crisis” insinuates that it is an aberration from the norm, an aberration which can be “solved” with policy fixes, new legal protections and, most insidiously, the market. The system is not in crisis; the crisis is the system!

It's all about class power? Always has been.

What we’re observing here is the all too familiar dissonance between capitalism’s economic theories and its economic realities. Despite what free-market proselytizers and “market optimists” alike want us to believe (as if there’s any functional difference between the two), capitalism is a system whose outcomes are ultimately determined by the balance of class power. Landlords, developers and financiers, who are single-mindedly driven by a desire to extract as much profit as possible out of tenants, do not submit meekly to the “laws” of supply and demand. 

To imagine that rent prices hinge on supply and demand rather than class power is completely ahistorical. Time and time again, capitalism has demonstrated an inherent tendency towards monopoly, cynical market manipulation and organized class warfare. 

Understanding the balance of class power as the condition of our exploitation is simultaneously key to grasping that our exploitation can only be limited and abolished through the exercise of our own class power as tenants. We’re engaged in a class war which only one side is consciously fighting. Our choice as tenants is whether or not we want to fight back.

If the future came on a platter…

The common sense which commands our collective reflexes does not permit us to think of revolution. After all, “it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism.”

So it’s natural that we’re derided as unrealistic for striving towards the abolition of the landlord class, and by extension the abolition of capitalism — but are we the unrealistic ones?

Our critics (liberals!) — on all issues, not just housing; think climate change, for instance — position themselves as “realistic” for arguing that handing the reins to organized capital will alleviate the conditions of the working class. Don’t we have hundreds of years of experience telling us that the exact opposite will happen? We can look to our cities as they are right now to understand that control of our buildings and neighborhoods by profit-motivated landlords, financiers and developers is a disastrous arrangement.

There’s nothing realistic about giving capital the freedom to roam where it wants and praying that it will magically change course and defy its five hundred year history of ravaging indigenous and working class communities for profit.

It's nonsense. Don’t listen to these people — they are the ones being unrealistic. 

And yes, to organize towards community control of our buildings and neighborhoods is a tremendous, daunting task. But let’s remember that we don’t organize simply because we believe in a political program. To struggle, to think — to really think! — to learn, is nothing less than the process of being alive. To not be in the struggle is a much more demoralizing proposition.

So let's get to it! Landlords and developers, and the financiers that back them, are tremendously well organized. To beat them, we have to turn to the only method by which we have historically won: that is, through our militant organization. If history has taught us anything, it's that we can only win by out-organizing our class enemies. 

Check out the Autonomous Tenants Union Network to see if there’s an existing organization in your area. In New York City: the Crown Heights Tenant Union, the Ridgewood Tenants Union, Brooklyn Eviction Defense and Tenant Union Flatbush; nationwide, the aforementioned Los Angeles Tenants Union; Tenants and Neighborhood Council (TANC) in the Bay Area; Stomp Out Slumlords in DC; and many more are doing incredible, principled work. 

You can find some resources and thoughtful reflections on tenant organizing here, here, here, here, here and here.

I like to think of this essay as a small contribution to uncovering the shape of the conjuncture, as Stuart Hall would call it. There is, of course, much more to be uncovered (and much more that has already been uncovered!), such as: the relation of tenants in the imperial core to the global anti-imperialist movement; how the tenant movement can resist settler-colonialism and aid the struggle for indigenous sovereignty; feminism and the tenant movement; the homeless industrial complex; and the ideology of homeownership, to name a few.

None of this work is easy. But, as Eduardo Galeano reminds us: “If the future came on a platter, it would not be of this world.”

The Protracted Crisis of Capitalism

By Prabhat Patnaik

Republished from People’s Democracy.

THERE is a commonly-held view that the current crisis in capitalism, which has resulted in a massive output contraction and increase in unemployment, is because of the pandemic; and that once the pandemic gets over, things will go back to “normal”.

This view is entirely erroneous for two reasons. The first which has been often discussed in this column, has to do with the fact that even before the pandemic the world economy was slowing down. In fact ever since the financial crisis of 2008 following the collapse of the housing bubble, the real economy of the world had never fully recovered. Small recoveries were followed quickly by collapses; and the low unemployment rates in the United States that had prompted Donald Trump’s triumphalism, were to a very large extent explicable by the reduced work participation rate after 2008. In fact if we assume the same work participation rate in 2020(just before the pandemic), as had prevailed on the eve of the financial crisis, then the unemployment rate in the U.S. was as high as 8 per cent as compared to the less than 4 per cent mentioned in official figures.

This slowing down in turn has been a result of the operation of neoliberal capitalism which has massively increased the share of economic surplus in output, both within countries and also at the world level, by keeping the vector of real wage-rates unchanged, even as the vector of labour productivities has increased; and this increase in the share of surplus, or this shift from wages to surplus, has lowered the level of aggregate demand for consumption goods, and hence of overall aggregate demand, as workers spend more on consumption out of a unit of income than the surplus earners.

The pandemic has occurred in this context, so that even after it gets over, the world will still be stuck with the crisis of over-production which had already engulfed it well before the pandemic. To get out of this crisis it is necessary to use State expenditure, provided such expenditure is financed by either taxes on capitalists or by a fiscal deficit ; State expenditure financed by taxes on workers will not help, since workers consume the bulk of their incomes anyway, so that State demand only substitutes workers’ demand without adding to aggregate demand.

But neither fiscal deficits nor taxes on capitalists are liked by finance capital, so that State expenditure as an anti-crisis measure is ruled out. This means that, even after the pandemic is over,not only will the crisis continue, but it will do so without any counteracting measures, at least as long as neoliberal capitalism lasts. This crisis therefore marks a dead-end for neoliberal capitalism.

There is however a second reason why even after the pandemic gets over, capitalism will still remain engulfed in a crisis; and this has to do with the fact that even if the demand for consumer goods recovers to the level where it had been before the pandemic, investment goods production will still remain below what it had been, and this very fact will also ensure that even the consumer good output does not get back to the level where it had been before the pandemic. This is what happens when an economy receives a major shock, of the kind that the pandemic represents for the world economy.

An example will make the point clear. Suppose before the pandemic the economy was growing at 2 per cent per annum. Then capitalists, anticipating a 2 per cent rate of growth, would have been adding to their capital stock also at 2 per cent. If the capital stock was 500, output was 100, then investment would have been 10, and consumption would have been 90. Let the share of post-tax profits and post-tax wage-bill in total private post-tax incomes be 50:50; and let all wages and 75 per cent of profits be consumed. If government consumption (assuming a balanced budget for simplicity) happens to be 20, then this 90 of consumption would have been divided as 20 by government, 30 by capitalists and 40 by workers.

Now, suppose, for argument’s sake, that after the pandemic, consumption recovers to 90. All of it can be produced by the existing capital stock requiring no additional investment. Moreover, there is no reason why the capitalists should expect output to grow at 2 per cent next year; so they would not add 10 to capital stock as they had done before the pandemic. Let us assume that they add only 5 to capital stock, and wait to see what happens before deciding to add any further to capital stock.

Two things will happen in such a case. First, in the capital goods sector, output will be only half of what it had been before the pandemic; likewise capacity utilisation in the capital goods sector will be only half of what it had been before the pandemic. Second, even the consumption demand of 90 cannot be sustained. Assuming the same ratios as above, an investment of 5, which must equal private savings, will generate a total consumption demand of only 55 (given by 20 of government+15 of capitalists out of total post-tax profits of 20 + 20 of workers). Total output will be only 60, equalling consumption of 55 and investment of 5.

The 90 of consumption therefore, which we assumed the world economy to reach, for argument’s sake, will not even materialise. The consumption goods sector’s capacity utilisation will be 61 per cent of what it had been before the pandemic (55 divided by 90). This will be higher than the ratio of capacity utilisation in the investment goods sector compared to what it had been before the pandemic (in fact it will now be only 50 per cent of what it had been earlier).

Any severe external shock to the capitalist system has this effect, namely that investment recovers only after a long time; and precisely for that reason even the recovery of consumption, though less delayed than the recovery of investment, also takes a fairly long time.

In other words, even if there had been no crisis of over-production engulfing world capitalism before the pandemic, the sheer external shock represented by the pandemic would have kept the system mired in crisis for quite a long time. The existence of an over-production crisis predating the pandemic only makes matters worse.

This is exactly what had happened in the U.S. in the recovery from the Great Depression of the 1930s. The consumption goods sector had recovered relatively faster than the investment goods sector, as a result of Roosevelt’s New Deal which had enlarged government spending. The recovery of the investment goods sector occurred only when there was an increase in armament expenditure in preparation for the war, which is why it is said that the recovery from the Great Depression was made possible by the war.

But the New Deal had meant larger government spending which is why at least the consumption goods sector had recovered somewhat, even before the war. Globalised finance capital today does not even allow larger government spending within any economy, either by taxing capitalists or by enlarging the fiscal deficit, the only two ways that such spending can increase aggregate demand. Therefore even the depression in the consumption goods sector will last much longer that in the 1930s, so that, altogether, world capitalism will remain sunk in a protracted crisis for a very long time.

In an economy like India where the government obeys the dictates of finance capital quite slavishly, the prospects of recovery are even bleaker. None of the measures adopted by the government to revive the economy addresses the issue of demand, because the government does not understand that the crisis is because of insufficient aggregate demand. In fact, the government measures are such that they will only aggravate the deficiency of aggregate demand, thereby worsening the crisis rather than alleviating it. As the crisis gets aggravated, however, the government will resort even more strongly to repression against the working people, and intensify even further its communal agenda.

Firm Level Price Determination: A Comparison of Theories (Perfect Competition, Imperfect Competition, and the Theory of Real Competition)

By Ezra Pugh

“The best of all monopoly profits is a peaceful life,” (John Hicks, 1935).

“The division of labor within society brings into contact independent producers of commodities, who acknowledge no authority other than that of competition…the ‘war of all against all,’”      (Karl Marx, 1867)

George Stigler defines the term competition as “the absence of monopoly power in a market,” (Stigler 1957, 14). This could seem a curiously narrow definition to the businessperson or the worker. But this notion has been ubiquitous in the teaching of economics for decades. It originates, of course, from the Neo-Classical theory of perfect competition. Abstraction is necessary to any theoretical investigation. Assumptions must be made for the purpose of conducting analysis. But in flattening the meaning of a term like competition in such a way, is there a risk that some essential insights may be lost?

Perfect Competition

Perfect competition is the foundational parable of orthodox economics. A perfectly competitive market is an abstract ideal with a number of specific attributes:

  •          There is a very large number of firms, such that no single firm can affect the overall market for its product.

  •          There is a very large number of buyers for the industry’s product.

  •          Each firm produces exactly the same undifferentiated product.

  •          Firms, and their consumers, have perfect knowledge of all relevant economic information related to their industry and its product.

  •          Firms have unrestricted power of entry and exit in their industry.

  •          Firms are entitled to a ‘normal rate’ of profit, which is included in its operations costs.

  • ·         Marginal costs drop at first then eventually increase with each unit sold. As a result, average cost is also upward sloping.

From its perspective, a firm in perfect competition is just a speck, dwarfed by the size of the market it competes in. The market can absorb whatever the firm can produce, provided it is sold at market price. The firm’s perceived demand curve is horizontal, or perfectly elastic. As a result, the demand curve is identical to its supply curve. The overall demand curve of the market, however, is downward sloping.

diag1.png

The firm must accept the prevailing market selling price for its good. If it sets its price above the prevailing price, even by an iota, the firm will lose all of its sales to the myriad other sellers. If it sets its price below, it will not be able to make enough profit to survive. A firm in a perfectly competitive market is therefore known as a price-taker, as it is powerless in the face of market pressures. Consequently, “a perfectly competitive firm has only one major decision to make—namely, what quantity to produce,” (Greenlaw 2018, 189).

Being rational, the firm’s motivating goal is to generate profit. Its profit (r), is defined as total revenue (TR) minus total cost (TC). Total revenue is made up on the products price (P) multiplied by the quantity produced (Q) minus the average cost per unit (AC) multiplied by the quantity produced. This can be written as:

eq1.jpg

To maximize its profit, the firm must continue producing more output up until the point its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost – the point where an additional unit of output contributes no more profit. Marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) are defined thus:

eq2.jpg

Because the market price the firm experiences does not change based on its output, the firm’s marginal revenue is a constant. Each additional unit sold adds the same value, which is equal to the price of the product. If marginal revenue is equal to price, and profit maximization occurs when marginal revenue equals marginal cost, the firm should produce up until the point where its marginal costs equals the price of its product.

The firm’s average cost is its total cost divided by quantity produced, and is assumed to initially fall then eventually be upward sloping. Because innumerable sellers all sell the same good, in the long run (which generally does not have a specific definition), all ‘economic’ profits—those which are above the assumed ‘normal’ profits—are eventually eroded completely away. If positive economic profits existed, more firms would enter the market, increasing supply and lowering price. If economic profits are negative, firms would leave the market, causing the opposite effect. As a result, in the long run perfect competition causes sellers to produce their goods at the lowest point on their average cost curve.

eq3.jpg

“When profit-maximizing firms in perfectly competitive markets combine with utility-maximizing consumers, something remarkable happens,” we are told, “the resulting quantities of outputs of goods and services demonstrate both productive and allocative efficiency,” (Greenlaw 2018, 206). Productive efficiency is attained because in the long run, firms produce at their absolute lowest cost. Allocative efficiency is achieved because the resulting goods’ price is equal to its marginal cost—precisely the value of the ‘social cost’ of producing it.

Imperfect Competition and Monopoly

But of course, this state of affairs does not resemble the world in which we live. This utopian optimality, we are told, is distorted and mutated by the anti-competitive behavior of firms and government. Due to that meddling, we live in a world of imperfect competition—monopoly, monopolistic competition, and oligopoly. Paradise lost. In monopoly, a firm is the lone provider of a good, in monopolistic competition many firms produce differentiated products, and in oligopoly a small cabal of firms control the marketplace and exert price pressure.

The culprit which creates each of these distorted market types is barriers to entry. Whether natural or legal, barriers to entry prevent firms who would otherwise enter a market from entering. The few firms which are active in the market have control of too large a slice. As a result, they can affect the market price based on how many units they produce. Instead of a horizontal perceived demand curve, the firms in imperfect competition face a downward sloping demand curve.

To maximize its profit, the imperfectly competitive firm still produces at the level where MR = MC. But because of its outsized effect on the market, P no longer equals MR. With each unit produced, the increased supply exerts downward pressure on the price, which effects the price of all other units produced by the same amount. If such a firm produces too much, it can hurt its own bottom line. Because it supplies as much as it wants and not what consumers want, a true monopoly will have perpetual positive economic profits at a level which depends on the elasticity of the product’s demand schedule. Monopolistic competition, however, will in the long run result in a total erosion of economic profit as firms enter the market, all producing at a point on the AC curve, albeit not at its minimum point. As a result, none of these markets is productively or allocatively efficient. The amount of goods produced is below what consumers would have wanted under perfectly competitive conditions, they are more expensive than they are socially worth, and firms inefficiently do not produce at their minimum average cost. Customers are robbed of potential utility. Such markets are sadly the norm, because, we are told, “firms have proved to be highly creative in inventing business practices that discourage competition,” (Greenlaw 2018, 220). This is a great state of affairs for the firms, however, because “once barriers are erected, once a barrier to entry is in place, a monopoly that does not need to fear competition can just produce the same old products in the same old way,” (Greenlaw 2018, 229). Managers can kick back and watch the profits roll in.

eq4.jpg

Historical Overview

Sketched out above is the dominant parable in economic thought and teaching. Interestingly, almost none of this resembles the real world. How did we get here? An outline is sketched below.

Adam Smith is generally credited with establishing economic thought, or Political Economy, as a distinct field of study. His work An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) is regarded as the first modern work of economics. A key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment, Smith was interested in observing economic phenomena, describing them, and discovering the hidden patterns within. David Ricardo furthered and built on Smith’s ideas, advancing theories on rent, trade, and value. Over the course of the three volumes of Capital (1867), Karl Marx extended this theoretical framework even further with sharpened historical and class analysis, building a signature value theory in the process. Along with others, these thinkers are referred to as the Classical economists.

But in the 1870’s there occurred what is known as the Marginalist Revolution. The Long Depression (1873-96) caused a crisis of confidence in the capitalist world. Interestingly, it was during this period that the most utopian theoretical depictions of capitalism were popularized. W.S. Jevons (1871), Carl Menger (1871), and Leon Walras (1874) independently and almost simultaneously developed this new theoretical paradigm. They perceived fundamental flaws in the theoretical framework and methodologies of the Classical economists and sought to “pick up the fragments of a shattered science and to start anew,” (Jevons 1879/1965, Preface lii). The Classicals believed that the ultimate source of an item’s value was the amount of labor embodied in it and that market prices were connected to costs—prices of production. The Marginalists vehemently disagreed. “Value,” wrote Jevons, “depends entirely upon utility” (Jevons 1871/1965, 1). Echoing this sentiment, Menger wrote “there is no necessary and direct connection between the value of a good and whether, or in what quantities, labour and other goods of higher order were applied to its production” (Menger 1871/2007, 146). Value then stemmed from a buyers utility gained from a good; that utility being an index of the good’s scarcity.

Jevons and Walras both used advanced mathematics to express their ideas. Adopting algebra and calculus, they could express complex ideas with greater accuracy than was possible previously. "Why should we persist in using everyday language to explain things in the cumbersome and incorrect way, as Ricardo has often done,” wrote Walras, “when these things can be stated far more succinctly, precisely, and clearly in the language of mathematics?" (Heilbroner 1997, 226). Walras pioneered what is known as general equilibrium theory—the notion that a complex balance of supply and demand can exist in and between markets.

It is during this period that supply and demand curves and the modern theory of perfect competition are introduced. In order to make their highly abstract models functional and defined, economists had to make assumptions that did not necessarily fit with, and often outright contradicted economic reality. "The pure theory of economics, it must precede applied economics,” wrote Walras, “and this pure theory of economics is a science which resembles the physic-mathematical sciences in every respect," (Heilbroner, 224). Actual people and actual societies faded from the picture in favor of platonic ideals. This fundamental methodological shift opened up many new avenues of exploration for economists, but the descriptive and predictive usefulness of the new models was not necessarily clear. Perfect competition became the theoretical jumping off point for all ‘rigorous’ analysis, and Marshall (1890) systematized the theoretical structure into what would recognize as modern Neo-classical economics. Dobb notes, "at the purely formal level, there can be little doubt that the new context and methods, with their mathematical analogy if not mathematical form, resulted in enhanced precision and rigor of analysis…the cutting knives of economic discussion became sharper -- whether they were used to cut so deeply is another matter" (Dobb 1973, 176).

In the 1920s, unease with the dominance of perfect competition was growing. Sraffa (1925) aimed a potentially devastating critique at the then-dominant Marshallian partial equilibrium theory, demonstrating that the theoretical structure was not capable of dealing with non-constant returns (increasing or decreasing costs) adequately (Mongiovi 1996). The next year, Sraffa (1926) suggested a solution might be found using the lesser utilized monopoly theory as a starting point. Even in competitive markets, monopolistic tendencies could easily be observed because 1.) firms can exert some control over their own prices, and 2.) they frequently experience increasing returns (decreasing costs). Sraffa argued that these circumstances are not the exception, “rather they are normal and persistent features of the economic landscape, with 'permanent and even cumulative' consequences for market equilibria. When these influences are operative, each firm is to be viewed as having its own distinct market; prices are set so as to maximise profits on the supposition that the relevant demand curve is not perfectly elastic,” (Mongiovi 1996, 214). Building on these ideas, Robinson (1933) and Chamberlain (1933) independently, but simultaneously, developed the theory of imperfect competition that is taught today. Eventually abandoning Marshallian theory altogether, Sraffa’s publication of Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960) is credited with establishing a distinctive Sraffian or Neo-Ricardian school.

Real Competition

In Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises (2016), Anwar Shaikh erects a theoretical framework independent of perfect and imperfect competition. Formalizing insights developed by the Classical economists, a theory is built which is both analytically sound and corresponds to observed economic phenomena. The theory of real competition, as it is called, “is as different from so-called perfect competition as war is from ballet,” (Shaikh 2016, Ch. 7.I.). The classical economists stressed themes that were either diminished or omitted completely by Neo-classical economists, including conflict, class, and temporality. In Capital, Volume 1, Karl Marx writes that the economic realm is bellum omnium contra omnes, ‘war of all against all,’ (Marx 1867/1990, 477). All evidence of this is lost in the parables of perfect and imperfect competition. But in Capitalism, the theory of real competition “pits seller against seller, seller against buyer, and buyer against buyer. It pits capital against capital, capital against labor, and labor against labor,” (Shaikh 2016, Ch. 7.I.). Abstracting away from the essentiality of conflict to capitalist production and distribution makes Neo-Classical analysis not only unrealistic, but totally misleading.

But even on pure theoretical grounds there are issues with the theory of perfect competition. For one, there is a fundamental contradiction within the assumptions. Firms are assumed to have perfect knowledge of the market in which they are competing, yet their perceived demand curve is assumed to be flat. These two assumptions cannot hold at the same time. “If firms are assumed to be sensible in their expectations, then the theory of perfect competition collapses. More generally, even mildly informed firms would have to recognize that they face downward sloping demand curves under competitive conditions,” (Shaikh 2016, Ch. 8.I). If a firm in a perfectly competitive market has perfect knowledge, it would quite easily deduce that the market signals it is receiving are being received by every other firm, and those firms will react in a predictable manner. As a result, the firm would know that it does not face a flat, perfectly elastic demand curve, and would act in exactly the same manner as a monopolistic firm, with just the same results.

Another problematic assumption within the orthodox framework is that firms are entitled to a normal rate of profit, which is included within its cost structure. The action of competition completely erodes excess profits away but leaves normal profits intact. This, of course, is wildly unrealistic because “no capital is assured of any profit at all, let alone the “normal” rate of profit. Indeed, all capitals face losses at some point, and a certain number drown in red ink in every given interval. It is therefore completely illegitimate to count “normal profit” as part of operating costs,” (Shaikh 2016, Ch. 7.I.). The prospect of making a loss is the dark cloud that hangs over every business manager, driving them unceasingly into conflict with agents both inside and outside the firm. Abstracting away from this motive force fundamentally misdiagnoses the motivations of economic agents.

In the theory of perfect competition, a firm’s only decision is how much to produce. Likewise, in imperfect competition, pricing and quantity decisions are mechanically connected. But in the works of the Classicals and in the theory of real competition, firms are active price setting, cost cutting entities. Neo-Classical theory stresses that firms will flock to higher profit rates at a given price. But once firms have the power to set their own price, the picture becomes more complicated. In their endless search for higher rates of return, firms cut prices to attract more buyers and increase market-share. In the process, “the advantage in this perpetual jousting for market share goes to the firms with the lowest cost,” (Shaikh 2016, 7.II.). If firms have the power to cut their own prices, they have the power to starve out other firms—even ones that are potentially more profitable at initial prices. Neo-Classical theory stresses that firms will adopt whatever method yields the highest profit at a given price, but “when costs differ, there is always a set of prices at which the lower cost firm has the higher profit rate. This does not mean that [it] has to drive the price down to that level. It has only to get the message across to its competitor that the future has arrived,” (Shaikh 2016, 7.VII.). This is demonstrated in Table 1 below. Pricing wars, which are extremely common occurrences in the real economy, highlight the conflictual nature of economic relations—"these are the operative principles of warfare: attackers try to impose greater losses on the other side. We will see that such behavior is the norm in the business world. It follows that the highest profit that is sustainable in the face of price-cutting behavior is generally different from the price-passive profit assumed in theories of perfect and imperfect competition,” (Shaikh 2016, 7.II.). Only the theory of real competition deals with this common behavior adequately.

Conclusion

Contrary to Hicks’ assertion, a peaceful life is not included in a firm’s profit—no matter their degree of monopoly. There is perpetual conflict generated both inside and outside of the firm that must always be contended with. For real firms, “price is their weapon, advertising their propaganda, the local Chamber of Commerce their house of worship, and profit their supreme deity,” (Shaikh 2016, 7.II.). Abstraction is a necessary tool for analysis. But the specific method of abstraction used in the theories of perfect and imperfect competition does not serve to elucidate truths that would be otherwise unattainable. Neo-Classical economics was formulated during a crisis of capitalism to create a utopian vision in order to justify capitalist social relations. Capitalist relations have been shown to be the most powerful and productive in history, but that does not justify obscuring their fundamentally destructive and chaotic elements. Competition is not merely the absence of monopoly power—it is the struggle of all against all.

tables1and2.jpg

References

Dobb, M. (1973). The ‘Jevonian Revolution’. In Theories of Value and Distribution since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory (pp. 166-210). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511559457.007

Cohen, A. J., & Harcourt, G. C. (2003). Retrospectives: Whatever Happened to the Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(1), 199–214. doi: 10.1257/089533003321165010

Greenlaw, S. A., Taylor, T., & Shapiro, D. (2018). Principles of Microeconomics. Houston, TX: OpenStax, Rice University.

Heilbroner, R. L. (1997). Teachings from the Worldly Philosophy. New York: W.W. Norton.

Hicks, J. (1935). Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly. Econometrica, 3(1), 1-20. doi:10.2307/1907343

Jevons, W. S. (1965). The Theory of Political Economy (5th ed.). New York, Ny: Augustus M Kelley.

Marx, K., Fowkes, B., & Fernbach, D. (1990). Capital: a Critique of Political Economy; vol.1. London New York, N.Y: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review.

Menger, C. (2007). Principles of Economics. Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Mongiovi, G. (1996). Sraffa’s Critique of Marshall: a Reassessment. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 20(2), 207–224. doi: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a013613

Sen, A. K. (1977). Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(4).

Shaikh, A. (2016). Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crises [Kindle version]. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, A., Heilbroner, R. L., Malone, L. J., Smith, A., & Smith, A. (1987). The Essential Adam Smith. New York: W.W. Norton.

Sraffa, P. (1926). The Laws of Returns under Competitive Conditions. The Economic Journal, 36(144), 535. doi: 10.2307/2959866

Sraffa, P. (1960). Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities: Prelude to a Critique of Economic Theory.

Stigler, G. J. (1957). Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated. Journal of Political Economy, 65(1), 1–17. doi: 10.1086/257878

Capitalism's Overproduction Problem: A Primer

By Prabhat Patnaik

Republished from Monthly Review.

It is in the nature of capitalism to have “over-production crises”, i.e., crises arising from “over-production” relative to demand. “Over-production” does not mean that more and more goods keep getting produced relative to demand, so that unsold stocks keep piling up. This may happen only for a brief period in the beginning; but as stocks pile up, production gets curtailed, causing recession and greater unemployment.

“Over-production”, in short, is ex ante, in the sense that if production were to occur at full capacity use (or at some desired level of capacity utilisation), then the amount produced could not be sold because of a shortage of demand. But it manifests itself in reality in terms of recession and greater unemployment.

It is a mistake to believe that such crises are only cyclical in nature, i.e., that they get automatically reversed after a certain period of time. On the contrary, the Great Depression of the 1930s, which was a classic over-production crisis, lasted nearly a decade and was finally overcome because of the war, or, to be precise, because of military expenditure in preparation for the Second World War.

Since 2008, there has again been an over-production crisis that has persisted with varying intensity right until now. There is, thus, no question of an over-production crisis under capitalism automatically disappearing. But what was striking about the erstwhile socialist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is that they were free from over-production crises. The question is why?

Over-production crises under capitalism arise because of two main reasons. One, investment decisions under capitalism depend upon the expected growth of demand, for which the current growth of demand is taken as a clue: if demand slows down then investment gets restrained. Two, whenever investment gets restrained, so does consumption and hence total income (this is called the “multiplier” effect of investment).

Both these factors were eliminated under socialism. Investment was undertaken according to a plan and not the dictates of profitability; hence, there was no question of investment being curtailed when the growth of demand slowed down for any reason. This is not to say that there were no fluctuations in the level of investment. These fluctuations, however, arose not in response to profit expectations, but for entirely exogenous reasons, of which, two in particular were important.

One was agricultural output fluctuations. In years when the agricultural output went down for weather-related, or some other, reasons, investment was cut, in order to prevent excessive upward pressures on food prices; correspondingly when agricultural output revived, so did investment. These investment fluctuations, however, had nothing to do with any calculations of profitability on investment; they were unavoidable even in a planned economy.

The second reason was the operation of “echo effects”. Suppose, for instance, that a whole lot of new investment had been installed in a bunched manner at a certain date, say the beginning of the planning period. These pieces of equipment would become due for retirement again in a bunched manner around the same time some years later, which would, therefore, push up the investment plan, and hence the real gross investment around that time, so that both net investment and replacement needs are accommodated. The investment figure, therefore, would not show a steady growth but would exhibit fluctuations. But these fluctuations again had nothing to do with any calculations of profitability; they arose because of past investment history.

But even when such investment fluctuations occurred, socialist economies ensured that they did not lead to fluctuations in consumption and income, i.e., those economies snapped the multiplier relationship that necessarily characterises capitalism. This is because all firms in the economy were asked to produce to their capacity, and, if demand was low because of investment being curtailed, then they were asked to lower their prices until whatever they produced got sold.

At these “market-clearing” prices, some firms would make losses, while others would still make profits; but this would not matter since both the profit-making and the loss-making firms belonged to the State, which could, therefore, cross-subsidise the loss-making ones from the profits of the profit-making ones. And taking both groups of firms together, there would always be positive net profits as long as investment was positive (even if lower than would have been otherwise).

This was a remarkable break from what happens under capitalism, and provides a clue to why output and employment fall in a crisis there. Under capitalism, a firm does not produce when prices do not cover costs; and when demand is low, prices do not fall, because they are “administered” through collusion among the oligopolistic firms. Instead, output, and hence employment, fall in order to equate supply with demand, and to eliminate stocks which might have got built up briefly.

The matter can be looked at somewhat differently. A fall in price, with money wages and employment given, which is what happened under socialism, meant a rise in the share of wages in total output; income distribution in short shifted in favour of the workers. Since workers more or less consume their entire wages, such a shift in income distribution in favour of the workers raised the share of consumption in total output. Thus, socialist economies never experienced over-production crises because even when investment fell for some reason, output was kept unchanged and the share of consumption rose to compensate for the fall in investment (through a rise in the workers’ share in output).

This, however, can never happen under capitalism because capitalists would never voluntarily agree to a lowering of their share in output and a corresponding increase in workers’ share, even in a situation of inadequate aggregate demand. This is why capitalism experiences over-production crises: income distribution here is a matter of intense class-struggle where there is no question of capitalists agreeing to lower their own share and correspondingly raise workers’ share for the sake of overcoming a situation of over-production.

The “multiplier” that operates under capitalism, whereby a reduction in investment causes a reduction in consumption and hence total output, occurs because of income distribution not being adjustable. The “multiplier”, in other words, is predicated upon the relative shares among capitalists and workers being given.

In fact, under capitalism, far from the workers’ share rising to offset the problem of insufficient demand, the tendency in periods of crisis is the exact opposite, namely, to cut wages and raise the share of profits, which, in a situation of reduced investment that brought about the crisis in the first place, actually compounds the crisis. A 10% fall in investment in such a situation does not just bring about a 10% fall in output, as the “multiplier” analysis would suggest, but a more than 10% fall in output, say a 15% fall, because an additional squeeze on consumption through a fall in workers’ share (via the wage cut) is further superimposed upon the reduction in investment.

The fact that the relative share of the workers is not allowed to increase in order to offset the tendency towards over-production, which is a basic characteristic of capitalism, also shows its supreme irrationality as a system. It shows that the system would rather have larger unutilised capacity and unemployment, i.e., a sheer waste of productive resources for lack of demand, than produce as before by avoiding this waste through giving more to the workers. From its point of view, wasted resources are preferable to using these resources to improve workers’ consumption. True, not being a planned system, it does not make such calculations consciously; but that is what its immanent tendencies amount to. Socialism avoids any waste or slack, such as is caused by a crisis, by raising the consumption of workers appropriately to avert it.

As the collapse of the Soviet Union recedes further into history, people increasingly forget that a system had existed there, which, notwithstanding its many limitations and defects, had nonetheless been free of unemployment, of over-production crises and of the irrationality of capitalism.

Prabhat Patnaik is Professor Emeritus at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His books include Accumulation and Stability Under Capitalism (1997), The Value of Money (2009), and Re-envisioning Socialism (2011).