Reclaiming the Community: A People's Project for Self-Determination

By Mychal Odom

San Diego, California is home to a unique grassroots project called Reclaiming the Community (RTC). This project exemplifies what was once called operational unity, comprising community activists and artists in San Diego from a variety of political positions, races and ethnicities, religious orientations, and, importantly, gang affiliations. The underlying goal of all liberation movements has been what many people call "self-determination." Self-determination in the most fundamental sense is defined as the right of members of a group to govern themselves and choose their own destiny. In the long history of liberation movements for African Americans and other people of color in the United States, this notion of self-determination has been translated to another highly important term, "community control." People from San Diego to Selma, Alabama have long understood that global change mandates robust progressive action at the local level. The Reclaiming the Community movement was founded by local Barber/Activist, Tau Baraka and a coalition of local organizations, and community members in response to the murder of Courtney Graham in 2010. Since then, the movement has continued to adapt and grow and is now made up of a larger coalition of people from a variety of different, longstanding, and well-respected organizations. The activism of the RTC movement has embodied the notion of community control by mandating that local residents be the ones who regulate the administration of education, political representation, and, importantly, criminal justice.

The Reclaiming the Community members have adopted the following declaration: "As a member of the Reclaiming the Community movement I recognize that power abuse by law enforcement and fratricide are the two most immediate issues facing our community." Herein lays the radical importance of the RTC movement to local, national, and international struggles. RTC has not separated its struggles against structural racism and economic oppression from the conversations we ourselves need to have as a community. In recent years, deeply conservative segments of American society have cynically used the waves of drug and gang violence throughout the United States as a retort to the popular statement "Black Lives Matter." "If Black Lives Matter, then why haven't you said anything about the killings in [Insert Major City with Gang/Drug Violence here]." However, these critics clearly have little to no interest in actually engaging the scourge of gang and drug violence that has assaulted Black people and communities of color consistently for four decades. Comparatively, some progressive activists shy away from internal conversations about gang and drug violence for fear that it might damage or lessen the concerns for structural inequality. RTC does not believe that conversations about police abuse and mass incarceration need to be separate from concerns over intra-community violence. Its members strive to "end mass incarceration and the targeting of Black and Brown community members by law enforcement" and to "renounce fratricide and the murder of our children, family members, and friends." The cause of these economic and social problems in places like Southeast San Diego is structural inequality. However, RTC has shown that the solution is, first and foremost, a form of empowerment that looks towards everyday people as leaders and change makers. For this reason, RTC has mixed more traditional forms of community engagement with cultural and social methods to create a strong base of grassroots activists.

In the spring and summer of 2014, the RTC movement held public marches and gatherings in a variety of Southeast San Diego neighborhoods and parks. Since the 1970s, Skyline, Encanto, Mount Hope, and Mountain View/Lincoln Park have been central to the gang and drug activity within the San Diego area. Yet reversing the tradition of urban flight, RTC did not shun these places and people; instead, RTC saw an important opportunity to organize the people where they are, gathering hundreds of residents and members to hold public marches throughout these areas. These marches were only a prologue to a longer discussion with Southeast San Diego. The goal of the marches was to introduce RTC's united front to the community. Following each march, RTC threw public barbecues with free food, drinks and music at the parks of the various districts. In doing so, RTC fostered important public conversations between community members, which eventually grew to larger community engagement with very real and important legislative changes in California. Amongst its many victories, these marches helped rally community support for the passage of California Proposition 47, which reclassified most non-serious drug and property crimes from felonies to misdemeanors. The main goal of the marches and RTC movement, however, has always been about moving people, and not just changing policy. Since the marches, the RTC movement has consistently engaged a variety of public concerns, with its largest focus on policing and criminal justice.

Critical to self-determination and community control is another term, "self-definition." Before a people can decide where they want to go, they must first decide who they are. Culture is vastly important to the self-definition of a people and it is therefore logical that cultural workers such as musicians, poets, visual artists, and other creatively minded people have always played a prominent role in movements for liberation. Cultural and social events prove just as important, if not more, as canvassing neighborhoods, polling, and holding public rallies. In 2014, while RTC was organizing the community marches, one of its founding members Khalid Alexander of Pillars of the Community, proposed the composition of a hip hop soundtrack. RTC organizers had utilized music as a tool during their community marches, and local artists such as Big June and Wilnisha Sutton, in addition to other musicians, had played an important role as community organizers. RTC members believed that a soundtrack would help further unite San Diego and carry RTC's message to the masses. Further, a major component of this message was criticisms of recent unjust and racist criminal conspiracy charges against a variety of young men and women from the Lincoln Park section of San Diego.

Among this group of men and women were two young men, Aaron Harvey and rapper Brandon "Tiny Doo" Duncan, who were arrested in June 2014 and charged with murder under the extremely controversial Proposition 21. Passed in 2000, Proposition 21 allows for the prosecution of anyone determined to benefit from or promote crimes committed by gang members. Actually admitting that Harvey and Duncan had no involvement in a series of killings that took place in 2012 and 2013, San Diego District Attorney charged that Facebook postings and music of the respective defendants allowed them to profit from the series of killings. Members of the RTC movement and other parts of San Diego rallied against these unjust charges against Harvey, Duncan and other defendants. In addition to presenting a clear violation of the First Amendment, these charges were grounded in the logic and working of a long history of racism and anti-blackness embedded in our criminal justice system. The charges against Harvey and Duncan are only comprehensible to people who are unable to separate Black people from their art or, even worse, the deviant images conjured in the popular imagination. In the spring of 2015, the charges against Harvey and Duncan were proven to be unfounded and they were released. But the charges against Duncan substantiated the power of Black and minority cultural production in San Diego. If rap lyrics could be used by Bonnie Dumanis to try to take away the lives of people, then why couldn't rap music be used as a tool of unity and to give life? As a counterpoint to the oppression and misappropriation of justice waged by Dumanis and her office, collective mobilization against these charges served to energize the RTC album project. Rappers and musicians have therefore played a critical role in RTC from the beginning. As the album's producer Parker Edison has noted, "The street rappers and hip hop artists are the voice [of the people maligned by throughout the US]. This CD is the natural outcome of the larger push for positivity and desire for self-determination that we see throughout South East San Diego."

The RTC album is an important tool in community organizing, as it brings together a group of local artists, many whom have intimate ties to the hard streets of Southeast but have also dedicated their life's work to trying to find an alternate and more positive way forward for all of San Diego. A reflection of RTC's overall political beliefs, the album project lets the community speak for itself, as opposed to just being spoken to. Parker notes, "It is meant to encourage all of those who are struggling for positivity and to overcome the many obstacles that society has place in their way, but most of all, it is a reflection of the realities we live with here on a daily basis; the good and the bad." The RTC album challenges the dominant narratives about life in South East San Diego, especially the ones that promote cultural links of Blacks and poor people to criminality. The album stands in direct opposition to the images that Dumanis, in her attempts to prosecute Harvey and Duncan, sought to exploit. In an interview, one of the album's artists Ecay Uno pronounced his appreciation for being a part of the RTC project because, despite his history of gangs and drugs, ever since his youth, he has wanted "to be a part of what gets people out of the mindset that we are in which causes us to make the choices that we make…a lot of the negative activity in the streets."

It is phenomenal and a testament to the artists themselves that this album was able to be completed. The album brings together artists such as Tiny Doo and C-Hecc, whose Blood and Crip neighborhoods have been in longstanding feuds with each other. Despite this, both artists recognize in their songs on the album that the decades-long genocide that Southeast has endured is a result of limited public and economic resources, and the destruction of the radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Tiny Doo's track is entitled "Deserve This" and C-Hecc's track is entitled "True Story." Both songs do what all great art is supposed to do and ask the people to imagine a new Southeast, a new San Diego, a new world beyond the one given to us. C-Hecc states, "Picture the progress, transforming the new day/not only money, our people living a new way/all that malice in their hear and they tears gone/no more mamas going broke over headstones/understanding is key to this transition/now these kids ain't got they brothers and they dads missing." In his song, Tiny Doo demands a return of the leadership of people like Huey P. Newton as a possible solution to the current state in which the Black community finds itself. In fact, the RTC movement and album have already engaged the tradition and ideals passed down by the Black Panthers-which they inherited from Malcolm X.

Students of the teachings of Malcolm X, the Panthers and other radical movements of the 1960s and 1970s understood that all successful liberation movements must organize what Huey Newton called "the brothers and sisters on the corner" and other people have referred to as the lumpenproletariat. Huey understood this personally because, like Malcolm, he too had spent a wealth of his childhood incarcerated. Malcolm once stated that to be born in America is to be born Black in America is to be born a prisoner. For this reason, the problem of mass incarceration in the RTC project is understood as one that impacts all of us and not just the formerly incarcerated. What's more, it is the formerly incarcerated who are best prepared to lead the movement because as one historian asked, "Who better to define freedom than the slave?" The victims of "neoslavery" are the ones leading this fight for freedom.

The RTC album released July 28, 2015 amidst a well historic moment for the history of American liberation movements. This date marks the 150th year anniversary of the end of the American Civil War and the passing of the 13th amendment. In an alternate universe, this would be a year in which we celebrate how far our nation has come. However, just as the great writer and critic James Baldwin noted in his famed letter to his nephew, "My Dungeon Shook," we are not truly free until the legacy and the structures of white supremacy have been defeated. The RTC album project was released on the 28th of July because that is the same day in 1868 that the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified by the Secretary of State William Seward and the Congress. The 14th Amendment was supposed to bestow citizenship, equal rights, and due process to the formerly enslaved and ensure that no one is denied their inalienable rights regardless of race, creed or color, but the continued struggles over the past 150 years underscore that this has yet to come. In this light, the RTC album is more than your average hip hop compilation-it is a political manifesto, a treatise. The RTC album is not the first San Diego album to bring together such a diverse grouping of artists across gang and racial boundaries. A dozen years ago, many of these same artists came together to create the now legendary compilation Str8 Off the Streets of Southeast. A couple of years later, the New West compilation album released. What makes this album different is the explicit political purpose amidst a larger political moment. RTC artists such as Black Mikey, Ecay Uno, and Odessa Kane have a longstanding tradition of progressive and radical lyrical content. Wilnisha Sutton is a local artist and a budding activist. Following the decision not to indict Darren Wilson for his killing of Mike Brown last fall, she was among the first to take to the streets in the mass actions in Southern California. However connected to the larger local, national, and international movement, the RTC album carries historic significance as it extends their activism to new height.

The RTC album was composed, produced, and released in lockstep with the RTC movement and within the spirit of the age. The album gives voice to the disposed and forgotten. It has transformed the "brothers and sisters of the corner" into agents for change. Be it about Mike Brown, Eric Garner, Sandra Bland, or Tiny Doo, everyday people are discussing the long history of injustice. They are reading, studying, and preparing for a new day. They are demanding that that change come now and that we no longer be asked to wait patiently. As the RTC artist letter notes, it "is the sound track to that feeling. It is a voice for those who society would leave voiceless. This album is a call to action, a call to solidarity, and a collective effort to haul up a new day. We believe a new day is dawning in America and you are the artists that are making it happen."

***

The RTC album project is available for download at https://rtcproject.bandcamp.com/. As an extra treat, the album has a second part-a mixtape. The album hosts the local artists Hotta (aka Silhouette), Tiny Doo, Big June, Ecay Uno, Odessa Kane, Black Mikey, Jaz Williams, Wilnisha A. Sutton, Looselyric, Aye Hitt, Licwit Loco, C-Hecc, Dave Moss, and Bossman Hogg. The mixtape contains music from Real J Wallace, Aki Kharmicel, Piff PCH, Ric Scales, Pedalay the Boss, Leon Saint Heron, GMG and Von Dream. For people who are less tech-savvy or are old school and like to purchase albums themselves, the artists will be selling copies; as well local barbershops such as Imperial Barbershop have copies for sale. The prices of both discs have been set at $10 each. The proceeds from the album will go to support this completely grassroots and remarkable movement.

Gentrification is a Feminist Issue: A Discussion on the Intersection of Class, Race, Gender, and Housing

By Cherise Charleswell

An Overview: What is Gentrification?

From a socioeconomic standpoint, gentrification may be defined as a gradual process of renewal and rebuilding that involves the influx of upper-income or affluent - usually white people - into existing urban districts that are often viewed as being deteriorating areas. This process causes the displacement of the low-middle income working-class, and often long-time, residents due to the increase in rents and property values and changes in the district's overall character and culture. The "rent gap" is often noted as the underlying mechanism of gentrification. The following is an overview of the cyclic nature of this rent gap put into historical perspective:

  • By the close of the Second World War there was a movement of capital to the suburbs. This movement was fueled by greater amount of open land, lower cost of land, little existing development, and opportunities for profit.

  • Capital and resources left the city - and followed urban migration (white flight) to the suburbs

  • Racist housing practices, including legislation that forbid selling homes and renting to non-White residents helped to uphold de facto segregation.

  • By the 1960s many of these urban areas, with the loss of capital, jobs, and so on; began to deteriorate, and property values fell.

  • Currently with the higher costs of property in the suburbs and other communities, there are fewer and fewer opportunities to invest small and gain a big profit; thus making the once "undesirable" urban properties with their low property values and costs, more "desirable."

  • By the 1980s gentrification was in full-swing.

  • Reinvestment in the urban communities causes the cost of property to rise quickly and long-standing residents who were once able to afford to live in these once "undesirable" areas, find themselves unable to afford the higher cost of rent and home mortgages. Further, they are unable to afford to patronize the new and costly stores that have replaced the shops that they used to frequent.

This rent gap is facilitated by a number of agents and practices, and "retenanting" is a professional euphemism given to the commercial real estate agents whose job is to study a community and help to make change -- gentrification -- happen quickly. Their work involves helping to kick out commercial tenants who are paying extremely low rent, and then finding tenants who will pay higher rates for the same spaces. The following expose was released discussing the work of one of these agents working in Highland Park, a hilly area northeast of downtown Los Angeles that has been a target for gentrification for residents fleeing even higher home prices and rents in neighboring Hollywood, Silver Lake, and Echo Park. Then there was the 2012 release of the documentary film "My Brooklyn," directed by Kelly Anderson and produced by Allison Lirish Dean, which offers detailed examples of this rent gap and an even broader analysis of the many factors behind gentrification. Brooklyn itself is home to some of the most rapidly gentrifying areas in the United States, and is among the most expensive cities to reside in.

Viewing the complex matter of gentrification through a feminist lens helps to uncover how multifaceted it is; in that gentrification involves the oppression, marginalization, displacement of vulnerable populations, particularly women and children who are often already negatively impacted by the effects of classism, sexism, and racism. Gentrification threatens to erode the communities and livelihood maintained by these women because their displacement becomes a precondition for the total transformation of the area.

When considering the complex definition and various factors involved in this process, one thing must remain clear -- it is driven by the private sector and is the result of capitalism's relentless pursuit of profit. The very sector of society that has control and influence over all levels of government in the United States, and is thus able to create policies that help to facilitate and increase gentrification in communities around the country --- as well as those outside the United States. This far-flung reach is due to the nature of multinational corporations which wield their power and influence globally. I was reminded of this while on vacation in Portugal this past Spring. As I was walking along a typically narrow, winding street in Vila Nova de Gaia, which is just South of Porto, a resident of the city pointed out how many of the original homeowners and families that lived along the street for many, many years, were becoming displaced. Their homes and shops were being bought up and replaced with hotels. Already, I could begin to see how the character of the community was changing. These new hotels used color schemes and architectural design styles that seemed completely out of place with the homes in the area, which were decorated with world-renowned, intricate and vibrant Portuguese ceramic tiles. I asked where these families went, and the response was that they were relocated to areas much further away from the city center.

And this seems to be a common theme on both sides of the Atlantic -- the lack of consideration that goes to displaced residents. Truly considering these residents would mean that factors which led them to these areas, which were previously viewed as being undesirable, should be taken into account. Thus, the argument can be put forth that gentrification may be viewed as new-wave colonialism, having economic, social, and public health repercussions for women, communities of color, and the poor. In this sense, it is a feminist issue, and should be interrogated, at least partly, as such.


Feminization of Poverty & the Cost of Housing

In the most simplistic terms, the feminization of poverty refers to the fact that women represent a disproportionate share of the world's poor. Further, the feminization of poverty is not only a consequence of lack of income, but is also the result of the deprivation of opportunities and gender biases present in both society and government. For women of color, the loss of opportunities are also a result of institutional-level racism and discriminatory practices. It is these biases that have helped to create the gender-wage gap and all of the socioeconomic consequences of inequity.


So what does the gender-wage gap look like?

gentri1.jpg

So, how does the feminization of poverty relate to the discussion of gentrification?

gentri3.jpg

For more than 30 years, women in the United States have had to deal with not only stagnant wages , where average wages have barely kept pace with inflation since 1979, but also with the persisting gender-wage gap. Even more troublesome is that these wages have remained stagnant despite an exponential growth in worker productivity.

For myself, and those born the generation after me, the 80s and 90s babies, this means that our overall standard of living is probably reduced by 50% in comparison to previous generations; and this includes college educated women who may also find it difficult to afford the loftier rental prices in gentrified neighborhoods. Salaries are simply not keeping up with the cost of living; especially the cost of housing.

Further, the gender-pay gap helps to ensure that those who are more likely to be impoverished and coping with issues of food insecurity, homelessness, etc. are women and children. Working-class and low-income women are the group who are most vulnerable to gentrification in that they live in the areas that are being targeted by this process. In essence, the sexist, racist, discriminatory and biased practices, beliefs, and policies that have helped to create the gender-pay gap also help to facilitate their removal from areas that they were once able to afford.

Having lower wages means that these working-class women will be unable to resist or withstand the process of gentrification and remain in their homes and neighborhoods. This is due to the fact that lower wages means that an increase in the amount on rent or mortgage costs is extremely difficult for women who are already dealing with wage deficits. To put this into perspective, a Latina woman who on average makes only $0.56 to a white man's $1.00 hourly, would be least likely to be able cope with a marked increase in rent, as well as the higher cost of groceries and other goods which occur when an area undergoes gentrification. In comparison, a white man, who make higher wages on average, would be more capable of remaining in a neighborhood that is undergoing gentrification.


Intersections: Communities of Color

When taking a look at the definition of gentrify, the root word of gentrification, one can readily discern what is implied, especially when considering the change in demographics of these neighborhoods:

" To change (a place, such as an old neighborhood) by improving it and making it more appealing to people who have money ."

The term "appealing" harkens back to the language used by banks, realtors, and others who wanted to ensure that certain neighborhoods would remain devoid of people of color. The American suburbs were actually built out due to this phenomenon of White flight from urban centers which, without resources and investment, were left to decay. In fact, post-New Deal communities actually received federal subsidies for home ownership, while others, that had Black residents or other people of color, did not. This process was called "red-lining", and it often barred any neighborhood with more than 5% of Black people/people of color from receiving subsidies for home ownership and wealth building. This process helped to keep Compton, California, the birthplace of gangster rap, completely White up until the early 1950s. This process led half a million whites to move out of Brooklyn in the 1970s.

The following statements shared by Zach Behrens in his essay , Before the 1950s, the Whiteness of Compton was Defended Vehemently, explains why these covenants manifested.

"Covenants across the country began in the late 1910s and early 1920s in response to the increasing black population in American cities, namely Northern and Western ones that saw the rise during World War I during the so-called great migration from the South. In Los Angeles, however, the move of African Americans was slow until World War II. Still, that slow growth in the 1920s was enough for white homeowners to become concerned about declining property values because of the black influx."

These discriminatory housing practices were - or continue to be -- used against other people of color around the US, and one can argue that at its roots, and according to the terminology used in its definition, gentrification is a racist practice that seeks to make a neighborhood more appealing to those who are deemed desirable - in other words, white people, or more specifically, wealthy white people. Women of color, particularly those who are working class and thus subjected to oppressive systems of racism, classism, ableism, and sexism, are deemed the most undesirable and are consequently marginalized. The rising cost of living, escalating rents and mortgages, stagnant wages, and gender wage-gap literally force them out of their neighborhoods, despite many having community ties for multiple generations.

Ultimately, the process of gentrification sits on a historical legacy of oppression and discrimination, and has only worsened with the shrinking of the middle class and transfer of wealth to the smallest percentage of the US population over the past 40 years. Furthermore, it has left women, especially women of color, as the most vulnerable in this process of systematic displacement. It is a matter where race, class, and gender intersect. And, for this reason, gentrification must be recognized as a feminist issue.

Dylann Roof and the Right: Domestic Terrorism and the Mainstreaming of Extremism

By Sean Posey

In April 2009, a Department of Homeland Security report leaked to the public entitled "Right Wing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment." Released within months of President Obama's inauguration, it bravely sketched the broad strokes of a nascent white nationalist backlash. Yet the report was pilloried by a variety of pundits on the right. However, the recent mass shooting at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina-and a rising tide of extremist attacks before it-confirm many of the worst predictions in the report. And as the media dithers, the rhetoric of white nationalism and far-right extremism is once again finding expression in the form of mainstream pundits and even presidential candidates.

The DHS report focused on several key themes. Officials correctly theorized that the election Of Barack Obama could drive "efforts to recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their scope and appeal through propaganda…."[1] The number of far-right organizations increased from 139 in 2008 to 1,360 in 20102.[2]

The DHS report also frequently highlights the importance of economic recessions, free trade agreements, and a "perceived" loss of jobs in both manufacturing and construction.[3] Unfortunately, this was one of the least commented on passages from the report. The U.S. lost more than five million jobs in manufacturing between the beginning of the Great Recession and 2014, and many of those losses can be blamed on free trade agreements.[4] Wages are flat; many of the jobs gained since the recession actually pay less overall. Far from being a "perceived" issue, the government could have fully examined the very real connections between widespread economic pain and the growth of far-right "patriot" and hate group movements.

Conservative commentators attacked the report immediately, but not because it lacked a nuanced discussion of economics. Peter Roff (among many others) commented in U.S. News and World Report that the DHS report represented "little more than a nine page screed against phantoms." [5] Roff pointed to a report issued by the Bush Administration on left wing extremism as being substantively different and less political than that of the Obama Administration's. He also criticized the DHS for indicting "people who hold certain political beliefs that are well within the mainstream of American political thought…." In this he proved to be far more correct than he might have imagined.

The massacre of nine African Americans by Dylann Roof, a self-described white nationalist, at the Emanuel AME Church is now fully revealing the connections between far-right organizations and mainstream conservative figures. It also validates the 2009 DHS report. Days after the brutal shooting, Roof's political manifesto emerged online. In some sense it is a standard white nationalist screed. Yet Roof directly points to organizations that influenced his thinking-including the Council of Conservative Citizens, a lesser-known but influential group on the right.

The Council of Conservative Citizens emerged in 1985 as a modern day descendant of the White Citizens' Councils of the Old South. Several prominent businessmen and politicians formed the backbone of the early organization. Today Jared Taylor, a prominent "racial realist," serves as the spokesman for the group. Opposition to interracial marriage is a key part of the organization's platform, as is the promotion of supposedly conservative Christian values. The groups members have vociferously spoken out against the civil rights movement, denounced the legacy of Martin Luther King, and engaged in the crudest possible racial characterizations of African Americans.

The CCC has also long been tied to conservative politicians, even after the Republican Party's connection to the group became known in the late 1990s. Leonard Wilson, a former committeeman for Alabama, is on the organization's board. Former Majority Senate Leader Trent Lott was a member while serving as a representative. Jess Helms had close ties to the organization while serving in the North Carolina State Senate and as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Dozens of conservatives have spoken at CCC events over the years or have connections to the group, including Congressman Roger Wicker of Mississippi; Haley Barbour, former governor of Mississippi and chairman of the Republican National Committee; Senator Gary Jackson of Mississippi; Representative Bob McKee of Tennessee; and Mike Huckabee during his time as Lieutenant Governor of Arkansas. Bob Barr, a former Libertarian Party Presidential candidate in 2008, spoke before gatherings of the CCC on several occasions. Other conservative scions have connections to the groups as well, including Family Research Council President Tony Perkins.

In 1997, the CCC presented a Confederate Flag from the South Carolina Statehouse (a flag similar to the one later taken down from the same location by activist Bree Newsome in the aftermath of the Charleston shootings) to Jean-Marie La Pen of the National Front, a French white nationalist party. Three years before, Congress passed a measure condemning the Nation of Islam as an extremist group in the aftermath of a racially charged speech given by spokesman Khalid Abdul Muhammad, but it has failed to issue a similar condemnation of the Council of Conservative Citizens in the aftermath of Charleston. Indeed, there has been little official effort to recognize the attack as an act of domestic terrorism at all.

A recent report by the New America Foundation analyzed domestic terrorist attacks by jihadists and far-right wing groups and lone attackers since September 11, 2001. They found that far-right extremists have killed nearly twice as many people as Islamist radicals. [6] These findings not only help repudiate the singular focus on the Islamist threat within America-they also call for a popular recognition of the domestic terror threat posed by the extremist-right. The media is largely ignoring the issue, however, save for the New York Times, Al Jazeera, and a few other publications. A recent Syracuse University study found wide discrepancies in the tenor of the coverage given to domestic terror attacks by extremists not affiliated with Islam or the political left. According to the report,"…It indicates that news organizations experience a degree of cognitive dissonance when non-Muslims (or individuals affiliated with the dominant hegemonic culture) commit terrorism-like violence."[7] Despite the media's blind spot, the attacks (and attempted attacks) that have taken place since the DHS report in 2009 reveal a stark picture. They echo the warning that " right-wing extremism is likely to grow in strength" if trends continue.[8]

In April 2009, Richard Poplawski, a white supremacist, killed three police officers in Pittsburgh in the second-worst assault on law enforcement since the World Trade Center attacks. In 2012, neo-Nazi Wade Michael Page shot six worshippers at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. That same year Jerad and Amanda Miller killed two police officers in an ambush in Las Vegas; they left a swastika and a Gadsden flag on the bodies before moving on to murder a shopper at a nearby Walmart. There has also been a string of failed or interrupted attacks by a variety of individuals on the extreme right as well, including the attempted bombing of a Martin Luther King Day parade in Spokane, Washington. Authorities also uncovered an effort by white supremacists to assassinate Barack Obama and carry out a campaign of mass murder against anonymous African Americans. The number of assaults against law enforcement officials is a notable element of many of the attacks. A recent survey of domestic law enforcement agencies recorded that 74 percent of jurisdictions found "anti-government extremists" to be a more serious threat than Islamic militants.[9]

The rhetoric and vitriol that is commonplace in white nationalist and far-right circles is also making its way into the mouths of public figures on the right. Anne Coulter has long made a living writing inflammatory books likeHow to Talk to a Liberal (If You Must): The World According to Ann CoulterIf Democrats Had Any brains They'd be Republicans, and Mugged: Racial Demagoguery from the Seventies to Obama. She has managed to carve out a place in the mainstream media while also essentially providing many of the talking points of white nationalists.

In her latest book, Adios America: The Left's Plan to Turn Our Country into a Third World Hellhole, she ups the ante. A bevy of white nationalists are cited or directly mentioned in the book. In chapter ten, she cites the work of white nationalist, Peder Jensen, better known as Fordjman, who Norwegian mass-murderer, Anders Breivik, cited over a hundred times in his manifesto. She also cites Robert Spencer, co-founder of "Stop Islamization of America." He appears numerous times in Breivik's manifesto as well and is banned from entering the United Kingdom. Peter Brimelow's work also appears. Brimelow, who once spoke at the mainstream Conservative Political Action Council, has called for Texas to secede, the organization of a campaign to protect "white rights," and the abolition of Martin Luther King Day - which Brimelow contends has turned into a day of "anti-white indoctrination." [10] Additionally, he has close connections to Jared Taylor of the Council of Conservative Citizens.

If Anne Coulter is the pundit channeling white nationalists, then Donald Trump is the candidate giving voice to many of their views. Trump is currently polling second among prospective presidential candidates, even as he unleashes a tirade of invective at immigrants. His candidacy is also garnering the support of groups on the far right, including the Council of Conservative Citizens. Fellow Republican candidates are trying distance themselves from Trump, but it is more difficult for them to distance their party from the tenor of his remarks.

While still clearly a minority, the far right-not Islamic terrorists-now present the greatest clear and present danger inside of America. The 2009 DHS report has proven prescient in many respects, and it should be revived and revisited in the wake of the Charleston massacre and the attacks and plots of others on the right. The problem is exacerbated by the inability of the mainstream media and the Republic Party to confront violent acts committed by non-Muslim assailants as actual terrorism. While Republicans have called government reports about far-right groups "propaganda," events and the statistics are proving the DHS largely correct. And all the while the rhetoric of extremists continues to seep into the mainstream.



Notes

[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment, April 2009.

[2] Southern Poverty Law Center, "Hate and Extremism," http://www.splcenter.org/what-we-do/hate-and-extremism (Accessed July 5, 2015).

[3] UDHS, "Rightwing Extremism"

[4] The Economic Policy Institute, "Fast Track to Lost Jobs and Lower Wages," Working Economics Blog, Robert E. Scott. http://www.epi.org/blog/fast-track-to-lost-jobs-and-lower-wages/ Accessed July 4, 2015.

[5] Peter Roff, "DHS Report on Leftists Not Like Napolitano Report on Right-Wing Extremism," U.S. News and World Report, April 16, 2009. http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2009/04/16/dhs-report-on-leftists-not-like-napolitano-report-on-right-wing-extremism (Accessed July 5, 2015).

[6] New America Foundation, "Deadly Attacks Since 9/11," http://securitydata.newamerica.net/extremists/deadly-attacks.html (Accessed July 7, 2015).

[7] Adam Yehia Elrashidi, "A Matter of Faith: U.S. Cable News Coverage and Definitions of Terrorism," S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, Syracuse University, May 2013.

[8] UDHS, "Rightwing Extremism"

[9] Charles Kurzman and David Schanzer, "Law Enforcement Assessment of the Violent Extremism Threat," Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, http://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_Schanzer_Law_Enforcement_Assessment_of_the_Violent_Extremist_Threat_final.pdf (Accessed July 6, 2015), 3.

[10] RWW News. "Brimelow: States Like Texas Should Secede" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqkliyiaIas (Accessed July 7, 2015); RWW News. "White Nationalists Victims of Lynch Mob" http://www.rightwingwatch.org/content/peter-brimelow-states-texas-must-consider-secession-protect-white-rights (Accessed July 7, 2015).

Identity, Inc.: Liberal Multiculturalism and the Political Economy of Identity Politics

By Jacob Ertel

The Left in the United States is at a critical juncture. Then again, it has been for roughly the past 35 years. With the onset of neoliberalism and the dissolution of the class-based politics of the 1960s and 1970s, a new political framework has emerged typified by the politicization of identity. It is this discourse that has prevailed on the Left since the early 1980s, always in tension with popular currents Marxian critique but oft posited as the sole truly radical theory and practice. To be sure, identity politics comes with indisputable benefits, including the reclaiming and centering of historical narratives and a more nuanced understanding of interpersonal forms of aggression and abuse. At the same time, however, certain critical features of Marxian critique have taken a backseat to this framework, which largely abjures a substantive analysis of the material conditions central to capitalist social relations in lieu of the purported deconstruction of institutional norms. In other words, the critique of classism (the individual denigration of people not exhibiting behavior or values associated with certain social classes) has largely superseded the critique of capitalism. It is worth considering, then, whether there is anything inherent about identity politics that necessitates an abandonment of veritable anti-capitalism in lieu of a more individualized form of putative radicalism. Is it purely by chance that the rise of identity politics coincides with the imposition of neoliberalism?

Many might argue that political movements have in fact secured significant victories since the 1980s. This sentiment often hinges on the successes of mainstream gay rights movements, but is perhaps most explicitly embodied by myopic utterances of 'post-racialism' since the beginning of the Obama presidency. However, victories such as the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, the repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell, and the election of Obama, do nothing to prevent state violence or the conditions that undergird it; at best they present a hyper-individualized conception of success and at worst they further legitimate the state as the supreme arbiter of rights in its capacity to promote ostensibly progressive social values, but without questioning how such rights are contingent on the state's own monopoly on violence both domestic and abroad. Perhaps most disturbing is that many self-described 'radicals' who share similar critiques of mainstream political movements maintain the central logic of identity politics while espousing a militant rhetoric that claims to challenge white bourgeois norms at the same time as it inadvertently reaffirms them. Identity politics, then, must be rooted in liberalism.

Much has been made of the deficiencies of identity politics and its cousin, liberal multiculturalism; fewer analyses actually trace the genealogy of these discourses. In moving from early liberal theorists to contemporary critics, this essay attempts to briefly sketch such a genealogy. In doing so, it examines the effects of these discourses on the potential for militant anti-capitalist organizing. It is ultimately argued that identity politics serves to further retrench the state's narrative of progress and liberal multiculturalism at the same time that economic stratification only intensifies under neoliberalism, in which appeals to a rights-based framework focused on representing a diversity of experiences do little to mitigate large-scale social upheaval. In this way, the shift from the insurgent materialist perspectives of the 1960s and early 1970s to a politics of identity often plays into same narratives that it positions itself against.


Liberalism and the Individual

The exercising of individual rights is a key tenet of civic liberalism that dates back to the 17th and 18th centuries, first articulated by theoreticians such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill. Mill in particular asserts the primacy of the self-determining liberal subject in contributing to societal progress. Through exercising individual liberties, he argues, "human life also becomes rich, diversified and animating, furnishing more abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevating feelings, and strengthening the tie to which binds every individual to the race, by making the race infinitely better worth belonging to."[1] Such liberty is not without parameters, however. In fact, Mill avers that it is precisely the necessary limits to behavior imposed on individuals through rights that enable "human beings [to] become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation" and fully cultivate themselves.[2] Law serves a paradoxical purpose here: it imposes limits on the individual at the same time as it engenders it through its very constitution. In other words, the individual, as an inherently juridical construct, cannot exist without the law and the limitations it imposes. Mill himself is acutely aware of this contradiction. "Whenever…there is definite damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public," he explains, "the case is taken out of the province of liberty and placed in that of morality or law."[3] Individual self-determination can thus only be understood as such when it is circumscribed in accordance with the purview of the state's legal personality.

This facet of liberalism presents essential problems for early critics such as Marx. In "On the Jewish Question" in particular, Marx argues that the law's primary function is the maintenance of private property as the central structuring mechanism of society. For Marx, property embodies the truest expression of self-interest, "the right to enjoy one's fortune and to dispose of it as one will; without regard for other men and independently of society…this individual liberty, and it's application, form the basis of civil society."[4] Such enjoyment, however, must also be secured through legal curtailment, as an unregulated expression of self-interest could hinder others' ability to cultivate their own property and thus develop as citizens. In this sense security is a natural consequence of private property and no less foundational to civil society. This dynamic poses an immitigable tension for Marx. If society "exists only in order to guarantee for each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights and his property,"[5] and if such preservation is inherently limiting to individual expression in its truest form, then the individual-and the political community to which the individual contributes-exists as a mere means for the preservation of rights. [6] Within this framework, the bourgeois property owner becomes the symbol of authenticity as the personification of liberal rights. This is why for Marx the achievement of "political emancipation" is ultimately futile as a finite strategy: political rights entail state recognition, and thus the perpetuation of the capitalist mode of production in which rights are constituted as an indispensable precondition.


Liberal Multiculturalism as 'American-ness'

Liberalism has endured as a central philosophical strain centuries after Mill formulated his famed treatise. Indeed, liberalism's emphasis on individual liberty, unregulated market rationality, and universality characterizes both the social dynamics and capital flows that permeate society. Yet it is important to interrogate the codification of individual freedom within a given set of all encompassing, state-legitimated rights. It is easily observed that not everyone residing in liberal states receives truly equal treatment; more often than not the law may appear to operate unfairly, and its ostensible commitment to equality can undermine radically unequal material conditions. Black people in the United States, for example, have been particularly subjected to tremendous physical violence, but also legally excluded from civic participation. Many activists and scholars believe that because of this, an intuitive approach to political agitation should involve advocating for greater state recognition. This stance takes for granted that, as Will Kymlicka puts it, "accommodating ethnic and national differences is only part of a larger struggle to make a more tolerant and inclusive democracy…An adequate theory of the rights of cultural minorities must therefore be compatible with the just demands of disadvantaged social groups…." [7] Kymlicka's proposition is important because it attempts to mitigate social inequities through a multicultural and rights-based framework deemed able to accommodate historical, social, and cultural differences. Rather than emphasizing the benefits of legal universalism, Kymlicka acknowledges that a blanketed application of the law is insufficient.

His provocation is less successful in its application, however. In positioning "the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or color"[8] as the great triumph of liberal democracy, Kymlicka participates in the very mode of erasure he seeks to ameliorate by failing to interrogate the composition of the "common" (read: middle-class, white) culture into which minorities are purportedly choosing to incorporate themselves. His assertion that "…[Latino] immigrants who come to the United States with the intention to stay and become citizens…are committed to learning English and participating in the mainstream society,"[9] for example, whitewashes any semblance of difference by commending minority groups for their ability to effectively shed such difference in striving for political recognition. On the other hand, Kymlicka misunderstands the effectiveness of specific legal provisions, claiming that "…national minorities in the Unites States have a range of rights intended to reflect and protect their status as distinct cultural communities, and they have fought to retain and expand these rights."[10] Kymlicka takes this to signify the superiority of liberal democracy while characterizing integration into the US legal framework as liberalism's crowning achievement.

On the contrary, the dual subsumption and glorification of difference is foundational to US nation building. To recall Marx, it is the normalization of political emancipation-as opposed to full human emancipation-as the main form of struggle that naturalizes the capitalist social order by positing the bourgeois property owner as the telos of human progress. Reading Kymlicka through Mill in conjunction with Marx, then, illustrates that liberal multiculturalism presupposes a universal standard that both inherently limits individual expression through the incorporation of minority groups into a presumptively 'common culture' premised on specifically normative discourses and institutions. This mode of incorporation circumvents the potential for opposition to capitalism while simultaneously producing newly racialized subjects who are excluded from the political rights now propounded as the fullest actualization of freedom. Jodi Melamed explains how this dynamic has been maintained through the US' efforts to promote racial equality by espousing a formal policy of "racial liberalism" not dissimilar to Kymlicka's propositions. Writes Melamed, "…the liberal race paradigm recognizes racial inequality as a problem, and it secures a liberal symbolic framework for race reform centered in abstract equality, market individualism, and inclusive civic nationalism. Antiracism becomes a nationally recognized social value and, for the first time, gets absorbed into US governmentality." [11] Moreover, the official antiracism of the post-war period can be read as constitutive in and of itself of US nationalism, as it becomes a rationalization for transnational capitalism and foreign intervention in the name of US interests. [12] The "suturing of liberal antiracism to US nationalism, which manages, develops, and depoliticizes capitalism by collapsing it with Americanism," Melamed writes, "results in a situation where 'official' antiracist discourse and politics actually limit awareness of global capitalism."[13] In other words, a policy of racial liberalism positions the US as a fully multicultural state necessarily counterpoised to the "monoculturalism" of non-Western societies.[14]

Multiculturalism as American-ness now reflects a universal subject, construed as a victory against racism at the same time as it is repurposed to further entrench global capitalism.[15] Liberal multiculturalism here functions not only with regard to race, but all non-normative identities. A pertinent example is the enfolding of queer people into the narrative of US nationalism after the September 11, 2001 attacks. As Jasbir Puar explains, "…even as patriotism immediately after September 11 was inextricably tied to a reinvigoration of heterosexual norms for Americans, progressive sexuality was championed as a hallmark of US modernity." Despite this glorification of heteronormativity, "the United States was also portrayed as 'feminist' in relation to the Taliban's treatment of Afghani women…and gay-safe in comparison to the Middle East." [16] Puar's insight demonstrates the ease with which non-normative cultural narratives are incorporated into US nationalism under liberal multiculturalism and subsequently recast as no less normative than Marx's bourgeois property owner. Queerness is still politicized, but not as an oppositional identity; rather, capitalism, orientalism, and heteronormativity are grafted onto it and reconstitute it as the expression of truly American values.


The Political-Economy of Identity Politics

Though is crucial to identify the development of liberal multiculturalism as essential to the naturalization of capitalism, it is also worth gauging the extent to which liberal multiculturalism has been enmeshed within larger political-economic processes such as the dissolution of Fordism. As the post-war Fordist model of standardized mass production and mass consumption began to outpace more relaxed consumption patterns, Fordism's systemic rigidities began to negatively impact its ability (in tandem with a relatively strong Keynesian welfare state) to mitigate capitalism's volatility. When exogenous factors such as the OPEC oil shock of 1973 compounded this dynamic, firms attempted to deal with these increasingly unsustainable political-economic features by diversifying their production lines to spike demand, a tactical shift made possible through the flexibilization of production along with the growingly transnational character of capital flows. Many firms moved their production lines off shore and marked up prices by way of customization at the same time as production costs were drastically lowered. As Wolfgang Streeck argues, however, a new accumulation regime is not just a new accumulation regime: it engenders a new individual.[17]

Within a globalizing economy, the expression of individual autonomy increasingly rests upon the exercising of agency now inextricable from the political economy of customized consumption. Streeck refers to this dynamic as "a way for individuals to link up to others and thereby define their place in the world" in which one may "conceive an act of purchase…as an act of self-identification and self-presentation, one that sets the individual apart from some social groups while uniting him or her with others."[18] It is not as though individuals regularly defined themselves in contrast to normative identities before the neoliberal turn, through a range of practices not inherently contingent on the act of consumption; however, the development of identity politics in conjunction with neoliberalism's emergence at the very least shares an affinity with the differentiated patterns of individuation present within the flexibilized production processes explicated by Streeck, in which politics is decontextualized as "individual market choice trumps collective political choice."[19]

Fordism's demise contributed to the fundamental restructuring of the Left in the US. The class-based politics of Left movements began to erode as New Right politicians like Reagan and Thatcher grew to ascendance in the late 1970s and early 1980s and used the inflationary crisis as a means to radically restructure their respective countries' economies. Such a restructuring involved scaling back social welfare institutions, busting unions, and imposing austerity measures, all of which present grave consequences for the ability of the working class to sustain itself politically. Whereas the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s had largely foregone an analysis of cultural difference (often to a fault) in lieu of forming strong class-based alliances, Left movements arising during the 1980s began to mirror the individualized ethos and distrust of political institutions embodied by neoliberal governments. As Adolph Reed Jr. notes, within the purview of this new form of identity politics, "as in Thatcher's apothegm, there is no such thing as society, 'only individuals and their families.'"[20] With the subsequent rightward turn of the Democratic Party in the US, moreover, much of the working class "…by and large proceeded to distance itself from the New Left's agenda, no longer seeing themselves reflected in or spoken for by its politics or its electoral strategies."[21]

Originally conceived in the late 1950s as a response to the bureaucratic, top-down approach of the Old Left, the New Left had attempted to politicize identity throughout the 1960s and early 1970s in response to the Vietnam War and virulent racism on the home front. Though the movement often included significant numbers of people of color and sexual minorities, the explicit politicization of these identities was never understood as central to its functioning.[22] The emergence of identity politics, in contrast, represents "the achievement of minority public 'voice,' metaphorically speaking, an enfranchisement of black, female, gay, bisexual, and ethnic communities," both within intentional political communities and the state at large.[23] This structuring of political communities by way of politicized identity takes as its foundation that the achievement of "social and economic equality" depends on increasing "political equality." [24] Here we can begin to outline how identity politics as a contemporary iteration of Left radicalism is in fact inextricable from the regimes of racial liberalism and liberal multiculturalism.


Identity, Inc.

The aim here is not to critique identity politics in and of itself as a method of organizing, but rather to demonstrate how compatible it is with the discourse of liberal multiculturalism. Identity politics in part arose as a reaction to the New Left's inability to account for difference in its composition. At the same time, a range of political-economic factors such as the collapse of Fordism and the consequent restructuring of the welfare state dissolved the New Left's ability to maintain a veritable anti-capitalist disposition. Reed also points to the notable retreat of the Left into academia and the materialization of identity politics as a corollary of cultural studies and post-structuralist discourse characterized by the "rejection of any form of centralizing power or notion of objective truth."[25] In practice, according to Reed, this discourse translates into "a focus on the supposedly liberatory significance of communities and practices defined by their marginality in relation to systems of entrenched power or institutions, a preference for strategies of 'resistance' to imperatives of institutions and 'transgression' of conventions rather than strategies aimed at transformation of institutions and social relations," and the belief that radical political movements should be composed of "groups formed around ascriptive identities that relate to one another on a principle of recognizing and preserving the integrity of their various differences." [26] Reed opposes identity politics because he believes it uncritically accepts capitalist social relations by focusing its efforts on transgression of institutional norms rather than on institutions themselves. In recalling Puar's explication of the manipulation of queer narratives after September 11, Reed's concern is understandable because of how seamlessly difference is codified through narratives of societal progress and liberal social values that both pass implicit judgment on those who continue to reside outside the parameters of normative liberal discourse, while legitimating imperialist projects abroad in opposition to putatively less-accepting 'monocultural' states.

At the same time, activists and scholars have argued in defense of identity politics as a radical discourse that enables the "re-creation of minority histories in a public sphere that had long been hostile or indifferent to narratives of that self and community." For Grant Farred, "Identity politics…represents not only the marginal subject speaking back, but a more engaging philosophical project: the oppressed not only resisting but also negotiating the limitations of agency."[27] In other words, the reclaiming of historical narratives and the construction of intentional communities through identity politics embodies the redefining of state-imposed limitations to self-determination and can thus contribute to both radical social transformation and a more nuanced and culturally aware Left. Indeed, potential exists for identity politics to enable the construction of previously censored histories or cultural narratives. There is certainly a perennial need within the Left for more complex understandings of power, for more less dogmatic visions of emancipation, and for a more expansive formulation of class-based politics. Yet while all this may be true, Wendy Brown explains, identity politics is "partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values," and "tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure." [28]


Discursive Dilemmas

Drawing on Foucault's theoretical contributions, Brown notes that identity itself is produced through disciplinary mechanisms that, when combined with liberalism's true inability to provide the universal protections it claims to embody, results in "the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary productions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice." [29] In other words, the politicization of identity is discursively ineluctable from liberalism's claim to universality. Through this form of protest, identity politics is driven by an inherent desire for incorporation into this universal framework, one that, as we have seen through Mill and Kymlicka, has come to tolerate a degree of diversity while presupposing the universal standard of the bourgeois white male property owner. Such a standard can only function when codified through the conferral of rights. Brown questions that if it is "this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s."[30]

None of this is to deride the tactics of various social and political groups, but to acknowledge how the destruction of the Fordist-Keynesian regime has made it more difficult to center an analysis of class when the already-insubstantial institutions of class-based social cohesion have been so drastically eroded since the 1970s and 1980s especially. In this way we may understand neoliberalism not solely as the political-economic reassertion of free market rationality, but also as the reconstitution of Mill's brand of civic liberalism through a multicultural discourse that, as Brown notes, "retains the real or imagined holdings of its reviled subject-in this case, the bourgeois male privileges-as objects of desire." [31] Identity politics thus necessarily "abjure[s] a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social acceptance."[32] The politicization of identity under neoliberalism thus arises through the exclusion of identity from liberalism's presumptively universal subjectivity, thus reinstalling the ideal of the white bourgeoisie as the base expression of such subjectivity. Politicized identity requires the maintenance of this universal subjectivity, as well as its own exclusion from it, in order to endure as identity itself.[33]

As a vehicle for protesting exclusion through the incorporation of the interests of social groups into the bourgeois power structure, identity politics inadvertently reifies it while framing rights, recognition, or (in its most militant variation) the transgression of norms as the actualization of resistance. What might an alternative political praxis to identity politics look like, then? How can the liberalism at the core of identity politics actually be contested when it seems to be so pervasive within a range of radical leftist circles? It is difficult to know for sure. Perhaps it would entail a recommitment to challenging the liberal discourse through which capitalism is legitimated. Perhaps it would include a recognition of and sensitivity towards the intersectional character of difference while seeking to destabilize the paradigm of transgression-as-revolution in lieu of a more fundamentally materialist framework that specifically prioritizes working class struggle. Perhaps it would mean a re-articulation of identity as a fluid rather than a historically and biologically fixed point while continuing to center the importance of historical and cultural narratives. These are merely provocations, however; it is ultimately up to the people to decide.



Works Cited

Brown, Wendy. "Wounded Attachments." Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (August 1993), pp. 390-410.

Farred, Grant. "Endgame Identity? Mapping the New Left Root of Identity Politics." New Literary History, Vol. 31 (2000), pp. 627-648.

Kymlicka, Will. "The Politics of Multiculturalism," in Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Marx, Karl. "On the Jewish Question," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978.

Melamed, Jodi. "From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism." Social Text 89, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter 2006), pp. 1-24.

Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty, in 'On Liberty' and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

Puar, Jasbir. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.

Reed Jr., Adolph. Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene. New York: The New Press, 2001.

Streeck, Wolfgang. "Citizens as Customers: Considerations on the New Politics of Consumption." New Left Review, Vol. 76 (July-August 2012), pp. 27-47.

Young, Iris Marion. "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ronald Beiner. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.


Citations

[1] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 'On Liberty' and Other Writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 60.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid, 80.

[4] Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), 42.

[5] Ibid, 43.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Will Kymlicka, "The Politics of Multiculturalism," in Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 10.

[8] Ibid, 15.

[9] Ibid, 8.

[10] Ibid, 4.

[11] Jodi Melamed, "From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism," Social Text 89, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter 2006), 2.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid, 6.

[14] Ibid, 8.

[15] Ibid, 6.

[16] Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 41.

[17] Wolfgang Streeck, "Citizens as Customers: Considerations on the New Politics of Consumption," New Left Review, Vol. 76 (July-August 2012), 35.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid, 44.

[20] Adolph Reed Jr., Class Notes: Posing as Politics and Other Thoughts on the American Scene (New York: The New Press, 2001), xxvi.

[21] Grant Farred, "Endgame Identity? Mapping the New Left Root of Identity Politics," New Literary History, Vol. 31 (2000), 634.

[22] Ibid, 636.

[23] Ibid, 631.

[24] Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 185.

[25] Reed, Class Notes, xiv.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Farred, "Endgame Identity? Mapping the New Left Roots of Identity Politics," 638.

[28] Wendy Brown, "Wounded Attachments," Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (August 1993), 394.

[29] Ibid, 393.

[30] Ibid, 394.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid, 398.

Disproportionate Minority Contact & Criminological Theory

By Miah Register

It has been recently discovered that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (trans*), queer, and questioning (LGBTQ) youth are disproportionately represented in the juvenile justice system (Holsinger & Hodge 2014; Hunt & Moodie-Mills 2012; Craziano & Wagner 2011). Hunt and Moodie-Mills (2014) also report that 60 percent of these youth are Black, Latino/a,. Further, despite the overrepresentation of LGBTQ youth in the juvenile justice system, the legal system's response has been lackluster, at best. In 1988, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) have responded with the Disproportionate Minority Contact (DMC) mandate, which was an amendment to the 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JJDP) Act (U.S. Department of Justice OJJDP DMC Factsheet 2012). This act was intended to reduce the contact of minority youth in the juvenile justice system. Moreover, most research involving minority youth has denied the impact or intersecting identities and the oppression and lack of safe spaces for these young people to exist in society, in general, and in the juvenile justice system. Although feminist criminology has emerged and enhanced the narrow ideologies of classical criminological theory, many intersections have been left uncrossed in juvenile justice theory, research and practice. Since the inception of criminological theory, significant elements of the human identity have been overlooked as primary factors of disproportionate minority contact with the juvenile justice system. For example, Hirschi's (1969) model of social control argues that race and ethnicity are factors that are invariant. Further, this false sense of equality and inclusion encourages exclusion and erasure of the identities of minority groups: i.e. the focus of the current research-lesbians, bisexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming black girls.


History of DMC

The DMC mandate originally intended to reduce the confinement of minority youth in the juvenile justice corrections facilities. Moreover, it required states receiving certain federal funding for juvenile justice programming to follow this mandate and its several components. In 1992, the JJDP Act "elevated the efforts" of the DMC mandate, and allocated 25 percent of the funding to state compliance. Further, the OJJDP proclaim that through the DMC mandate, they learned that minorities were overrepresented in all components of the juvenile justice system, as opposed to earlier beliefs that minorities were only disproportionately institutionalized. As a result, the mandate was amended in 2002 and renamed to Disproportionate Minority Contact for state municipalities to understand the necessity to address overrepresentation of minorities at every point of the justice system.

Further, at the inception of DMC, the OJJDP developed a model for states to emulate in their efforts to reduce minority contact. Their reduction model calls for state agencies to identify, assess, intervene, evaluate, and monitor DMC. The OJJDP claims that their efforts, while not complete, have catalyzed some institutional change. While they quote some positive changes in arrest statistics and in detention facilities, criminological scholars must approach this perceived change from a critical, intersectional lens to understand and asses the positive changes, if any, after the DMC mandate. While each state has implemented the DMC model to some extent, most states have monitored their programming, but they have failed to methodically evaluate the program's effectiveness. Thus, in this paper, I will critically examine the effectiveness of the DMC mandate in serving all minorities-not just Black boys. This evaluation will be conducted through a comprehensive literature review, as well as a theoretical analysis of the potential origins of this deeply rooted issue.


Theoretical Approach

This paper will utilize Blalock's (1967) racial threat theory as a basis to expand upon. In essence, primary ideology of racial threat theory will be expanded to encompass and explain the matrix of oppression for all minorities. This theory asserts that competition (for jobs, economic superiority, etc.) between Black and White people in the US causes an intensified level of social control exerted on Black people. An example of racial threat theory applied to the current plight of the juvenile justice system is the disproportionate involvement of Black youth at every contact point of the system. On the other hand, Black people, in general, represent a minority of less than 15 percent of the country. Thus, the representation of Black youth in the justice system is unjustifiable through realistic, critical approaches to criminological theory.

Moreover, in this paper, some literature is reviewed that deals with Hirschi's contrasting model of social control, which completely denies that racism, prejudice, bias, and corruption are real. These two theories of social control are purposely compared in this paper to illustrate the historic failure of the justice system to understand the "matrix of power" (Potter 2013). The next section of this paper discusses the literature and research studies conducted to understand the complexities of race, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression, social control, and the juvenile justice system.


Literature Review

Although little research has been conducted regarding DMC, the mandate was analyzed in Leiber et al.'s (2011) study. The purpose of their research was to evaluate the effectiveness of the DMC mandate in decreasing racial disparities in the juvenile justice system. The researchers approached this topic through Durkheim's (1964) consensus theory and conflict (symbolic threat) view in relation to racial stereotyping. The consensus model argues that tradition, law, punishment, and treatment derive from a broad consensus of societal norms (Durkheim 1964). According to this criminological theory, racial disparities in crime are attributed to differential involvement in crime, gender, age, dysfunctional family structures and school misbehavior. (Tracy 2005). The conflict model alleges that minority youth possess feelings of fear and jealousy, which makes them pose a greater threat to society and public safety. Moreover, this studies draws from these theories to understand racial bias and stereotyping by practitioners in the juvenile justice system, particularly at intake (court referrals) and at judicial disposition. The researchers hypothesized that the race of the offender would have no influence on intake or judicial disposition before and after the DMC mandate, and that DMC would reduce decision-making outcomes.

The researchers utilized data from a county in Iowa, which was chosen by Congress in 1989 as one of five model states for the DMC mandate. The researchers reviewed about 5,700 cases ten years before and ten years after the DMC mandate, 60 percent being White offenders and 40 percent being Black offenders. They reviewed how both groups were treated in intake and during judicial disposition. Thus, the researchers found that their hypotheses, grounded in criminological theories that do not explain oppression and discrimination, were unsupported. They found that even after the DMC mandate, cases involving Black youth were referred to court more often than that of White youth, especially when Black youth derived from single-parent families. Moreover, the researchers also found that the effects of race become much more covert and indirect, but they were apparent under a critical lens. The researchers found decision-making was most impacted by race when the there is "no procedure for review;" i.e. when discretion is at its highest.

The researchers acknowledged that the data and sample were pulled from a single jurisdiction, which makes the ability to generalize based on their research questionable. Nonetheless, they urge for more research to be conducted on the effectiveness of the DMC mandate, as it has been in place for over 20 years.

Myers and Raymond (2010) studied the effect of heternormativity on the perspectives of elementary-aged girls. The researchers hypothesized that heteronormativity is not just the result of pubescent transformation; instead, it is intertwined within everyday life and interactions, even as young as five years old. Because there has been a gap in previous research (Renold 2006; Casper and Moore(2009), the authors prioritized the focus of heteronormativity and gender performance to a young population, as opposed to the middle and high school population. The authors examined how heteronormativity governs elementary girls' gender performance and their self-image and images of their peers. The researchers gathered a focus group of 43 girls, ages five through 11 (median age 9-years-old), grades kindergarten through fifth grade. The participants were primarily white, lower middle class girls, which represented the majority of the school's population. The girls were divided into age-appropriate groups, where discussion was moderated by a researcher, but was guided based on desirable topics of conversation. The researchers found that although the questions prepared were regarding the girls' general interests, the conversation constantly shifted to a boy-centered discussion. Most girls bashfully and secretly desired to discuss their crushes or dating climate in their elementary classes, and some were very open about the boy-centered interests and perceptions.

Through the conversations with girls, the researchers found evidence to support their hypothesis. They found that the girls defined themselves through the lens of boys, and their heteronormative ideologies were consistent with their firm beliefs that sexual orientation should match one's gender identity and expression. There were also consistent findings of heteronormativity being an agent of social control. The researchers found that heteronormativity was utilized as a mirror for girls to measure themselves and one another through a heterosexist lens, and through a very chivalrous, traditional ideology of what it means and looks like to be an "appropriate" girl. Finally, they found that this was policed through school policy and through home life standards. Moreover, most of the girls' parents followed very traditional gender roles.

The researchers acknowledged the lack of racial and economic diversity in their focus group. The participants were primarily white, lower-middle class socio-economic status, and the researchers noted that the group interviews were dominated by the white participants. This lack of representation silenced the perspectives of the young, Black and Latina girls in the focus group (which were they only people of color reported in the demographic notes). The researchers did not discuss this as an opportunity for future research.

Chesney-Lind, Morash, and Irwin (2003) conducted a literature review regarding the impact of policing girls' behavior. The researchers investigated how the policing of relational aggression between girls is utilized as a mechanism of social control. Moreover, they examined the implications of treating relational aggression as a criminal justice problem. The researchers explained that [relational] aggression can be a plethora of behaviors: eye-rolling, spreading rumors, breaking others' confidence, criticism of other girls' appearance and personality, sarcasm, and much more. Further, the researchers hypothesized that the relational aggression should not be handled in a punitive manner and it should not be governed under school zero tolerance and behavioral policies.

The researchers critically examined literature from the 1970s until the early 2000s. They found that most research has emphasized the necessity to prevent relational aggression between girls, because of the emotional and psychological damage they believed would be caused. Nonetheless, Chesney-Lind et al. (2007) also found that the research supporting this psychological damage is inconsistent. They found that intervening in relational aggression has adverse effects on girls. Moreover, the researchers gathered that this increases the formal social control over girlhood, femininity, and what it means to be a girl or woman.

Thus, while previous research suggested that relational aggression be prevented with gender-specific programming, Chesney-Lind et al. (2007) found this method inappropriate. Further, the researchers found that policing noncriminal behavior of girls increased their involvement in the criminal justice system, as opposed to preventing criminal behavior or juvenile girls. While juvenile girl crime rates may have increased, self-report studies suggest that violence amongst young, female offenders was decreasing (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice 2012). This supports the researchers' hypothesis that policing relational aggression will increase girls' involvement in the criminal justice system and have adverse effects. Further, extensive research has been conducted to understand policing of girls' noncriminal behavior. Eventually, scholars developed several theories to understand the needs of girls in the system and ways to better deal with girls in the system.

There has been much existing research on the dichotomy between the chivalry hypothesis and the evil woman hypothesis. The next section of the literature explores the many facets of these theories, as they have been tested several times. Moreover, Embry & Lyons (2012) conducted a study that looked to analyze the "evil woman hypothesis." They hypothesized that females who committed crimes diverting furthermost from traditional gender roles would receive harsher sentences. Further, the researchers believed that women would receive more severe sentences than men for sex offenses, as this type of violent, dominant, and powerful behavior is an egregious diversion from traditional gender roles.

The researchers analyzed data collected by the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) in order to examine the relationship between sentence lengths for males and females convicted and sentenced for sex offenses. The data was pulled from January 1994 through December 2004. There was little demographic information, offense type, and sentencing variable. The authors' analysis of previous research focusing on women as sex offenders was inconsistent; most research in this article focused on women as victims. Further, the researchers did not find evidence to support their hypothesis, based on the "evil woman thesis." Instead, based on their data sample of approximately 2,800 cases involving females and approximately 2,800 cases involved males, the researchers found that males were sentenced more harshly than females.

The researchers discussed some limitations to their study. When they controlled for offenders' criminal history, they found that sentencing discretion was misleading and unreliable, because females' and males' criminal histories are gendered, based on the chivalry hypothesis.

Thus, this study found evidence to support the chivalry hypothesis, which previous research has utilized to compare the discrepancies in sentencing of male and female offenders who commit the same crimes. The study did not mention the implications of race, class or sexual orientation in relation to sex offenses and sentencing discrepancies.

Spivak et al. (2014) also dissected the relevance of the chivalry hypothesis and the evil women theory in relation to female juvenile offenders. The researchers had multiple hypotheses to test the two theories: they projected that status offenders would be primarily girls, girls' cases would be more often referred to court, girls would have less guilty verdicts, and girls would more frequently be sentenced to custody as opposed to probation.

The researchers utilized the Oklahoma Office of Justice Affairs, where they examined approximately 3,000 cases of status offenders (controlling for race, age, prior history, type of status offense, and socio-economic status). Status offenses included runaway, truancy, 'school behavior problems,' 'beyond parental control,' and 'in need of supervision.' The authors found that their hypotheses were supported; however, the data was inconclusive in terms of the chivalry thesis and evil woman hypothesis. The results were inconsistent, which is parallel with most existing research testing these theories. It was apparent that in this focus group, status offenders were primarily females (approximately 57 percent).

Thus, the researchers discussed that the limitations of their study are the sample size. Because the sample was gathered just from Oklahoma, it is difficult to utilize this as a general consensus about female status offending. Also, the study controls for race, age, prior history, type of status offense, and socio-economic status. Nonetheless, it is imperative view these intersectional identities when truly understanding the methods of the juvenile justice system. Although many researchers have studied these models, there have been inconsistent results.


Hirschi's (1969) Social Control model

While the current study utilizes Blalock's (1967) theory on racial and minority threat, it is important to critically examine other models of social control. Further, Peguero, Popp, Latimore, Shekarkhar, and Koo (2011) critically examined Hirschi's (1969) classical criminological theory of social control. The researchers looked to examine the validity of social control theory and school misbehavior (juvenile delinquency) in relation to race and ethnicity. The authors asserted that previous criminological theory and research has failed to address race and ethnicity as a focal point; instead, race and ethnicity have historically been a "peripheral" (Peguero et. al 2011) aspect of findings in previous research. Further, the authors hypothesized that the relationship between social control theory and school misbehavior vary by race and ethnicity.

The researchers dissected the data from Educational Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS:2002), which includes a national sample of 10th grade students. Each of the four elements of Hirschi's (1969) social control theory was used: attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. School misbehavior was operationalized as noncriminal behaviors violate school rules. The researchers found that for the overall sample, each element of social control theory is consistent with explaining school misbehavior for white students. On the other hand, for Black, Latin American, and Asian American students, a variation of two of the four elements of social control theory explained school misbehaviors. For example, Black students' misbehavior did not correlate with their rates of self-reported attachment and involvement. The researchers assume that this is most likely due to students of color being discriminated against, and the likelihood of these students to not be connected to social conventions and normality. Thus, the historic exclusion of people of color from social normality may make them feel disconnected from generally White traditions and norms.

The researchers discussed limitations to this study. They understand that their analysis was drawn from data that represents a small age group of participants and a small date range. Also, the researchers acknowledge that, like the criminal justice system, social control theory is naturally gendered, and it especially fails to address intersectional identities. Lastly, the researchers strongly suggest that further research place race and ethnicity as a focal point, rather than an afterthought of data and criminological research.

Wordarski andMapson's (2008) study filled some gaps of previous research that researchers have encouraged more scholars to contend (Embry & Lyons 2012). Wordarski and Mapson (2008) examined the relationship of the four elements of Hirschi's (1969) social control theory and how it varies between Black and White female offenders. They hypothesized that there is a stronger relationship between the four elements of social control theory and crime rates of White female juvenile offenders than that of Black female juvenile offenders. The researchers used data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN), which comprehensively drew data regarding the environment of social behaviors. The PHDCN documented Chicago's social, economic, organizational, political, and cultural structures and significant changes that occurred between 1994 and 2001. The sample of the study was Black and White female juvenile offenders, ages 12 to 15.

The researchers asked several questions that were relevant to each of the four elements of social control theory. For example, to understand the girls' 'involvement' (in relation to social control theory), a question asked was "Was the subject involved in any other after-school program other than extracurricular activity" (231). Further, the term delinquency was operationalized as the commission of any illegal act by an individual under 18.

While the researchers found their hypothesis was not supported, they noted several significant implications to their study. Many of the questionnaires had missing data, as many participants were unwilling to report their criminal histories and prior involvement in any crimes. The researchers also concluded that their sample size was not diverse nor large enough to represent girls in the general juvenile population, as the sample size was 837, and they were primarily Black. Lastly, the researchers suggested that more longitudinal research be conducted in order to obtain consistent results on this matter, specifically as it pertains to race in relation to juvenile delinquency.

As most research has taken a narrow focus on determining extralegal factors in juvenile justice outcomes, Guevara et al. (2006) explored juvenile justice decision making in relation to both race and gender. Specifically, the researchers examined the effect of race on outcomes of juvenile justice and how these outcomes vary by gender. They also reviewed this in relation to the effectiveness of DMC. The researchers hypothesized that white females would receive more lenient judicial disposition than male youth of color .

The researchers collected case file data from two Midwestern counties from 1990 through 1994. The names of the counties were undisclosed, and they were referred to as County A and County B. Of a total population of approximately 200,000 people, the majority of residents were White (69 percent White, 15 percent Black, 15 percent Latino, and 1 percent Native American and Asian American). On the other hand, County B had a smaller population, and it was much less racially diverse (92 percent White, 3 percent Black, 2 percent Latino, 1 percent Native American, and 2 percent Asian American). The researchers randomly chose approximately 1,300 case files for County A and approximately 1,047 case files for County B. Further, the sample was primarily minorities, because out of a total 15,000 cases for County A and a total 6,000 cases for County B, the cases referred to court were primarily minorities.

Thus, the researchers did not find evidence to support their hypothesis. The researchers emphasized the necessity to examine race, gender, and the juvenile justice system-particularly decision making-from an intersectional approach, rather than a narrow lens. This was noted several times throughout the study. A major implication to the study was that the categories of race were divided based on status of White and non-White. These labels devalue the existence of people of color, and it places all people of color in a single category, as opposed to by race and ethnicity.

In order to truly dissect the impact of the juvenile justice system on queer, black girls, it is important to look at all components of the justice system. Goodkind and Miller (2006) examined a corrections facility and their gender-specific treatment methods after the 1992 federal mandate for gender-specific services for girls in the juvenile justice system. The researchers wanted to understand the (positive and negative) effects of an art therapy treatment program, designed specifically for girls in a corrections facility, because the art therapy program was based on gender stereotypes about girls. The authors evaluated the program and found that while the art therapy program has positive effects, the inmates (participants) also understand that it is very gender-stereotypical, and it enforces gender norms as a method of controlling young girls. The researchers used the work of Foucault to understand how gender-specific treatment can be utilized to control the behavior and "appropriateness" of young girls.

The authors did not explicitly make any predictions regarding the art therapy program, in regards to the effects it had on the female inmates; they wanted to study both the positive and negative effects and the perceptions of the female inmates and the staff members. The researchers conducted five focus groups of three to six female inmates. Of the 21 participants, 12 were Black, 7 were White, 1 was biracial, and 1 was Asian American. Women of color accounted for about 60 percent of the participants, and this was representative to the population of the entire institution. They also interviewed 14 administrative staff members-four were people of color, and 9 were women. Most of the participants identified very positive aspects of the art therapy program; however, they felt troubled by the fact that only females participated in the therapy program. The participants sensed that the therapy program was gender-specific, because of the notion that they are more "needy" or more "traumatized" than their male counterparts. It is important to note that the male inmates had access to the art studio, but they did not have to participate in the program with the art therapist.

The conversations were primarily about how the female inmates are expected to act "appropriately," and any deviation from appropriateness resulted in indirect or direct punishment. The inmates were expected to create art pertaining to gendered subjects: relationships, self-esteem, etc. Some inmates expressed their frustrations with the expectations of feminine appropriateness, particularly when as it pertains to creating art. The women expressed their concern for the therapy program and the institution, in general, polices feminine "appropriateness" as a way to control the girls.

The researchers concluded that it is important to question the positive effects of the art therapy program. It must be understood that gender-specific services in the juvenile justice system can "widen the net of social control," as an art therapy program can attempt to make girls conform to society's "gendered expectations of them."

Girls' sexuality has been a taboo topic in the juvenile justice system. Practitioners have historically failed to address sexuality and sexual orientation, and they have contributed to damaging assumptions and policing of "inappropriate" behavior of girls. Pasko (2010) conducted a historical analysis of juvenile justice policing of girls sexual behavior. This was an analysis of over a century of the courts and corrections systems, and the author found the ideology of practitioners has not changed much; nonetheless, the policing has become more indirect and covert through policies and the policing of "inappropriate behavior." Pasko also wanted to investigate how the juvenile justice system has dealt with girls' sexual orientation, specifically lesbian, bisexual, and queer girls.

In addition to the historical analysis, the researcher conducted interviews with juvenile justice professionals: current and former probation officers, and correctional facility administrators (counselors, therapists, and directors of residential facilities). The researcher included that all but five interviewees were female, and all but 13 were White. These practitioners had been in their position from four to 20 years, and they were from seven different (short-term and long-term) facilities. The interviewer noted that a few of the interviewers felt uncomfortable talking about sexuality and sexual orientation in their places of work; therefore, they arranged to meet at locations other than their offices.

The author included dozens of quotes from the interviewees, most of which portrayed signs of policing girls' "appropriateness" and sexual behavior through institutional policies, psychiatric treatment, and their own personal ideologies on girls' sexuality. The primary concern of the interviewees were girls' promiscuity and pregnancy inside and outside of the institutions, and the notion that lesbian behavior was temporary or the result of trauma, and methods of feeling power over others. It is also important to note that most of the girls who were in the institutions had not committed serious offenses, but that had violated conditions of probations, which were often related to sexual behavior-behavior that was not in line with traditional gender roles. Thus, the researcher found that the interviewees were mostly uncomfortable and unknowledgeable about sexual orientation and gender identity issues. To illustrate the climate of the institutions, the author included the following quote from an interviewee: "They are gay on the inside and straight when they get out. I just had a girl who was, 'Oh, I am in love with [girl].' And I said, 'Yeah right, back to your boyfriend you go when you get out. I am sure of it.' This research illustrated the problematic nature of juvenile facilities for queer girls, especially those expressing non-binary genders.

Crenshaw et. al (2015) found that most existing research on youth in the juvenile justice system excludes girls from analyses, assuming that girls are not as at-risk as boys are. The researchers also found that research focusing on race excluded gender (Guevera et al. 2006). Furthermore, the authors developed a report to draw attention to the misunderstood and misrepresented issues of Black girls and other girls of color in the juvenile justice system and the public school system. The report gathers data regarding the effect of school discipline, zero-tolerance (used interchangeably with "push-out") policies, and the almost inescapable pathways to incarceration (school-to-prison pipeline), poverty, and low-wage work. The researchers conducted interviews with high school girls of color from Boston and New York City public schools. While the report includes statistical analysis, it also provides insightful, first person dialogue from the interviews. The premise of this report was to provide a basis of discussion and increase awareness of "gendered consequences" of discipline tactics in schools that increasingly marginalize girls of color-primarily Black girls.

While the current study cannot address all of the researchers' findings, it is imperative to note that all of the issues found in the juvenile justice system as it pertains to Black girls need to be addressed in future research to develop intervention and best practices. Nonetheless, the findings most relevant to the current research are as follows: the authors found that girls felt extremely uncomfortable, unsafe, and discouraged in the school environment. They understood the devaluing effects of push-out policies, as they argued that administrators and teachers prioritized discipline over education. The researchers gathered that traditional gender roles were enforced, as girls were disciplined for behavior deemed as misconduct (that boys were not disciplined for). The authors also note that the school, in general had extreme security measures, such as police presence, metal detectors, etc., which many girls expressed how uncomfortable this made them, discouraging them from attending school.

The authors attributed some limitations to their research to the sample size. Most importantly, the researchers noted that existing data and statistics are difficult to interpret, because of the misrepresentation of race in many databases. Thus, the authors encouraged uniformity in data reporting, because of the lack of availability of consistent measures.

Holsinger and Hodge (2014) explored the climate of juvenile corrections facilities for incarcerated lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender girls. The authors wanted to understand the experiences LGBT girls, because of the disproportionate amount of this population incarcerated. The researchers critically examined the challenges facing the girls and the staff members, and they provide recommendations to better serve LGBT-identified girls in the correctional facilities.

To investigate the needs of LGBT girls, the authors conducted interviews with inmates and staff members. The authors were able to hear the perspectives of three LGB girls in residential facilities, and 21 staff members of these facilities. The results of these interviews show this particular facility illustrates the necessity of LGBT-affirming and protective policies, staff training, and implementation is imperative in order to create safe spaces for this overrepresented population in correctional facilities. The inmates reported that the facilities were uncomfortable for LGBT-identified girls. Moreover, the interviews with staff members portray the lack of knowledge and the dangerous marginalization and implicit discrimination and poor treatment of LGBT-girls. The facility also policed "appropriate" behavior, enforcing traditional gender norms, as well as a poor understanding and acknowledgement of LGBT identities, especially bisexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming youth.

The results of this study are telling and troubling, and illuminate the lack of space for existence of LGBT-identified girls in the justice system. Most of the staff members explained that dealing with LGBT girls in their facilities made their jobs more difficult. The researchers also noted that while there had been some attempted LGBT training done for staff members, the facility needs implementation. The results of this study are also indicative of the majority of findings throughout the literature analysis, which will be elaborated in the discussion of the major findings in the forthcoming sections of this paper.


Discussion

There has been exhaustive research conducted to understand, address, and increase awareness on minority populations in the juvenile justice system. After analyzing the literature, it was concluded that future research must focus on the marginalization of queer black girls as a group of people and how the layers of their identities interact, resulting in intensified oppression and trauma upon entering the juvenile justice system. The major findings were as follows: a) we have little knowledge on the perceptions of youth directly affected, but much knowledge on the lack of understanding of juvenile justice professionals and practitioners, b) most research has a diminishing, narrowed focus on one or two identities, and fail to convincingly address what happens when all of these identities collide in the margins of justice, c) most focus groups conducted reported a lack of diversity in their participants, as one social group was almost always overrepresented, d) the common theme of research on heterosexual and LGTQ girls discusses the enforcing of "appropriateness" and noncriminal, sexual and sexual orientation and gender identity-expressive behavior, and finally, e) the lack of a safe space for queer black girls to exist at every point of juvenile justice involvement.

Existing research has portrayed the power of first-person dialogue through one-on-one and group interviewing. This presentation of data has provided unparalleled insight into the perspectives of the participants in a research study, especially in the social science studying the human experience. While this approach has been utilized in the reviewed literature, most of the focus groups were to understand how equipped juvenile justice practitioners are to respond and address minority issues in corrections. While these interviews were very telling of the climate of current institutions, more youth perspective may appropriately address the issues the youth face. Nevertheless, because of staff testimonials, critical scholars can infer that the type of work that needs to be done to create safe spaces for minority youth.


Revisiting DMC

After reviewing existing research on the effectiveness of DMC and through the analysis of the OJJDP's data reporting techniques, it is clear that the DMC efforts were intended to address the issue of Black, Latino, Asian, and Native American boys' disproportionate confinement. Moreover, these efforts failed to include other "minority" groups, such as LGBTQ, disabled, mentally ill, and poor youth, as well as a major population in the US: girls. The lack of focus on girls in the juvenile justice system has led to a misunderstanding in best practices in dealing with offending girls. As some research has tested the effectiveness of the DMC mandate, as well as the OJJDP's annual reviews of the decades-old program, implicitly excluding girls and other minority groups from the focus of these reviews illustrates the lack of understanding of disproportionate minority contact and responding to the needs of these populations upon intake into juvenile delinquency prevention programs.

More current literature, specifically as it pertains to black girls (a general representation of the focus of the current study), it is apparent that DMC has failed to include queer, black girls in its efforts, because of the reported increase in get-tough policies that have directly affected outcomes for queer, black girls.


Revisiting Minority Threat Theory

Minority threat theory is so important in discussing the findings of this literature. As Blalock (1967) identifies, racial threat theory manifests in the form of overpolicing urban communities of color and mass incarceration. In the same manner, the complete erasure and generalization of the outcomes and experiences of queer black girls exhibits minority threat theory. Much of the literature involving girls' sexuality and gender expression focuses on the "appropriateness" of girls' behavior and the policing of such. In addition, the policing of appropriateness manifests as follows: existing research has found that girls most often enter the system through status offending, conveying the policing of girls' behavior. Data on girls is often generalized to encompass the experiences of all girls; nonetheless, it would be a significant area of study to truly understand how queer, black girls are affected.


Conclusion: Call for intersectional thinking

Potter (2013) cites several intersectional, anti-essentialist, critical feminist criminologists and legal scholars in her article that fervently calls for critical criminologists to dig deeper into the statistical findings to understand the complexities of the human identities. In one section, Potter explains that plague of essentialism by feminist scholars throughout multiple disciplines. She asserts that "there is not a singular, shared experience among all women" (307). She then quotes the declaration of Wing (2003): "women of color are not merely White women plus color…or men of color plus gender. Instead, these identities must be multiplied together to create a holistic One when analyzing the nature of the discrimination against them" (307).

For decades, feminist criminologists have called for the study of intersectionality in criminological theory and practice (Potter 2013; Crenshaw 1989, 1991, 2015); nevertheless, as previously mentioned, this is not being done. Much data analysis has had a narrow focus, which Crenshaw (2015) dissects in her report, Black Girls Matter: Pushed Out, Overpoliced, and Underprotected. Crenshaw alleges that research on race excludes gender, and research on gender excludes race. Moreover, many data analyses have failed to focus on the multi-dimensional human identity and have, instead misrepresented and misinterpreted the needs of queer, black girls in a system that erases their interacting identities.

It is imperative that future research, policy, and practice take on an intersectional approach in order to truly reduce disproportionate minority contact. Otherwise, the oppression applied at the intersections will continue to intensify in the form of violence, brutality, mass incarceration, and erasure. The efforts to include all minority populations may not only contribute to the reduction of the overrepresentation of queer, black youth in the justice system, but it may also create safe spaces for them to decrease the double trauma enhanced by the justice system.



References

Blalock, H. Jr. (1967). Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York: Capricorn Books.

Chesney-Lind, M., Morash, M., Irwin, K. (2003). Policing Girlhood? Relational aggression and violence prevention. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice (5)3.

Crenshaw, K., Ocen, P., Nanda, J. (2015). Black girls matter: pushed out, overpoliced, and underprotected. African American Policy Forum. Columbia Law School Center for Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies.

Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: A black feminist critique of anti-discrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 139-167.

Crenshaw, K. (1991). Mapping the margins: Intersectionality, identity, politics, and violence against women of color. Stanford Law Reivew 43(6) 1241-1299.

Embry, R. ,Lyons, P. M. Jr. (2012). Sex-based sentencing: sentencing discrepancies between male and female sex offenders. Feminist Criminology

Goodkind, S., Miller, D. L. (2006) A widening of the net of social control? "Gender specific" treatment for young women in the U.S. juvenile justice system. Journal of Progressive Human Services, 17(1), 45-70.

Graziano, J. L., Wagner, E. F. (2011). Trauma among lesbians and bisexual girls in the juvenile justice system. Traumatology 17(2) 45-55.

Guevara, L., Herz, D., Spohn, C. (2006). Gender and juvenile justice decision making: what role does race play? Feminist Criminology, 1(4), 258-282.

Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Holsinger, K., Hodge, J. P. (2014). The experiences of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender girls in juvenile justice system. Feminist Criminology, 1-25.

Hunt, J., Moodie-Mills, A. (2012). The unfair criminalization of gay and transgender youth: An overview of the experiences of LGBT youth in the juvenile justice system. Washington D.C.: Center for American Progress.

Leiber, M., Bishop, D., Chamlin, M. B. (2011). Juvenile justice decision-making before and after the implementation of the disproportionate minority contact (DMC) mandate. Justice Quarterly 28(3) 460-492.

Myers, K., Raymond, L. (2010). Elementary school girls and heteronormativity: the girl project. Gender & Society 24(2) 167-188.

Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. (2012). Disproportionate minority contact OJJDP: In Focus.

Peguero, A. A., Popp, A. M., Latimore, L., Shekarkhar, Z., Koo, D. J. (2011). Social control theory and school misbehavior: examining the role of race and ethnicity. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice. 9(3) 259-275.

Pasko, L. (2010). Damaged daughters: the history of girls' sexuality and the juvenile justice system. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 100 (3), 1099-1130.

Potter, H. (2013). Intersectional criminology: Interrogating identity and power in criminological research and theory. Critical Criminology. 21 305-318.

Spivak, A. L., Wagner, B. M., Whitmer, J. M., Charish, C. L. (2014). Gender and status offending: judicial paternalism in juvenile justice processing. Feminist Criminology, 9(3), 224-248.

Wodarski, J., Mapson, A. V. (2008). A differential analysis of criminal behavior among African-American and Caucasion female juvenile delinquents.

Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment 18

(2) 224-239.

Monopoly Capitalism in the 21st Century: Neoliberalism, Monetarism, and the Pervasion of Finance

By Colin Jenkins

The following is the third part of a multi-part series, "Applying Poulantzas," which analyzes the work of Greek Marxist political sociologist, Nicos Poulantzas, and applies it to the unique political and economic structures found under neoliberalism and post-industrial capitalism.


With industrial or "competitive capitalism," it was the "separation and dispossession of the direct producers (the working class) from their means of production" which created this multi-layered, class-based societal structure. [1] Globalization has resulted in a massive shift of national economies. Former industrialized nations are now considered "post-industrial" due to the ability of large production-based manufacturers to move their operations into "cheaper" labor markets. International and regional trade agreements have facilitated this shift. With post-industrial capitalism and the widespread destruction of "productive labor," or labor that produces a tangible product and is thus exploited through the creation of surplus value, it is the complete reliance on a service economy which produces no tangible value that allows for strict control through wage manipulation. The ways in which the working class interacts with the owning class has changed significantly, if only in regards to their physical worlds. In the US, financialization has replaced industrialization as the main economic driver. Alongside this shift, monopoly capitalism has effectively replaced "competitive capitalism," and globalization has ushered in the neoliberal era. These developments have rearranged the superstructure and forced capitalist states to develop new methods in maintaining a societal equilibrium that is constantly being pushed to the brink of unrest at the hands of a capitalist system that breeds concentrations in wealth and power, while simultaneously driving the working-class majority towards a state of functional serfdom.

The emergence of monopoly capitalism was inevitable. "The battle of competition is fought by cheapening of commodities," explained Marx. "The cheapness of commodities depends, ceteris paribus, on the productiveness of labor, and this again on the scale of production. Therefore the larger capitals beat the smaller."[2] Whether we are referring to technology and automation, the relation of finance and the varying degrees of access to capital, or merely the all-encompassing process of "cheapening commodities" which Marx refers to above, it all works in tandem to create a funneling effect whereas capital becomes concentrated. And with this concentration of capital comes the concentration of wealth, which in turn inevitably breeds concentrations of other forms of power, i.e. political. In this sense, what many have come to refer to as "corporatism" is more correctly viewed as a mature stage of capitalism, rather than a differentiation from capitalism. The "marriage of corporation and state" that Benito Mussolini once referred to is merely a byproduct of capitalist advancement - the natural consequence of concentrated interests relying on the state apparatus to both facilitate its progression and protect its assets.

The consequent development of financialization could also be seen as an inevitable late stage of capitalism. As Paul Sweezy explains, while paraphrasing Marx, "Further, the credit system which 'begins as a modest helper of accumulation' soon 'becomes a new and formidable weapon in the competition in the competitive struggle, and finally it transforms itself into an immense social mechanism for the centralization of capitals.'"[3]

In the US, the creation of the Federal Reserve and the use of government-approved, macroeconomic policy-making has been a crucial tool in maintaining the equilibrium that is a central theme of Poulantzas' work. It has, in a sense, represented a Captain's wheel on a chaotic ship rolling over rough seas. The Keynesian model that dominated the American landscape from the late-1930s until the late-1970s relied on fiscal policy to supplement private sector instability, mainly by stimulating and supplementing this sector through infusions of money.

A shift to monetarism in the late-1970s paralleled the arrival of the neoliberal era, an intensification of privatization, and deregulation. While the all-encompassing policy-direction found under neoliberalism extended into the geopolitical realm to include "free trade" agreements and far-reaching international policies directed by the IMF and World Bank, it was this newfound reliance on monetary policy that created more ground between the standard operations of capitalist economy and the development of a " corporate-fascistic model." In other words, it allowed for greater returns on corporate profit in spite of wage stagnation, an overall degeneration of employment, increased poverty, and a consequent decline in expendable (consumer) income from within the working class. With regards to the equilibrium, direct manipulation of the money supply has allowed for a tightly-controlled mechanism that safeguards this extension and intensification of systemic inequities. Neoliberal economist Milton Friedman echoed the call for monetarism through his analysis of the Great Depression:

"The Fed was largely responsible for converting what might have been a garden-variety recession, although perhaps a fairly severe one, into a major catastrophe. Instead of using its powers to offset the depression, it presided over a decline in the quantity of money by one-third from 1929 to 1933 ... Far from the depression being a failure of the free-enterprise system; it was a tragic failure of government." [4]

Friedman's assessment wasn't critical of the existence of the Fed, or even of the Fed's ability to manipulate the money supply, but rather quite the opposite; it was critical of the Fed's failure to increase the money supply in times of crisis. In this sense, Monetarists did not oppose the Keynesian approach of intervention, but rather the nature of that intervention -fiscal policy (government spending) versus monetary policy (Quantity Theory of Money). The former provides money to the government, which in turn creates public programs and/or increases public spending that directly affects the population. The latter provides money to the financial industry and/or government, which in turn provides money to "power players" (corporate interests, big business, bank bailouts, etc...) in the hopes that such money will make its way through the population, hence "trickle down." Modern monetarism (Post-2008 financial crisis) has intensified through multiple bouts of QE (Quantitative Easing), which has reaped tremendous growth for the financial industry and big business (see the Dow Jones Industrial Average) while having no positive effect on the population, which continues to struggle through stagnation, chronic unemployment, and impoverishment.

It is no surprise that financialization found a perfect bedfellow in neoliberalism . "The neo-liberal bias towards de-regulation, which widened the space for financialization, was more often linked to an institutional fix that relied (and still relies) on 'unusual deals with political authority', predatory capitalism, and reckless speculation - all of which have fuelled the global financial crisis," explains Bob Jessop. "As the limits to 'more market, less state' emerged, there was growing resort to flanking and supporting measures to keep the neo-liberal show on the road. This was reflected in the discourse and policies of the ' Third Way ', which maintained the course of neo-liberalization in new circumstances, and is linked to the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (witness its eruption under 'New Labour' in Britain as well as the Bush Administration in the USA)." [5]

While conducted and carried out on different spheres, and for different reasons, financialization and expansionary monetary policy have emerged in parallel to one another. Because of this, they have maintained a loose relationship in the era of neoliberalism, with one (financialization) creating massive rifts and chaotic patterns of accumulation, and the other (monetary policy) attempting to manage the aftermath of this chaos. This has added yet another element to what Poulantzas saw as the inevitable rise of the authoritarian nature of State Monopoly Capitalism (SMC), whereas the capitalist state is forced to become more and more involved in maintaining equilibrium. In the economic realm, this amounts to monetary policy; in the political realm, this amounts to steadying the superstructure (balancing austerity measures with the welfare state); and in the social realm, this amounts to increased militarization of domestic police forces and a gradual erosion of civil liberties, features that become necessary when society's equilibrium is pushed toward a breaking point (civil unrest).

In the era of finance-dominated accumulation, and especially following periodic, systemic crises, governments have extended their reach to deal with unprecedented volatility. This was seen following the financial crisis of 2008-09, as capitalist states the world over scrambled to right their ships which had been steered into a perfect storm of financialized accumulation (many guided by illegal schemes; see the mortgage-backed securities scandal). Since then, it has become commonplace for governments, through monetary policy, to "intervene periodically to underwrite the solvency of banks, to provide extraordinary liquidity and to guarantee the deposits of the public with banks." [6] This is not to suggest that government intervention in the capitalist system is a new phenomenon; only that its methods have changed as capitalism has changed. Poulantzas explains:

"In the competitive capitalist stage, the capitalist state (the liberal state) always played an economic role; the image of the liberal state being simply the gendarme or night watchman of a capitalism that 'worked by itself' is a complete myth… From taxation through to factory legislation, from customs duties to the construction of economic infrastructure such as railways, the liberal state always performed significant economic functions..." [7]

With monopoly capitalism and the onset of financialization, the tendency toward extreme developments in both accumulations of the dominant classes and dispossession of the dominated classes requires higher degrees of state intervention. These interventions inevitably extend far beyond the economic base. Poulantzas contrasts this development with its former stage of 'competitive capitalism':

"If it is possible to speak of a specific non-intervention of this state into the economy, this is only in order to contrast it with the role of the state in the stage of monopoly capitalism, the 'interventionist state' which Lenin already had in mind in his analysis of imperialism. The difference between this and the state of competitive capitalism is not, as we shall see, a mere quantitative one. In the stage of monopoly capitalism, the role of the state in its decisive intervention into the economy is not restricted essentially to the reproduction of what Engels termed the 'general conditions' of the production of surplus-value; the state is also involved in the actual process of the extended reproduction of capital as a social relation." [8]

The emergence of expansionary monetary policy, most notably in the US Federal Reserve's use of Quantitative Easing, has become the go-to method of addressing the chaotic effects of financialization. This has become a necessary component for embedded capitalist interests that have taken advantage of a system that privatizes gains and publicizes losses. For the working classes, the reliance on consumer credit for not only luxury goods but necessities has illustrated how financialization has penetrated everyday life. To the former industrialized working classes (like that in the US), this is due to the emergence of both globalization and neoliberalism, which "favour exchange- over use-value" and "treat workers as disposable and substitutable factors of production," and "the wage (including the social wage) as a cost of (international) production." [9]

The permeation of this trifecta (Globalization, Neoliberalism, and Financialization) is not lost on the working classes. "Neoliberalism tends to promote financialization, both as a strategic objective and as an inevitable outcome," Jessop writes. "As this process expands and penetrates deeper into the social and natural world, it transforms the micro-, meso- and macro-dynamics of capitalist economies." [10] For the economic base and its power players, the state's use of expansionary monetary policy becomes a lifeboat, providing eternal life to corporate accumulation. For the working-class majority, whose existence is more and more precarious due to declining wages, consumer credit (often predatory) becomes a necessity to satisfy basic needs. Jessop concludes:

"The primary aspect of the wage is its treatment as a cost of (global) production rather than as a source of (domestic) demand; this is linked to re-commodification of social welfare in housing, pensions, higher education, health insurance, and so on. This leads to growing flexibility of wage labour (especially increasing precarization), downward pressure on wages and working conditions, and cuts in the residual social wage. A further result is the financialization of everyday life as the labour force turns to credit (and usury) to maintain its standard of living and to provide for its daily, life-course, and intergenerational reproduction. Combined with the increased returns to profit-producing and interest-bearing capital, this also intensifies income and wealth inequalities in the economies subject to finance-dominated accumulation, which now match or exceed their levels in just before the 1929 Crash (Elsner 2012; Saez 2013)." [11]

Monopoly capitalism in the 21st century has become ever more reliant on capitalist states to serve as facilitators, protectors, and a damage control mechanism. Former industrialized nations have shifted the remnants of "competitive capitalism" to global labor markets (which are also state-supplemented) and replaced them with service-sector economies based in finance schemes that seek to reproduce "fictitious capital" at alarming rates. Capitalist states, in adjusting to this shift, have embraced expansionary monetary policy as a means to address the ensuing chaos by supplementing and protecting financial institutions (the dominant classes in the age of neoliberalism/financialization). Will the volatility created by this shift finally bring capitalism to its breaking point? Will the prospect of automation force governments to develop radically new welfare states that include basic income guarantees? Will highly-exploited, global labor markets radicalize and collectivize, and bring the neoliberal era to its knees? The future brings many questions.



Notes

[1] Poulantzas. Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. Verso, 1978, pp. 97-98.
[2] Marx, Karl. Capital, Volume 3. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1894.
[3] Sweezy, Paul M. "Monopoly Capital." Monthly Review, Volume 56, Issue 5. October 2004.
[4] Friedman, Milton & Friedman, Rose. Two Lucky People: Memoirs, University of Chicago Press, 1998.
[5] 'Finance-dominated accumulation and post-democratic capitalism', in S. Fadda and P. Tridico, eds, Institutions and Economic Development after the Financial Crisis, London: Routledge, 83-105, 2013.
[6] Lapavitsas, C. (2013) Profiting without Producing: How Finance Exploits All, London: Verso.
[7] 
Classes in Contemporary Capitalism, p. 100.
[8] Ibid. p. 100.
[9] Bob Jessop. (April 1, 2014) "Finance-Dominated Accumulation and Post-Democratic Capitalism."
http://bobjessop.org/2014/04/01/finance-dominated-accumulation-and-post-democratic-capitalism/
[10] Jessop, 2014.
[11] Jessop, 2014.


Works Cited

Elsner, W. (2012) 'Financial capitalism - at odds with democracy: The trap of an "impossible" profit rate', Real-World Economics Review, 62: 132-159. http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/issue62/Elsner62.pdf

Saez, E. (2013) 'Striking it richer: The evolution of top incomes in the United States (Updated with 2011 estimates)', at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/.

Eternal Fascism and the Southern Ideology

By Jeremy Brunger

Umberto Eco's 1995 essay "Ur-Fascism" informally outlines the most striking qualities of fascistic theory and practice. It remains one of the most popular tool-kits for intellectuals in discovering where the barbarity of fascism might once again materialize, for Eco was convinced fascism did not die at the end of the second World War. If there is an "eternal fascism" inherent to Western life, the critical observer must ask: in which groups is it most fostered? Is it limited to bald-headed neo-Nazis manufacturing methamphetamine by moonlight, the poor white lumpenproletariat of godforsaken boondocks, the aged reactionaries of the Mediterranean and the Rhine? To the chagrin of sanity, the evidence suggests otherwise: one can trace the fascist tone to one of the most politically active regions of the United States. The American South features in abundance all the tendencies of proto-fascism, from its enduring historical disadvantage following Reconstruction, reverence for the redemptive firearm and the punitive crucifix, hegemonic tendencies in matters of race and religion, and perhaps most importantly, the affinity for hero-worship. If fascism finds its formal renaissance anywhere in the twenty-first century, it will be in the Southern Ideology, which still mutters vaguely the threat that "the South will rise again," confuses faith in the God of Abraham for the will to power over man, and sees fit to solve its social ills with paranoid gun-toting, capitalist republicanism, and social excommunication rather than the humane critical understanding of the Other.

*

To begin this analysis of the Southern Ideology, it is necessary to point out that "ideology" is not identical with "culture." Culture is a metaphor quite aptly likened to the situation of a bacterium being cultured in a petri dish; the bacterium can sense nothing other than that substance in which it is being grown, and as such, does not recognize it as anything but a natural, eternal verity. To humanize the metaphor, consider ideology to be the words written on the walls of the petri dish. Then consider these words are inscribed in culture only by those who hold power. As such, all Southerners are not fascists-many, perhaps most, are well-distanced from this theory. The ideology is fostered by, and fosters, those already in power, those not citizens by default but rather citizens by assertion.

*

Eco's first tenet of "eternal fascism" has it that

The first feature of Ur-Fascism is the cult of tradition. Traditionalism is of course much older than fascism. Not only was it typical of counter-revolutionary Catholic thought after the French revolution, but it was born in the late Hellenistic era, as a reaction to classical Greek rationalism... This new culture had to be syncretistic. Syncretism is not only, as the dictionary says, 'the combination of different forms of belief or practice;' such a combination must tolerate contradictions. Each of the original messages contains a silver of wisdom, and whenever they seem to say different or incompatible things it is only because all are alluding, allegorically, to the same primeval truth. As a consequence, there can be no advancement of learning. Truth has been already spelled out once and for all, and we can only keep interpreting its obscure message.

Such a description no doubt boggles the mind of any native Southerner. Traditionalist conservatism is the dominant political form from Florida to the majority of Appalachia to Tex-Arkana. The reigning political agenda, stemming from the mid-century Republican platform onto the neoconservative administration of former President Bush, sees modernism as something to be defended against, as though the progressive agenda were intimately tied to some imaginary Red Plot. Since the 2000s, the Southern peculiarity has been nationalized. Any politician antagonizing traditional values will not be elected to office; nor will any non-Christian politician survive the culture of criticism pertaining to his religion. Tradition is seen as possessing more utility than mere historical value, while progressiveness and modernism are seen as dangerous attempts to re-instate state socialism. In the familial sphere, the traditional patriarch-submissive wife-obedient children triad still stands dominant, while non-traditional families, like homosexual or poly-amorous families, are seen as undesirable, confused, and confusing. Home ownership is viewed as a key to political participation, with proletarian and other non-propertied classes being relegated to the ideological back-burner. There is no vivid unionization movement, nor political support for the welfare state. In fact, attacking the foundations of the welfare state appears to be one of conservativism's chief weapons in his political arsenal-macroeconomics of the flunking polity is still seen as a microeconomic moral infirmity. All of these developments are seen-once again-as outgrowths of communist subversion dating from the mid-century, or as otherwise foreign intrusions into the classic Southern community. Of course, such forays into the 1950's Golden Age are based on mythological assumptions of communitarian solidarity rather than statistical analysis of real historical social relations, when broken families, impoverished districts, and moral panics defined social life as much in the past as they do in the present. Romantic histories-the gallant South, the mystical Pacific-conceal and apologize for peasant suffering.

The most obvious symptom of this ideological syncretism is the marriage of biblical Christianity and politico-economic conservatism. Especially within the Fundamentalist strain, biblical morality posits that poverty is less a moral problem than a problem in distributive justice; yet the conservative critique of poverty lays its blame on sinful individuals. That the poor ought to be supported by the wealthy does not pass muster in the conservative worldview, no matter how much it thinks itself biblically grounded. Both the communism of the early Christians and the socialism of nineteenth-century Christianity are cast aside in pursuing Christian capitalism (a distinctly twentieth-century phenomenon). These contradictions stand to Eco's reason-truths are not dialectical and do not come from debate, but rather are found in sola scriptura biblical exegesis of a characteristically conservative pattern. It does not matter that state welfare programs are categorically more effective than church services in alleviating local working-class poverty: it only matters, for the Southern conservative, that state intervention is destructive by definition. Compelling comparisons might be made of historical feudal social relations to the Third Estate and the modern status of poverty in the South, given that nobility and the clerical class-when not engaged in class warfare-saw themselves as sole paternal caregivers to the poor. Limited-government ideologies proliferate, insisting the government is not designed to care for the well-being of its people in the aggregate, but rather to bolster and maintain the property relations of its upper class and maintain their singular dominance in the most impoverished region of the country: the sprawling hills and mountains of the South.

Eco continues his critique, saying that

Traditionalism implies the rejection of modernism. Both Fascists and Nazis worshiped technology, while traditionalist thinkers usually reject it as a negation of traditional spiritual values. However, even though Nazism was proud of its industrial achievements, its praise of modernism was only the surface of an ideology based upon Blood and Earth (Blut und Boden). The rejection of the modern world was disguised as a rebuttal of the capitalistic way of life, but it mainly concerned the rejection of the Spirit of 1789 (and of 1776, of course). The Enlightenment, the Age of Reason, is seen as the beginning of modern depravity. In this sense Ur-Fascism can be defined as irrationalism.

While there is not a proper anti-technology movement in the South per se, there is a pervasive climate of anti-intellectualism and anti-scientism, as foremost expressed in the popular disagreement with the neo-Darwinian synthesis. In fact, Tennessee is home to the most aggressive anti-evolution movement of the twentieth century, while Texas is home to the most vocal opponents of the theory of environmental decline as a result of industrial activity. Darwinian-derived evolution, environmental concern, and the more worrying insights of sociology are all seen as species of false consciousness-with some even going so far as to label environmentalism a Marxist invention. The Southern Ideology forgets that, once upon a time, the parsons and the preachers were the only men of letters to be found. Beyond this, the traditionalist identification of self with land is a strong cultural current throughout the rural areas of the region, along with its inevitable accompaniment of xenophobic racism. The homeland institution wars with the anonymous drifters of the city-culture. Given that historical fascism did not, in practice, limit the excesses of capitalism, but merely aimed its roaring engine to the benefit of the state, Eco's position that fascism was not co-incident with capitalism is faulty. Nevertheless, Southern republicanism allies itself wherever possible with high capital, even if it is to the detriment of its population. From its tourist towns to its metropolises, Southern governments support capitalism enthusiastically-usually in the form of importing business for the exploitation of its cheap, half-educated labor force. The irrational practices of racism, patriarchal social relations, and misinterpreted biblical religion all link the American South to Eco's understanding of eternal fascism: just consider the Rebel Flag, a militant relic of the Civil War and reified symbol of slave republicanism, and then consider the tilted swastika of the Germano-fascist regime. The only difference is one can still see the Rebel Flag touted through township and city, pasted on university dorm walls and tattooed on shoulder blades, flashing the ancient petulance in the public eye. The Southern proletarians who exhibit this rebellion live in cramped living quarters even while supporting their betters; in mistaking the cause of the misery in multicultural initiatives and liberal movements toward equality, the poorest in the region bolster the social positions of their real oppressors and universalize squalor among their young in a nationalist delusion.

In discussing fascistic disdain for the intellectual in society, Eco writes

Irrationalism also depends on the cult of action for action's sake. Action being beautiful in itself, it must be taken before, or without, any previous reflection. Thinking is a form of emasculation. Therefore culture is suspect insofar as it is identified with critical attitudes. Distrust of the intellectual world has always been a symptom of Ur-Fascism, from Goering's alleged statement ('When I hear talk of culture I reach for my gun') to the frequent use of such expressions as 'degenerate intellectuals,' 'eggheads,' 'effete snobs,' 'universities are a nest of reds.' The official Fascist intellectuals were mainly engaged in attacking modern culture and the liberal intelligentsia for having betrayed traditional values.

There is, perhaps, no better characterization of Southern culture than Eco's description of fascism here. Southern culture is largely heteronormative, and given that it has only recently industrialized since the 1970's, it is still largely based on reproducing social relations based on athletics rather than intellect. In an economy of pure muscle, this survival might be understood as once having value; but in an Information Age economy that values thought-work over grunt-work, it has little practical utility beyond willing wage-slavery. Right-wing media is popular in the South, with its usual targets of the "liberal intelligentsia," the secular university, racial minorities, and the specter of communism issuing from all of the above. Masculinity is viewed as an end in itself, with all deviations therefrom being devalued or derided. Military culture, the chief characteristic of fascist social life, is prevalent-given that much of America's standing army comes from the South, due in part to there being little opportunity for lower-middle class youth to establish a future, this is not surprising. Post-WWI German fascism came to prominence after Germany began to feel itself existentially and economically threatened after the Treaty of Versailles ruined its national vitality. Given that the South remains an economic under-achiever in the domestic arena, and that culturally it is seen as subordinate to the general Northern zeitgeist (Southern English is not standard, but is rather a basilect which hopeful emigrants quickly learn to forget), it is not surprising that, in their discourses, Southern ideologues and fascist ideologues sound startlingly similar in their aims and rhetoric. Social science dare not enter.

Eco, discussing the value of critical theory, continues:

No syncretistic faith can withstand analytical criticism. The critical spirit makes distinctions, and to distinguish is a sign of modernism. In modern culture the scientific community praises disagreement as a way to improve knowledge. For Ur-Fascism, disagreement is treason.

What better description of fundamentalist religion and socially-embedded opposition to scientific inquiry? In questioning the reigning dogmas of capitalist competition, anti-welfare government, and the nuclear family, the Southern activist is instantly marginalized or linked to the boogeyman of socialism. In the sphere of political theory, criticizing the marriage of conservatism and an essentially socialistic religion-a contradiction in terms-is sure to paint the critic as an uninformed, ahistorical dissenter. But analyzing the surface of Southern culture's conservatism by relating to its rather proletarian past reveals it to be what it is: a logical paradox unsupportable by thinking people. The philosophic tendency subordinates to the religious tendency, if not for intellectual value, then for mere social utility-Southern Christianity is a shibboleth, and as such, an entryway into power that defies the very foundations of the faith it cynically uses. The original Christians were outcasts from Roman hegemony, poor and diseased, marginal and pathetic. They were mytho-revolutionaries, not conservatives; at any rate, the early Church was awash in heresy and doctrinal battles, not unified in theoria. In the South, the only "liberation theology" extant is a variation on right-wing anarchism, while the general religion preaches the long-outdated theme of obedience. As roving bands of cash-poor Christians addicted to the fetishism of authority flock and flit from one city to the next hoping for a better turn of fate, they are categorically denied by Christians who pay their property taxes, sent to live in downtown wastelands and fret the police whose patience grows as dim as their hope for this life. Religion disintegrates when actually confronted with the moral dilemmas for which it was designed. Even the bigger cities have the small-town feel of isolation, the distinct impression their denizens have not yet left the outer bounds, and catercorner to every liquor store there are two churches which deliver much the same.

Besides, disagreement is a sign of diversity. Ur-Fascism grows up and seeks for consensus by exploiting and exacerbating the natural fear of difference. The first appeal of a fascist or prematurely fascist movement is an appeal against the intruders. Thus Ur-Fascism is racist by definition.

The Southern syncretism is globally renowned for its pathological racism. Nineteenth-century theories of racialism are still common currency in the South, as is the lay understanding of racial essentialism. Families still see fit to bar their young from interracial dating and marriage, and whiteness, as a social fact, is still viewed as a supreme value. The typical habit of denouncing foreign influences, especially with immigrant Mexican labor, melds comfortably with the denunciation of models of sexual difference. Homosexuality is mistaken for an incarnation of "Hollywood Values" rather than a natural human phenomenon and is beaten or prayed away. Diversity and the Rawlsian difference principle, in general, are decried as liberal intrusions into a primordial white capitalist paradise founded not in actual history but in the pseudo-historical imagination. Even as municipal services decline in breadth and quality, Southerners worry more of an incoming horde of Babel, a Brown Plague come to undo their immemorial caste system and expand their multicultural nightmare. Race-horror is more prevalent than the horror of war, which is why they support the second by decrying the first. In exclaiming the virtues of First World aristocratic philosophy, Southern thought closes in on itself, and ignores how much of the region resembles the underdeveloped world when exposed to realist scrutiny unsympathetic to the romance of white property.

The fascist impulse owes its prevalence to Eco's next observation:

Ur-Fascism derives from individual or social frustration. That is why one of the most typical features of the historical fascism was the appeal to a frustrated middle class, a class suffering from an economic crisis or feelings of political humiliation, and frightened by the pressure of lower social groups. In our time, when the old "proletarians" are becoming petty bourgeois (and the lumpen are largely excluded from the political scene), the fascism of tomorrow will find its audience in this new majority.

In Germany and Italy, fascism was specifically a lower-middle class development. Fundamentalist Christianity and institutional racism do not find much expression in the Southern lower class, which tends to have more divergent religious views and more tolerant views on interracial marriage; rather, the Southern parallels to fascism find their most vocal expressions in its middle class. Especially since the financial crisis of 2007-08, the Southern middle class has returned to a thorough-going religious atmosphere centering on the family and private property, racial rhetoric is abundant even now as President Obama nears the end of his second term in office, and the decrying of socialistic policies (which are actually centrist policies according to the global political spectrum) rallies in the popular domain. Rather than recognizing that middle-class precarity depends on corporate malpractice and right-wing government, the Southern middle class understands only that it is endangered, and so sees fit to vent its worries on its classic targets: those who are different. Economic difficulties are due to the black president's corruption, not an essentially unstable national-economic way of life, just as threats to culture are due to outside influences rather than internal contradictions. To study these contradictions is to incite the charge of red-baited communism, even as accusers forget who first coined the term of their beloved capitalism. Dr. Martin Luther King was murdered in the same state that gave birth to the Klan for preaching that both the white man and the black man were exploited in common. Even in the university towns, ten-story tall crucifixes dot Alpine highways in robust mimesis of the theocratic pretension as symbols wholly antithetical to King's message: they signify authority, not inquiry.

In an era of social disruption and economic change-when "all that is solid melts into air"-the eternal fascism finds its home. Eco writes

To people who feel deprived of a clear social identity, Ur-Fascism says that their only privilege is the most common one, to be born in the same country. This is the origin of nationalism. Besides, the only ones who can provide an identity to the nation are its enemies. Thus at the root of the Ur-Fascist psychology there is the obsession with a plot, possibly an international one. The followers must feel besieged. The easiest way to solve the plot is the appeal to xenophobia. But the plot must also come from the inside: Jews are usually the best target because they have the advantage of being at the same time inside and outside. In the U.S., a prominent instance of the plot obsession is to be found in Pat Robertson's The New World Order, but, as we have recently seen, there are many others.

America is no longer a white, protestant, wealthy country; those who do fall into this category, having their social identity threatened by a changing cultural climate, seek more and more intensive ideologies with which to understand the world. The politics of the American South are, still, overwhelmingly white and protestant, but many of its subjects are not. The misattribution of this change to recent developments rather than diversifying historical currents-in the Melting Pot era, the whiteness of Irish immigrants was not yet an established social fact, but became one over time-reveals that historical ignorance is one of the many vices of dominant Southern culture. The vague idea that some obscure subculture is constantly threatening American virtues (ISIS, crypto-Marxist senators, "the Left Coasts") routinely crops up in Southern discourse, even as poverty and under-employment grows within the Southern states due to its inherent infrastructural and social deficits. Instead of Jews, Southern discourse focuses on the plots of racial, sexual, and religious minorities from nearby and abroad. In offloading responsibility to outlanders, the Southern status quo is maintained in all its contradictions.

The Southern Ideology expresses the contradiction between its opponents, its leaders, and the people who subscribe to it:

The followers must feel humiliated by the ostentatious wealth and force of their enemies. When I was a boy I was taught to think of Englishmen as the five-meal people. They ate more frequently than the poor but sober Italians. Jews are rich and help each other through a secret web of mutual assistance. However, the followers must be convinced that they can overwhelm the enemies. Thus, by a continuous shifting of rhetorical focus, the enemies are at the same time too strong and too weak. Fascist governments are condemned to lose wars because they are constitutionally incapable of objectively evaluating the force of the enemy.

Southern discourse is pro-capitalist, but its adherents are more often than not in poverty themselves. Rather than distrusting their better-off superiors, however, the Southern conservative poor prefer to distrust East Coast liberals as symbols of wealth-a perversion of what wealth is for, the establishment of a family, or for wealth stolen through socialistic redistribution. The rhetoric of "Wall Street versus Main Street" is a populist example of this (Tea Party on the right, Occupy on the left), but the emphasis tends to lie on the idea that Main Street represents a social minority, when in fact it does not. Most Americans either live or aspire to live middle-class lifestyles, and most government attention is paid to this group, with the rest looking out for the interests of high capital and the limited interests of the working poor. Imagining that they are persecuted lends their ideology credence, given the current zeitgeist of identity politics (replacing proletarians and women with white Christian patriarchs in a muddled, illogical algebra of oppression); but they are, in reality, no more persecuted than normal people ever have been. Actual minorities have vocal defense groups defending their interests against normative onslaughts, and sensing that their own group lacks this special defense, the white Southern middle class invents one for the sickly purpose of special pleading. The idea that there is a cultural war against their lifestyle is preposterous, but leading media outlets, like Fox News, continue to insist that the typical American way of life is under threat from non-white queer Bolsheviki. Of course, the only threat to this lifestyle is the capitalist economic model it itself supports, and the rudderless antinomies the Southern Ideology preserves.

In fact, Southern political culture is rather Hobbesian in the most alarming sense of the word:

For Ur-Fascism there is no struggle for life but, rather, life is lived for struggle. Thus pacifism is trafficking with the enemy. It is bad because life is permanent warfare. This, however, brings about an Armageddon complex. Since enemies have to be defeated, there must be a final battle, after which the movement will have control of the world. But such a "final solution" implies a further era of peace, a Golden Age, which contradicts the principle of permanent war. No fascist leader has ever succeeded in solving this predicament.

In "right-to-work" states, employment is seen as a privilege rather than a right or a mere path to survival, and welfare assistance is seen as a deep taboo suggesting moral incompetence. The South overwhelmingly supported the Iraq War-elements of racism and Islamophobia aside-in the most jingoistic manner possible. Neoconservative policy has as its direct and stated aim that "democracy," an abstraction, ought to be violently spread throughout the whole world. This teleological end to history, once seen in the Jacobinite-Hegelian view of the French Revolution, finds its next expression in the economic policies of globalization, by which Washingtonian economic models are assumed to work in disparate economies the world over. In short, America assumes it holds the key to global problems, and sets itself up to manage them. The most vocal applause for these globalist efforts resound from the militaristic South which, despite its native diversity, cannot imagine a world that operates according to social laws different than its own. Southern thought-leaders preach that leftism is a conspiracy theory even as they scour the doctrines of the holy book of the West's very first conspiracy theory.

In any society with vast economic divides between rich and poor, Eco suggests the eternal fascism can erupt once again in elitist terms that deride elitism:

Elitism is a typical aspect of any reactionary ideology, insofar as it is fundamentally aristocratic, and aristocratic and militaristic elitism cruelly implies contempt for the weak. Ur-Fascism can only advocate a popular elitism. Every citizen belongs to the best people of the world, the members of the party are the best among the citizens, every citizen can (or ought to) become a member of the party. But there cannot be patricians without plebeians. In fact, the Leader, knowing that his power was not delegated to him democratically but was conquered by force, also knows that his force is based upon the weakness of the masses; they are so weak as to need and deserve a ruler. Since the group is hierarchically organized (according to a military model), every subordinate leader despises his own underlings, and each of them despises his inferiors. This reinforces the sense of mass elitism.

The Southern elite are, of course, the white propertied class that views all others as inferior and subordinate-hardly worth the political time, in fact. Even where this fails, Southerners take up the mantle of nationalism: "America is the best country in the world." It isn't the best country in the world by any statistical analysis, but such mythologies are common to fascistic ideologies. When not serving in the military, they serve in intensive capitalist industries (which themselves feature militaristic labor hierarchies) that bolster their notions that everyone has a place in society. In this respect the tone turns to Calvinism, and the moral realism of poverty, for those who fail to succeed in the capitalist environment, comes to the ascendant. No scientific critique of economic failure is allowed. Only criticism of moral failure is sanctioned-and thus to be poor is to become un-American. The mid-level employee, glad to have a job, detests the entry-level employee, as though the mid-level were any less an existential penalty. Below them all exist the unemployed and under-employed who rarely even make blips on the political radar except to remind the wealthy there are barbarians concerned only with use-value circling the borders.

Eco presses on one of his most salient points about everyday heroism next:

In such a perspective everybody is educated to become a hero. In every mythology the hero is an exceptional being, but in Ur-Fascist ideology, heroism is the norm. This cult of heroism is strictly linked with the cult of death. It is not by chance that a motto of the Falangists was Viva la Muerte (in English it should be translated as "Long Live Death!"). In non-fascist societies, the lay public is told that death is unpleasant but must be faced with dignity; believers are told that it is the painful way to reach a supernatural happiness. By contrast, the Ur-Fascist hero craves heroic death, advertised as the best reward for a heroic life. The Ur-Fascist hero is impatient to die. In his impatience, he more frequently sends other people to death.

American popular culture is unequivocally heroic. The most successful films in its canon feature violent farces in which the white male hero vanquishes the egghead evil genius, or the syndicalist Soviet forces, or the alien (cargo-cultish immigrant) machinations of foreign powers. The hero looks like the typical viewer of these films: white males who want to be heroes. Since the world is not a fantasy, however, these children later grow up to think of the world in embattled terms of nation and enemy, Manichean reckonings of good and evil, gun-violence and double-standard law and order. The educational system grades students according to a hierarchical ability to integrate into capitalism, graduating top-ten heroes directly into the workforce and the rest into the welfare offices. Beyond education lies the whole sports industry-football has a monolithic presence in the South, with its university teams commanding higher budgets than entire academic departments combined-in which a few gladiators, selected from among the hoi polloi, are paraded in shows of athletic feat to audiences struggling at home for the means of subsistence. The collective struggle for existence becomes the individual struggle for existence against others-who this is, it matters not, so long as there are heroes and enemies to be fought. Behind all this lies a well-spring of nihilism that disallows the everyman to merely exist and be comfortable. The American way ensures that one is always fighting, whether people or their causes, oneself or some outsider figure dreamed up in the paranoid imagination of an Old Testament demagogue. This is a general product of the American monoculture, but it finds more grizzly embodiment in the South: anti-muslim sentiment mingles with anti-secular sentiments as some twin conspiracy from beyond the national borders in a nation that was, according to the conservative myth, founded on Christo-propertarian values. Once the culture war dissipates, the military absorbs and recruits them all: long live death.

Next, Eco focuses on the culture of uber-masculinity:

Since both permanent war and heroism are difficult games to play, the Ur-Fascist transfers his will to power to sexual matters. This is the origin of machismo (which implies both disdain for women and intolerance and condemnation of nonstandard sexual habits, from chastity to homosexuality). Since even sex is a difficult game to play, the Ur-Fascist hero tends to play with weapons - doing so becomes an ersatz phallic exercise.

Southern patriarchy is the norm, with non-patriarchal families being relegated to the cultural shadows, about which popular culture frightfully whispers. The overwhelming popular distaste for homosexuality in general, and especially the idea of gay-led families, speaks to the value the South places on masculinity taken to excess. A man is not his job, since most jobs there (retail, auto, maintenance, construction) are dismal: he is his sexual prowess, he is the distance between himself and the feminine. Gun culture is a massive feature of its everyday life, from its legal rulings (guns being allowed in high schools and grocery stores) to its tragedies (children shooting themselves with their parents' handguns). Gunslinging plays as large a role in Southern culture as the consumption of literature might play in other parts of the world-they are the regional past-time, taken as an extension of innocence from home protection to gift-giving. Of course, this is due in part to the crime endemic to the region's cities (caused, in turn, by poverty and political corruption) and in part to the practice of hunting in the rural hinterlands. It is not an uncommon rite of passage for a father to take his son to the shooting range, or indeed, even his daughter, for the paranoiac social climate co-extends in equal measures. The odd one out is the person who sues; the gunslinger mythos becomes universal as the South achieves an antic matrimony of the Nazarene with Sade.

Eco highlights a distinction between democratic practice and republican practice by examining the politico-theology of eternal fascism:

Ur-Fascism is based upon a selective populism, a qualitative populism, one might say. In a democracy, the citizens have individual rights, but the citizens in their entirety have a political impact only from a quantitative point of view - one follows the decisions of the majority. For Ur-Fascism, however, individuals as individuals have no rights, and the People is conceived as a quality, a monolithic entity expressing the Common Will. Since no large quantity of human beings can have a common will, the Leader pretends to be their interpreter. Having lost their power of delegation, citizens do not act; they are only called on to play the role of the People. Thus the People is only a theatrical fiction. To have a good instance of qualitative populism we no longer need the Piazza Venezia in Rome or the Nuremberg Stadium. There is in our future a TV or Internet populism, in which the emotional response of a selected group of citizens can be presented and accepted as the Voice of the People.

The South is not a democratic region-it prefers to elect republican elements, which, by nature, do not much defer to their Rousseauvian demos. The "common will" is filtered through popular right-wing media and deflected against actual parliamentary practice. It is a noted eccentricity that, in the South, elections are decided in the churches. Its populism is one which ignores the secular history of American politics and instead focuses on its religious fringe. No matter that most people do not want a President who decides which war to wage according to his prayers, or the scattering of tea-leaves in his breakfast cup-it only matters if the religious majority thinks it right. Right-wing pulpits condemn minority lifestyles as being non-religious, and therefore non-political. They ask: what use does vox Dei have for the vox populi of the poor, or homosexuals, or immigrants? The fictive majority aligns itself with God and his exact prescriptions, leaving the deviants to the shadows of civilization. Horse-mouthed small business owners refer to their own neighbors as trash as their own children sink into hedonism; unread, uncouth mercenaries of capital pretend to culture even as they skirt Mosaic law and condemn the universities that wouldn't accept them. Patriarchal ontology has not yet been dismantled by the last stages of the Enlightenment: married man is below God, below him married woman, below him the offspring. The dreadful rest may do as they please provided they do not hog the political platform or scrounge from the public trough-that is for "people who deserve it," which is everyone, not the people who apply. The private narrative of one alone being deserving of civilization's benefits, and all others being thieving parasites, speaks to the Southern citizen's identification with a personal God: they bear the burden of civilization and suffer for it so that the sinners may frolic with their grotesque families in abiding narcosis. They pay no heed to the actual aggregate population; only certain of its members have a say in the community, while the rest are rabble, even when the rabble outnumber them. To the rest of the country, the highest Southern citizen casts a pale lot in a contest against their lowest citizen-a king of the hill complex-but when one lives ascendant in the New Feudalism, surrounded by stranded and illiterate people desperate even for day labor, such comparisons little matter.

Eco ends his list on an Orwellian note:

Ur-Fascism speaks Newspeak. Newspeak was invented by Orwell, in 1984, as the official language of Ingsoc, English Socialism. But elements of Ur-Fascism are common to different forms of dictatorship. All the Nazi or Fascist schoolbooks made use of an impoverished vocabulary, and an elementary syntax, in order to limit the instruments for complex and critical reasoning. But we must be ready to identify other kinds of Newspeak, even if they take the apparently innocent form of a popular talk show.

It does not take the reader long to glance through school textbooks in the South to note glaring inconsistencies, or worse yet, the home-school textbooks purveyed by its religiously-inclined companies. The lack of educational attainment in the South is nothing short of depressing, from illiteracy rates being the highest in the country (excluding immigrants who do not speak English), statistics concerning how many books households with children have (few to none), to cultural disrespect for intellectual endeavor (book-smarts are devalued as effete, while street-smarts are encouraged as masculine even in a world that has passed these values by). In fact, the Southern educational sector is the worst performing sector in the country by any relevant means of analysis. The Southern economy does not need many thinkers: otherwise, its factories would idle into rust. As for Newspeak, only the eternal fascist could think "democracy" means "American hegemony" or that "the land of the free" means "the Christian dominion." Pertaining to Eco's final remark-"even if they take the apparently innocent form of a popular talk show"-who is not reminded of Fox News, the radio butcheries of Rush Limbaugh, or the slew of political candidates wielding God and corruption with the same hand, whose respective audiences enthusiastically outnumber the populations of entire states?

*

The greatest misfortune of the Southern Ideology is that Southerners themselves suffer for it. By misplacing the blame for systemic poverty on communist specters and liberal spooks, Southern politicos impoverish their own constituents-both those who consent and those who dissent. By insisting on racist practices, unavowed but extant, white Southerners learn to distrust their own black neighbors while praising the capitalists who rent and exploit them both. In the middle of this dramatic race-to-the-bottom are children who, with under-funded educations, can expect little in the way of an agreeable future beyond the workhouse or the charities of church. Fascism by another name is not just a topic for punditry. Real, living people think and speak in its terms without the slightest idea of their affinity with the twentieth-century's darkest movement. The will to fascism, masquerading as the Southern Ideology, stands to benefit only a very select milieu of the region's population. Beyond these elect, it has such abundant victims they either live their lives in isolation or become finally convinced they must flee the South rather than fix it: because, they think, there is no fixing it. To the detriment of all concerned, reactionaries and regressives provoke this exodus with all too human satisfaction, as the project of Enlightenment moves first to dusk and concludes in night, suspending the somber South in the medieval gloom it deserves.

Misunderstanding the Civil Rights Movement and Diversity of Tactics

By Lorenzo Raymond

It's gotten to be a pattern on the Left. When Black protest erupts into insurrection, as it did in Ferguson and Baltimore, most liberals and white radicals express empathy for the cathartic release of anger, but urge the oppressed that this is not the way. This is "not strategic," says the leftist concern-troll. This is "what the police want." Most of the time they manage to stop short of asking "why are they burning down their own neighborhood?" -if only to be mindful of clichés-but some can't even help themselves there. In the aftermath,Amy Goodman (seemingly channeling Alex Jones) will spread conspiracy theories on how the government "orchestrated" the rioting.¹ The respectability politics of nonviolence will return.

It's hard to believe that anyone who has paid attention to Black Lives Matter takes these positions in good faith because, of course, the riots in Ferguson were objectively the best thing that happened to a movement that was already more than a year old. In August 2014, Trayvon Martin and George Zimmerman had been almost completely forgotten by white America except as grim punchlines, while national civil rights leaders were more concerned with Chicago's gang killings than with the national wave of police terror. Yet by December, in the wake of recurring rioting in both Ferguson and the Bay Area, the Ferguson PD was under investigation by Amnesty International, the Justice Department and the United Nations ( and #BlackLivesMatter had been named Word of the Year by the American Dialect Society ).

This month the pushback comes with Jonathan Chait's promotion of a scholarly paper on the effects of rioting on Black liberation in the 1960s. Chait's argument can be critiqued on just about every level: the paper has a distorted idea of what liberation is (apparently, it means electing Democrats), an undefined idea of what rioting is, and on top of that the paper isn't even accredited scholarship, in the sense that it hasn't been peer-reviewed by anyone (except of course by Jonathan Chait).

Chait first got uptight about this subject last year, when he and Ta-Nehesi Coates had an indirect back-and-forth over the efficacy of Black insurrection. Chait wrote regarding Ferguson that "Property damage and looting impede social progress." Coates replied with a concise historical sketch of militancy in the civil rights era:

The Civil Rights Bill of 1964 is inseparable from the threat of riots. The housing bill of 1968-the most proactive civil-rights legislation on the books-is a direct response to the riots that swept American cities after King was killed. Violence, lingering on the outside, often backed nonviolence during the civil-rights movement. "We could go into meetings and say, 'Well, either deal with us or you will have Malcolm X coming into here,'" saidSNCC organizer Gloria Richardson. "They would get just hysterical. The police chief would say, 'Oh no!"

But now Chait claims that a draft research paper by Omar Wasow, an assistant professor at the department of politics at Princeton, fills in the blanks left within the broad strokes of that sketch. "And his answer is clear," Chait announces. "Riots on the whole provoke a hostile right-wing response. They generate attention, all right, but the wrong kind."

Chait and Wasow's position is a restatement of the timeworn "backlash thesis." Over the years, this thesis has been largely discredited by various studies (studieswhich, unlike Wasow's, were peer-reviewed). The weakness with the thesis is not that there was no serious white backlash to the anti-racist movement, but that the backlash started as soon as the civil rights struggle began in the mid-1950s, not suddenly after the mid-60s Northern rebellions.


The Limits of Nonviolence

Take for instance Michael Klarman's book From Jim Crow to Civil Rights (which one reviewer calls "the first great and indispensable work of American constitutional history in the twenty-first century"). Klarman demonstrates that Brown vs. Board of Education didn't inspire an unambiguously effective civil rights movement; it inspired an uncertain experiment in passive resistance which in turn provoked the segregationist " massive resistance" movement. And just as Brown didn't lead to widespread desegregated schools, the Supreme Court decision that emerged from the Montgomery bus boycott didn't lead to widespread desegregated buses-most Southern municipalities simply ignored it, and launched highly effective repression against Black activism and liberalism generally. Montgomery itself enactednew segregation laws after the boycott victory, andterrorized both moderate and radical political figures ( Rosa Parks fled the city after the campaign, both because she was blacklisted from work and because of credible death threats). On the rare instances where the federal government stood up for school desegregation, like in Little Rock in 1958, the conservatives were strong enough to wait out the withdrawal of troops, or else simply shut down the schools rather than comply.

A new hope seemed to emerge in the early 1960s with the lunch counter sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, and the Mississippi voter registration drives. But the sit-in movement only led to the desegregation of Woolworth's luncheonettes-most Southern eateries remained Jim Crow. The Freedom Rides were actually unpopular with the American public, most of whom thought Blacks were moving too fast. And the Freedom Rides led to yet another federal decision that was seldom honored in the South. The Mississippi movement provoked a wave of lynchings that the Kennedy administration did nothing to prevent. Klarman noted that the early civil rights movement had a "backlash-counterbacklash" dynamic.

Klarman's work builds on that of scholar Gerald Rosenberg who demonstrated that no dramatic change for Black liberation occurred until the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The direct impetus for that law was rioting in Birmingham inMay of 1963: thousands of local blacksdefied Martin Luther King's exhortations to nonviolence, set fire to nine square blocks of downtown, and sent a police officer to the operating room. The author of the most comprehensive study of President Kennedy's civil rights policy, Nicholas Bryant, noted that

It was the black-on-white violence of May 11 - not [the nonviolence of the previous weeks] - that represented the real watershed in Kennedy's thinking…Kennedy had grown used to segregationist attacks against civil rights protesters. But he - along with his brother and other administration officials - was far more troubled by black mobs running amok.²

Birmingham wasn't an isolated episode; Black insurrection flared across the country for the rest of 1963 and into 1964. Sometimes it was milder than Birmingham and sometimes it was more explosive. SNCC leader Gloria Richardson recalls that in her campaign in Cambridge, Maryland, activists exchanged gunfire with National Guardsmen just a few months prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act.


"Burning in every city, North and South"

President Kennedy's response to Birmingham is the key historical moment of the movement. According to White House tapes, the president initially thought about sending federal troops to Alabama in May 1963 with the idea of acting against Blacks if the rioting continued-not against Bull Connor. He ultimately kept the troops on stand-by. As the month wore on and Kennedy saw Black rebellion spread to Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York, he eventually concluded he would have to make a major gesture of support for African-Americans. On June 11, he gave his landmark Civil Rights Address, in which he first proposed the Civil Rights Act. The Address acknowledged the role of riots:

This is not a sectional issue. Difficulties over segregation and discrimination exist in every city, in every State of the Union, producing in many cities a rising tide of discontent that threatens the public safety… The fires of frustration and discord are burning in every city, North and South, where legal remedies are not at hand. Redress is sought in the streets, in demonstrations, parades, and protests which create tensions and threaten violence and threaten lives.

Kennedy's speech is the first time the federal government even acknowledged it had a major racial problem in the North. The post-Birmingham uprisings were indeed the root of the nationwide white backlash, but they were also the beginningof a truly nationwide civil rights movement. And they proved to be the first real federal breakthrough in either the North or South.

Some of Professor Wasow's charts actually illustrate my points better than they illustrate his:

divtact1.jpg

We can see in this chart that there was little violent activity in the early sixties movement-but we can also see that there was very littlenonviolent activity in the movement either. The marked decline of nonviolent protest shown in 1962 confirms Malcolm X's characterization in his " Message to the Grassroots" speech that the movement seemed to be on its last legs that year. Then, in 1963, we see violent and nonviolent activity spike in unison-if anything violent protest leads the trend. The riotous tendency in that year helped to stimulate nonviolent protest (including preparations for the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom). And as we've already seen, it directly inspired Kennedy's Civil Rights Address and proposal of his civil rights bill.

The chart also shows a smaller but still significant curve towards violence in 1964. The peak of this curve appears to be June 1964- the month the Civil Rights Act was finally passed. And once again, riots and peaceful protests rose and fell together in similar timeframes. Also note that the Watts rebellion doesn't spring out of nowhere in August 1965; it's part of a general increase in militancy that begins in the first half of the year, which means that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is also inseparable from the threat of riots (Note too that the overall rates of violent protest in 1965 and 1963 are nearly the same).

Wasow doesn't mention the Birmingham riot, or the Cambridge riot, or the "fires of frustration and discord…burning in every city, North and South," in 1963. They don't help his case. But they do prove the case of the anarchist writer Peter Gelderloos, who's noted for years that the civil rights movement at its strongest was a model of diversity of tactics.

The underlying premise of Wasow and Chait seems to be that since it's dangerous to win (there's a backlash) it's much better to lose. In his study of the struggle for the Civil Rights Act, legal historian Gerald Rosenberg has a more heartening message:

"Overcoming discrimination is a good news/bad news story.The bad news is that discrimination is deeply enmeshed in the fabric of American life; it is hard to change. But there is good news. The good news is that change is possible."


Originally posted at Lorenzo's blog, Diversity of Tactics.


Notes

Democracy Now uncritically publicized the idea that the National Guard stood down in Ferguson in order to encourage rioting - http://www.democracynow.org/2014/11/25/riot_as_the_language_of_the - However, it was documented later that the officials' motivation was concern about the public image of militarized policing - http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/revelations-about-national-guard-mission-in-ferguson-anger-local-businesses/article_1532b2bd-ca7e-5f3d-8a38-a379a4cb5b6a.html

Nicholas Andrew Bryant, The Bystander: John F. Kennedy And the Struggle for Black Equality (Basic Books, 2006), p. 393

Why Comparisons Between the Boston Tea Party and Baltimore Riots are Wrong

By Colin Jenkins

The comparisons being made between the Baltimore riots this past week and the historical Boston Tea Party are wrongheaded. Baltimore residents have much more to fight for than the American colonists of old.


The Boston Tea Party

In 1767, British Parliament passed the Townshend Acts, which included a tax on the American colonies for tea imports from Britain. For the next six years, in order to avoid paying this tax, colonists established a significant smuggling ring with the Dutch, which amounted to approximately 900,000 pounds of tea being shipped into the American colonies per year. This was viewed as a crime by British authorities. So, in 1773, British Parliament passed the Tea Act. Contrary to a popular misconception, the Tea Act did not create a new royal tax on the American colonists. Rather, it was implemented for three reasons: (1) to help boost the East India Company, which had fallen on hard times, by granting them the right to ship tea directly to the colonies as a duty-free export, (2) to undercut the price of smuggled tea the colonies were receiving from the Dutch, and (3) to bolster and reinforce the tea import tax placed on the colonies due to the Townshend Acts.

Since the Tea Act indirectly served as a way to enforce the tax established by the Townshend Acts, colonists were up in arms. Not because they were being denied basic necessities like food, water, clothing and shelter. Not because they were terrorized by British authorities patrolling their neighborhoods. Not because they were forced to live in constricted areas with no jobs, no resources, and no ownership over their communities. They were up in arms, ready to rebel, prepared to destroy the property of another, because their sipping tea was suddenly going to cost a little more.

New England merchants who had constructed profitable businesses with the help of a complex and illegal smuggling scheme were suddenly worried about their bottom lines. Artisans worried about their rising costs of tea. Silversmiths began fretting about the prospect of falling demands for teapots. These material concerns grew fast. Town hall meetings were called to address this issue. Merchant meetings ensued. Talk continued throughout the New England colony until this disdain developed a political context falling under the banner of "no taxation without representation."

On the fateful night of December 16, 1773, over one hundred colonists, some of whom were disguised as Native Americans, jumped aboard the three ships docked at Boston Harbor and proceeded to smash open 340 chests of East India Company tea with axes. The colonists dumped every single tea leaf, 90,000 pounds (45 tons) in all, into the ocean. None of the tea belonged to them. Yet, over the course of three hours, they destroyed all of it. Its value, in today's dollars, was roughly one million dollars.

The men who took this rebellious, "criminal" and incredibly destructive stand that night must have been distressed, even hopeless. After all, what kinds of conditions would have to exist to drive people to destroy $1 million worth of someone else's property? And tea nonetheless. So, who were these desperate men? They were Paul Revere, a "prominent and prosperous" Boston Silversmith. They were Thomas Young, a Physician. Elisha Story, a Physician and the son of the Register of the Court of Admiralty, William Story. Edward Proctor, a "prominent citizen," military officer, and importer. They were Thomas Mellville, a Theologian and Princeton graduate. Abraham Hunt, a business owner involved in importing and exporting. They were David Kinnison, a farm owner. Nathaniel Barber, a wealthy merchant and insurer. Charles Conner, a coastal trader, Innkeeper and horse trader.

The list goes on and on. All men of privilege. All men of wealth. All products of a multi-generational, state-protected, feudal system of 'nobility.' All benefactors of the very empire they now opposed. Willing to riot, commit severe "criminal" acts, and destroy a million dollars worth of property in order to prevent a rise in the cost of tea.


The Baltimore Resistance

In the modern US, the state of Maryland is the standard-bearer of rising inequality. As the wealthiest state in the country, with a median income of $71,707, over 13 percent of Maryland's children live in poverty. And in this sea of extreme inequality and poverty, Baltimore has been drowning for decades, so much so that the city's socioeconomic landscape resembles that of a Third-World country, and in many cases, is much worse.

36.5% of Baltimore's children have grown up in poverty. In a city where one needs to make $24 an hour in order to sustain themselves adequately, a large majority simply cannot. The lack of living-wage jobs has forced 35% of the population to rely on food stamps to supplement their diet, and 84% of children must rely on the government supplemented reduced lunch program in order to eat in school. Since the arrival of the Great Recession in 2008, things have gotten progressively worse. Between 2008 and 2013, the participation rate in Baltimore's Food Supplement Program increased by 59 percent.

recent study published by the Journal of Adolescent Health examined the living conditions of 15-19 year olds in poor areas of five cities across the world. Baltimore happened to be one of those cities. The others were Shanghai, China; Johannesburg, South Africa; New Delhi, India; and Ibadan,Nigeria.

In comparison to the other cities, Baltimore teens showed "poor perceptions about their physical environments, their sense of social cohesion, and their sense of safety within their neighborhoods." Teens from Baltimore and Johannesburg, the cities that received the lowest ratings, are generally "fearful" and "don't feel safe from violence."

This fearful existence is the result of impoverished economic conditions that have been shaped by historical occurrences of institutional racism, racial segregation, and "White Flight." During the housing boom of the 2000s, real estate agents pulled out the "White Flight" operating manual and capitalized on "racial fears," convincing large amounts of white residents near expanding black neighborhoods to sell their houses only to turn around and "sell them to black families at a much higher price," regularly approaching 69 percent markups and fueled by the widespread illegal activities by banks leading up to the Subprime mortgage crisis. In all, the Department of Justice exposed 4,500 cases of mortgage fraud directed at residents in Baltimore and Washington, D.C. This predatory and highly-racialized housing scam was built on decades of similar practices, creating intensely segregated neighborhoods. Like most large cities in the US, a majority of Baltimore's African American residents have effectively been corralled into ghettos with deteriorating infrastructure, substandard schools, and nonexistent jobs, opportunities and resources. "The city's black population had nearly doubled between 1950 and 1970 as whites reactively began moving away: Almost a third of the city's population left the city between 1950 and 2000." When teenagers from East Baltimore were asked to describe their neighborhood, they spoke of "big rats going around in people's trash, vacant houses full of squatters and needles on the ground."

Freddie Gray, the 25-year-old black man who was brutally murdered by police, grew up in similar surroundings. "In Sandtown-Winchester, more than half of the people between the ages of 16 and 64 are out of work and the unemployment rate is double that for the city at one in five. Median income is just $24,000, below the poverty line for a family of four, and nearly a third of families live in poverty. Meanwhile, somewhere between a quarter to a third of the buildings are vacant, compared to 5 percent in the city as a whole." These material conditions create a desperate reality when compounded with draconian drug laws and increased policing aimed at predominantly poor, black, and working-class communities.


Higher Stakes

To be fair, for the American colonists who staged the riot at the Boston Harbor, relations with King George III had been deteriorating over time. The Boston Massacre had occurred three years earlier when five colonists were killed by British soldiers who were confronted by a mob. Tension surely existed, even animosity; however, most of the American colonists' still maintained privileged lives, owned prosperous businesses, enjoyed positions of prominence and power, and owned property. They were elitists in every sense of the word.

In contrast, Black residents of Baltimore have been forced to endure a bleak landscape - one shaped by centuries of white supremacy, institutional racism, and uneven development. The creation of the black ghetto in the US is the culmination of this development - a desolate and barren landscape that often resembles more of an open air prison than a community. Despite valiant efforts on the parts of many in this community, these historical developments have been difficult to shake. Joblessness continues. A lack of resources persists. A general indifference on the part of state and federal government is now chronic.

The change that was willed by great Civil Rights leaders of the past never arrived. It's been suspended in mid-air, surrounded by empty celebrations of de-radicalized revolutionaries, de-contextualized ideas, and empty promises made by a Black "leadership" class that has continuously sold its constituents out. This once-promising change is now held forever out of reach, serving as nothing more than a mockery of our present reality. The hopes accompanying the election of the first black President proved to be a mirage. We not only failed to land in a "post-racial America," we drifted further away. Domestic military and police forces have taken on the role of a foreign occupier, patrolling the streets in armored cars, recklessly smashing in doors of homes, harassing and intimidating community members, and even referring to them as "enemy forces." Constitutional rights are regularly overridden by "stop and frisk" policies that scoff at any minimum standard for being stopped and questioned, let alone reasonable suspicion. The fact that Freddie Gray ran for his life after officers "made eye contact with him" is understandable. Unlawful stops that turn into deadly encounters have become the norm in Black neighborhoods across the US. Thus far in 2015, on average, three people are killed per day by the police.

Police officers have been become more militarized than ever, more aggressive than ever, and bolder than ever. Not only do they murder young (and unarmed) black Americans daily, they do it on national television, while laughing and gloating, for all to see. Surreal debates ensue about whether this murder was justified or that murder was acceptable. White racists flood social media with a robotic vileness that seems worthy of Stanley Kubrick's direction. And the desperate people of Baltimore - who are treated as strangers and outsiders in their own neighborhoods, allowed no vested interest in their communities, and given no say over how their lives unfold - are labeled "animals," "criminals," "savages," and "thugs," even by the kowtowing Mayor they elected, as they fight, by any means necessary, to gain an ounce of dignity or respect. The American colonists had it easy. The people of Baltimore are fighting for their lives.

Juxtaposing Anarchy: From Chaos to Cause

By Colin Jenkins

Anarchy is synonymous with chaos and disorder. It is a term that stands in direct contrast to the archetype of society we have become accustomed to: hierarchical, highly-structured, and authoritative. Because of this, it carries negative connotations. Merriam-Webster, the consensus source of meaning within the dominant paradigm, defines anarchy as: a situation of confusion and wild behavior in which the people in a country, group, organization, etc., are not controlled by rules or laws; or, a state of disorder due to absence or non-recognition of authority. The implications made in these definitions are clear - any absence of authoritystructure, or control most surely amounts to confusionwild behavior, and disorder. In other words, human beings are incapable of controlling themselves, maintaining order, and living peacefully amongst one another. So we are to believe.

Far removed from the general presentation of anarchy is anarchism, a political philosophy rich in intellectual and theoretical tradition. Again turning to Merriam-Webster, we are told that anarchism is: a political theory holding all forms of governmental authority to be unnecessary and undesirable and advocating a society based on voluntary cooperation and free association of individuals and groups. Even from within the dominant paradigm, we see a wide range of divergence between anarchism, which is presented strictly as an idea, and anarchy, which is presented as the real and absolute consequence (though hypothetical) of transforming this idea to praxis. Juxtaposing these terms, injecting historical perspective to their meaning, and realizing the differences between their usage within the modern lexicon and their philosophical substance should be a worthy endeavor, especially for anyone who feels that future attempts at shaping a more just society will be fueled by ideas, both from the past and present.

While comparing and contrasting the various ways in which anarchy is deployed, we recognize three arenas: 1) Popular culture, which embraces and markets the association of chaos, wild behavior, and disorder; 2) Corporate politics, which uses the term as a pejorative, mostly to describe dominant right-wing platforms like the Tea Party and USAmerican libertarian movement; and 3) In activist and theoretical circles, where anarchism is understood as an authentic and legitimate political philosophy with roots firmly placed in the Enlightenment.


Pop Anarchy and Nihilism: Rebels without a Cause

The anti-authoritarian tendencies of anarchism are understandably attractive in a world that is overwhelmingly authoritative, intensely conformist, and socially restrictive. The conservative nature of American culture, which is notorious for repressing attitudes and beliefs that form outside of the dominant "white, Judeo-Christian" standard, begs for the existence of a thriving subculture that is based on rebellion, if only as an avenue of personal liberation and expression. The 1955 James Dean movie, Rebel without a Cause, offered a first glimpse into this nihilistic backlash against the deadening and soulless culture of conformity as it showcased the contradictory and often confusing nature of adolescence in white, middle-class suburbia.

On the heels of Dean was a baby-boomer revolution fueled by radical inquiry, hippie culture, bohemian lifestyles, and a "British Invasion." For the better part of a decade, the counterculture movement in the US that came to be known quite simply as "the '60s" boasted a wide array of meaningful causes, addressing everything from poverty to institutional racism and segregation to war. However, this brief period of revolutionary cause dissipated into a new and distinctly different counterculture through the 1970s and 80s, taking on a rebellious yet counterrevolutionary identity. In contrast to the existentialist nature of the 60s, which sought answers through philosophical exploration, the collective angst that developed in subsequent decades sought individual freedom through nihilism, self-destruction, and chronic apathy. Not giving a shit about detrimental traditions transformed into not giving a shit about anything. In turn, acts of defiance morphed from politically conscious and strategic opposition to oppressive structures to spiteful and self-destructive nothingness.

The revolutionary uprising of the 1960s, which had been stomped out by government suppression and maligned as an "excess of democracy," was effectively replaced by a reactionary insurrection bankrupt of any constructive analysis or productive goal. This nothingness was embraced by a significant counterculture that developed alongside the punk rock music scene, which flirted with anarchist politics before descending into an egoistic and narrow identity based in privilege. What followed was a brand of "pop anarchy" devoid any meaning beyond contrived images. Acts of rebellion were central, but a cause was neither constructed nor needed. The anarchist and revolutionary symbolism that screamed for meaning was reduced to shallow marketing schemes as remnants of legitimate angst were redirected into childish rants against parents, teachers, "the man," and "the system" - terms that often carried little meaning for those who used them. The exclusivity that developed made political organizing virtually impossible, and had an alienating effect on many. "Looking at the fact that most people who rear their heads at anarchist 'movement' events are roughly between 16-30 years old, with background influences of 'punk' or other 'alternative' persuasions," explains one former anarchist from the punk scene, "it is easy to understand why such 'movements' tend to alienate most people than interest them." A major problem that was exposed was demographics. "Punk primarily appealed to middle-class, staright white boys, who, thought they were 'too smart' for the rock music pushed by the corporations, still wanted to 'rock out.' It is also a culture that was associated with alienating oneself from the rest of society, often times in order to rebel against one's privileged background or parents." Because of this, "we have to admit that it was (and still is) exclusive."

By contrasting US punk culture of this time with its British counterpart, one could see the development of a counterculture that lacked revolutionary meaning or class context. As Neil Eriksen explains:

"The distinctions between US and British punk rock are based solidly on differences in the audience. In the US the counter-cultural character of punk is evident in the primary emphasis on style of dress and posturing. 'Middle class' youth can copy the style of the British punks and are afforded the economic and ideological space to make it a whole lifestyle, similar to the way the hippies dropped out, turned on and tuned in. It is primarily those who do not have to work for a living who can afford the outrageous blue, green and orange punk hair styles and gold safety pins. The working class generally cannot choose to go to work with orange hair. In England punk is much more complex, especially given the history of other sub-cultures such as the Mods, Rockers and Skinheads. British punks find in their sub-cultural expressions of music and attitudes, as well as styles, more of an organic indication of their experiences as under- or unemployed youth. In the US, punk has few organic working class roots, and it thus functions as a broad counter-cultural milieu that does not indict the system for lack of jobs, but tends toward nihilism and mindlessness."

The counterculture described above was a favorable, and almost inevitable, result of both appropriation from above and cooptation at the hands of capitalist profit. Revolutionary politics, in its authentic form, is not a profitable commodity. Instead, the radical roots of anarchist philosophy, which are briefly described in the definition of "anarchism" provided by Merriam-Webster, serve as a threat to any society that possesses extreme divisions of power and wealth. The United States - with its hierarchical governmental structure, no-holds-barred corporate landscape, and extreme divisions between the wealthy and everyone else (20% of the population owns 90% of the wealth) is no exception. For this reason, anarchism has (historically) been appropriated by the dominant culture (which is shaped by this 20%), diluted to anarchy, and served to the masses in the form of entertainment. This process has led to "gradual appearances in mainstream culture over the course of several years, at times far removed from its political origin (described by Situationists as " recuperation"). These appearances typically connected it with anarchy and were intended as sensationalist marketing ploys, playing off the mainstream association of anarchy with chaos."libertarianism

The most recent form of this appropriation has come in the popular television series, Sons of Anarchy, which depicts a California biker gang inundated with drama, drug abuse, senseless murders, gun-running, and gang activity. Despite glimpses and a few mentions of the fictional founder's manifesto, which included some scattered words by genuine anarchists like Emma Goldman and Pierre Joseph Proudhon, the show clearly chooses chaos and senseless, self-serving crime as its theme. The pinnacle of this appropriation, and ignorance of the rich history of philosophical anarchism, concludes with reviews that refer to one of the show's main characters, a ruthless, murderous, and power-hungry leader by the name of Clay Morrow, as a " true anarchist."


Liberal Enablers and the Right's Appropriation of Libertarianism

In the midst of the US government shutdown in October of 2013, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid took to the Senate floor to criticize the move. "We have a situation where we have a good day with the anarchists," Reid said. "Why? Because the government is closed." Reid's comment was meant as a jab to the Republican Party, which was largely responsible for allowing the shutdown to take place, purely as a political ploy. A few days later, Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren referred to "anarchist tirades" and "thinly veiled calls for anarchy in Washington" coming from Tea Party members in the House as the impetus for the shutdown. Warren even went as far as equating anarchists with "pessimists and ideologues whose motto is, 'I've got mine, the rest of you are on your own,' while ironically tying in neoliberal deregulation that "tolerates dangerous drugs, unsafe meat, dirty air, or toxic mortgages," as an "anarchists' dream."

"Anarchy" has maintained its status as a pejorative in the modern American liberal lexicon, but not by choice. Borrowing from the nihilism of pop anarchy, it embraces misconceptions, ignores historical roots, and guts the term of genuine meaning. Considering that such rhetoric is coming from folks who have advanced degrees in political science, careers as political pundits, and a working knowledge of history, it can only be explained as calculated fear-mongering. The fact of the matter is that the Republican Party is just as "statist" as the Democratic Party, if only in different ways. And while the approach of political sects like the Tea Party and USAmerican "libertarian" movements present a less-statist platform than their counterparts from within the establishment, their philosophical make-ups (if you can even call them that) include a blatant disregard for the public at-large, an underlying racism that is dangerously oppressive, a love affair with capitalism, a childish refusal to recognize needs outside of privileged interests, a fanatical support for gun rights, and a narrow-minded obsession with protecting private property and personal wealth - beliefs that are more in line with the self-absorbed, reactionary nature of fascism than with the revolutionary, "cooperative individualism" of anarchism. Ultimately, the Tea Party, much like the USAmerican "libertarian" movement, is focused on one goal: protecting an embedded array of privilege and maintaining the status quo; and the means to their end (at least, theoretically) is the coercive power structure of the market, as opposed to that of the state. If and only when the market hierarchy is threatened by, say, a popular uprising, a workers strike, or a movement for civil rights, this brand of "libertarian" views the state - in the form of domestic police and military forces - as a necessary component. In other words, these so-called "anarchists" are really nothing of the sort. Instead, they are more than willing to use state power to uphold historically-based inequities related to wealth accumulation, racism, and class division.

If the cheap political jabs used by liberals were packed with historical context, they could be closer to the truth. However, this would defeat the purpose. Parts of the right-wing have, in fact, appropriated and twisted anarchist philosophy, mostly through a concerted effort to adopt an ahistorical version of "libertarianism." In his "anarcho-capitalist" manifesto, Betrayal of the American Right, Murray Rothbard explained this intent:

"One gratifying aspect of our rise to some prominence is that, for the first time in my memory, we, 'our side,' had captured a crucial word from the enemy. Other words, such as 'liberal,' had been originally identified with laissez-faire libertarians, but had been captured by left-wing statists, forcing us in the 1940s to call ourselves rather feebly 'true' or 'classical' liberals. 'Libertarians,' in contrast, had long been simply a polite word for left-wing anarchist; that is for anti-private property anarchists, either of the communist or syndicalist variety. But now we had taken it over, and more properly from the view of etymology; since we were proponents of individual liberty and therefore of the individual's right to his property."

Of course, like all others who claim this contradictory title of anarcho-capitalist, Rothbard either failed to recognize "how property results in similar social relations and restrictions in liberty as the state," or simply believed that "liberty" was synonymous with feudalistic ideals. As one anarchist (of the authentic variety) writer laments, the thought process of this faux-anarchism is that a "capitalist or landlord restricting the freedom of their wage-workers and tenants" is ok, but any such restrictions from "the state" is not. "It's an oddity that in the United States, the main current of libertarian thought has been twisted and inverted into a kind of monstrous stepchild," explains Nathan Schneider. "Rather than seeking an end to all forms of oppression, our libertarians want to do away with only the government kind, leaving the rest of us vulnerable to the forces of corporate greed, racial discrimination, and environmental destruction."

Since the Democratic Party's use of the term borrows from the simplistic, nihilistic version of "pop anarchy," rather than the complex, philosophical version of anarchism, it becomes useful within the modern political arena. The true right-wing appropriation of anarchism as noted by Rothbard, which is fabricated in its own right, becomes buried under the fear-mongering and falsely implied association by the likes of Reid and Warren. Historically, this same type of fear-mongering has allowed for fascist scapegoating (Reichstag Fire), capitalist scapegoating (Haymarket Affair), and unlawful state executions ( Sacco and Vanzetti), all designed to exploit widespread ignorance regarding anarchist beliefs and prevent authentic libertarian movements from spreading through the populace. "The figure of the anarchist has long dominated our national imagination," explains Heather Gautney. "It's a word that conjures up the lawless, the nihilistic and even the violent. It's the image Senators Reid and Warren invoked in their talking points against the Republicans." It's also an image devoid any real meaning. By removing its substance and demonizing its association, the establishment wins.


Anarcho-Punk, Underground Hip Hop, and Conscious Chaos: Rebels with a Cause

While "pop anarchy" took over much of the American punk scene in the '70s and '80s, it was only part of the story. Punk culture still served what Henry Rollins once succinctly described as "the perfect expression of postmodern angst in a decadent society," creating an outlet for rebellious urges seeping from the dominant culture. It also served as a catalyst for pockets of revolutionary politics. When done right, it was the perfect combination of expression and meaning. The hard, edgy, and chaotic sounds spilling from the music represented a form of liberation that was desperately needed, while the lyrics roared against the establishment and aimed at deadening conformity and the music industry's increasingly corporatized and cookie-cutter production value. The UK provided an example of this perfection when it birthed anarcho-punk.

"From the numerous situationist slogans that graced the lyrics of early punk bands, to the proliferation of anarcho-punk bands such as Crass and Conflict in the early eighties, punk rock as a subculture has had a unique history of having a strong relationship with explicitly anarchist and anti-capitalist political content over the years," explains an anonymous Colours of Resistance blogger . "Many anarchists today, including myself, are by-products of punk rock, where most become politicized from being exposed to angry, passionate lyrics of anarcho-punk bands, "do-it-yourself" zines, and countless other sources of information that are circulated within the underground punk distribution networks. Some are introduced to punk through the introduction to the anarchist social circles. Regardless of which comes first, the correlation between the punk scene and the anarchist scene is hard to miss, especially at most anarchist gatherings and conferences."

Within the anarcho-punk movement, "the possibilities for advances in popular culture in the dissolution of capitalist hegemony and in building working class hegemony" began to surface. "The fact that punk rock validated political themes in popular music once again," Eriksen suggests, "opened the field" for the left libertarian movements. As an example, punk initiatives like "Rock Against Racism were able to sponsor Carnivals with the Anti-Nazi League drawing thousands of people and many popular bands to rally against racism and fascism" and "openly socialist bands like the Gang of Four were taken seriously by mainstream rock critics and record companies, and thereby were able to reach a broad audience with progressive entertainment."

Punk ideologies that arose from this era touched on concepts like anti-establishment, equality, freedom, anti-authoritarianism, individualism, direct action, free thought, and non-conformity - many ideas that are synonymous with historical-anarchist thought. This social consciousness naturally led to activism, and specifically, acts of direct action, protests, boycotts, and squatting. These elements represented authentic anarchist philosophy and served as a counter to nihilistic and empty "pop anarchy," while politicizing many.

Another form of "rebellion with a cause" came from American hip-hop and rap. The rise of hip-hop in the US paralleled that of the punk scene, and shared many of the same revolutionary tendencies. While not explicitly anarchist, hip-hop took on an identity that mirrored authentic anarchist philosophy. Its anti-authoritarian nature was far from nihilistic, but rather survivalist; born in response to centuries of racial subjugation, economic strangulation, and violent oppression at the hands of domestic police forces. Hip-hop's birthplace, the Bronx (NYC), characterized its development. "Heavily influenced by the economically and socially oppressed ghettoes, along with the echoes of the last generation's movements for liberation and the street gangs that filled in the void they left," Derek Ide tells us, "the South Bronx provided the perfect matrix in which marginalized youth could find a way to articulate the story of their own lives and the world around them. In this historically unique context, a culture would be created through an organic explosion of the pent-up, creative energies of America's forgotten youth. It was a culture that would reach every corner of the world in only a couple decades.."

In the end, hip-hop and gangsta rap provided endless displays of socially-conscious and revolutionary tracks throughout the '80s and '90s, and combined with the punk scene to construct a form of "conscious chaos" that provided valuable social and cultural analyses as well as revolutionary goals that sought to establish a more just world. These counter-cultural movements represented an important about-turn from the contrived nihilism and "pop anarchy" that had surfaced in response to the "excess of democracy" in the '60s, and displayed elements that echoed authentic anarchism, as a revolutionary libertarian philosophy.


Authentic Anarchism and Its Philosophical Roots

The roots of Anarchism, as a school of thought, are firmly placed in the Age of Enlightenment and, specifically, within two major themes stemming from that period: liberalism and socialism. In a sea of definitions, one of the most concise and encompassing is offered by Lucien van der Walt and Michael Schmidt in their 2009 book, "Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism." In it, they describe anarchism as "a revolutionary and libertarian socialist doctrine" that "advocates individual freedom through a free society" and "aims to create a democratic, egalitarian, and stateless socialist order through an international and internationalist social revolution, abolishing capitalism, landlordism, and the state." [1]

Anarchism's roots in the Enlightenment are undeniable. From Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "Discourse on Inequality" to Wilhelm von Humboldt's "The Limits of State Action," the libertarian strain born of this time served as the precursor to the anarchist thinkers of the 19th and 20th centuries. Their similarities are found in a philosophical examination of social inequities like personal wealth, private property, political power, and all forms of authority established within human societies - elements that are heavily scrutinized by anarchists. However, despite these roots, Schmidt and van der Walt tell us that anarchism should be considered "a relatively recent phenomenon" that emerged specifically "from the 1860s onward within the context of the modern working-class and socialist movement, within the womb of the First International." [2] For this reason, anarchism can most aptly be described as "socialism from below." In fact, the demarcation between enlightenment philosophy and anarchist thought is generally found in their distinct reactions to hierarchies created by systems of monarchy, feudalism, and theocracy (enlightenment) and hierarchies created by the exploitative nature of capitalism and the modern liberal, democratic state (anarchism).

The development and separation of anarchism from the Enlightenment was made clear by prominent anarchist thinkers at and around the turn of the 20 th century. In the years following the Paris Commune, Russian revolutionary anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, expressed his disgust with the idea of a "purely formal liberty conceded, measured out and regulated by the State, an eternal lie which in reality represents nothing more than the privilege of some founded on the slavery of the rest," and "the shabby and fictitious liberty extolled by the School of J-J Rousseau and the other schools of bourgeois liberalism, which considers the would-be rights of all men, represented by the State which limits the rights of each - an idea that leads inevitably to the reduction of the rights of each to zero."[3] A few decades later, in a critique of liberalism, Peter Kropotkin denounced the aim of all so-called "superior civilizations," which was "not to permit all members of the community to develop in a normal way," but rather "to permit certain, better-endowed individuals fully to develop, even at the cost of the happiness and the very existence of the mass of mankind." This separation had much to do with the newly developed social constraints stemming from capitalism. As Noam Chomsky explains, "It is true that classical libertarian thought is opposed to state intervention in social life, as a consequence of deeper assumptions about the human need for liberty, diversity, and free association..." however, "on the same assumptions, capitalist relations of production, wage labor, competitiveness, and the ideology of 'possessive individualism' all must be regarded as fundamentally antihuman" as well. For this reason, he suggests, "libertarian socialism is properly regarded as the inheritor of the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment," while it also embraces its own identity through the inclusion of a class analysis and critique of the coercive structures stemming from the capitalist hierarchy.[4]

The socialist nature of anarchism represents a fundamental current in both its thought and process, yet is often overlooked by many who claim to be anarchists, especially in the United States. This misunderstanding is caused by both pro-market (and even pro-capitalist) "libertarian" movements that are ahistorical and seemingly blind to the authoritative structures of modern, industrial capitalism, as well as by the abovementioned "pop anarchy" phenomenon and "liberal enabling" that falsely limit anarchism to a vague and unsophisticated "anti-government" stance. Superficial dualities that have captured consensus thought, most notably that of "collectivism vs. individualism," are also largely responsible for this misinterpretation. Because of this, the virtual disappearance of class analysis from modern libertarian thought in the United States not only represents a significant departure from nearly two centuries of libertarianism, but also neglects to address a highly-authoritative and hierarchical private structure that has long surpassed its governmental counterpart. Schmidt and van der Walt explain the importance of rejecting "pop anarchy" stereotypes and maintaining this class analysis within anarchist thought:

"For anarchists, individual freedom is the highest good, and individuality is valuable in itself, but such freedom can only be achieved within and through a new type of society. Contending that a class system prevents the full development of individuality, anarchists advocate class struggle from below to create a better world. In this ideal new order, individual freedom will be harmonised with communal obligations through cooperation, democratic decision-making, and social and economic equality. Anarchism rejects the state as a centralised structure of domination and an instrument of class rule, not simply because it constrains the individual or because anarchists dislike regulations. On the contrary, anarchists believe rights arise from the fulfilment of obligations to society and that there is a place for a certain amount of legitimate coercive power, if derived from collective and democratic decision making.

The practice of defining anarchism simply as hostility to the state has a further consequence: that a range of quite different and often contradictory ideas and movements get conflated. By defining anarchism more narrowly, however, we are able to bring its key ideas into a sharper focus, lay the basis for our examination of the main debates in the broad anarchist tradition in subsequent chapters, and see what ideas are relevant to current struggles against neoliberalism."[5]

When considering and rejecting both public and private forms of restriction, the most fundamental element of authentic anarchism clearly becomes cooperation. This theme was thoroughly established by Kropotkin in his 1902 classic, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, in which he pointed to "the practice of mutual aid, which we can retrace to the earliest beginnings of evolution, we thus find the positive and undoubted origin of our ethical conceptions; and we can affirm that in the ethical progress of man, mutual support not mutual struggle - has had the leading part. In its wide extension, even at the present time, we also see the best guarantee of a still loftier evolution of our race." This theme was echoed by Rudolf Rocker in his 1938 treatise on Anarcho-Syndicalism. Said Rocker, "Anarchism is a definite intellectual current in the life of our time, whose adherents advocate the abolition of economic monopolies and of all political and social coercive institutions within society" while calling on "a free association of all productive forces based upon cooperative labor" to replace "the present capitalistic economic order."[6]


Why Does this Matter?

The importance of Anarchist theory lies in its critique of hierarchies and the uneven distribution of power emanating from such. This makes this school of thought an important component as we move forward in attempting to address the pervasive ills of society, whether coming from the state or corporate structures that tower over us. The mere questioning of these "authorities" is crucial in itself. As Chomsky tells us:

"… any structure of hierarchy and authority carries a heavy burden of justification, whether it involves personal relations or a large social order. If it cannot bear that burden - sometimes it can - then it is illegitimate and should be dismantled. When honestly posed and squarely faced, that challenge can rarely be sustained. Genuine libertarians have their work cut out for them." <[7]

While many socialist-oriented strains incorporate this same analysis, some do not. Essentially, regarding the formation of class-consciousness, anarchist theory of all varieties (syndicalism, mutualism, communism, etc.) act as ideal compliments to historically strong currents of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, and Trotskyism, and should be included within all such theoretical considerations. When transforming theory to praxis, anarchism's inclusion of worker collectivization in the form of labor or trade unions prove valuable in this regard. In his treatise on Syndicalism, Rocker made a compelling argument for the usefulness of this brand of anarchism as a component to working-class emancipation. For the Anarcho-Syndicalists," says Rocker, "the trade union is by no means a mere transitory phenomenon bound up with the duration of capitalist society, it is the germ of the socialist economy of the future, the elementary school of socialism in general." He continues, "Every new social structure makes organs for itself in the body of the old organism. Without this preliminary, any social evolution is unthinkable. Even revolutions can only develop and mature the germs which already exist and have made their way into the consciousness of men (and presumably, women); they cannot themselves create these germs or generate new worlds out of nothing." [8]

Putting this philosophy into action is still of utmost importance. Creating a brand that is palatable and accessible to the working-class majority, without sacrificing its revolutionary tone and message, is also crucial. In his 2013 book, "Translating Anarchy: The Anarchism of Occupy Wall Street," Mark Bray stresses the importance of deploying a practical anarchism which avoids the esoteric idealism that so many genuine and well-intentioned anarchists get bogged down in. This pragmatic approach is perhaps most important when attempting to relay information via short interviews and sound bites. Bray points to three specific lessons he learned while interacting with mainstream media during his time at Zuccotti Park:

"First, I learned the value of presenting my revolutionary ideas in an accessible format. How I dress, the words I choose, and how I articulate them affect how I am received, so if my primary goal is to convince people of what I am saying, then it's often useful to shed my "inessential weirdness." Second, I realized the usefulness of letting tangible examples sketch the outline of my ideas without encumbering them with explicit ideological baggage. Finally, I concluded that the importance that Americans place on the electoral system dictates that any systematic critique should start with the corporate nature of both parties. Like it or not, that's where most people are at in terms of their political framework, so if you skip past the candidates to alternative institutions, for example, without convincing them of the bankrupt nature of the electoral system, you'll lose them." [9]

Essentially, anarchism is what democracy is supposed to be - self-governance. In this sense, anyone even remotely involved in the Occupy movement had the privilege, likely for the first time in their lives, to truly witness democracy (anarchism) in action. "This is not the first time a movement based on fundamentally anarchist principles - direct action, direct democracy, a rejection of existing political institutions and attempt to create alternative ones - has cropped up in the US," explains David Graeber. "The civil rights movement (at least, its more radical branches), the anti-nuclear movement, the global justice movement … all took similar directions." And, in a country where a large majority of citizens have given up on and/or no longer believe in their representatives, a little democracy may be exactly what we need, even if it's not what our white, wealthy, slave-owning "founding fathers" wanted. "Most (of the founding fathers) defined 'democracy' as collective self-governance by popular assemblies, and as such, they were dead set against it, arguing it would be prejudicial against the interests of minorities (the particular minority that was had in mind here being the rich)," Graeber tells us. "They only came to redefine their own republic - modeled not on Athens, but on Rome - as a 'democracy' because ordinary Americans seemed to like the word so much."

In our inevitable and necessary escape from the faux democracy of America's colonists and founders, anarchist thought will undoubtedly play a role. It is, after all, the only school of thought that can be described as authentic, class-based libertarianism. Its foundation is the reasonable expectation that all structures of dominance, authority, and hierarchy must justify themselves; and, if they cannot, they must be dismantled.

This covers ALL coercive institutions - not only governments, the state, police, and military, but also cultural phenomena like patriarchy, racism, and white supremacy, and most importantly, economic systems like capitalism. Unlike modern forms of "libertarianism" in the US, which ignore racist structures and the historical formations behind them, and falsely view the labor-capital relationship inherent in capitalism as a "choice," authentic Anarchism correctly views such elements as coercive and forced; and seeks to dismantle them in order to move forward with constructing a society based on free association, where all human beings have a healthy degree of control over their lives, families, and communities.

Contrary to consensus thought (propaganda), such as those rooted in "rugged individualism" and "American exceptionalism," there is a collective and cooperative nature to true liberty. We simply cannot gain control over our lives until we learn to respect the lives of all others. This is the essence of community. And we cannot begin to do this until we deconstruct illegitimate hierarchies of wealth and power, which have been constructed through illegal and immoral means over the course of centuries. Recognizing these structures and realizing that they are NOT legitimate, and therefore do not deserve to exist, is the first step in this process. Embracing contributions from this school of thought is crucial in this regard.

Fundamentally, Anarchism is a working-class ideology. Occupy Wall Street was largely influenced by it. Workers' co-ops are largely influenced by it. Any action that attempts to establish free association within society can learn much from it. Its foundational requirement of organic human cooperation and peaceful co-existence has been tried and tested throughout history - from hunter-gatherer societies across the world to Native American communities to the Paris Commune to revolutionary Catalonia to Chiapas. It provides a philosophical foundation - not a rigid blueprint - that allows for limitless potential in attempting to solve our problems, collectively, while trying to carve out a meaningful human experience for everyone. It may not provide all answers, or even most, but its foundation is worthy of building from, or at least considering. Its true value is found in its inclusion of historical formations as well as its role as a catalyst for new ideas and action - something we desperately need, moving forward.



Notes

[1] Schmidt, Michael & van der Walt, Lucien. Black Flame: The Revolutionary Class Politics of Anarchism and Syndicalism. AK Press, 2009, p. 33

[2] Schmidt & van der Walt, p. 34

[3] Guerin, Daniel. "Anarchism: From Theory to Practice." Monthly Review Press, 1970. Taken from the Preface by Noam Chomsky.

[4] Chomsky on Anarchism , selected and edited by Barry Pateman. AK Press: 2005, p. 122-123

[5] Schmidt and van der Walt, p. 33

[6] Rudolf Rocker, Anarcho-Syndicalism: Theory and Practice, 6th edition. AK Press, 2004. P. 1

[7] Chomsky on Anarchism , p. 192.

[8] Rocker, P. 59.

[9] Mark Bray, Translating Anarchy: The Anarchism of Occupy Wall Street. Zero Books, 2013.