By Ibrahim Can Eraslan
There is an ongoing debate among internet users from the South Caucasus nations about the origin of the Sabre Dance, one of the most iconic sequences in Soviet composer Aram Khachaturian’s 1941 Gayane Ballet. Some argue that it reflects Armenian motifs, given that Khachaturian was ethnically Armenian. Others insist that no such Armenian dance tradition exists. It is indeed true that Khachaturian was Armenian, born and raised in Tbilisi—now the capital of Georgia—and later educated in Moscow[1]. Thus, he was a Soviet artist, and if the Sabre Dance signifies anything, it is the fraternity of the peoples of the Caucasus. This explains why so many see themselves reflected in it.
However, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this region—where peoples and cultures were historically intertwined—plunged into bloody instability. The same nations that once danced together in Gayane turned on one another. As in many other post-Soviet countries, imperialism rapidly asserted itself in the region, bringing with it various propaganda apparatuses, mafia-capitalist networks, and fierce competition over natural resources.
While regional nations still maintain deep ties with Russia—including widespread Russian-language fluency—these historical connections do little to simplify the present complexities. The most recent episode in this unfolding situation began with a police operation in Yekaterinburg, targeting a group connected to the Azerbaijani diaspora, known as the Seferov brothers. According to Russian authorities, they were operating as a criminal organization. Over the years, multiple incidents—including murders and illegal alcohol sales—had occurred around their restaurant.[2]
Following this, Azerbaijan conducted its own raid on the Baku office of Sputnik, the Russian state media outlet, based on similar allegations.[3] It is important to note that, much like in Yekaterinburg, none of the Azerbaijani charges were based on newly discovered evidence. This clearly suggests that the operations are political in nature. While some argue over the technicalities—such as the fact that the individuals arrested in Russia are Russian citizens and therefore the issue is not international—such legalistic distractions obscure the political character of the events. In summary: Russia claims it is cracking down on organized crime, while Azerbaijan accuses Russia of targeting its nationals.
Notably, one of the first leaders to contact Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev after the incident was Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky. This raises questions about the evolution of recent tensions.[4]
However, relationships weren’t always bad. When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan, he stayed at Aliyev’s residence.[5] This gesture carried many meanings—trust, fraternity, continuity. After all, Ilham Aliyev's father, Heydar Aliyev, was appointed Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1982, rising to become the Soviet Union’s “third man.” The last decade has seen significant shifts in the South Caucasus. Though this article does not focus on Georgia or Armenia, recent developments—European Union-aligned protests in Georgia (which some describe as a “color revolution”), Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan’s visit to Turkey, internal disputes involving the Armenian Church, and now the Azerbaijan–Russia confrontation—all reflect a pattern.
The real rupture in Azerbaijan–Russia relations likely occurred in 2024, when a plane traveling from Baku to Grozny was reportedly downed, with suspicions pointing to Russia. Since then, Azerbaijan has awaited an apology, and subsequently shut down the Russian cultural centers known as Russkiy Dom—key institutions in countries where Russian embassies operate.[6]
During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia refrained from providing direct military aid to Armenia, a move interpreted by some as tacit approval of Azerbaijan’s military operations. It was also seen as a response to Pashinyan’s pro-Western orientation. Armenia, in turn, suspended its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[7] While Azerbaijan may have viewed these developments favorably, it is significant that Putin hosted both Pashinyan and Aliyev after the first war—and that these meetings were held in Russian, underscoring Moscow’s symbolic role.
However, a new phase began when Azerbaijan started receiving support from Turkey and Israel. Since then, Putin has not hosted any more trilateral meetings. Russia increasingly found itself sidelined. Pashinyan’s Western alignment strained relations with Moscow, while Aliyev—buoyed by military victory—deepened ties with Turkey and Israel, effectively replacing Russia's role in the region. After the full retaking of Karabakh, the presence of Russian peacekeepers lost its rationale.
Where is Azerbaijan turning its gaze?
The fact that Azerbaijani fuel is transported to Israel via Turkey helps clarify matters[8]. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline also offers a potential alternative to Russian energy routes. The European Union's renewed interest in Central Asia is not coincidental—it is directly tied to its broader strategy of sidelining Russia in all strategic domains. And we must remember: the ultimate target of this project is China.
The political landscape of post-Soviet countries often takes shape around being “pro-Russia” or “anti-Russia.” This has been evident in Moldova, Central Asia, Georgia, and Armenia. In Armenia, recent events include not only Pashinyan’s confrontation with the church but also the arrest of Karapetyan—one of the country's wealthiest figures, a Russian citizen, and someone outside the traditional ecclesiastical elite. But Azerbaijan does not fit into this binary pattern. There is no pro-Russian opposition figure or faction that can be mobilized internally. This is due to both Azerbaijan’s internal political dynamics and its external alliances.
Power in Azerbaijan is not easily challenged. Ilham Aliyev is not only the son of Heydar Aliyev but also the victor of the Karabakh War, with no significant rival in sight. Thus, while it is reasonable to speak of coup plots by pro-Russian forces in Armenia or pro-European uprisings in Georgia, such frameworks do not apply to Azerbaijan. As a result, Russia has turned to one of the few tools available in its arsenal: intervening in criminal networks and informal economic circuits linked to Azerbaijani actors within its borders. This is where the heart of the story lies.
Has the encirclement of Russia in the South Caucasus begun?
The region is a crucial corridor for energy transit and holds potential as a logistical hub via the Black Sea in the Belt and Road Initiative. After the Soviet collapse, the region roughly split into two camps: Turkey–Azerbaijan and Iran–Armenia. But the 2008 Georgia crisis, NATO’s Black Sea partnership with Georgia, and the color revolution that brought Pashinyan to power have complicated this landscape.
Azerbaijan, for a long time, resisted being drawn into this encirclement. The main reason was persistent Western pressure over the Karabakh issue.
What changed this equation?
The logic is simple. For decades, European development depended on three key factors: cheap energy from Russia, market access to China, and surplus labor from war-torn Yugoslavia and peripheral regions like Turkey. After Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, Europe’s industrial sector has suffered from energy shortages. Meanwhile, the Chinese market is no longer as accessible—Chinese goods are more affordable and digitally advanced than their European counterparts. While some have proposed a new India–Europe trade corridor, when it comes to energy, the South Caucasus presents itself as a viable alternative.
It must be emphasized: Azerbaijanis and Turks speak mutually intelligible Turkic languages and belong to the same ethno-linguistic family. This makes their cooperation natural. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s public appeal to the people of Iran, and the presence of 30 million Azerbaijanis in Iran*[9], also deserve attention in this context. Pashinyan’s visit to Turkey should be interpreted in this light—and we must not forget that Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest army after the United States.
Thus, Azerbaijan occupies a position that somewhat diverges from the typical post-Soviet portrait. Its potential role in transporting Central Asian energy to Europe, its ability to leverage ties with NATO-member Turkey, its relevance to Iran due to its large Azerbaijani population, and its energy relations with Israel all place Azerbaijan in a key position—perhaps even a decisive one.
Today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union. The Gayane Ballet is no longer performed. Once, this dance embodied the harmony of fraternal Caucasian peoples. But now, the dancing has stopped, and only the sabres remain.
The essential question is this: will those sabres be turned against imperialism, or will they become instruments of a new imperialist project to expand markets and exploit labor?
Notes
[1] https://www.therightnotes.org/aram-khachaturian.html
[2] https://mash.ru/news/207599/
[3] https://report.az/hadise/din-in-sputnik-azerbaycan-agentliyinin-ofisinde-emeliyyatdan-fotoreportaj/
[4] https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-proviv-rozmovu-z-prezidentom-azerbajdzhan-98773
[5] https://president.az/en/articles/view/66701
[6] https://azerbaijan.rs.gov.ru/news/priostanovleno-2/
[7] https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/03/10/armenia-csto-analysis/
[8] https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/azerbaijan-maintains-oil-sales-israel-despite-turkish-backlash-says-report
[9] I used an Azerbaijani source because I couldn't find a complete bibliography. In other words, whether it is a completely accurate number or not can be compared within the framework of different sources, but here, Azerbaijan's claim will be important within the scope of various future claims. As a result, Azerbaijan may enter into a process based on its own claim.
